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This thesis provides an original reconstruction of Gillian Rose’s work as a distinctive 
social philosophy within the Frankfurt School tradition that holds together the 
methodological, logical, descriptive, metaphysical and normative moments of social 
theory; provides a critical theory of modern society; and offers distinctive versions of 
ideology critique based on the history of jurisprudence, and mutual recognition based 
on a Hegelian view of appropriation. Rose’s philosophy integrates three key moments 
of the Frankfurt tradition: a view of the social totality as both an epistemological 
necessity and normative ideal; a philosophy that is its own metaphilosophy because it 
integrates its own logical and social preconditions within itself; and a critical analysis of 
modern society that is simultaneously a critique of social theory. Rose’s work is original 
in the way it organises these three moments around absolute ethical life as the social 
totality, its Hegelian basis, and its metaphysical focus on law and jurisprudence. Rose’s 
Hegelian philosophy includes an account of reason that is both social and logical 
without reducing philosophy to the sociology of knowledge, thereby steering between 
dogmatism and relativism. Central to this position are the historically developing nature 
of rationality and knowing, and an account of the nature of explanation as depending on 
a necessarily and necessarily imperfectly posited totality. No totality is ever fully 
attained but is brought to view through the Hegelian-speculative exposition of history, 
dirempted experience, and the tensions immanent to social theories. Rose explored one 
main social totality within her social philosophy – absolute ethical life – as the implied 
unity of law and ethics, and of finite and infinite. This enables a critique simultaneously 
and immanently of society and social philosophy in three ways. First, of both the social 
form of bourgeois property law and social contract theories reflective of it. Second, of 
social theorising that insufficiently appreciates its jurisprudential determinations and/or 
attempts to eliminate metaphysics. Third, the broken middle shows the state-civil 
society and the law-ethics diremptions as two fundamental features of modern society 
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If you could create a phenomenology of consciousness, some part of it would be the 
systematic falsification of the foundations of our culture… 
  – Marilynne Robinson 
 
1 Introduction  
This thesis provides an original interpretation and reconstruction of Gillian Rose’s work 
as a distinctive social philosophy within the Frankfurt School tradition that holds 
together the methodological, logical, descriptive, metaphysical and normative moments 
of social theory; provides a critical theory of modern society, which is open to religion 
based on the Frankfurt doctrine of self-limiting reason; and offers distinctive versions of 
ideology critique based on the history of jurisprudence, and of mutual recognition as the 
actuality1  of modern society based on a Hegelian view of appropriation. Rose’s 
philosophy integrates three key moments of the Frankfurt tradition: a view of the social 
totality as both an epistemological necessity and normative ideal; a philosophy that is its 
own metaphilosophy because it integrates its own logical and social preconditions 
within itself; and a critical analysis of modern society that is simultaneously a critique 
of social theory. Rose’s work is original in the way it organises these three moments 
around absolute ethical life as the social totality, its Hegelian basis, and its metaphysical 
focus on law and jurisprudence. I expound Rose’s Hegelian philosophy as an account of 
reason that is both social and logical without reducing philosophy to the sociology of 
knowledge, thereby steering between dogmatism and relativism. Central to this position 
are the historically developing nature of rationality and knowing, and an account of the 
nature of explanation as depending on a necessarily and necessarily imperfectly posited 
totality. Said positing is always provisional and can be revised through the combination 
of several different kinds of social theorising. No totality is ever fully attained, in 
practice or theory, but is brought to view through the Hegelian-speculative exposition of 
history, of dirempted experience, and of the tensions immanent to social theories.2 I thus 
call such totalities ‘implied’ or ‘provisional’. For example, any adequate understanding 
of the contemporary world must include a grasp of the global capitalist economy but no 
                                                
1 Wirklichkeit; here, immanent normative telos; see p.88 for elaboration. 
2 “Speculative” denotes, approximately, Hegel’s logic and its way of handling contradictions (see chapter 
1, §4.3). “Diremption” is a Hegelian term for a split between two things; Rose means a split that cannot 
be mended between two things that are nevertheless related and, as it were, yearn for unity (see especially 
chapter 4, §2.2 and §2.3). My titular phrase ‘speculative diremptions’ means the speculative exposition of 
experience of diremption. 
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such grasp can be complete. Rose posited and explored one main social totality within 
her own social philosophy – absolute ethical life – as the implied unity of law and 
ethics, and of finite and infinite. In her trilogy (Hegel Contra Sociology, Dialectic of 
Nihilism, The Broken Middle) absolute ethical life enables a critique simultaneously and 
immanently of society and social philosophy in three ways. First, of both the social 
form of bourgeois property law and social contract theories reflective of it. Second, of 
social theorising that insufficiently appreciates its jurisprudential determinations and/or 
attempts to eliminate metaphysics. Third, the broken middle shows the state-civil 
society and the law-ethics diremptions as two fundamental features of modern society 
and as frequently unacknowledged influences on social theorising.  
 
Rose’s social philosophy speaks to a number of debates. In the field of social theory and 
sociology it provides a critical theory of modern society revolving around the law-ethics 
and state-society diremptions, which are also foci for empirical investigations. It 
provides a logical grounding for social theory that also explains the presence of 
contradiction and appearance (Schein) in sociology, accounts for the historical nature of 
sociological knowing, foregrounds the need for an interplay between different methods 
and between philosophy and sociology, and is exemplary in handling the relation 
between metatheory and theory. It shows that social philosophy cannot escape 
metaphysics or ethics, and that ethics must take on board at the ground floor the all-
pervasive inevitability of mediation. It adds important textures to the ethics of mutual 
recognition, and suggests several aspects of practical wisdom for citizens of modern 
societies. It provides a significant contribution to the development of Hegelian-
Adornian Frankfurt theories, including how such theories could be open to religion and 
a unique version of ideology critique based on jurisprudence. It calls for a broad vision 
of philosophy of law, in which relations between legal, ethical and metaphysical 
questions are foregrounded and addressed. Finally, its distinction between ‘Holocaust 
ethnography’ and ‘Holocaust piety’ addresses discussions in continental social 
philosophy about power and subjectivity after the Holocaust. 
 
By ‘reconstruction’ I mean that I make explicit what is implicit and extrapolate what is 
latent within Rose’s work; clarify, disambiguate and systematise her writing. The 
former is usually clear when Rose’s work is properly contextualised within the fields of 
Hegel scholarship and classical and Frankfurt sociology; the latter involves inferring 
and elaborating from Rose’s statements. I use the term ‘social philosophy’ to describe 
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Rose’s work because Rose preferred the term ‘philosopher’ as a self-description since it 
covered the breadth of her interests – ethical, legal, political, metaphysical, 
epistemological and social: ‘only philosophy as I conceive it can accommodate my 
intellectual endeavours across their range.’3 She also used the self-appellation ‘social 
theorist.’4 Rose placed herself within the Frankfurt School tradition in a lecture given in 
1986: ‘there are now generations of Frankfurt School students who occupy posts as 
sociologists and philosophers throughout the world. I really consider myself to be one 
of them.’5 She was, more specifically, part of the Hegel-Adorno strand of the second-
generation of the Frankfurt School. In line with this tradition she opposed the separation 
of philosophy and sociology. ‘My current and recent research and publishing has a 
common core: to investigate the separation of sociological thinking (methodological 
and substantive) from philosophical thinking which leads to the posing of sociological 
questions without a sociological culture.’6 For the purposes of my argument, therefore, I 
use ‘social philosophy’ and ‘social theory’ (and their derivatives) synonymously. 
 
My interpretation has five main advantages over the alternatives, constituting the 
originality of my contribution to knowledge. First and above all, it presents Rose’s work 
as a coherent social theory and shows how she deployed it in various ways, thereby 
making Rose’s work more useable as a social theory. It shows Rose sophisticatedly 
relates the main moments of critical social theory, has a critical theory of modern 
society, which is, furthermore, open to religion, and it reveals for the first time her 
distinctive versions of mutual recognition and ideology critique. Second, it explains 
how and why Rose regarded Hegel Contra Sociology, Dialectic of Nihilism and The 
Broken Middle as a trilogy. Each is a way of pursuing the critique-of-society-and-
sociology in relation to the social totality on the basis of a Hegelian philosophy and 
metaphilosophy. Third, by showing how Rose appropriated Hegel, Adorno and the 
Frankfurt School, the jurisprudential tradition, Marx and Weber, it reveals her work as 
                                                
3 In a letter to Paul-Mendes Flohr, dated 5 August 1992, replying to his question about where Rose saw 
herself fitting in the university, she wrote, ‘I think my departmental allegiance must be philosophy – this 
is the bane of my life: only philosophy as I conceive it can accommodate my intellectual endeavours 
across their range’. Gillian Rose Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick, MSS.377 box 
19. Hereafter, references to archive material will be given by box number only. 
4 In a letter from John Milbank to Gillian Rose, 12 June 1992, he notes that at her request he has amended 
his description of her (in his review of BM) to ‘philosopher and social theorist’, box 11. 
5 ‘Introduction to Critical Theory’, cassette 7658, a lecture in the ‘Sociological Theory and Methodology’ 
series at Sussex University, 1986. In the same lecture she claims to have been the only person in the 
country working on the Frankfurt School during the time of her doctorate in the early seventies.  
6 Letter to Warwick University’s registrar (26 October 1989, box 52). I was informed by staff at Sussex 
University that Rose was a member there of both sociology and philosophy departments; c.f. BM, 
‘Acknowledgements’, ix. 
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an original synthesis of all her main sources rather than concentrating on some. Fourth, 
it is the most comprehensive and detailed interpretation available, encompassing not 
only her written works but also archive material, and recollections of former friends, 
colleagues and students. I have made the most extensive use to date of the Gillian Rose 
archives at Warwick and her taped lectures at Sussex. In the course of my research I 
have retrieved the text of a paper she gave at a conference in Sweden in the early 
eighties that was heretofore unknown.7 I also register the influence of her teachers 
Dieter Henrich and Leszek Kołakowski. Continuities between Rose’s work and these 
philosophers are revealing and noted where they occur. This comprehensiveness matters 
because the scope and ambition of Rose’s work is crucial to it: her social philosophy is 
only properly understood in a synoptic vision; concentrating on only parts of it, rather 
than the whole, distorts those parts. Fifth, due to its comprehensive nature, my 
interpretation is able to answer the debate within the secondary literature about the role 
of religion in her work and her work’s relation to religion. I show that religion was not a 
major source for her thinking but was rather material on which she exercised her mature 
social philosophy; at the same time Rose articulates a Frankfurt Hegelianism open to 
religion and theology. 
 
The rest of this introduction provides the background against which the originality of 
my interpretation will appear, by setting out a biographical sketch of Rose, an outline of 
the secondary literature that engages more thoroughly with her thinking,8 and an outline 
of my argument. 
 
2 Rose’s life and work 
Rose’s work is for some ‘one of the most brilliant intellectual enterprises in recent 
years’,9 and ‘heralds a new theoretical dawn’;10 yet it is not, with the exceptions noted 
below, extensively discussed. Most treatments of Rose are single articles or chapters 
that use isolated aspects of her work for their own purposes, often to respond to her 
                                                
7 Gillian Rose, ‘Parts and Wholes’, Proceedings of the International Conference on Parts and Wholes, 
June 1983, 95-100. Copy held at University of Lund, Sweden. 
8 The first Bibliography on Rose was compiled by Vincent Lloyd with help from Andrew Shanks and was 
current up to 29 December 2008: http://vwlloyd.mysite.syr.edu/rose-bib.html, accessed 15 April 2015. 
My Bibliography is an updated version of theirs. I gratefully acknowledge their work. 
9 Fergus Kerr, ‘Review of The Broken Middle’, Sociology 27.2 (May 1993), 365.  
10 John Milbank, quoted on the verso frontispiece of MBL. C.f. Laura Marcus, ‘Introduction: The Work 
of Gillian Rose’, 1-18 in Women: A Cultural Review 9.1 (1998), 1: ‘…Rose…was, and remains, one of 
the most important social philosophers of the late twentieth century’. 
 5 
engagement with a thinker,11 though others are more substantive.12 There are only seven 
other Ph.D. dissertations on her work,13 three books, and two journal special issues.14 
As Simon Speck observed in a review of the most recent book on Rose, ‘Rose’s work is 
now owed a sustained and critical treatment if its full range and depth are to be retrieved 
and its powers of comprehension tested.’15 My thesis provides this treatment. 
 
Gillian Rose was born Gillian Rosemary Stone in London on 20th September 1947 to a 
secular Jewish family originally from Poland.16 She studied philosophy, politics and 
economics at Oxford, then continental social philosophy, sociology and the Frankfurt 
School at New York’s Columbia University and the Freie Universität of Berlin. She 
also attended the New School for Social Research whilst in America. Her introduction 
to German philosophy began at Oxford, in a seminar set up by Hermínio Martins; 
continued in America and Germany; and resumed in Oxford when she returned to 
complete a Ph.D. on Adorno under the supervision of Leszek Kołakowski and Steven 
Lukes. Rose studied Hegel with Dieter Heinrich in Germany.17 She was Reader in 
Sociology at Sussex University from the mid-seventies18 to 1989 and Professor of 
Social and Political Thought at Warwick University from 1989 to 1995, a chair created 
especially for her. All ten of her Ph.D. students moved with her from Sussex to 
Warwick. Rose was ‘one of a number of Jewish “intellectuals” chosen to advise the 
                                                
11 See Bibliography for articles dealing with Rose in passing.  
12 See Bibliography and Andrew Brower Latz, ‘Hegelian Contra Neo-Kantian Sociology: The Case of 
Gillian Rose’, Critical Horizons (in press); ‘Gillian Rose and Social Theory’, Telos (Winter 2015, in 
press); ‘Ideology Critique Via Jurisprudence: Against Rose’s Critique of Roman law in Kant’, Thesis 
Eleven (in press). 
13 See Bibliography for details. The discussion is limited to one chapter in Gibson and Schick and less in 
Ratzman. According to the contributor information in After the Postsecular and the Postmodern: New 
Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion, ed. by Anthony Paul Smith and Daniel Whistler 
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2010), Clare Greer was writing a thesis entitled, ‘The Critical 
conversation Between John Milbank and Gillian Rose, and its Consequences for an Aporetic Political 
Theology’. I have been unable to find this thesis in Manchester’s library and suspect it is unfinished.  
14 Women: A Cultural Review 9.1 (1998), pp. 1-61 ed. by Howard Caygill; Telos (Winter 2015, in press), 
ed. by Andrew Brower Latz and Marcus Pound. 
15 ‘Just Enough’, Review of Kate Schick, Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice, Radical Philosophy 179 
(May/June 2013), 46-48, at 48. 
16 Her sister Jacqueline Rose is professor of English literature at Queen Mary, University of London. The 
subject of my thesis should not be confused with the geographer Gillian Rose. 
17 LW; John Milbank, ‘Obituaries: Professor Gillian Rose’, The Independent, 13 December, 1995; 
‘Professor Gillian Rose: obituary’, The Times, 14 December, 1995, 23; Howard Caygill, Radical 
Philosophy, 77, May/June 1996, 56; Hermínio Martins, St. Antony’s College Record (1996), 112-114. I 
thank Hermínio Martins and Wayne Hudson for additional biographical information (private 
communication, 20 December 2012 and 20 January 2013 respectively). (The Guardian obituary by J. M. 
Bernstein 11 December 1995, 12, ‘A Work of Hard Love’, incorrectly gives her dates as 28 September 
1947 to 10 December 1995).  
18 Milbank, ‘Obituary’. Milbank and Bernstein give 1974 as the start of Rose’s Sussex career, though 
Martins’ obituary has Rose as a student at Oxford until 1977. Rose’s review of Adorno’s Negative 
Dialectics, published in June 1976 (The American Political Science Review 7.2, 598-9), places her at 
Sussex. Rose’s Ph.D. thesis is dated as submitted 28 September 1976.  
 6 
Polish Commission on the Future of Auschwitz.’19 Rose published eight books, two 
articles and four book reviews.20 She made interventions into many fields, including 
German idealism, the Frankfurt School, Marxism, postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, sociology, Christian theology, Jewish theology and philosophy, 
Holocaust studies, architecture and jurisprudence, and offered original readings of many 
figures including Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Arendt, Luxemburg, 
Varnhagen, Girard, Mann and Kafka. She read German, French, Latin, Hebrew and 
Danish. She died in Coventry on 9th December 1995, aged forty-eight, after a two-year 
struggle with ovarian cancer. She was baptised into the Anglican Church moments 
before her death by the then-Bishop of Coventry, Simon Barrington-Ward. This was 
surprising and troubling to some, creating a debate about how or whether Rose’s 
conversion related to her work.21 ‘Conversion’, however, may be the wrong term, since 
she wrote in her final weeks in hospital, ‘I shall not lose my Judaism, but gain that more 
deeply, too…I am both Jewish and Christian.’22 Rose applied her social theory to 
Judaism and Christianity as she became both increasingly interested in religion and, 
indeed, religious. Some of her close friends were important religious figures or 
theologians (Julius Carlebach, John Milbank, Rowan Williams, Simon Barrington-
Ward),23 and her work has been used theologically by Milbank, Williams, Andrew 
                                                
19 LW, 12. 
20 This is only one way of counting her output, since Mourning Becomes the Law is a collection of essays 
she had published elsewhere. That book, along with Paradiso and ‘The Final Notebooks of Gillian Rose’ 
(ed. by Howard Caygill, in Women 9.1 (1998), 6-18) were published posthumously by Howard Caygill, 
her literary executor. She was interviewed by Elaine Williams, ‘Keep your Mind in Hell and Despair Not’, 
Times Higher Education Supplement, 14 April 1995, 1171, 15-16, and by Andrew O’Mahoney for radio 
(first broadcast on October 28 and November 4 1995 on Dialogue, RTÉ Radio 1), the results of which 
appeared in two programmes and an abridged print version edited by Vincent Lloyd, ‘Interview with 
Gillian Rose’, Theory, Culture and Society 25.7-8 (2008), 201-218. To hear the interviews go to: 
www.rte.ie/radio1/podcast/podcast_dialogue.xml. Extracts from The Broken Middle appear in Neil Levi 
and Michael Rothberg (eds.), The Holocaust: Theoretical Readings (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 
2003) and Graham Ward (ed.), The Postmodern God: A Theological Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). 
21 Rose, ‘Final Notebooks’; Arnold Jacob Wolf, ‘The Tragedy of Gillian Rose’, Judaism 46:4 (1997), 
481-88; Martin Kavka, ‘Saying Kaddish for Gillian Rose, or On Levinas and Geltungsphilosophie’ in 
Secular Theology: American Radical Theological Thought, ed. by Clayton Crockett (London: Routledge, 
2001), 104-29; Martin Jay, ‘Force Fields,’ Salmagundi 113 (1997), 41-52; Marc H. Ellis, ‘Questioning 
Conversion: Gillian Rose, George Steiner, and Christianity’ in Revolutionary Forgiveness: Essays on 
Judaism, Christianity and the Future of Religious Life (Waco: Baylor University, 2000), 229-58. John 
Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory (2nd ed.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006 [1990]), acknowledges a major 
debt to Rose. Clare Greer, ‘The Problem of the Middle in Gillian Rose’s Reading of Hegel: Political 
Consequences for the Theology of John Milbank’ in After the Postsecular; Marcus Pound, ‘Žižek, 
Milbank, and the Broken Middle’, International Journal of Žižek Studies 4.4 (2010), special issue, Žižek’s 
Theology, ed. by Marcus Pound, http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/269/344, accessed 25 
November 2011; Joshua B. Davis, Waiting and Being: Creation, Freedom and Grace in Western 
Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013).  
22 Rose, ‘Final Notebooks’, 7. 
23 MBL, LW, P and ‘Final Notebooks’; Graham Kings, ‘Faith and Fellowship in Crisis’, Fulcrum 
Newsletter, April 2008, http://www.fulcrum-anglican.org.uk/page.cfm?ID=301, accessed 14 November 
2012. 
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Shanks, Vincent Lloyd, Anna Rowlands, Rachel Mann, Joshua B. Davis and Randi 
Rashkover. This has created a debate within the secondary literature about the role and 
status of religion in her thought. Does religion (especially Anglicanism) emerge as a 
telos for her whole corpus (Andrew Shanks)? Is its role overplayed when she instead 
developed a ‘secular faith’ (Vincent Lloyd)? Did her interest in religion make her work 
less coherent and less powerful (Tony Gorman)? Or does her work provide useful 
insight and resources for theology (Milbank, Rashkover, Rowlands, Williams)? Rose 
was not a theorist of religion per se and did not develop a separate theory of religion. 
Only in her posthumously published texts do explicit religious remarks appear. I will 
show she used the social philosophy she had already developed to assess certain aspects 
of religious philosophy and political theology. Thus theology was not a major source for 
Rose in forming her social philosophy but material on which she exercised it. This, 
along with the various uses by theologians of her work, clearly supports the view that 
her social philosophy provides useful insights for theology, without being itself directly 
theological (except in the record of her personal religious experiences in her 
posthumous writings). Hence her work’s relation to theology cannot be understood 
apart from a proper understanding of her social philosophy. Yet Rose does show the 
possibility of a coherent connection between a Frankfurt version of self-limiting 
rationality and theological or religious views, and therefore represents an important and 
unusual version of Frankfurt theory. To this end I summarise below the most important 
elements of current interpretations of Rose as a useful entry to the broad lines of her 
thought. 
 
3 Interpretations of Rose 
J. M. Bernstein reports Rose saying ‘she couldn’t distinguish between her thought and 
Adorno’s. This is a telling half-truth: her thought is easily distinguishable from 
Adorno’s but she shared with him a project: to renew the claim of Hegelian philosophy 
by using it as an instrument in a critique of contemporary philosophical theories and 
ideals.’24 He describes Rose as a practitioner of ‘Hegelian Realism’, critiquing ‘views 
                                                
24 Bernstein, ‘Hard Love’. The parallels between Adorno as interpreted in Andrew Bowie, Adorno and 
the Ends of Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 2013) and Rose as I interpret her here are remarkable, though 
Bowie does not refer to Rose. Rose was influential on several Adorno commentators: Simon Jarvis, 
Adorno: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: 
Horkheimer to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California, 1980). C.f. Brian O’Connor, Adorno 
(London: Routledge 2013) (and the review by James Gordon Finlayson, http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/41463-
adorno/, accessed 25 September 2013); Maggie O’Neill, Adorno, Culture and Feminism (London: Sage, 
1999); Robert W. Witkin, Adorno on Popular Culture (London: Routledge, 2003), xiii; Geoff Boucher, 
Adorno Reframed (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013), 153. 
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which desired an ethical or metaphysical “purity” or, despairing of those, completely 
gave up on reason and morality.’25 Thus she saw many contemporary philosophers as 
beautiful souls who refused the complexities of power. This led her to support for 
institutions – flaws notwithstanding – that upset the dualism between private and public, 
state and individual: ‘trade unions, local government, civil service, the learned 
professions: the arts, law, education, the universities, architecture and medicine’.26 The  
 
repeated and hard lessons to be found in all her writings are: the unavoidability of 
reason – which is always partial and difficult; the unavoidability of power, from which 
our knowledge can never fully separate itself; the unavoidability of violence, which 
does not come from external sources, but which we harbour in ourselves and risk when 
we act seriously; and the unavoidability of authority, which is never pure but must 
always be tested.27  
 
For Rose, as John Milbank wrote, ‘one is to trust reason, even though it is without 
foundations and partial…Such reason with faith allows us to take the risk of action, 
which is always the risk of power and even of violence against the other.’28 She had a 
‘sceptical faith, shaky but persistent, in critical reason’.29 This epistemological realism 
was the basis of her critique of postmodern epistemology.30 These two elements – the 
necessary violence of institutions and the necessary imperfection of reasoning – are 
linked. Hence Rowan Williams: ‘To recognize misperception is to learn; to learn is to 
reimagine or reconceive the self; and this in turn is to encounter the ‘violence’…that is 
inescapably involved in our position towards others and towards ourselves.’31 ‘Love 
stakes a position and so cannot help risking the displacement or damaging of another. It 
is never far from violence.’32  
 
Nigel Tubbs, a former Ph.D. student of Rose, develops in his philosophy of education, 
the idea of learning from mistakes as an aspect of Rose’s Hegelian phenomenology.33 
                                                
25 Bernstein, ‘Hard Love’, 12. C.f. Hegel, PhR, Preface, 10, and §258, 231. All translations and page 
references are from the Knox/Houlgate edition unless otherwise noted. 
26 BM, 285. 
27 Bernstein, ‘Hard Love’, 12. 
28 Milbank, ‘Obituary’. 
29 LW, 130. 
30 E.g. MBL, 1-14. 
31 ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics: Reflections in the Wake of Gillian Rose,’ Modern Theology 11.1 
(1995), 3-22 (9). 
32 Rowan Williams, Lost Icons: Reflections on Cultural Bereavement (London: Continuum, 2000), 178. 
33 Nigel Tubbs, Philosophy of the Teacher (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); c.f. Contradiction of 
Enlightenment: Hegel and the Broken Middle (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997); Education in Hegel (London: 
Continuum, 2008); ‘Hegel and the Philosophy of Education’, (no date), Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of 
Education, ed. by M. Peters, P. Ghiraldelli, B. Źarnić, A. Gibbons, 
(http://www.ffst.hr/ENCYCLOPAEDIA/doku.php?id=hegel_and_philosophy_of_education_ii. Accessed 
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This signifies what Rose called the ‘existential drama’34 of the phenomenological 
method, in which the dialectic between experience and thought, and between natural 
and philosophical consciousnesses, is just as much an existential formation and re-
formation (a culturing) of the self as it is an epistemological exercise. ‘Culture here has 
a specific educational meaning and import within speculative philosophy. It refers to the 
way in which an idea or an experience, in being known, re-forms itself in this being 
known. Ideas without such a notion of culture or re-formation tend towards dogma 
because they are asserted without philosophical or educative significance.’35 Tubbs 
combines the theme of the formative nature of speculative philosophy with two other 
main strands of a Rosean Hegel. The first is the master-slave dialectic as both internal to 
one consciousness (Rose) and as explicating the teacher-student relationship (Tubbs’ 
application). The second is Rose’s term the ‘third’, which Tubbs understands as ‘the 
relation of the relation’; that is, as a self-conscious relation to the relationship between 
one’s natural and philosophical consciousnesses.  
 
Coming to awareness of the social determinations of both natural and philosophical 
consciousnesses – that is, of the effects of a shape of spirit (Geist) on consciousness – 
through the phenomenological journey, does not allow a complete escape from social 
determinations, but a different relation to them and thereby some measure of freedom. 
‘We observe that justifications are circular and self-defeating. Why should this 
observation, the common-sense experience of contradiction, be ruled out as a valid 
observation?’ 36  ‘The speculative can retrieve the non-foundational experience of 
thought at the same time as the authority and integrity of reason.’37  
 
Andrew Shanks’ 2008 Against Innocence: Gillian Rose’s Reception and Gift of Faith38 
was the first of only three books devoted entirely to Rose’s work.39 Shanks regards 
Rose’s baptism as a ‘natural symbolic conclusion to the whole trajectory of Rose’s 
                                                                                                                                          
12 November 2012). 
34 HCS, Preface. The Preface was new to the 1995 Verso re-print. All HCS references are to the 
pagination of this volume. 
35 Tubbs, Teacher, 39. C.f. ‘Hegel knows very well that every attempt at rational totalization ultimately 
fails, this failure is the very impetus of the “dialectical progress”’. Hegel’s ‘wager’ is whether he can 
make a system out of this ‘series of failed totalizations’: Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They 
Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (2nd ed.; London: Verso, 2008 [1991]), 99.  
36 Tubbs, Teacher, 23. 
37 Tubbs, Teacher, 15. 
38 (London: SCM, 2008). 
39 I have not counted Tubbs’ Contradiction of Enlightenment since, although it does use Rose, it is more 
focused on philosophy of education. 
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thought’,40 transmuting her writing into a difficult gift for the Anglican Church.41 He 
focuses on Rose’s work in relation to Christianity and the influence of Hegel and 
Kierkegaard on her thinking. The risk for anyone dealing with Rose’s thought, as 
Vincent Lloyd notes, is to ‘approach the subject from one distinctive angle at the risk of 
distortion’42 and Shanks does somewhat assimilate Rose into his own thinking: as my 
argument shows, Rose was not primarily interested in Christianity. Shanks’ own 
language, as Lloyd’s review shows, sometimes clarifies Rose’s thought and sometimes 
obscures it; and, crucially, Shanks does not greatly discuss her sociological or critical 
theory sources and inspiration. Nevertheless, despite its overly theological reading, 
Against Innocence is an excellent introduction to Rose’s thought.  
 
Shanks concentrates on The Broken Middle, which he regards as in some ways a re-
working of Hegel’s Phenomenology in trying to show concretely both sides of 
modernity’s diremptions in a phenomenological history. (Simon Jarvis said of The 
Broken Middle, ‘the work may lack the breadth of the Phenomenology, but retains 
something of its spirit in attempting to think through, rather than merely acquiescing in, 
divided intellectual labour’43). Hegel tried to be systematic, whereas Rose’s approach 
was fragmentary, which Shanks thinks is a better method for this purpose because no 
systematic completion is possible. They both fail but the attempt to ‘think everything’ 
should fail and we should acquire the taste for this failure.44 The work reveals Rose’s 
Hegelian desire to triangulate between the individual, Sittlichkeit (ethical) communities, 
and the (modern, secular, pluralist) state.45 Sittlichkeit communities are groups with a 
somewhat coherent organisation and ethics and they tend to be institutions that mediate 
between the state and individual by virtue of their size and role in society (such as trade 
unions and the like mentioned above). This triangulation is the way Shanks views 
Rose’s approach to law, which he glosses as how to create good communal life in a 
modern state. For Shanks, the resulting ‘equivocation of the ethical’ comprises the two 
challenges to Sittlichkeit from the self-expression of non-conformist individuals and 
                                                
40 Shanks, Innocence, 3. 
41 On his Rosean political theology, see Andrew Brower Latz, ‘Andrew Shanks’ Civil Theology’, 
Political Theology, 13.1 (2012), 14-36; ‘Review of Andrew Shanks, Hegel and Religious Faith’, Political 
Theology, 14.2 (April, 2013), 227-9; ‘Review of Andrew Shanks, Neo-Hegelian Theology’, Political 
Theology (in press).  
42 ‘Review of Against Innocence’, Ars Disputandi 11 (2011), 40-2 (40). 
43 Simon Jarvis, ‘Review of The Broken Middle’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, 27/28 
(1993), 89. 
44 This remark and the preceding paragraph are based on a conversation with Andrew Shanks at 
Manchester Cathedral, 15 December 2011. C.f. JAM, ‘Preface’. 
45 For this paragraph, see Shanks, Innocence, 35-8.  
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from the modern, pluralist, secular state. Sittlichkeit groups are still the prime source of 
ethical life and for beginning ethical reflection but that ethical reflection now takes 
place in this modern context, one which recognises individual autonomy and in which 
the state is secular by juggling between different sittlich (and religious) groups. 
Similarly, however, the state should recognise the contribution of sittlich groups, so that 
good law will feel the legitimate pull of all three corners of the triangle. In Shanks’ 
hands, the upshot of the equivocation of the ethical is to be alert to three errors. First, a 
‘nihilism’ that collapses onto the pole of individuality and refuses to recognise 
Sittlichkeit (including religion) as a source of morality. Second, a dogmatically secular 
politics that does not recognise religion. Third, identifying one particular moral 
community as the sole source of morality. Shanks understands Rose as renewing this 
Hegelian tension within political philosophy.  
 
Vincent Lloyd’s 2009 Law and Transcendence: on the Unfinished Project of Gillian 
Rose46 was the second book-length treatment of Rose’s work. There, and in a series of 
articles, 47  Lloyd develops a ‘jurisprudential idiom for philosophy’ only ‘gestured 
towards’ in Rose’s work, but which he thinks is its proper fulfilment.48 Lloyd’s 
jurisprudential model is H. L. A. Hart’s legal positivism and his central premise is a 
constant, ineluctable mismatch between social norms and social practices. This 
generates a critique of recent philosophy’s tendency to hide its metaphysics by ‘placing 
certain privileged concepts in a transcendental register’ that are then ‘immune from 
criticism’ and ‘determine the conditions of possibility for the empirical world.’49 Lloyd 
sees this as a reprise of Rose’s criticism of neo-Kantianism in sociology and 
poststructuralism, in which theory and experience are not allowed sufficiently to 
interact. For Lloyd social norms are only attempts at describing social practice, not 
access to immutable ethical laws.  
 
There is much more to be said about Rose’s social theory than this however, and as a 
characterisation of Rose’s position it is questionable because Lloyd fails to account for 
Rose’s opposition to both the ironic poststructuralism he outlines and correspondence 
                                                
46 (Renewing Philosophy; Gary Banham (ed.); Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
47 See bibliography for details. C.f. Andrew Brower Latz ‘Review of Vincent W. Lloyd, The Problem 
with Grace’, Theological Book Review 23.1 (October 2011), 90-1 and ‘Review of Vincent W. Lloyd and 
Elliot A. Ratzman (Eds.), Secular Faith’, Theological Book Review 23.1 (October 2011), 12. 
48 Law, 8. The unfinished nature of Rose’s work is often noted, e.g. William Desmond’s review of MBL, 
Modern Theology 13.4 (1997), 539-41; Daniel Johnson, ‘Mourning, the consolation of a philosopher’, 
The Times, 21 December 1996, 16. 
49 Lloyd, Law, 2.  
 12 
theories of truth in the name of a phenomenological, intersubjective positing and re-
positing of reality.50 In my view, this misconstrual results from Lloyd seeing Rose 
primarily as a postmodern or poststructuralist51 philosopher to the neglect of her 
standing within the Frankfurt tradition. In Lloyd’s favour, continental philosophy was 
one of Rose’s main interlocutors and in a letter to Simon Barrington-Ward, she 
described herself as a ‘continental philosopher but NOT of the Nietzsche Heidegger 
variety’.52 Yet this does not support Lloyd’s approach in the way it first appears. Rose 
saw her version of continental philosophy as an alternative strand, less French and more 
German, stemming from Kant and Hegel and running into the Frankfurt School.53 Just 
as Adorno regarded much of the earlier modern philosophical tradition as addressing the 
important ethical and political questions with more depth than the ‘new philosophies’ 
(Husserl, Heidegger), so Rose views many figures in modern philosophy and classical 
sociology as preferable to Heidegger’s descendants in postmodern philosophy.54 That is 
why Rose’s work on the poststructuralist tradition was almost entirely negative and 
polemical. As this side of Rose’s work has received the most attention, I do not treat it 
in detail.55 
 
Lloyd cites Rose’s feeling that she was ‘too Jewish to be Christian and too Christian to 
be Jewish’.56 Lloyd is keen to avoid the assimilation of Rose to theology, critiquing the 
appropriations of her work by John Milbank and Graham Ward. Lloyd observes that she 
never wrote as a theologian but some have garnered this impression from the fact that 
many of her interpreters are theologians.57 Lloyd suggests Rose developed a ‘secular 
faith’, in which the virtues of faith and love are given an immanent, non-theistic 
denotation, as virtues for personal and political agency. Hope, he notes, is nowhere 
                                                
50 MBL, 6-12. 
51 I am not sharply distinguishing these terms. 
52 Quoted in Anna Rowlands, Practical Theology in ‘The Third City’ (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Manchester University, Thesis no. Th28503, 2007), 11. All emphases original unless otherwise noted. 
53 She discusses this in the RTÉ interviews. 
54 TMS, 52. 
55 I lack space to pursue to what extent Rose’s polemic against poststructuralists hides substantial 
similarities between herself and them. Those pointing out such overlaps include: Richard Beardsworth, 
Derrida and the Political (London: Routledge, 1996), 47-71 and David Wood, Thinking After Heidegger 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 115-22. For an excellent discussion of both similarities and differences 
between Hegel and Deleuze, Derrida and Levinas, which supports Rose (without citing her), see Robert R. 
Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition (London: University of California, 1997), 364-412. C.f. Gavin 
Hyman, Traversing the Middle: Ethics, Politics, Religion (Eugene, Or.: Cascade Books, 2013). 
56 Lloyd, Problem, 19, citing Archbishop George Carey’s 1996 Christmas day Sermon, 
http://www.anglicancommunion.org/acns/news.cfm/1996/12/25/ACNS1064, accessed, 23 February 2012.  
57 E.g. Scott Lash, Another Modernity, Another Rationality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). Ted A. Smith, 
‘Politics in the Wake of Divine Violence’, Studies in Christian Ethics 25.4 (2012), 469: ‘Rose ends up 
making a case for a fallibilist mythic violence, a kind of trial-and-error theocracy.’ This is in fact the view 
Rose is opposing, but a good example of the over-theological reading about which Lloyd complains. 
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discussed in Rose’s oeuvre and from this he concludes she did not regard it as important 
or useful because although she encouraged political engagement, she always expected 
some measure of failure.  
 
Kate Schick’s Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice58 is the third of the three books on 
Rose.59 It outlines Rose’s thought as primarily Adornian-Hegelian and applies it to 
debates in contemporary political theory about trauma and memory, exclusion and 
difference, and utopianism and political realism. 60  Rose’s thought is less about 
providing specific solutions or policies and more about ‘an aporetic sensibility that 
resists the twin temptations of tragic resignation or utopian hope’. 61  ‘…Rose’s 
speculative philosophy struggles to negotiate particular injustices, whilst always striving 
towards the (constantly revised and revisable) universal; it learns from and mourns the 
past, whilst working towards a different future; and it perceives the fragility of moral 
progress, whilst continuing to take political risks, in the hope of engendering positive 
outcomes.’62  
 
Tony Gorman, in two articles and a book chapter,63 shows that Rose’s work shared 
many similarities with J. M. Bernstein’s, as Adornian-Hegelian rather than Habermasian 
Frankfurt theory. He disputes Rose’s own view of her work as a complete oeuvre, 
suggesting her work falls into two stages. In the first phase, she gives ‘a 
phenomenological account of the relation between ‘substance’ (objective ethical life) 
and subjectivity in which the possibilities of self-transformation are predicated upon 
overcoming the limitations and constraints placed on society by the continued 
domination of bourgeois law and private property.’64 But the second phase concentrates 
on transforming subjectivity through ‘faith, inwardness and an ethic of singularity.’65 
                                                
58 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2012). 
59 Andrew Brower Latz, ‘Review of Kate Schick, Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice’, International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 21.2 (May 2013), 307-11. 
60 For a Hegelian position that takes this middle position independently of Rose see Alan Brudner ‘Hegel 
on the Relation between Law and Justice’ in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, ed. by Thom Brooks (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 180-208.  
61 Schick, Rose, 10. 
62 Schick, Rose, 34. See also her ‘Gillian Rose and Vulnerable Judgement’ in The Vulnerable Subject: 
Beyond Rationalism in International Relations, ed. by Amanda Russell Beattie and Kate Schick 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 43-61. 
63 Anthony Gorman, ‘Whither the Broken Middle? Rose and Fackenheim on Mourning, Modernity, and 
the Holocaust’ in Social Theory After the Holocaust, ed. by Robert Fine and Charles Turner (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University, 2000), 47-70; ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, Radical 
Philosophy 105 (January/February 2001), 25-36; ‘Nihilism and Faith: Rose, Bernstein, and the Future of 
Critical Theory’, Radical Philosophy, 134 (November/December, 2005), 18-30. 
64 Gorman, ‘Critical Marxism’, 25. 
65 Gorman, ‘Critical Marxism’, 25. 
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Political engagement is still required but it is no longer based on revolutionary politics. 
In the early work ‘the antinomies of sociological reason are comprehended and 
criticised from the standpoint of the universal (‘the Absolute’) which, though not 
‘posited’ or ‘pre-judged’, is nonetheless understood to be latent or implicit within the 
antinomies themselves.’66 Later, however, in ‘forsaking the implied ‘Absolute’, Rose 
leaves herself with no criteria by which to justify rationally her particular version of the 
determination of modernity from those of other claimants.’67 Gorman places the blame 
on Rose’s reception of Kierkegaard and religion. Unlike most Frankfurt thinkers she 
thereafter ceased to regard religion as an illusion, or to reduce it to its social function, 
rather she thought it contained truth and could help counter nihilism.68 This motivated 
Rose’s engagement with political theology, in which she explores the ‘antinomies of 
modern theology and then attempts to return them to their source in the central 
contradiction of civil society, namely, the institutional separation of morality and 
legality.’69 
 
The two-stage interpretation of Rose’s work does not stand up for four reasons. First, as 
late as 1995 Rose considered Hegel Contra Sociology, Dialectic of Nihilism and The 
Broken Middle as continuous, for which good reasons can be given, as my thesis will 
show. Second, her use of Kierkegaard in The Broken Middle is partly to align him with 
Hegel – not to depart from her Hegelianism and its Absolute – and partly to explore 
questions of subjectivity. Third, as is clear from Judaism and Modernity and other 
works, her interest in religion remained sociological, political and philosophical, not 
just individual or personal. Fourth, in the late Mourning Becomes the Law, Rose was 
still referring to mutual recognition as part of the Absolute; she had not given up on 
normative standards nor fallen into relativism or perspectivalism.  
 
In sum, Speck’s judgement that Rose’s work still lacks a fully comprehensive treatment 
and test of its powers is justified by the foregoing review of the secondary literature. 
Important and useful as such work is, it remains partial. None of it sets out fully Rose’s 
work as a social philosophy. Shanks and Lloyd concentrate on the political theology 
dimension of Rose’s work, Shanks via Hegel and Kierkegaard, Lloyd via French 
thinkers such as Badiou; but this is only one part of Rose’s work. Tubbs and Schick 
                                                
66 Gorman, ‘Whither’, 55. 
67 Gorman, ‘Whither’, 55. 
68 Gorman, ‘Nihilism’, 27. 
69 Gorman, ‘Whither’, 53. 
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rightly contextualise Rose more thoroughly as an Adornian-Hegelian, but concentrate 
on applying her thought to philosophy of education and themes in political theory 
respectively. This reveals some of its power but leaves much important detail obscure. 
Gorman also takes this line but in order to critique the coherence of Rose’s project. The 
real unity behind Rose’s work – beyond its influence from Adorno and Hegel – is still 
not clear from these accounts, which can be seen most clearly in their failure to account 
for Rose’s versions of mutual recognition and ideology critique; the lack of a sustained 
attention to absolute ethical life and sociological method; their failure to explain why 
Rose regarded three of her key works as a trilogy; the insufficient attention given to the 
place of law in her work; and their neglect of Dialectic of Nihilism. Furthermore, 
although the importance of Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard and Adorno is noted in the 
secondary literature as a whole, the role of Weber and jurisprudence in her thinking is 
not adequately treated. The full power of Rose’s synthesis of her main sources is 
therefore unavailable on these other accounts. 
 
4 Outline of the argument 
I argue that Rose integrated the methodological, descriptive, metaphysical and 
normative moments of social theory, as well as three core Frankfurt School 
requirements for social philosophy – a view of the social totality,70 that philosophy be 
its own metaphilosophy,71 and that a critique of society be at the same time a critique of 
sociology72 – around absolute ethical life. I argue further that she provides a critical 
theory of modern society and advances distinctive versions of ideology critique and 
mutual recognition. Rose’s theory is also open to religion based on the Frankfurt 
doctrine of self-limiting reason. 
 
Absolute ethical life is for Rose a central component of Hegel’s Absolute, an impossible 
unity of law and ethics we are nevertheless compelled to posit by a speculative 
                                                
70 E.g., Thomas Wheatland, ‘Debate About Methods in the Social Sciences, Especially the Conception of 
Social Science Method for Which the Institute Stands’, Thesis Eleven 11.1 (2012), 123-9 (a transcription 
of the Institute for Social Research, Seminar of 17 January 1941); Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, 
Aspects of Sociology trans. by John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972 [1956]), 5. 
71 Or: ‘any science in their view must also be its own metascience’, Eike Gebhardt, ‘A Critique of 
Methodology’ in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. by Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New 
York: Urizen Books, 1978), 372. C.f. Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Introduction’, 1-67 and Jürgen Habermas, ‘A 
Positivistically Bisected Rationalism: A Reply to a Pamphlet’, 198-225 in Theodor W. Adorno, Hans 
Albert, Ralf Dahrendorf et al, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, trans. by Glyn Adey and 
David Frisby (London: Heinemann, 1976 [1969]); Jürgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, 
trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholson and Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge, MA.: MIT, 1988 [1967]).  
72 E.g. Frankfurt Institute, Aspects, 119: ‘A theory of society must be at the same time a critique of 
sociology’. This stems from their examination of the internal connections between forms of reason and 
social forms. 
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exposition of experience of society. In her trilogy she brought out three main aspects of 
this. First, Hegel’s view of absolute ethical life as a critique of the bourgeois property 
form and its hold over the social contract philosophy of Kant and Fichte; second, social 
philosophy’s unavoidable entanglement in metaphysics and jurisprudence; third, the 
diremptions between law and ethics and between state and civil society as fundamental 
to modern society and influencing social theories. I explore these in chapters 1, 3 and 4 
respectively. Chapter 1 explains the Hegelian foundation of Rose’s social philosophy, 
showing its integration of philosophy and metaphilosophy to supply methodological and 
logical guidance in sociology. Chapter 2 shows how, from the beginning, Rose’s 
conception of the social totality was of a self-consciously imperfect grasp of a fissured 
whole, thus avoiding many of the problems associated with “totalising”. Her Frankfurt 
view of self-limiting rationality supported this conception and her reception of religion. 
I examine her versions of ideology critique and mutual recognition in chapters 3 and 4 
respectively. Chapter 4 elucidates the state-civil society and law-ethics diremptions as 
Rose’s theory of modern society.  
 
Chapter 1 exposits Rose’s Hegelian framework for social philosophy as found in Hegel 
Contra Sociology. I begin by relating Rose’s work to contemporary and earlier Hegelian 
scholarship in order to locate her interpretation of Hegel. I then explain the argument of 
Hegel Contra Sociology and her appreciative critique of classical and Frankfurt School 
sociology. Since any totality (both as social reality and our epistemological grasp 
thereof) is necessarily imperfect, Rose accepts the complementarity of different 
sociological approaches but aims to account for the good practice of social theory better 
than the self-understanding of many other social theorists. This prepares the ground for 
Rose’s own Hegelian social philosophy. Through an interpretation of Hegel’s 
phenomenology, triune logic and speculative identities, Rose justifies and integrates the 
three central moments of her account (the social totality, a philosophy that is its own 
metaphilosophy, a simultaneous critique of society and social theory). The key issue is 
the difference in the circular natures of speculative and transcendental explanation and 
positing. Speculative explanation (better, comprehension) is ultimate by historically 
informed reference to the social totality; transcendental explanation is penultimate by 
starting from a given precondition. The totality Rose develops is absolute ethical life, 
which introduces mutual recognition as her main normative ideal and provides a 
critique of the role of private property and bourgeois property law in society. She uses 
this to explain Hegel’s critique of the political philosophy of Kant and Fichte as 
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possessed of substantive errors prompted by metatheoretical misunderstanding, 
especially the way individualism in social contract thinking relates to the bourgeois 
property form. To demonstrate the sociological gains of Rose’s theory, I relate it to 
contemporary work in social theory, including emergence, the status of contradictions 
within sociology, and the sociology of philosophy. I also adduce the work of Wayne 
Martin and Ellen Meiksins Wood as examples of the way her approach could be used 
constructively. 
 
Chapter 2 refines the picture of Rose’s social philosophy via those elements of the 
Frankfurt School tradition most important to her work but which she does not defend at 
length because they were well-established Frankfurt ideas. These were a Weberian 
analysis of modernity, a combination of sociology and philosophy, a realist-idealist 
epistemology rather than positivism or relativism, and immanent critique aiming at 
emancipation and reflexive self-knowledge. I describe Rose’s social philosophy more 
precisely as part of the Hegelian-Adorno line of this tradition, partly by drawing on the 
work of her intellectual colleague J. M. Bernstein. Her speculative philosophy led to an 
aporetic ontology; a vision of philosophy as a modernist cultural practice opening the 
way to modern forms of phronesis and praxis; and a self-limiting rationality. The latter 
brings religion and Frankfurt theory closer together. I further define her notion of the 
social totality to show it avoids totalising. I explain the difference between her 
speculative philosophy and Adorno’s negative dialectics. Some of the difference turns 
on Rose’s reactivation of the role of recognition and appropriation from Hegel, one 
consequence of which is revealed in Rose’s work on theoretical responses to Auschwitz.  
 
Chapter 3 shows how Rose pursued the reciprocal critique of sociology and society in 
Dialectic of Nihilism through ‘the antinomy of law’. This names the permanent but 
changing tension between law and ethics, foregrounded by absolute ethical life and 
manifested socially in tensions between customs and constitution. Rose does not 
attempt to solve or dissolve the antinomy, by synthesising its poles or making one 
primary. She analyses its appearance in social philosophies as an ideology critique of 
said philosophies based on historical legal epochs influencing their work. Rose critiques 
Kant, neo-Kantians and poststructuralists in this way, showing the effects of objective 
spirit on consciousness (relating the soul and the city, as she put it). By examining 
Rose’s critique of Kant I show how her novel ideology critique is intended to work and 
how in Kant’s case it fails, but suggest her critiques of poststructuralism are nearer the 
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mark. This failure is nevertheless instructive insofar as it reveals some of Rose’s 
constructive aims, namely, support for a social and political philosophy inspired by 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the use of law to gain a view of the social totality, and an 
expansive view of jurisprudence as examining the links between the metaphysical, 
ethical and legal. I explore the latter in dialogue with the work of Sean Coyle, as a 
positive example of ‘jurisprudential wisdom’. 
 
Chapter 4 shows how, in The Broken Middle and later works, Rose developed in her 
mature position both the relation between philosophy and metaphilosophy and the 
reciprocal critique of sociology and society through the two fundamental diremptions of 
modern society: between state and civil society (using Marx and Arendt), and between 
law and ethics (using Weber). She examines how social philosophies of various stripes 
do not adequately reflect on these diremptions and so are determined by them in ways 
that undermine their intentions. In this way both postmodern political theologies and 
Levinasian forms of ethics are mirror images of one another, in flight from the 
rationalisation of law and society. At this stage in the argument, with a view of Rose’s 
social theory as a whole, it becomes apparent Rose applied her social theory to political 
theology rather than wrote directly theological material. I expand on the constructive 
side of Rose’s theory as an analysis of modern society by drawing on the work of Sara 
Farris and Zygmunt Bauman to defend the enduring importance of the state-civil society 
diremption. I show the way in which Rose began to develop the law-ethics diremption 
in relation to ethics, politics and mutual recognition. I briefly explore the modulation 
Rose gave the latter.   
 
The conclusion summarises Rose’s mature social philosophy of the broken middle and 
suggests directions for further research, including, inter alia, dialogue between religion 
and the Frankfurt School, and between the latter and Anglophone forms of political 
philosophy; ethical recognition theory; her metaphysical approach to jurisprudence; and 





You do have to have a system. 
  – Harry Hill 
  
1 Introduction  
This chapter has two main tasks. First, it sets out the Hegelian basis of Rose’s social 
philosophy to show how it holds together the methodological, logical, descriptive, 
metaphysical and normative aspects of social theory. Second, it exposits absolute ethical 
life as an implied and imperfectly posited social totality. Rose’s Hegelian philosophy 
requires a totality as integral to any satisfactory account or explanation of society – this 
is the formal source of absolute ethical life. Its substantial source is that absolute ethical 
life both emerges from and critiques the diremptions of society’s bourgeois property 
form and the antinomies of social contract theory. It is, for Rose, key to the Absolute in 
Hegel: ‘Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the absolute…cannot be thought.’1 
This chapter shows three of my original contributions: the basis for the coherence of 
Rose’s social theory, one of the ways it can be used to critique society and social theory, 
and how both are part of the unity of her work as a whole and her trilogy in particular.  
 
A principal question of the first task is whether Rose was right to claim Hegelian 
speculative philosophy offers not only a better approach to social theory than both the 
classical sociological and Frankfurt School traditions but ‘a wholly different mode of 
social analysis.’2 In Hegel Contra Sociology Rose critiqued both traditions for their 
transcendental or neo-Kantian structure and proposed a Hegelian speculative philosophy 
as an alternative way of doing social philosophy. Transcendental theories (including 
empirical sociology) are necessary but penultimate;3 their explanations must be taken up 
into a wider pattern of thought. This is a bold claim and a potential misunderstanding 
should be confronted immediately. Rose does not argue that transcendentally structured 
social theory has no worth or that its explanations fail. She argues the logical foundation 
                                                
1 HCS, 45. 
2 HCS, 1. 
3 C.f. Habermas, Logic of the Social Sciences. Habermas moves from Windelband and Rickert to 
Gadamer. Thomas McCarthy, ‘Introduction’, ix, notes the classical sociologists such as Marx and Weber 
‘were unable to grasp the methodological specificity’ of their own work and attempted to imitate the 
natural sciences. 
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and practice of social philosophy are best articulated by Hegelian speculative logic and 
that a more conscious appreciation of this would alter the practice of sociology to some 
extent. She said of Hegel Contra Sociology: ‘the first and longest chapter of my book is 
devoted to discussing the ‘neo-Kantian paradigm’, in order to derive the conditions of 
intelligibility of sociological reason, not its ‘uncomprehendability’…my whole book is 
a defence and restatement of the view that Hegelian heights are…the most ‘sensational’ 
in offering a perspective on the recurrent issues of social theory.’4  
 
Rose’s speculative logic, then, offers itself as a better articulation of what social theory 
does at its best than the self-understandings of neo-Kantian social theories, and accounts 
for sociological error derived from their self-misunderstanding. In other words, her 
theory sublates them; it preserves some elements and negates others.5 In this, she 
continued the Frankfurt School tradition.6 This goal and her admiration for the classical 
sociological tradition are articulated in a lecture at Sussex University in 1986 entitled 
‘Does Marx Have a Method?’  
 
The general statement of our rules always presupposes the results which are to be 
explained. They are an essential and deadly exercise. Sociological rationalism is this 
paradox. A scientism which knows that it is historically specific; that it is always both 
separate from and part of its object. And this seems to me equally true of all the great 
classic sociologists: Mannheim, Simmel, Tönnies, as well as Marx, Weber, Durkheim, 
Lukács, and phenomenology. Sociology must be disciplined or methodological in order 
to be rational, but equally it must recognise its inherent tendency to lose its object if it 
becomes excessively instrumental. Hence it must constantly radicalise its methods. The 
particular claim of Marxism to be methodological and sociological is that it exposes the 
illusion that experience is immediate, in a way that is more comprehensive than its 
rivals, more inclusive. It sees the paradoxes of other theories as contradictions, which 
themselves have a social origin. Thus in an important sense, the varieties of sociologies 
are complementary not competing. Sociology does not impose abstract schemas, it 
provides an exposition of the abstract experience we are already living as immediate 
experience.7 
 
                                                
4 Rose, Letter to London Review of Books 3.24 (17 December 1981), 
http://www.lrb.co.uk.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/v03/n24/letters, accessed 28 January 2015.  
5 TMS, 78, 95-6, 102-8, 51: Adorno ‘shows how various modes of cognition, Marxist and non-Marxist, 
are inadequate and distorting when taken in isolation; and how by confronting them with each other 
precisely on the basis of an awareness of their individual limitations, they may nevertheless yield insight 
into social processes’; 96: ‘…no one method could produce conclusive results concerning any object of 
investigation, but the results of several methods, qualitative as well as quantitative, would need to be 
collated.’ C.f. BM, 182-3; TMS, 84. 
6 E.g., Max Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ in Critical Theory: Selected Essays (trans. by 
Matthew J. O’Connell and others; New York: Continuum, 2002), 231; Theodor W. Adorno’s attitude to 
Durkheim in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Rodney Livingstone, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann 
(Stanford: Stanford University, 2001 [1995]), 168-9.  
7 Cassette 7703, Sussex University. 
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Rose’s belief that different areas of social theory cannot be hermetically separated led 
her to favour the systematic ambitions of the founders of classical sociology above the 
fragmented status of much (then) current sociology.8 Rose’s argument concerns whether 
and how reason, truth, ethics and politics may be legitimately grounded, or whether 
some form of dogmatism (rationalism) or nihilism (scepticism) are inevitable: ‘This 
book, therefore, remains the core of the project to demonstrate a nonfoundational and 
radical Hegel, which overcomes the opposition between nihilism and rationalism.’9 
Rose also argues against positivism in sociology, arguing for an essential moment of 
hermeneutic understanding or Verstehen for understanding human society.10 Indeed, 
insofar as social theory has progressed since 1981, thereby avoiding some of Rose’s 
criticisms, it has tended to confirm her core thesis that the issue is the choice between 
neo-Kantian and Hegelian social theory. Insofar as theories like those of Giddens and 
Bourdieu succeed it is because they approximate to the Hegelian speculative rationality 
Rose sets out.11 Likewise many continuing sociological debates are set within German 
idealist terms, knowingly or not,12 often in ways that repeat the original debates, though 
sometimes with less sophistication.13 
 
In order to answer the question about the success or failure of Rose’s alternative social 
philosophy I first situate Rose’s Hegelianism within the contemporary field of Hegelian 
                                                
8 Currently a minority view. David Levy (‘Hegelian Idealism’, Times Higher Educational Supplement, 26 
March 1982) thought HCS an example of the ‘obsessive intellectual radicalism of social scientists’ in its 
search for unnecessary theoretical foundations. C.f. Austin Harrington, ‘From Hegel to the Sociology of 
Knowledge: Contested Narratives’, Theory, Culture & Society 18.6 (2001), 125-33. Recently, however, 
the status quo has been called into question in a way sympathetic to Rose’s position: Amanda Goodall 
and Andrew Oswald, ‘Do the social sciences need a shake-up?’, Times Higher Education, 9 October 2014 
<http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/do-the-social-sciences-need-a-shake-
up/2016165.article> (accessed 2 December 2014); Nicholas A. Christakis, ‘Let’s Shake up the Social 
Sciences’, International Herald Tribune 9 July 2013 < 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/lets-shake-up-the-social-sciences.html?_r=0> 
(accessed 2 December 2014). 
9 HCS, Preface to 1995 edition. 
10 Though C.f. Adorno, ‘Introduction’ in The Positivist Dispute, 1-67, 65: the nuanced positivism of 
Popper and Albert are actually extremely close to dialectical theories of society. TMS, 102 suggests 
Deutung (elucidation) is better than Verstehen because it is less subjective. 
11 Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (‘structured and structuring structure’) works like a Hegelian 
concept (Begriff): ‘When one speaks of the aristocratic asceticism of teachers or the pretension of the 
petite bourgeoisie, one is not only describing these groups by one, or even the most important, of their 
properties, but also endeavouring to name the principle which generates all their properties and all their 
judgements of their, or other people’s, properties.’ (Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of 
Taste, trans. by Richard Nice (London: Routledge, 2010 [ET: 1984; 1979])), 166.  
12 E.g. the debate between Latourians and the strong programme. See Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Science 30.1 (1999), David Bloor, ‘Anti-Latour’, 81-112 and Bruno Latour, ‘For David Bloor… and 
Beyond: A Reply to David Bloor’s ‘Anti-Latour’’, 113-129. Latour and Bloor talk as if all the idealists 
were subjective idealists. Further, Rose’s version of phenomenology can incorporate Latour’s idea of the 
influence of non-human beings on human ideas and agency. 
13 The same claim is argued against postmodern philosophy in DN and Robert B. Pippin, Modernism as a 
Philosophical Problem (2nd ed.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1999 [1991]).  
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studies, in relation to non-metaphysical approaches to Hegel (§2). These interpretations 
rose to prominence in English-language scholarship after 1989, almost a decade after 
Rose’s own Hegel book but they are nevertheless the most useful way of expositing her 
thinking. Then I explain the nature of the argument in Hegel Contra Sociology, and 
expound its criticisms of social theory by reference to the work of Richard Biernacki 
and Nigel Pleasants, who have independently made similar critiques to Rose against, 
respectively, social science (§3.1) and critical theory (§3.2). Having thus corroborated 
Rose’s complaints against social theory, I explain Rose’s version of Hegelian 
speculative philosophy (§4). Programmatically put, Rose’s speculative social theory 
involves a phenomenological exploration of ethics, society and politics (§4.1); a triune 
rather than dichotomous way of thinking (§4.2); and speculative propositions (§4.3). I 
then show Rose’s Hegelian philosophy in action as it critiques society and social theory 
(§5.1) and posits an implied social whole, absolute ethical life (§5.2). In the course of 
the chapter I elucidate Rose’s work by comparing it to other social theories and 
suggesting some examples of work that could be regarded as meeting Rose’s 
requirements for social philosophy. I will also show the utility of Rose’s social 
philosophy by going beyond her own use of it by relating it to questions in 
contemporary sociology she did not directly address: emergence, the status of 
contradictions within sociology, and the sociology of philosophy. I answer two 
criticisms of Rose’s early and late work (§6), that her phenomenology is unable to 
address specific determinations and that absolute ethical life is too vague to do any 
substantive work. 
 
Within the larger argument of the thesis, this chapter lays out the main theoretical 
architecture for Rose’s social theory. Although she would revise her thought in various 
ways, she never fundamentally departed from the Hegelianism she expounded in 1981. 
Her later thought therefore cannot be properly understood apart from the Frankfurt-
School-influenced-Hegelianism set out here. Rose’s second book re-affirmed her 
commitment to the Frankfurt School but in a critical manner. She distanced herself from 
Adorno and Lukács14 though remaining strongly influenced by them even in her 
interpretation of Hegel. In the preface to a new printing of Hegel Contra Sociology in 
1995 she expressed its role as the foundation of her work in Dialectic of Nihilism, The 
Broken Middle and Judaism and Modernity. In those books she repeats the speculative 
                                                
14 See the abstract to Rose’s Ph.D. thesis, Reification as a Sociological Category: Theodor W. Adorno’s 
Concept of Reification and the Possibility of a Critical Theory of Society (28 September 1976); HCS, 29-
36. 
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critique first aimed at sociology against, respectively, poststructuralism; political 
theology, anthropology, modernism, architecture, political philosophy, etc.; and various 
forms of Jewish theology and philosophy, or uses thereof. In the process, her position 
was elaborated and refined, the results of which will occupy chapters 3 and 4. This 
thesis therefore follows simultaneously the chronological and conceptual development 
of Rose’s social theory. To understand Rose one needs first to grasp her background in 
and commitment to her Frankfurt Hegelianism, then her mature position and its 
appropriation and critique of its competitors. 
 
Rose implies that transcendental sociologies sublate themselves into speculative-
Hegelian ones and that speculative logic provides the best grasp of our modern situation 
and the best way to develop a social theory (including political and ethical 
philosophy).15 She did not always provide the kind of detailed arguments that would 
fully defend her positions, however, and I cannot reconstruct in detail all her moves and 
claims, but have pointed the reader to places where they may pursue such arguments in 
related literature. In what follows there is space to treat only those aspects of Rose’s 
thought that bear the most structural weight for her philosophy as a whole. Since Rose’s 
work is often concatenated and cryptic, I have reconstructed what I believe her 
argument either implicitly says or must say in order to work. I have done so using other 
works written after the publication of Rose’s texts, not in the anachronistic belief she 
already knew the fully developed arguments on which I draw, but so as to present the 
most plausible and useful theory to be gained from Rose’s texts.  
 
2 Situating Rose’s Hegelianism 
Hegel Contra Sociology was one of the first books of the English-language Hegelian 
renaissance of the last few decades.16  Some aspects of her interpretation remain 
contentious, however, and I will indicate these as they crop up, but confusion over one 
of Rose’s main strategies is best cut short here. Rose interprets Hegel’s later thought as 
consistent with his early writings, though most commentators agree there is a shift in 
                                                
15 Like Winfield and Kolb respectively; each take the Logic seriously in itself and as the foundation of 
Hegel’s social philosophy: Richard Dien Winfield, Reason and Justice (New York: State University of 
New York, 1988); David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and After (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1986). C.f. William Outhwaite (ed.), The Habermas Reader (Cambridge: Polity, 
1996), 369-70. 
16 H. S. Harris, ‘The Hegel Renaissance in the Anglo-Saxon World since 1945’, The Owl of Minerva, 
15.1 (1983), 77-105 (esp. 90-1). Stephen Houlgate suggested to me that although HCS did not find many 
who took up its position in full, it was read and discussed and enabled the challenging of restrictive 
readings of Hegel, such as the method-system split (private conversation, Warwick Workshop, ‘Hegel’s 
Logic and Metaphysics’, 1-2 May, 2014). 
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Hegel’s thought, dating his mature work from the 1807 Phenomenology. Rose does not 
deny Hegel changes his mind or that his thought matures; her argument is only that his 
earlier works display more obviously the links between the form of thinking employed 
by Kant and Fichte and the content of their political, ethical and legal philosophies, and 
that this connection remains in play in all of Hegel’s later work.17 Since she believes 
Kant and Fichte’s form of thinking are shared by sociology, Hegel’s critique of his 
predecessors can also be made to work against the sociological tradition. Her approach 
to Hegel is less concerned with discovering exactly what Hegel meant than with Rose’s 
intention to ‘retrieve Hegelian speculative experience for social theory’.18 Her work 
asks to be judged not as a strict exegesis of Hegel but as a contribution to social 
theory.19 As she would later write, her version of speculative philosophy was partly a 
criticism of Hegel. 20  Rose, in 1981, took more seriously than most of her 
contemporaries the systematic nature of Hegel’s thought and the centrality of the 
Absolute to it, but simultaneously altered the details of his overall philosophy. Thus, for 
instance, Robert Bernasconi noted how in Rose’s presentation, ‘the completion of 
philosophies and religions takes place as the revealing of their social and political 
foundations…It is hard to recognise this as a description of Hegel’s discussions of the 
history of philosophy and when Hegel accounts for the possibility of the science it is not 
in these terms.’21 Or, for H. S. Harris ‘her interpretive gambits are certainly very one-
sided’,22 which he put down to her focus on sociological implications, as when she 
reads the Logic of Being as a critique of Kant and the Logic of Essence as a critique of 
Fichte.  
 
Hegel’s epistemology was read for a long time as if absolute knowing (attaining the 
‘concept’ and its highest form in the ‘idea’) meant knowing everything and/or attaining 
                                                
17 A view substantiated by C. Allen Speight, ‘The “Metaphysics” of Morals and Hegel’s Critique of 
Kantian Ethics’, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 14.4 (October 1997), 379-402; and Shlomo Avineri, 
Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1972). Bo Earle, ‘Reconciling 
Social Science and Ethical Recognition: Hegelian Idealism and Brunswikian Psychology’, Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy, 14.3 (2000), 192-218, agrees with Rose on this point. 
18 HCS, 1. 
19 Bernasconi, ‘Review’, 43: ‘I understand her book as an attempt to repeat Hegel’s philosophy as social 
theory in order to destroy it as onto-theo-logy.’  
20 HCS is not entirely clear about this but in a letter dated 12 June 1991, Rose wrote that her version of 
‘speculative exposition…(arising from my criticism of Hegel see Hegel Contra Sociology last two 
chapters esp. 199) can accommodate everything post-modernity is convinced it omits, and still produce a 
critical account of modernity.’ (Box 11, original emphasis). A good example of Rose’s at times 
revisionary exegesis of Hegel is the way she offers an original and compelling reading of System der 
Sittlichkeit that nevertheless completely downplays Hegel’s view of the role of class, war and the military 
nobility as the absolute class best expressing absolute ethical life. 
21 Bernasconi, ‘Review’, 42. 
22 Bernasconi, ‘Review’, 426. 
 25 
a God’s-eye view, both of which are clearly impossible.23 Given this picture, it is not 
surprising that Hegel was viewed with a mixture of bemusement and disdain.24 Hence 
the Frankfurt School sought to be Hegelian in a way that included the contingency, 
finitude and imperfection of human knowing. Hegel’s philosophy of history, similarly, 
was read as if history would at some intramundane point achieve perfection, as if it was 
directed by rational necessity and intelligence.25 Hence the Frankfurt School took up 
Nietzsche’s criticism of teleological history. Rose’s Hegel knew that knowledge and 
society would never be perfect.26 This reading of Hegel is now quite common, its 
plausibility strengthened by the fact that the idea of perfection in knowledge and society 
are themselves wildly implausible and thus it would be surprising if Hegel had believed 
them possible. As Rose pointed out, the phrase ‘absolute knowing’ (like Nietzsche’s 
‘absolute method’) is an oxymoron, and should have alerted readers to Hegel’s (and 
Nietzsche’s) ‘facetious’ presentation.27 The same is true of Rose’s conception of 
‘absolute ethical life’. 
 
Prior to the late 1980s Hegel was often regarded (in English scholarship) as failing to 
appreciate the challenge of Kant’s critical philosophy, and proposing a pre-critical 
metaphysics of Geist as a divine or quasi-divine reality, a priori granting rational and 
moral certainty. Hegel was likewise the totalitarian thinker: in politics (as famously 
“argued” by Karl Popper) and in the very structure of his thought – according to 
poststructuralists, Hegel only superficially tolerates difference or the Other, but 
ultimately absorbs everything back into the same of his starting position. 28  The 
renaissance in Hegel scholarship has overturned these two previously dominant 
                                                
23 I will follow the convention of translators who do not capitalise Hegel’s technical terms on the grounds 
that all nouns are capitalised in German. I follow Rose’s use of ‘Absolute’ as a shorthand for absolute 
ethical life. 
24 For the history of these myths in the English-speaking world, see Harris, ‘The Hegel Renaissance’ and 
the essays in Part 2 of Jon Stewart (ed.), The Hegel Myths and Legends (Illinois: Northwestern 
University, 1996). 
25 E.g. Georg Lukács, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’ in History and Class 
Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin, 1971 
[1968]), 147. Another common misreading is to suggest Hegel posits Geist as a macrosubject in history. 
Habermas does this according to Espen Hammer, ‘Habermas and the Kant-Hegel Contrast’ in German 
Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. by Espen Hammer (London: Routledge, 2007), 113-34. 
26 PhR §216. 
27 MBL, 56. Of course, there are enough passages in Hegel for the older reading to gain traction in the 
first place, as Thomas Lynch brought home to me. 
28 Criticised by Walter Kaufman, ‘The Hegel Myth and its Method’ in Hegel: A Collection of Critical 
Essays, ed. by Alasdair MacIntyre (London: University of Notre Dame, 1977), 21-60. Hegel, EL §238 
Addition: ‘But philosophical thinking…requires, however, the strenuous effort of holding off on one’s 
own notions [Einfälle] and particular opinions which are always trying to assert themselves.’ 
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caricatures of Hegel.29 Hegel Contra Sociology had some influence on English-speaking 
Hegel scholarship, though not in the same way that the 1980’s books of Houlgate and 
Pippin did, even if Rose arrived at some of what is now considered mainstream long 
before many others.30 Thus I will not spend a great deal of time defending her particular 
views on Hegel’s epistemological and ethical idealist-realism, 31  the mixture of 
contingency and necessity, the Logic as attaining completeness by acknowledging its 
incompleteness,32 the need to read Hegel systematically, the necessity of constructing 
systems of knowledge and ethics even whilst recognising their contingency and 
historicity, and so on. All of these insights have since been elaborated, refined and 
defended at greater length by others. Rose’s Hegel book is of more than merely 
historical interest because she uses Hegel to develop her own social theory.  
 
Hegel Contra Sociology was published in 1981, eight years before the shift in English-
speaking Hegel reception gained momentum from Robert Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism. 
Pippin refers to Rose’s work in that book, and in his Modernism as a Philosophical 
Problem, as similar to his approach.33  This is true in three broad senses: Rose 
understands Hegel in a ‘non-metaphysical’ way, that is, she interprets Geist as 
something like the mindedness of culture, not as divine or originating from beyond the 
                                                
29 For the details of this shift see Simon Lumsden, ‘The Rise of the Non-Metaphysical Hegel’, Philosophy 
Compass, 3.1 (2008), 51-65. In fact Klaus Hartmann and Dieter Henrich began to develop a variant of 
this position in Germany in the 1960’s. Their version is different to Pippin’s. As Pippin puts it (Hegel’s 
Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989), 177-8), 
they view Hegel’s logic as a category theory without any specific metaphysical entailments – a 
Wittgenstein-esque position; whereas Pippin sublates that view to take seriously Hegel’s “logic is 
metaphysics” pronouncement. Rose is closer to Pippin. 
30 Rose is seldom referenced in later Hegel scholarship, excepting Pippin. She had some influence on 
Slavoj Žižek, who uses HCS occasionally in his earlier work, (e.g. For They Know Not, 99-107; on which 
see Pound, ‘Milbank, Žižek and the Broken Middle’ and Žižek: A (Very) Critical Introduction 
(Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008); Peter Osborne, ‘More than everything: Žižek’s Badiouian Hegel’, Radical 
Philosophy 177 (January/February 2013), 19-25.  
31 These labels are admittedly polyvalent. Pippin, who eschews the label realist for Hegel (because he was 
an idealist not a rationalist), still takes Hegel to be realist in Rose’s sense, since Hegel thinks he has 
refuted scepticism, subjective idealism, and Kant’s reticence about the noumenal realm (e.g., Robert B. 
Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 42-4). That is, in Pippin’s terms, Hegel is an antirealist arguing we know reality 
(99). C.f. Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity (West Lafayette: 
Purdue University, 2006); and his ‘Introduction’ to The Hegel Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). In 
terms of ethics see e.g., Robert Stern, ‘Freedom, Self-Legislation and Morality in Kant and Hegel: 
Constructivist vs. Realist Accounts’, 245-66 in Hammer (ed.), German Idealism; Thom Brooks, ‘Natural 
Law Internalism’, 168-79 in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, ed. by Thom Brooks (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2012). 
32 David Kolb, ‘What Is Open and What Is Closed in the Philosophy of Hegel’, Philosophical Topics 19.2 
(Fall 1991), 29-50. 
33 In a private communication, 28 May 2012, Pippin wrote, ‘I was very impressed by Hegel Contra 
Sociology, thought it one of the very best discussions, at a time when Hegel literature was pretty awful.’ 
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world; 34  she views Hegel’s social and political philosophy as an historical self-
understanding of modern society and thought; and she regards his system as in some 
way incomplete, open, revisable, inherently negative. Rose says dialectical progression 
proceeds by surprise, contingency and error, which means she favours the weaker sense 
of rational necessity in dialectics.35 (The strong sense is that B improves on A in being 
the only possible and necessary next position to take. The weak sense is that B can be 
shown retrospectively to be an improvement on A, though other options are available. 
In the strong sense, everything later must follow from everything earlier and so is 
contained therein.)36 For Hegel ‘the thought of the totality of what is…[is] the Absolute 
[that] must be thought of…as process and transition rather than thing or entity.’37 Rose 
viewed the Absolute as a ‘broken middle’, and Hegel’s system as one that 
‘acknowledges both its circularity and the breaks in the circle.’38 Hegel believed he had 
found the basically complete form of the philosophical idea – i.e., of logical and 
ontological categories – although further development was possible.39 Rose described 
this later as ‘aporetic philosophy’ aware of its gaps and problems.40  
                                                
34 Such mindedness occurs in various forms: in objective spirit in institutions; in subjective spirit in 
individuals; in Absolute spirit in the self-knowing of the concept through individuals and cultures at a 
certain reflexive stage. Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 147: Spirit is Hegel’s ‘term of art for social existence, 
for collectively achieved practices’. For the antecedents of this see Klaus Hartmann, ‘Hegel: A Non-
Metaphysical View’ in MacIntyre (ed.), Hegel, 101-24. 
35 MBL, 72. Contra Wesley Phillips, ‘Melancholy Science? German Idealism and Critical Theory 
Reconsidered’, Telos 157 (Winter 2011), 129-47, who attributes this realisation only to Schelling and not 
Hegel, despite his discussion of HCS. This theme in Hegel has been explored in various publications, e.g. 
Karin de Boer, On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Stephen 
Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (2nd ed.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2005 
[1991]). Andy Blunden’s ‘Foreword’ to Hegel’s Logic. Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences (1830) (rev. ed.; Marxist Internet Archive) says the notion gathers up what was 
before and adds something new, e.g., the idea of ‘sexism’ incorporates all sorts of phenomena going back 
to Wollstonecroft but also adds to and organises it all. Yet there is no formula to predict such conceptual 
advances.  
36 Pippin, Philosophical Problem, 76, says Hegel’s is the stronger version but probably fails, but only the 
weak version is required to defend Pippin’s (and, I add, Rose’s) version of Hegelianism. 
37 David A. Duquette, ‘Kant, Hegel and the Possibility of a Speculative Logic’ in Essays on Hegel’s 
Logic, ed. by George di Giovanni (Albany: State University of New York, 1990), 1-16 (7-8). 
38 HCS, 199. C.f. Hegel’s Idealism, 260; and Pippin’s Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1997), 170. Many commentators now argue Hegel himself had a 
view of the Absolute and/or Being as intrinsically incomplete. See David Gray Carlson, A Commentary to 
Hegel’s Science of Logic (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), who draws on Houlgate, Burbidge, 
Žižek and many others.  
39 PhR §216 and Addition. Exactly how these two claims could be reconciled continues to be debated. 
See Kolb, ‘What Is Open’; Pippin, Philosophical Problem. It is enough for Rose’s position to say that 
with Hegel’s philosophy thought reaches a certain formal self-awareness that has a certain completeness 
but remains to be refined and applied. It has this completeness because it becomes fully aware for the first 
time of the socio-political conditioning of thought (thought’s conditions of possibility in a much wider 
sense than Kant allowed) and the role of thought in constituting objects. Close to Rose’s view is Angelica 
Nuzzo, “The Truth of Absolutes Wissen in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,” in Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit: New Critical Essays, ed. by Alfred Denker and Michael G Vater (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity 
Books, 2003), 265–293. 
40 MBL, 7-15. 
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Rose therefore is another ‘non-metaphysical’ Hegelian. 41  Rose insisted on the 
importance of metaphysics, however, but this discrepancy is quite easily defrayed. For 
Rose ‘metaphysics’ means a general account of how we take the world to be, which is 
elaborated from our various commitments when we try to put them into practice amidst 
the contention and difficulty they inevitably occasion, and when we try to relate them 
coherently to one another.42 These commitments and their articulation are known to be 
historical products, though some of them are non-reversible, namely: the importance of 
freedom, or, that ‘no belief (action, norm, etc.) can be valid apart from our authorising 
of it, self-legislating it’; that ‘significant human values, practices, and institutions’ 
emerge ‘historically as the intended or unintended consequence of particular human 
activities’; and that we are part of the natural world.43 ‘Modernity has once and for all 
set the world in perpetual motion and change.’44 Just this, however, is how the non-
metaphysicals interpret Hegel. The disparity is entirely verbal, resulting from the 
general ambiguity of the term ‘metaphysics’. Both metaphysical and non-metaphysical 
Hegelians accept there is metaphysics in Hegel, they disagree over how much and how 
separable it is from other parts of his thinking.45 The non-metaphysical Hegelians 
wanted to show that Hegel had not regressed to pre-critical metaphysics but had 
intensified and radicalised Kant’s critical philosophy by questioning givenness tout 
court and challenging the assumptions latent in Kant’s Copernican turn. Hegel accepted 
Kant’s Copernican turn in at least two senses: that our categories were the condition of 
possibility of objects and objective reality, and that thought was essentially apperceptive 
(that any judgement is in principle accompanied by the awareness that I am making that 
judgement). Geist is not a divine reality or a natural given but a way of thinking about 
                                                
41 Pippin highlighted the similarity between his and Rose’s interpretations of Hegel (in HCS and DN): 
Philosophical Problem, 194 n29; 195 n42; passim; Hegel’s Idealism, 262 n9; 276 n34. An alternative 
label to the metaphysical/non-metaphysical (since each side accepts that Hegel has some metaphysics) is 
Thom Brooks’ suggestion that we talk in terms of systematic and non-systematic readings: Hegel’s 
Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right (2nd ed.; Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University, 2012 [2007]). Everyone accepts Hegel wished his works to be read as a system but they differ 
in whether they think this is necessary, possible or desirable. Brooks calls a reading that understands any 
one part of Hegel’s philosophy in the context of the whole a ‘weak systematic reading’, because it makes 
no commitments to endorsing Hegel, only to understanding him systematically. Rose’s is a stronger 
systematic reading because she is committed to reading his philosophy as a whole and defending some of 
its main substantive theses, especially the links between logic, phenomenology and social philosophy. 
This labelling system also has difficulties however: see Paul Redding, ‘Thom Brooks’s Project of a 
Systematic Reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 66 
(Autumn/Winter 2012), 1-9. Since non-/metaphysical remains the dominant label I have used it here. 
42 Williams, ‘Between’. 
43 J. M. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Modern European Philosophy; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2001), 236. Bernstein correlates these orientations with immanent criticism, 
genealogy, and a certain naturalism or materialism. 
44 Lumsden, ‘Rise’, 59. 
45 This label is so misleading that Pippin eschewed it completely as a useful label for his work during the 
2013 conference of the Hegel Society of Great Britain. C.f. Hegel’s Idealism, 4. 
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how the meaningfulness of the world is dependent upon historically and socially 
changing conditions and human intellectual categories. At the same time, there is no 
permanently hidden reality as in Kant’s noumenal realm. 
 
Lumsden avers the ‘question for Hegel that constitutes the modern problem of 
philosophy is not an epistemological question concerned with how consciousness could 
know anything about external realities but the question of how a finite being can find a 
meaningful place in a world set in constant motion’,46 which means Hegel is ‘concerned 
with capturing a kind of modern self-understanding, which would enable the modern 
subject to identify with the self-transforming nature of norms.’47 Rose saw this as 
continuous with the ancient Greek concern with the soul and the city, but her more 
immediate influence was the Frankfurt School’s inheritance of Hegel in their 
investigations into ideology and reification as the contemporary forms of the 
determination of consciousness by society and objective spirit. In fact, Lumsden’s 
characterisation is partly misleading, since Hegel was equally concerned with both 
epistemological and social questions. As Pinkard explains in his biography of Hegel, 
Hegel began with an interest in religious and political reform, seeking to be a man of 
letters like Lessing, who would bring the philosophical and political changes afoot in 
universities into popular consciousness and acceptance, and felt that the details of 
Kant’s epistemological revolution could be left to scholars. But Hegel came to realise 
that the two sides were inextricably bound together, and that changes in one had to be 
worked through in the other.48  The post-Kantian German idealists were all very 
interested in how our intellectual categories could correctly connect with the external 
world. These terms are vague but important because German idealists are still, even 
now, sometimes construed as subjective idealists, as if their claim was that our thoughts 
create or invent reality.  
 
I mention this because it is the German idealist combination of logic, epistemology and 
social theory that is at work in Rose’s own thinking from 1981 onwards, and because 
Rose described the tradition of philosophy to which she belonged as stemming from 
Kant, even though she was most interested in Hegel. 49  She, like Pippin, thinks 
intellectual and political modernity (including postmodernity) is best understood by 
                                                
46 Lumsden, ‘Rise’, 58. 
47 Lumsden, ‘Rise’, 58. 
48 Terry Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001), 33-7, 59-64, 80. 
49 RTÉ interview. 
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going back to Kant and Hegel (the ‘original options’ as Pippin calls them in Idealism as 
Modernism). Both favour Hegel but see him as following and extending Kant. Both 
think the Phenomenology and Logic should be understood together, and that Hegel’s 
core project can work without defending every claim he makes in those texts.50 Both 
saw postmodernism as misunderstanding the German idealist tradition and failing to 
realise their dependency on some of its central notions (freedom, the subject, 
metaphysics).51 Neither thinks Hegel offers a philosophical or theological theodicy; 
neither accepts that modernity is completely to be rejected. Both think institutions are a 
key element in the practical and theoretical criticism and defence of modernity. Both 
regard thought as intrinsically incomplete.52 
 
3 The nature and scope of the argument in Hegel Contra Sociology 
3.1 Hegel Contra Sociology in-itself 
The enduring antinomy of sociology – variously thought as agent/structure, 
freedom/determination, system/actor – is: do people make society or does society make 
people? Does Rose’s version of Hegelian speculation provide a better way to think 
through this antinomy and its implications? She wrote: ‘The speculative proposition that 
substance is subject refers to a reality in which subject does not know itself as substance 
but is, nevertheless, a determination of substance.’53 The historical dimensions of 
speculation ‘reveal the aporia of subjectivity: the subjective standpoint is criticized by 
means of the exposition of its formation; but the absolute is thought as subject.’54 That 
is, individual subjects are shaped by the substance of society, yet society itself can only 
be properly understood as a kind of subject, that is, as a totality more than the sum of its 
parts (we will refine this thought over the next two chapters). As Pippin noted,  
 
                                                
50 Also defended by John Burbidge, ‘Hegel’s Logic as Metaphysics’, Hegel Bulletin, 35.1 (2014), 100-15. 
51 Pippin often claims that once Kant’s critical stance is adopted without admitting the success of 
transcendental idealism, the only serious options are Hegel or Nietzsche. For Rose, Hegel is the only 
viable form of rationality, which she opposes to poststructuralism as Nietzschean and sociology as neo-
Kantian (though she interprets Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as in line with Hegel). 
52 William Rasch compares HCS and Pippin thus: ‘…Pippin agrees with Rose on the desirability of being 
able to think the simultaneity of dichotomies (of being able to think, for instance, the simultaneity of the 
self-determining and yet determined nature of subjectivity)…Indeed, an ineradicable Kantian 
impossibility remains in Pippin’s Hegel, for what Rose sees as an inevitable consequence of attempting to 
think the absolute from within the space of bourgeois society, Pippin seems to see as constitutive of 
thought itself.’ (Niklas Luhmann’s Modernity: the Paradoxes of Differentiation (Stanford: Stanford 
University, 2000), 7). Rose in fact thinks all societies, not only bourgeois society, create and are 
constituted by aporia. 
53 HCS, 112. 
54 HCS, 113. 
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the foundational issue [in Hegel Contra Sociology is]…the way in which a subject can be 
said to determine itself (to be a subject),…what…could be called the “Fichtean 
dimension,” and yet how a subject can be said also to be a real, concrete, and so, in some 
sense, determined subject (…Fichte’s aporia). To think both aspects together, indeed even 
to be able to recognize that they must be thought together, requires, as Rose points out 
with great thoroughness and insight, the move to Hegel's “speculative” position.55  
 
Central to any proper social explanation is to see that people make society and society 
makes people. Hegel’s speculative way of handling that duality emerged from his 
critique of Kant and Fichte and can be used, Rose thinks, as a critique of the way the 
duality is handled in much sociology, which she considers neo-Kantian in its founding 
logic.56 The heart of Rose’s claim that Hegel offers a different kind of social theory 
from the mainstream tradition is therefore in the meaning of the speculative handling of 
this pair of terms.57 In order to get to this, I summarise Rose’s argument, then discuss 
her critique of non-speculative sociology (§3.2) and then treat of her speculative 
philosophy (§4). 
 
Hegel Contra Sociology set out a reading of Hegel with several aims. It argued that his 
fundamental goal as a philosopher remained constant from the late eighteenth century: 
to critique contemporary philosophy and society in order to reveal a different ethical 
life. It read Hegel systematically, which involved three interrelated tasks: to unite 
Hegel’s oeuvre around his speculative logic and view the early and late works as a 
piece; to combat thereby the various Hegel myths that were still prominent in English 
philosophy at the time; and to use this Hegelian philosophy as a basis for social 
philosophy. Hegel criticised the logical and philosophical basis of the practical 
philosophies of Kant and Fichte, in his natural law essay, in the Differenzschrift, and 
throughout his later writings; Rose performs the same sort of critique on neo-Kantian 
sociology, postmodern thought, political theology, etc. Rose thought the philosophical 
issues she addressed fed into substantive theorising, and she believed she had shown 
how Hegel’s thought of the Absolute affected thinking in various areas of social thought 
(religion, art, work, etc.). Rose believed some of the fundamental justifications for and 
forms of society were the same in the late eighteenth century as now, including: a 
                                                
55 Hegel’s Idealism, 272 n.49. 
56 For a feminist application of Rose’s argument to critique the gendered nature of many dualisms see 
Kimberly Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).  
57 PhR, Preface, 3: ‘But in this book I presuppose that philosophy’s mode of progression from one topic 
to another and its mode of scientific proof – this whole speculative way of knowing – is essentially 
distinct from any other way of knowing.’ Contrast the view that to explain a social phenomenon is to 
reduce it to natural scientific explanations (e.g. Robert Brown, Explanation and Experience in Social 
Science (London: Aldine Transaction, 1963)). 
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distinction between state and civil society, a capitalist economy, private property law, a 
culture of ‘reflection’ (that is, of making fixed divisions between opposites). Insofar as 
these and other similarities remain in place, Hegel’s thought is directly relevant to 
contemporary social theorising. Rose took Hegel’s attempt to unify theoretical and 
practical reason to be superior to the later attempts of Weber and Durkheim and the 
earlier attempts of Kant and Fichte to do the same. Kant and Fichte were understood by 
Hegel and Rose as representing the summation and consummation of their time and 
culture: the culture of reflection or understanding (Verstand).58 
 
Rose’s outline of the form or structure of Hegel’s philosophy is accordingly offered in 
contrast to Kant, because his critical philosophy sets the terms of the debate for German 
idealism and later sociology. (She nevertheless opposes the content of Hegel’s thought 
more often to Fichte’s than Kant’s.59 Such distinctions are at best heuristic, since in 
speculative philosophy ‘content is essentially bound up with form’,60 but the impression 
remains that in Rose’s mind Kant and Hegel were closer on ethics and politics than 
Hegel and Fichte). Hegel replaced Kant’s transcendental method of argument with a 
phenomenology; his moral philosophy with the idea of (absolute) ethical life; and his 
disjunction between theoretical and practical philosophy with their unity as expressed in 
the Science of Logic.61 Here we should distinguish two ways in which Kant’s arguments 
have transcendental form or structure.62 In discussing the transcendental structure of 
neo-Kantian sociology, Rose has in mind arguments of the form: ‘we know we have p, 
what else must be the case for us to have p?’ For example, Kant began from the fact that 
morality is binding, and argued that God must exist and we must presuppose ourselves 
to be (noumenally) free for morality to work as it does. A second feature of 
transcendental arguments is both less common and more controversial. A transcendental 
argument may gesture towards a transcendental object, which is an object that cannot be 
known (wissen) but may be thought (denken).63 In Kant’s case, we cannot know God or 
freedom but must (not simply may) think them. The controversies around whether the 
noumenal realm and its transcendental objects can be coherently thought caused many 
                                                
58 Hegel’s early works give ‘reflection’ a negative denotation, whereas later he saw reflection as a 
necessary moment of the concept. See Beatrice Longeunesse, Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007 [1981]), 31f. 
59 E.g. HCS, 215-7. 
60 E.g. PhR, Preface, 4; c.f., EL §160, §162, and the Preface. 
61 HCS, 48-50. 
62 I am grateful to Christopher Insole for pressing me to clarify this distinction, and for several 
illuminating conversations about Kant.  
63 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 1998), B166 and note. 
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post-Kantian theorists to abandon both doctrines and so leave Kant’s transcendental 
idealism behind. Metacritical theories, as we shall see, are transcendental in the first 
sense but not the second: they take a feature of society as given or conditioned (say, 
morality) and seek to explain it by recourse to something that conditions it (say, the 
economy), but that pre-condition is immanent not transcendental. (Hence, the term 
‘quasi-transcendental’). 
 
Rose exposits Hegel’s whole thought as speculative, as an alternative to the dualism of 
his idealist predecessors and later sociology, and as intrinsically bound up with the 
Absolute; hence her oft-repeated line that Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the 
Absolute cannot be thought.64 Such philosophy interprets experience speculatively and 
expresses it in speculative propositions. The main speculative proposition of Hegel’s 
thought, according to Rose, is: ‘In general religion and the foundation of the state is 
[sic] one and the same thing; they are identical in and for themselves.’65 That is, the 
main speculative experience for Hegel was the harmony and disharmony (or unity and 
difference, as Rose often puts it) between political legitimacy and ideology; between 
political structures and institutions on the one hand and the inner dispositions, the 
customs, ethos and ethics of a people and culture, on the other.66  
 
In the first chapter of the book she clears the ground to enable the speculative reception 
of Hegel as opposed to neo-Kantian forms of sociology that dominate the tradition and 
the imposition of which on Hegel have created so many misunderstandings. She then 
explains, via his early writings, speculative propositions and Hegel’s central concern 
with absolute ethical life, which is substantial freedom, the unity of finite and infinite 
and of theoretical and practical reason (ch. 2).67 Next she offers a reading of the rest of 
his corpus to elaborate what is involved in absolute ethical life so conceived: his 
lectures on religion and history (ch. 3), on art (ch. 4), the Phenomenology (ch. 5), the 
Logic (ch. 6). Chapter 7 returns to the questions of understanding society and how 
philosophy has a role in social change, suggesting a speculative Hegel provides a better 
                                                
64 HCS, 45, 98, 218, 223, c.f. 101, 221. 
65 HCS, 51, citing Philosophie der Religion, 16, 236, tr. I 297 (Rose’s own translation and square 
parentheses). 
66 HCS, 224. C.f. PhR §267. This reappears in DN as ‘the antinomy of law’ and in BM as the diremption 
between law and ethics. 
67 EL §214: ‘The idea can be grasped as reason (this is the genuine philosophical meaning of reason), 
further as subject-object, as the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the infinite, of the soul and 
the body, as the possibility that has its actuality in itself, as that the nature of which can only be 
conceived as existing, and so forth, because in it [the idea] all relationships of the understanding are 
contained, but in their infinite return and identity in themselves.’ 
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grasp of the theory-praxis relationship than Marxism, though Rose interprets Hegel as 
close to Marx, and combining idealism and materialism. The result of her exposition 
enables the possibility of a ‘critical Marxism’, which would combine Marx’s analysis of 
capital with a philosophy of subjectivity and culture in capitalism, which Rose believed 
deficient in Marxism. 
 
3.2 Is Hegel contra sociology? Rose’s critique of classical and critical social theory  
3.2.1 Classical social theory 
Rose’s title is misleading if understood as simplistically opposing Hegelian philosophy 
to sociology. On Rose’s reading Hegel is a social theorist and Rose valued the classical 
sociological tradition. She spoke highly of it in her lectures, used it in her books, and 
praised Weber, Marx and Durkheim as better at integrating sociological and 
philosophical concerns than many later thinkers. The reviewers of Hegel Contra 
Sociology in the early eighties could not know that, however, and Rose unfortunately 
appeared to some to be arguing that the neo-Kantian structure of sociology voided its 
conclusions.68 Yet Rose states explicitly on the first page: ‘The neo-Kantian paradigm is 
the source of both the strengths and weaknesses of Durkheim’s and Weber’s 
sociology.’69 Neo-Kantian sociology does provide information about and insight into 
society but is incomplete. Its transcendental circularity posits a condition of possibility 
(e.g., the economy) and a conditioned (e.g., moral philosophy), but does not sufficiently 
allow the conditioned to redound onto the condition: ‘a transcendental account 
necessarily presupposes the actuality or existence of its object and seeks to discover the 
conditions of its possibility.’70 Again: ‘empirical reality or experience of it cannot be 
specified apart from concepts. Experience of social reality is mediated by concepts, thus 
there is no independently definable reality to pit against concepts in order to ‘test’ 
them…to stipulate a priori, that is apart from experience, what is to count as empirical 
evidence for a concept, is merely to register what the methodology is equipped to 
                                                
68 See the reviews of Berki, Knapp, Minogue, Schuler and Toth. Knapp sums up the worry (201): ‘Even if 
she has correctly formulated the first principle of modern social theory, this still forgets the difference 
between a first principle and a developed science, between an acorn and an oak.’ Jeffrey Lloyd Crane, 
however, did understand Rose: ‘Habermas and Hegel: Possible Contributions to a Unified Social Theory’, 
Contemporary Sociology 11.6 (November 1982), 636-9. 
69 HCS, 1. C.f. 31, where she argues that Lukács was neo-Kantian but nevertheless his work had ‘great 
sociological force.’ 
70 HCS, 1; on 129-30 Rose points out that Hegel’s aesthetics lectures are a transcendental sociology in 
this sense. Notice that the non-redounding of pre-condition onto conditioned is a feature of neo-Kantian 
sociology (for Rose) but not something she attributes to Kant, since Kant very much did allow such 
redounding (JAM, 112).  
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register….A circle is unavoidable’.71 As Adorno had it, ‘an object gets investigated by a 
research tool which, through its own formulation, decides what the object is: a simple 
circle.’72 Hence Rose: 
 
With instruments in general we can demonstrate their use without setting about using 
them…But designing, building and examining sociological tools can only be done by 
the same rationality that is sociology’s object. Rationality means rules, and sociology is 
the study of the rules and conventions of social life. So we are in a vicious circle. We 
are assuming the validity of the operation whose validity is to be questioned. This [neo-
Kantian] approach is claiming that it is neutral and makes no assumptions but it has 
overlooked a major assumption: that logic, here socio-logic, is distinct from the rest of 
reality and that it can be used to grasp that reality, or at least part of it. The very 
metaphor of tool in sociology is suspect. The power of sociology, especially Marxist, is 
that scientific rationality and subjective consciousness are themselves part of the whole 
to be apprehended. Instrumental method, however, seeks to know before it starts 
knowing. This is absurd – this is what Hegel said about Kant…73 
 
There are five substantive implications of the transcendental form of social theory of 
importance for Rose’s case. Each is to some extent related to a lack of historicality, 
insofar as they involve reifying either a feature of society or a concept for interpreting 
or explaining society. Rose’s social philosophy, by contrast, is intentionally historical in 
its phenomenological approach. Each is also related to the circularity of social 
theorising, which is worked out differently in transcendental and speculative social 
philosophies. 
 
First, in a transcendental account, that which explains other terms does not explain 
itself, such that one term tends to become unknowable. For example, Fichte and Kant 
considered variously the ego, categorical imperative and transcendental unity of 
apperception unknowable. They see this as a limit of knowledge itself, rather than a 
resting point of an historical formation of reason within modern society. This in turn 
bleeds into their political philosophies and so has substantive, not simply formal, 
implications. Or John Milbank, on the basis of Hegel Contra Sociology, argued in 
Theology and Social Theory74 that the characteristic gesture of sociology of religion was 
to “explain” (away) religion by reducing it to society, which obfuscated the nature of 
both religion and society, and took the concept society for granted, when in fact society 
                                                
71 TMS, 101. 
72 Soziologie cited in ‘Introduction’ to ‘A Critique of Methodology’ by Eike Gebhardt in Frankfurt 
School Reader, 376. 
73 ‘Does Marx have a Method?’ 
74 101-44. 
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itself requires explanation. 75  Likewise Durkheim ‘transforms society into the 
precondition of facts and, therefore, into a primary and ultimately unanalyzable 
concept.’76 Rose discerned a similar difficulty in late nineteenth century neo-Kantian 
jurisprudence.77 Thus Eike Gebhardt: ‘Without a theory of what mediates between 
social and cognitive factors, i.e. of the “transcendental” constitution of consciousness 
and reality, their relation had to remain accidental – or exemplify a cultural truism 
which begs the very question it pretends to answer.’78 Rose’s speculative philosophy 
uses phenomenological history to discover various ‘third’ terms mediating between 
society and individuals.79  
 
Second, any pre-condition is itself conditioned and so in need of a further pre-condition, 
thus creating an infinite regress.80 Speculative circularity substitutes the bad infinite 
regress for a good infinite regress. 
 
Third, Rose repeats Adorno’s criticism of prioritising either philosophy – such that truth 
becomes untouched by history – or sociology – such that truth is lost because 
philosophy is replaced by sociology of knowledge. Writes Adorno:  
 
what are alleged to be the most highly abstract and universal factors governing 
knowledge, the factors that must be present for knowledge to be conceived of in the first 
place, presuppose the element of factuality, of actual existence, that they are supposed to 
explain. Thus reflection on the fact that subject and object or transcendental factors and 
human reality are mutually interdependent is at the same time a necessary pointer to the 
fact that I must not make absolutes of these transcendental factors, I must not hypostatize 
them. This means that I may not separate them from their genesis, their origins in factual 
reality, any more than I can detach factual reality or judgements about the world of things 
from their subjective mediation and hence from their historical roots…just as it is 
impossible to see the categories other than in relation to their origin and to history, it is 
equally impossible simply to derive concepts like space, time and the categories from 
history and to reduce them to social phenomena.81 
 
                                                
75 Rose and Milbank made these criticisms in the early eighties, since then things have moved on (e.g. 
James Beckford, Social Theory and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2003), 2-3) although 
the fundamental approach is arguably still widespread (see Callum G. Brown, The Death of Christian 
Britain: Understanding Secularisation 1800-2000 (2nd ed.; London: Routledge, 2009)). 
76 Crane, ‘Habermas and Hegel’ 638. See TMS, 82-6 on Durkheim and Weber. 
77 DN, 25-49. 
78 ‘Introduction’, Frankfurt School Reader, 356. 
79 Adorno criticised the tendency to absolutise one term and remove it from mediation since mediations 
give it its meaning (Metacritique of Epistemology excerpted in The Adorno Reader, ed. by Brian 
O’Connor (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 112-36). 
80 DN, 70. 
81 Adorno, Kant’s Critique, 167-8. 
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Rose’s Hegelian speculative philosophy, by contrast, examines its own positing more 
thoroughly than neo-Kantian social theory and, as we will see below, is circular in a 
way that avoids making one side of the condition/pre-condition prior to the other. 
Indeed, Hegel Contra Sociology is a kind of sociology of sociology.82 Rose, following 
Hegel, makes the social determination of thought intrinsic to the very logic of thinking 
itself, without reducing thought to the sociology of knowledge. By contrast, the neo-
Kantian ‘transformation of Kantian transcendental epistemology into a series of 
methodologies concerned with ascertaining the basis of validity implied that 
epistemological problems could be transformed into problems of the sociology of 
knowledge.’83 As a result, the force of practical reasons is much reduced and Rose thus 
doubts the quasi-transcendental form of social theory can fully account for ethics, 
especially if it is used as the basis of philosophy as a whole and as the way to hold 
together practical and theoretical reason. The neo-Kantians conceded they could not 
explain the unity of fact and value; these had to be taken on faith.84 ‘Behind [Weber’s] 
demand for value free science lies an epistemological conception derived from the neo-
Kantians, namely, that value judgements are not the result of cognitive acts. In fact 
Weber later saw the justification of practical judgments as meaningless’.85 Weber and 
Durkheim accept the fact-value distinction in a way that assumes mind and world are 
separate, and so fail properly to understand their mutual mediation. Weber, following 
Rickert, saw the world itself as irrational, and the values and categories used to 
understand it imposed on it by human minds.86 Rose’s Hegelian social philosophy does 
not take the fact-value distinction so rigidly, and sets it within a different mind-world 
relationship in which the aim is to see all the multiple mediations through which subject 
and object, individual and society, create one another.87  
 
Fourth, neo-Kantian sociology is problematic when the ‘notion of the limitations of 
knowledge simply turns into positivism of a generally scientific or, more 
                                                
82 I owe this phrase to Nigel Tubbs, in private correspondence, 22 October 2013. On the sociology of 
sociology see George Ritzer, Explorations in Social Theory: From Metatheorizing to Rationalization 
(London: Sage, 2001). 
83 Joachim Israel, ‘Epistemology and Sociology of Knowledge: An Hegelian Undertaking’, Sociological 
Perspectives 33.1 (Critical Theory, Spring 1990), 116. 
84 C.f. Frederick C. Beiser, ‘Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall’, International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 17.1 (209), 9-27; and Theodor W. Adorno, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, Telos 31 
(March 20 1977), (120-33), 121. 
85 David Frisby, ‘Introduction’ in The Positivist Dispute, ix-xliv (xxiv; c.f. xxxix). 
86 Habermas, Logic of Social Sciences, 4-5, 13-16. 
87 HCS, 194: ‘Absolute knowledge is a path which must be continually traversed, re-collecting the forms 
of consciousness and the forms of science. This idea of a whole which cannot be grasped in one moment 
or in one statement for it must be experienced is the idea of the system.’ 
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specifically, psychological or sociological kind.’88 An interesting corollary of Rose’s 
critique of sociology is that one of the sources of the repeated recurrences of 
positivism89 within sociology may be the lack of appreciation by sociologists about the 
transcendental form of their thinking.90 Neo-Kantians retained the transcendental form 
of enquiry developed by Kant but rejected his transcendental idealism. As a result, the 
objectivity of knowledge – the way in which thought relates to the world – became a 
problem. As Max Horkheimer put it, in neo-Kantianism  
 
Particular traits in the theoretical activity of the specialist are here elevated to the rank of 
universal categories, of instances of the world-mind, the eternal “Logos.” More 
accurately, decisive elements in social life are reduced to the theoretical activity of the 
savant. Thus “the power of knowledge” is called “the power of creative origination.” 
“Production” means the “creative sovereignty of thought.” For any datum it must be 
possible to deduce all its determinations from theoretical systems and ultimately from 
mathematics.91   
 
In other words, the touchstone for a system of thought is thought itself, in a way that 
tended to insulate thought from receptivity to thought’s other. 92  (Rose viewed 
poststructuralism’s attitude to truth as reproducing this neo-Kantian problem). Validity, 
values and cognition of the world are separated from one another. Validity becomes an 
a priori matter, separable from conditions of experience; values are based only on 
conviction. Weber’s value neutrality, for example, whilst legitimate if methodologically 
constrained, ‘makes independent scientific access to empirical reality a logical 
impossibility and ultimately reduces science to just one more value.’93 (Rose believed 
                                                
88 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 58 (referencing HCS). Shamoon Zamir, uses Rose to mark the same danger 
in relation to William James’ pragmatism: ‘an apparently particularist and historicist account of 
experience can easily slip into a mere validation of experience.’ (Dark Voices: W. E. B. Du Bois and 
American Thought, 1888-1903 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993), 96). The epistemological roots 
are evident in passages from Rickert such as: ‘Nur aus dem Sollen also und nicht aus dem Sein kann ich 
die Wahrheit des Urteils ableiten’ [Only from the ought therefore and not from being can I derive the 
truth of the judgement]; ‘der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis…kann nur das Sollen [sein], das im Urtheile 
anerkannt wird’ [the object of knowledge can only be the ought that is recognised in the judgement]. 
Heinrich Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (Freiburg i. B.: J C B Mohr, 1892), 66-7. My thanks to 
Marina Micke for checking that last sentence. 
89 On which see George Steinmetz (ed.), The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and 
Its Epistemological Others (Durham: Duke University, 2005). 
90 C.f. Habermas, Logic of Social Sciences, 109. 
91 Max Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, 198. Horkheimer is here discussing the Marburg 
school of neo-Kantians, whereas Weber was more influenced by the Heidelberg or Southwestern neo-
Kantians, but Rose felt the same problem was discernable in both (which she traced back to the influence 
of Lotze). She thought Marburg neo-Kantianism, however, developed ‘a logic of thought which is 
independent of the process of cognition’, which ‘heralds the end of transcendental logic’ (HCS 10) and 
thus was not Kantian enough. 
92 Hegel’s Idealism, 185. It should be stressed that Rose did not overlook the sophistication of the original 
neo-Kantians such as Rickert, Cohen, etc., but focused on the neo-Kantian elements at work within 
Durkheim, Weber, etc.  
93 Crane, ‘Habermas and Hegel’, 638. 
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poststructuralism’s use of Nietzsche replicated this neo-Kantian problem). Now of 
course sociologists know they should test their theory against the evidence and alter it 
accordingly if it does not match.94 In that sense, their theory is not at all trapped within 
thought; but two problems may arise. The first problem occurs when the circularity of 
the explicans and explicandum is left untroubled. Since the theory is supposed to 
explain the data, the data is taken to support the theory rather than disturb it. A virtuous 
circle may easily turn vicious. The second problem is to regard the externality between 
mind and world as fundamental, rather than a useful method for specific activities. 
Experience and representation are then no longer part of cognition and method becomes 
external to its object. As William Rasch summarises: 
 
Rose reads modern sociology as a bad infinite based on the neo-Kantian abstract 
opposition of validity and value…If the “structural metacritique of validity 
(Durkheim)” leads to the absolutizing of the “totally conditioned agent,” then the 
“action-oriented metacritique of values (Weber)” results in the absolutizing of the 
“unconditioned actor”…On the one hand we have the primacy of theoretical reason, the 
“structured” realm of necessity that is nature; on the other, the primacy of practical 
reason, the free, supersensible, self-positing “Ich” that simultaneously posits its 
conditioned other. The former leads to an “empty” structural sociology, the latter to a 
“blind” action theory.95  
 
This is all the more worthy of critique for Rose because the classical sociologists rightly 
retained Hegel’s ambition to unite practical and theoretical reason, but were not as 
successful as Hegel in prosecuting the aim. Once again, it is a question of refinement 
rather than outright rejection.  
 
Fifth, neo-Kantian sociology has a tendency to treat the appearance of society as its 
reality.96 This is not simply a matter of dissatisfaction with first-order statements made 
by individuals about their experience.97 Rose shares the Frankfurt view of social forms 
as not-fully-actualised-forms or forms-in-process.98 For Hegel, the social forms not 
fully actualised are those based on the concept and the concept has both rational and 
                                                
94 Rose spoke approvingly of Weber: ‘Weber’s sociology is circular, but it is a virtuous not a vicious 
circle, a journey, a hodos, which ends where it began, after of course a lot has happened on the way.’ 
‘Does Marx Have a Method?’  
95 Luhmann’s Modernity, 4. 
96 TMS, 23. 
97 Although the first-order/second-order distinction is common in sociology, it can be difficult to make in 
practice: Christian Greiffenhagen and Wes Sharrock, ‘Where Do the Limits of Experience Lie? 
Abandoning the Dualism of Objectivity and Subjectivity’, History of the Human Sciences 21.3 (2008), 
70-93. 
98 The importance of treating forms as processes, of prioritising becoming over being, goes back to 
Hegel’s Logic but also Nietzsche and Lukács’ ‘Reification’, esp. 177-207. 
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ethical normativity99 (for example, a state should be like x and do y). Further, Rose uses 
Hegel’s logical category of Schein (translated “shine”, “show”, “seeming” or 
“appearance”) as a fundamental feature of social philosophising. Schein is the 
appearance of something, and thus presents a limited truth of that something, but 
conceals a fuller truth – the essence behind the appearance – to see which a more 
comprehensive view is necessary. The appearance is not left behind but retained in the 
more comprehensive view.100 As a category of social philosophy, then, Schein means 
that a phenomenon is not fully understood unless its connections to and mediations in 
the social totality are known (making it ‘more concrete’ in Hegel’s terms). Schein is 
also used to ground the idea of necessary illusions (or fetishism), in which a society 
structurally produces certain appearances, which are both true in a limited sense and yet 
mask its real structures. For example, capitalist societies systematically foster the view 
of individuals as atomised and self-constituted rather than intersubjectively formed, and 
this both expresses a significant feature of experience (hence the illusion can take hold) 
and yet hides the multiple dependencies between people. They are necessary to the 
society because they play an important role in the reproduction of the society. Revealing 
necessary illusions (or fetishisms) is one of the two main forms of ideology critique 
taken from Marx by the Frankfurt School. 101  A failure to do social philosophy 
thoroughly leavened by the category of Schein and forms-in-process can result in work 
that is insufficiently critical of society and rescinds from normative judgement:102 
‘social conformism is smuggled in as a criterion of meaning for the social sciences.’103   
 
Is Rose’s critique justified? Peter Knapp voices two important problems: ‘Rose deals 
not with contemporary sociology but with Durkheim, Weber and the Frankfurt school, 
and she does not deal with their substantive theories but with one aspect of their 
methodological self-understanding…[she] tends to portray Hegel’s own social theory as 
a simple stamping of philosophical positions by property relations, a picture which is 
vulgar-Marxist and ultimately anti-Marxist.’104 The preceding paragraphs make clear 
that theoretical (or methodological) and substantive issues cannot be separated, hence 
                                                
99 Frederick Beiser, Hegel (London: Routledge, 2005), 211-3. 
100 See ‘Appearance’ and ‘Essence’ in the Glossary in TMS, 149-51. 
101 Andrew Arato, ‘Introduction’ to ‘Esthetic Theory and Cultural Criticism’ in Frankfurt School Reader, 
201. The second main form (mistaking theory for reality) is discussed at the beginning of chapter 3. 
102 C.f. Chris Thornhill, ‘Political Legitimacy: A Theoretical Approach Between Facts and Norms’, 
Constellations 18.2 (2011), 135-69 (164 n.1, and the references there): ‘Sociology might be seen as in 
toto founded in a primary hostility to normative political analysis.’ 
103 Adorno, ‘Introduction’, The Positivist Dispute, 17. 
104 Knapp, ‘Review’, 201-3. 
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Rose’s focus on the theoretical level is not only legitimate and of interest but has 
implications for substantive theories themselves (we will see below further examples of 
interaction between these two levels). Rose thinks Hegel can help social theory improve 
by being more aware of the form of thought it uses and how thought and actuality 
relate.105  
 
On Knapp’s second point, there are moments where Rose strays into vulgar-Marxist 
pronouncements,106 or lays herself open to misunderstanding, as when she writes that 
the neo-Kantians shared the problem of ‘the transformation of Kant’s critical method 
into a logic of validity (Geltungslogik), a general method, [which] excluded any enquiry 
into empirical reality.’107 How can this be, when the whole purpose of sociology is to 
enquire into the empirical reality of society? Rose’s protest is more subtle than a 
simplistic reading of this sentence indicates. The problem with a ‘method’ in the human 
(or geistig) realm is its external relation to what it analyses. Hence her doctoral 
supervisor Kołakowski: ‘What we properly call a method should be a sequence of 
operations which, when applied to the same subject, will give the same or 
approximately the same results. In the humanities, the identification and collation of 
sources apart, this is far from being the case.’ 108 The so-called methods in the 
humanities are really only general guidelines such as ‘the way people think is usually 
influenced by their social relations, the values accepted within their community’; thus 
‘no explanatory method exists in the study of cultural history’.109 ‘A method is simply a 
question…and surely no method will yield information which it does not ask for 
(through its very formulation)…Methods/questions are thus as dependent on the cultural 
paradigm as are “satisfactory” explanations’.110 Further, over the course of the neo-
Kantian period, methodology became detached from and began artificially to dominate 
substantive study.111 This is the sense in which Rose worried about theory (see below 
her comments on Marxism being problematic precisely qua theory). Yet Rose was not 
                                                
105 See §5.1 below. 
106 Especially HCS 79-84, where Rose repeatedly uses the word ‘only’ in sentences such as: ‘As long as 
bourgeois property relations and hence formal recognition prevail religion can only be a form of 
misrepresentation’ (83). In fact, her treatment of religion in HCS is methodological in the way she 
criticises. The problem is the move from condemning one particular version of religion to condemning 
religion per se. 
107 HCS, 10, my emphasis. C.f. PhSp §50. 
108 Leszek Kołakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial (London: University of Chicago, 1990), 244. C.f. 
HCS 2: ‘The very idea of a scientific sociology, whether non-Marxist or Marxist, is only possible as a 
form of neo-Kantianism.’ Rose regards Marxism as suffering from the same problems as neo-Kantian 
sociology because of its claim to scientific status. 
109 Kołakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial, 245.  
110 Gebhardt, ‘Introduction’, Frankfurt School Reader, 379. 
111 Frisby, ‘Introduction’ in The Positivist Dispute, xxviii and n.57, citing Nietzsche. 
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arguing against empirical enquiry, explanation or theory per se. She was opposed only 
to the unreflexive use of theory, to its reification into a rigid schema, which is then 
imposed on experience. The dialectical combination of different methods or forms of 
sociology could prevent such ossification. Once again, the transcendental form of 
method is both a strength and weakness: ‘Methodologies are either relative (adequate) 
to predefined object domains, and thus share their transcendental organization, or they 
must claim to be universal, in which case the question of their adequacy is undecidable 
and irrelevant. In either case, their validity cannot be determined regardless of their 
relation to their subject matter.’112 The strengths may be used and weaknesses avoided 
if the method is used in the right way, for which a good meta-philosophy or meta-theory 
is required. Then one can say with Adorno, ‘Method is really the substantive, complete 
understanding.’113 
 
One of Rose’s examples is how to think of the finite and infinite. Weber and Durkheim 
separate concepts for thinking about the finite world of society from larger metaphysical 
questions.114 Thus, Durkheim treats values as given social facts; Weber treats values as 
coherent and justifiable only from within the form of life embodying them, but the 
choice between values as arbitrary.115 From a Hegelian point of view, their logic 
assumes too much and imposes itself on the world rather than knowing it immanently. 
This is apparent from Hegel’s critique of Fichte and Locke in Faith and Knowledge.116 
‘Finite’ in this text refers to the seemingly neutral, descriptive, empirical aspects of 
humanity, and the infinite refers to the endlessly controverted realm of beauty, morality, 
truth – those aspects of humanity by which it transcends itself. More technically, finite 
refers to the Kantian stipulation of knowledge’s need for sensuous content 
                                                
112 Gebhardt, ‘Introduction’, Frankfurt School Reader, 379.  
113 Cited in Wheatland, ‘Debate About Methods’, 128. C.f. Rose’s remark about Negative Dialectics as 
‘an experimental attempt to state a method apart from its practice when the special nature of that method 
is that it is inseparable from its practice.’ (‘Review’, 599). 
114 Chapters 3 and 4 of Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. 
115 Walter Cerf, ‘Speculative Philosophy and Intellectual Intuition: An Introduction to Hegel’s Essays’ in 
Faith and Knowledge or the Reflective Philosophy of Subjectivity in the complete range of its forms as 
Kantian, Jacobian, and Fichtean Philosophy, trans. by Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris, Albany: State 
University of New York, 1977), xxv: ‘In the following generations this vision of the whole will be 
degraded to Weltanschauung, leading to the relativization not only of moral and aesthetic standards but 
also of the basic theoretical categories, emerging as sociology of sorts in France, and in Germany as 
Dilthey’s typology of Weltanschauungen’. 
116 C.f. Slavoj Žižek, ‘Preface: Hegel’s Century’ in Hegel and the Infinite: Religion, Politics and 
Dialectic, ed. by Slavoj Žižek, Clayton Crockett and Creston Davis (New York: Columbia University, 
2011), ix-xi. Žižek criticises Habermas for a neo-Kantian avoidance of the ‘“big” ontological questions’, 
and links this to the ‘deflated’ Hegel of Brandom and McDowell.  
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(spatiotemporal intuition) if it is to be knowledge, in contrast to the illusions and 
antinomies that are generated when thought attempts to work without such reference.117  
 
The problem with treating the finite and infinite as opposites is that knowledge is 
limited to the sensuous realm; empirical happiness is treated as humanity’s only goal; 
cognition (or Reason as Hegel calls it in this essay) then ‘consists solely in calculating 
the worth of each and every thing with respect to the singularity, and in positing [i.e., 
subsuming] every Idea under finitude.’118 ‘Locke and the eudæmonists transformed 
philosophy into empirical psychology’; they ask merely ‘what the universe is for a 
subjectivity that feels and is conscious by way of calculations typical of the intellect, or 
in other words, for a Reason solely immersed in finitude, a Reason that renounces 
intuition and cognition of the eternal.’119 For Hegel, the parts must be understood within 
the whole; thus human possibilities and capacities, what may be expected from the 
world and people, should not be decided on the basis of a narrowly-viewed 
anthropology and rationalised reason120 but in connection with the widest metaphysical 
and ontological questions. This is, as it were, Hegel’s critique of positivism, with which 
he connects form and substance in social and political philosophy. Hence: ‘what we 
tend to think of as immediate (sense) perceptions are in Hegel’s view the product of 
complicated mediations. Furthermore, ideas that commonsense [sic] regards as 
concrete, because particular, are normally abstract for him, because they are 
unmediated; the truly concrete is not a particular, isolated phenomenon, but an aspect or 
‘moment’ of a totality. Thus in his usage ‘concrete’ pertains more properly to ‘totality’, 
while ‘abstract’ is related to the partial and one-sided, the individual and 
unmediated.’121 To understand things immanently is to allow all their mediations to 
present themselves.  
 
The occasional, vulgar-Marxist slip notwithstanding then, Rose’s considered opinion is 
that the exact nature of the relation between social forms and philosophy is the ‘most 
                                                
117 Duquette, ‘Speculative Logic’; Beiser, Hegel, 166. 
118 Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, 60-1. The square parentheses are original to the Cerf and Harris 
translation. It has to be noted Hegel is being rather unfair to Kant here.  
119 Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, 63. The similarity with Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, trans. by John Cumming (London: Verso, 1997 [1944; 1969]) should be apparent. The 
dialectic between Enlightenment and religious faith reappears in PhSp B.I-II. 
120 This term is anachronistic but captures Hegel’s objection to philosophy that apes after maths in PhSp 
§38. C.f. Houlgate, An Introduction, 29-30. 
121 Rodney Livingstone, ‘Notes to English Edition’ in Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 344. 
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important and difficult’ part of Hegel’s thought122 and ‘everything depends on how they 
are determined’.123 This refinement becomes even clearer in Rose’s later work. Knapp’s 
objection can thus be put to rest. Furthermore, Rose’s rejection of external method and 
detection of its recurrence in sociology, can be supported by Richard Biernacki’s work 
on textual coding in social science.124 Biernacki shows the ways in which qualitative 
and quantitative methods are combined in three important (because widely influential) 
sociological studies of literature to produce viciously circular arguments that simply 
confirm and justify prior assumptions and in some cases interpret the meanings of texts 
exactly opposite to their plain meaning. This is a detailed confirmation of Rose’s 
warning about the adoption of general methodology (Geltungslogik) that ends up 
distancing a sociologist from the real world and empirical data – exactly the opposite of 
what sociology intends. 125  The use of method can induce complacency or 
overconfidence and lead to bad results. Biernacki cites Clifford Geertz: ‘Keeping 
reasoning wary, thus useful, thus true’ is the best kind of approach.126 ‘The only 
intellectual building material is self-vigilance, not the reified ingredients “theory” or 
“method.”’127 For Rose, ‘the aim is simply to be fully alert, to know the score’.128 (It is 
important to remember this is neither an argument against quantitative methods nor 
transcendental arguments per se). Biernacki’s thesis is bold: that ‘humanist’ approaches 
to literature and history are truer to the ideals of science than the scientific seeming 
mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods:129 ‘the nonsystematizing humanists still 
appreciate the obstacles to induction, the gift of an acute trial, the insurance of shared 
documentation, and the transformative power of anomalies…such interpretation better 
fulfils the consecrated standards to which social “scientists” ostensibly subscribe.’130  
 
Rose’s Hegelianism, lacking the guarantee of method, is more open about its risk: it 
knows it must start its judgements in the middle, in an already contested space, in a 
mixture of error and truth. It knows that sociology does not generate universal laws but 
                                                
122 HCS, 60. 
123 HCS, 119. 
124 Reinventing Evidence in Social Inquiry: Decoding Facts and Variables (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012). 
125 Anthony Giddens provides other examples of this problem in his ‘Introduction’ in New Rules of 
Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociologies (2nd ed.; Stanford: Stanford 
University; 1993 [1976]), 10-11. 
126 Biernacki, Reinventing, 8. 
127 Biernacki, Reinventing, 8. 
128 DN, 7. 
129 Biernacki, Reinventing, 151. 
130 Biernacki, Reinventing, 3-4. C.f. Adorno’s comments about Kraus in his ‘Introduction’, The Positivist 
Dispute, 44-6. 
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only rules of thumb.131 Moreover, it knows there is no unfiltered or raw data, but moves 
from what appears as such into a more comprehensive view, from natural consciousness 
to speculative thought, from real illusion to awareness of determination. The importance 
of Schein thus re-appears; in Stephen Houlgate’s words: ‘illusion is in fact 
real…seeming does occur – and…reflexivity (negativity) is actually at work in our 
world.’132 In short, Rose saw the value for social theory of ‘Hegel’s critique of the 
methodological mind’,133 which is lost if his system and method are divorced. Rose 
noted how Adorno had previously attacked ‘methodologism per se. This refers to any 
neo-Kantian kind of pure logic, which grants validity to an autonomous method and its 
objectifications, which is ‘positive’ in the general sense of suppressing the social and 
historical preconditions of its own possibility. Methodologism or ‘positivism’ in this 
metacritical sense may be found in any approach: phenomenology, Marxism, as well as 
in the positivist methodology of the standard verificationist kind.’134 
 
It is by attention to particulars, beginning with immanent analysis and including ever 
deepening or widening awareness of determination, that Rose’s Hegelianism avoids the 
crude determinism of vaguely referring to society or capitalism (etc.) to explain 
phenomena. Put otherwise, as noted above, there are various levels of mediation before 
jumping to society, or Geist, or culture, etc., as cause – this is why Hegelian dialectics 
proceeds immanently and works outwards. 135  If this difficulty is lost, then any 
phenomenon or piece of ‘data’ can be fit into the overall scheme, losing proper contact 
with ‘empirical reality’:136 just this is the vicious circularity and divorce between 
universal and particular against which Rose complains.137 Rather than making one pole 
of the antinomy fundamental and the other epiphenomenal to it, or collapsing the 
distinction, the best thinking keeps both in play through different forms of mediation. 
Rose’s position was thus similar to Adorno’s.  
 
Since our access to empirical reality and our conceptual apparatus are inseparable and 
                                                
131 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2nd ed.; London: Duckworth, 1985 [1981]), 88-108; Peter Winch, 
The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (2nd ed.; London: Routledge, 1990 [1958]), 
86-94. This is well-trod ground in critical theory’s argument with positivism. Contrast Brown, 
Explanation. 
132 Stephen Houlgate, ‘Introduction’ to Encylopaedia Logic, in The Hegel Reader, 131. 
133 HCS, 36. 
134 HCS, 35. C.f. EL §227. 
135 C.f. Kolb, Pure Modernity, 47. 
136 HCS, 10; Biernacki, Reinventing, 28, 127. 
137 C.f. Biernacki, Reinventing, 16-7. On the difficulties of explanation for any account of society see 
Thomas Bierbricher, ‘Critical Theories of the State: Governmentality and the Strategic-Relational 
Approach’, Constellations 20.3 (2013), 388-405. 
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equally restricted, the idea of testing theoretical propositions by means of 
independently-defined indicators is incoherent. However, Adorno does not therefore 
abandon empirical research as irremediably circular, but utilises a range of empirical 
means to explore the divergences between the ways in which social reality is 
understood and the ways in which this illusory intelligibility is determined. This 
exposition of empirical procedures is designed to eschew not only the ‘scientistic’ 
understanding of them, but also any adaptation of them which takes account merely of 
an interpretive circle between theory and its designated indicators.138  
 
Milbank well sums up Rose’s distrust of neo-Kantian sociology:  
 
it treats society as ‘an “external,” empirical reality, whose ahistorical form is governed 
by eternal laws.…Only since Comte has an object called “society,” amenable to 
scientific treatment, been isolated. As Gillian Rose…has shown, the means of this 
isolation is to elevate some aspect of given social reality – either a structural pattern, or 
a subjective understanding of meaningful action – into a categorical role in the Kantian 
sense…If, for example, a social structure is interpreted as a category, as a “quasi-a 
priori,” then this means that it can be appealed to as a sufficient way of categorising and 
“explaining” the social facts that fall within its scope. In this way one is excused from 
the “difficult labour” of searching for genuinely historical interpretations.139 
 
As we will see, Rose’s historical version of phenomenology avoids such ahistoricism, 
and of course inherits a great deal from Adorno’s critique of identity thinking. 
Biernacki’s response to the problems with social science is to return to the ‘wary’ or 
alert use of Weber’s ideal types, providing ways of organising and understanding 
research whilst remaining conscious of the risks of reification. Rose’s social theory, we 
shall see, has a great deal in common with Weber here.140 Yet Rose is clearer than 
Weber on our ability to know the truth about reality and moral norms. Others, such as 
Giddens, Bourdieu and Habermas, have echoed her complaints against classical 
sociology, in various attempts to harmonise subjective and objective dimensions of 
society, or individual experience and structures of experience.141 For example, Giddens 
argues that agent and structure are the two fundamental, connected but distinct elements 
in any sociological analysis, and are always implicated in meaning, norms and power. 
Knowledge is always mediated, particularly through language, but not in hermetically 
sealed universes of meaning (the problem of some Wittgensteinian or Heideggerian 
interpretive sociologies like Peter Winch’s). 142  Giddens also affirms the need to 
examine different levels between macro- and micro-structures. This is very like Rose’s 
                                                
138 TMS, 145. 
139 ‘An Essay Against Secular Order’, The Journal of Religious Ethics 15.2 (Fall 1987), 201. Whereas 
with Hegelianism ‘There is…no social “given” at the categorical boundary of our understanding’ (203).  
140 See her Sussex lectures ‘Does Marx Have a Method?’ and ‘The Dispute Over Marx and Weber’ 
(7702), 23 April 1987, and TMS 90-1 in which she compares ideal types to Adorno’s constellations. 
141 Grieffenhagen and Sharrock, ‘Limits of experience’. 
142 New Rules, 50-7. 
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view that society and subject are in a speculative identity; that various levels of 
mediation between the two are required; her focus on truth, morality and law; and her 
realist critique of epistemologies of hermetically sealed communities. They share very 
similar critiques of the traditions of sociology stemming from Durkheim and Weber. 
Giddens argues against functionalist sociologies that focus solely on structure 
(Durkheim, Parsons) for reducing or eliminating subjectivity, but he also thinks 
Weberian Versetehen-style sociologies (understanding action through empathetically 
understanding the intentions of the actor) pay insufficient heed to structures. This is 
very similar to Rose’s critique of the separation of validity and values. 
 
Once again it is important to recall that Rose valued the classical sociological tradition. 
Her social theory aims to explicate better the logical basis of the good practice of 
Weber, Giddens, Bourdieu, etc., than they achieved in their own methodological 
statements, and to sublate neo-Kantian social theory. With this reminder of the 
measured nature of Rose’s critique – in contrast to her polemical tone – we can turn to 
her critique of the Frankfurt School. 
 
3.2.2 Frankfurt School social theory  
As Peter Osborne noted, Rose’s ‘reading of Hegel functions as a reformulation of the 
foundations of Critical Theory’.143 To see how, consider Tony Gorman’s statement:  
 
On Rose’s interpretation of Hegel, phenomenological criticism is, as it were, immanent 
critique of metacritique. To explain: metacritique aims to reveal the socio-historical 
conditions of possibility of given theoretical and social disciplines and practices (for 
example, philosophy, science, morality, art, etc.), on the assumption that the latter lack 
either the interest or self-reflective capacity to acknowledge these wider preconditions of 
their own activity…Unfortunately, metacritique founders upon the problem of circularity. 
There is, it appears, simply no non-question-begging way to validate the unobservable 
transcendental fact or value that is postulated to explain the observable social reality – 
whether it be ‘economic determinism’ (Marx), ‘social facts’ (Durkheim) or ‘meaning’ 
(Weber) – independently of the theory in which the stipulated postulate is inscribed…By 
contrast, phenomenological criticism attempts to comprehend the repetition of the antinomy 
of sociological reason without repeating it, or, more exactly, by repeating it differently.144   
 
Metacritiques repeat neo-Kantian circularity in sociological form, positing some socio-
historical entity as the (quasi-)transcendental feature making possible and explaining 
experienced realities. Again, this structure is both a strength and weakness. ‘A 
philosophy of reflection is at the heart of…all sociological metacritiques of the neo-
                                                
143 Osborne, ‘Hegelian Phenomenology’, 8. 
144 Gorman, ‘Critical Marxism’, 28. 
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Kantian kind. What is regrettable is not the presence but the denial of this element of 
[their] thought.’145 Metacritiques structurally leave the question of the epistemological 
validity and ontological reality of the transcendental (or conditioning) factor necessarily 
undecidable (or else posited as unquestionable and to be taken on faith).146 They also 
give the transcendental condition of possibility an ambiguous form: it is both 
transcendental and empirical (Habermas explicitly recognises this in calling his 
argument ‘quasi-transcendental’).147 Metacritiques have difficulty accounting for ‘the 
status of the relation between precondition and condition’.148 They hover between 
offering society-specific preconditions and universal, atemporal preconditions.149 When 
the latter wins out, the ‘point of mediation between precondition and conditioned 
becomes the pivot of a theory’,150 with the problems of external method just noted. The 
danger is to conflate or level off the transcendental and empirical in a way that 
reproduces a kind of positivism. Consider, for example, a Marxist view of law: ‘Law 
gives effect to, mirrors or is otherwise expressive of the forms of economic relations.’151 
If this is taken as a guide for investigations into law, it is very useful. If it is read as the 
prescription of a scientific law, as if every piece of legislation was chiefly economic in 
ultimate derivation, it becomes implausible. 
 
Garbis Kortian explains the structure of Habermas’ work as a way of expounding 
Frankfurt School thinking more generally. He independently confirms Rose’s analysis 
of the quasi-transcendental structure of their argumentation, though he embraces it: 
‘The more precise co-ordinates which define the Frankfurt School thesis are, on the one 
hand, the two fundamental concepts of the Phenomenology of Spirit, speculative 
experience and the speculative proposition, and, on the other, the fact that the 
dissolution of German Idealism threw these concepts into question.’152 Rose begins her 
                                                
145 HCS, 42. 
146 Rose takes this from Hegel’s critique of Fichte in Faith and Knowledge but Pleasants makes the same 
charge without reference to idealism in Wittgenstein and the Idea of a Critical Social Theory: A Critique 
of Giddens, Habermas and Bhaskar (London: Routledge, 1999). The question is whether any particular 
metacritique is neo-Kantian or whether some meet the Hegelian criteria Rose stipulates.  
147 HCS, 36-43. C.f. J. M. Bernstein, Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of 
Critical Theory (London: Routledge, 1995); Pippin, ‘Hegel, Modernity, and Habermas’, 157-84 in 
Idealism as Modernism. On Habermas’ theory as another version of Geltungslogik, based on Rose’s 
analysis in HCS, see Israel, ‘Epistemology and Sociology of Knowledge’. 
148 HCS, 41. 
149 C.f. DN, 125. 
150 HCS, 44. Rose thought Habermas’ theory had become methodological in this sense.  
151 Alan Hunt, ‘Marxism, Law, Legal Theory and Jurisprudence’ in Dangerous Supplements: Resistance 
and Renewal in Jurisprudence, ed. by Peter Fitzpatrick (Durham, NC: Duke University: 1991), 101-32 
(102).  
152 Garbis Kortian, Metacritique: The Philosophical Arguments of Jürgen Habermas, trans. by John 
Raffan (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1980), 26. Rose regarded his book as ‘excellent’, HCS, 244, 
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Hegel book: ‘This essay is an attempt to retrieve Hegelian speculative experience for 
social theory’ and she goes on to explain speculative propositions as fundamental to the 
whole enterprise. She takes exactly the opposite view to the Frankfurt School’s rejection 
of speculative experience and speculative propositions.153 Again, in Kortian’s view, 
contemporary philosophy must understand the implications of the dissolution of Hegel’s 
idea of absolute knowledge, and must ‘denounce one of the constitutive moments of 
Hegelian speculative experience: the moment of recognition and appropriation 
(Anerkennung und Aneignung) of the phenomenalised totality of the absolute concept in 
its otherness.’154 This is precisely contrary to Rose’s view in which the Marxist 
distinction between ‘radical method’ and ‘conservative system’ has obscured ‘the 
centrality of those ideas which Hegel developed in order to unify the theoretical and 
practical philosophy of Kant and Fichte…These ideas, recognition and appropriation 
(anerkennen and aneignen), are fundamental to Hegel’s notion of a system, and their 
importance cannot be appreciated apart from Hegel’s critique of the methodologism and 
moralism of Kant and Fichte.’155 Hegel’s system and method cannot be separated 
because Hegel ‘demonstrated the connection between the limitations of the idea of 
method in Kant and Fichte and the limitations of the kind of social and political theory 
which they produced.’ 156  Hence: ‘the ‘absolute’ is not an optional extra, as it 
were…Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the absolute is banished or 
suppressed, if the absolute cannot be thought.’157  
 
To return to Osborne’s comment, Rose was reformulating the foundations of critical 
theory away from neo-Kantian transcendental circularity towards Hegel’s speculatively 
circular logic in combination with his phenomenology (i.e., the logic of the concept).158 
Pippin encapsulates the heart of Rose’s position: ‘The Hegelian experiment…involves 
entertaining and thinking through the view that, in accounting for the fundamental 
elements of a conceptual or evaluative scheme, there is and can be no decisive or 
                                                                                                                                          
n181. She thought Habermas was ‘half-way on the road between Kant and Hegel’ (Rose, Letter to 
London Review of Books). 
153 C.f. PhSp §47-8, §56-7. EL §82 and Addition. Since I am expositing Rose’s Hegelianism, the extent to 
which the Additions reflect Hegel’s own thought remains moot for my discussion. 
154 Kortian, Metacritique, 41. C.f. Jürgen Habermas’ discussion of totality in Theory of Communicative 
Action : Reason and the Rationalisation of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity, 1986 
[1981]), 1: 339-99. 
155 HCS, 45. 
156 HCS, 45. 
157 HCS, 45. C.f. Howard Caygill’s remarks about the oscillation between ‘absolute’ and ‘Absolute’ in 
HCS, ‘Intimations of Political Theology’ during the ‘Thinking in the Severe Style’ symposium on Hegel 
Contra Sociology, Kingston University, 18 October 2013. I have not placed any interpretive weight here. 
158 HCS, 197-217.  
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certifying appeal to any basic “facts of the matter,” foundational experiences, logical 
forms, constitutive “interests,” “prejudices,” or guiding “intuitions” to begin or end any 
such account.’159 There are no formal rules or ultimate criteria for the (meta)rules for 
creating categories for judgements; rather we have the categories we have as a response 
to the failure of previous categories. These two claims combined mean ‘the justification 
of our most authoritative claims to knowledge is “dialectical,” not logical or formal.’160 
When Rose speaks of the ‘validity’ of a sociology’s transcendental precondition (as she 
frequently does throughout the book) she is referring to Kant’s question (in the first 
Critique) of whether the categories can be used in conjunction with experience to create 
knowledge (i.e., whether the categories are objective). Kant argues in the affirmative in 
the Transcendental Deduction. Hegel replaced Kant’s Transcendental Deduction with a 
phenomenological deduction: rather than combining a priori categories with intuitions 
(sociologically: pre-condition with condition), Hegel argues the categories develop 
increasing objectivity over time through attempts to apply them, the break downs of 
those attempts and formulations of more successful categories. Neo-Kantian sociology 
treats its transcendentally circular knowledge as valid; speculative sociology treats its 
knowledge as historically sufficient. Hegel’s speculative logic builds that status into its 
very conception of knowledge, whereas the transcendental form of neo-Kantian 
sociology cannot do full justice to the historical nature of reason and knowledge (even if 
a sociologist explicitly thinks of reason and knowledge as historical, the transcendental 
form of thinking works against that insight). 
 
Nigel Pleasants has independently criticised Habermas, Giddens and Roy Bhaskar for 
their transcendentally structured theories. 161  Like Rose, Pleasants considers these 
theories to be Kantian in form, with an ‘emphasis on universal and transcendent rules, 
structures and mechanisms, and its method of transcendental theoretical analysis.’162 
He, too, thinks much of ‘both first- and second- generation “critical theory” is rooted in 
Kantian ontological pictures of subjectivity and agency.’ 163  The ‘“craving for 
generality” which motivates the construction of these pictures is…a “reaction 
formation” to the widespread acceptance…of the doctrine of fallibilism…critical social 
theorists react to this by seeking to combine epistemic fallibilism with “ontological” 
infallibilism – thereby claiming that we can achieve certainty at the most abstract, 
                                                
159 Idealism as Modernism, 163. 
160 Pippin, Idealism as Modernism, 166. 
161 As has Anthony King, The Structure of Social Theory (London: Routledge, 2004). 
162 Pleasants, Wittgenstein, 171.  
163 Pleasants, Wittgenstein, 171. 
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transcendental level because things must be the way that their theories depict.’164 
Pleasants summarises his critique of transcendental arguments in social theory thus:  
 
this type of reasoning involves the postulation of various mechanisms, powers, structures, 
etc. at a level which is logically unexperienceable because it supposedly constitutes the very 
conditions of possibility of experience. These transcendental entities are then taken to be, in 
a sense, more ‘real’ than the reality which can be and is known; the former is understood to 
generate the latter. In critical social theory this form of reasoning issues in a conjunction of 
theoretical assertions which purport to explain how people do what they do, how social 
order is sustained, and how social change is possible. Critical social theory is respectably 
fallibilist about particular kinds of knowledge-claim, but assumes infallible authority over 
generalised transcendental knowledge-claims. Wittgenstein tried to show that the 
transcendental form of reasoning is delusory and unsatisfactory because it ultimately does 
not provide the kind of understanding that we (as philosophers) hanker after.165 
 
This echoes Rose’s critique that pre-conditions in sociology, the terms that are supposed 
to explain the conditions, tend to become reified.  
 
Second, both Rose and Pleasants question the strength of the connection between 
correct description and social change. Giddens, Bhaskar and Habermas employ a 
‘double hermeneutic’, focused simultaneously on understanding both society and 
individuals’ capacity to understand themselves differently via understanding social 
theory (and the interaction between these two levels). These thinkers know the 
complications involved here but nevertheless focus more on description than on how 
their work connects with non-specialists. Pleasants discerns a latent positivism in the 
relentless concern with accurate description and failure to appreciate how the technical 
nature of the presentation of the theories inhibits its reception by people in the society it 
wishes to change: ‘theories of people’s behaviour can feed back into that behaviour, 
thereby becoming a factor in sustaining or changing it. But this should be seen as an 
empirical connection, not a transcendental, ontological presupposition.’ 166  Rose 
inherited this concern from Adorno via the question of style, and criticised Giddens and 
Habermas on this basis: 
 
This jettisoning of speculative thinking by recent ‘critical theory’ of modernity has also 
meant the abandonment of that methodological reflexivity, which is equally substantive, 
and which learns by coming to know its own formation in the culture it explores. Habermas 
and Giddens write in the severe style, having disqualified not only Marx and Hegel, but also 
Weber, Horkheimer and Adorno, who are read without any attention to their difficult and 
facetious presentation. This lack of attention to form and style leads to the functionalism of 
                                                
164 Pleasants, Wittgenstein, 178; ‘craving for generality’ is Wittgenstein’s phrase. 
165 Pleasants, Wittgenstein, 181-2. 
166 Pleasants, Wittgenstein, 177. 
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the subject: to the critical theorist who becomes a sociologist, his own authoritative voice a 
neutral, unimplicated discourse of its object.167 
 
Rose and Pleasants differ on how best to respond to their shared dissatisfactions with 
such social theory. Pleasants stresses that he, like Wittgenstein, does not have a 
‘substantive alternative view of “the way things really are”’ with which to replace the 
philosophical pictures that he ‘deconstructs’.168 He thinks the problems matter more 
than the theories, and philosophy as therapeutic description should replace philosophy 
as theory.169 From Rose’s point of view this is a little too easy. It is not that there are no 
pre-conditions or explanations to be had; it is that explanations should be more complex 
than is usually admitted, by reference to a totality (see below). Put otherwise, Pleasants 
has no concept of Schein. Further, how could social and political ‘problems’ be tackled 
without some sense of how things really are and how things should be? And then how 
could those views be justified? Descriptions in Hegel’s view take their meaning from 
wider contexts in which they are embedded in a way that circumvents the 
description/explanation distinction Pleasants wishes to draw: 170  ‘Speculative logic 
contains the former logic and metaphysics, preserves the same forms of thought, the 
same laws and objects, but at the same time in doing so it develops them further and 
transforms them with the help of additional categories.’171 Pleasants suggests that 
Milgram’s obedience experiments and Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust172 are 
two examples of work that can be described more accurately as critical social theory 
than the work of these others precisely because they have affected how many people 
think about themselves and their society. But this proves Rose’s point. Milgram and 
Bauman both produced such important work only by making use of a great deal of 
theory (quantitative, qualitative, sociological, philosophical).173 Further, Bauman ends 
his book by recommending Levinasian ethics; that is, by endorsing a theory to guide 
action. Rose thinks Levinasian ethics suffers from an inability to grapple fully with the 
                                                
167 BM, 245. 
168 Pleasants, Wittgenstein, 181. 
169 Pleasants, Wittgenstein, 182, 14-5. 
170 This sounds a little misleading as Pleasants does allow some role to explanation and theory: 19-26. 
C.f. Robert Brandom, ‘Georg Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit’, Topoi 27 (2008), 161-4. 
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mediations of ethics and politics,174 and this may be true of Pleasants’ Wittgensteinian 
approach. 
 
4 The substance of Rose’s Hegelianism 
Thus it appears Rose’s criticisms of sociology and critical theory express genuine 
worries within the disciplines, and that the main thrust of her understanding of Hegel 
coheres with Pippin’s approach in making the phenomenological rather than 
transcendental deduction of the categories of thought one of the central Hegelian issues. 
If these aspects of her project are well motivated, we are in a better position to 
understand Rose’s intention to present ‘a repristination of the Hegelian project in 
something like its full ambition.’175 At the start of this chapter I mentioned the three 
main pillars of Rose’s speculative thought: a phenomenological justification of ethics, 
society and politics; a triune rather than dichotomous way of thinking; and reference to 
absolute ethical life. As Rose put it:  
 
Hegel put a trinity of ideas in place of Kant’s idea of transcendental method: the idea of 
phenomenology, the idea of absolute ethical life (absolute Sittlichkeit), and the idea of a 
logic. The idea of phenomenology can be seen as an alternative to Kant’s theoretical 
quaestio quid juris, while the idea of absolute ethical life can be seen as an alternative to 
Kant’s justification of moral judgements. This, however, would be to concede the Kantian 
dichotomy between theoretical and practical reason. The idea of all Hegel’s thought is to 
unify theoretical and practical reason. In his Logic, as in all his works, the unification is 
achieved by a phenomenology and the idea of absolute ethical life.176 
 
For Rose, Hegel’s thought was a response to perceived failures with Kant’s 
transcendental idealism whilst remaining committed to transcendental philosophy itself. 
How Kant’s failure is construed will naturally shape the response. If the failure is one of 
logic – transcendental idealism cannot fully account for its precondition – then one 
answer, favoured by Houlgate and Winfield, is a presuppositionless, a priori speculative 
logic that derives logical categories from complete indeterminacy rather than taking 
certain things for granted. If the failure is linked to the failure of theory per se, as with 
Pleasants, then a therapeutic response is called for. Rose does not quite take either of 
these routes. In the final sentence of the above quotation Rose refers the Logic to 
phenomenology and absolute ethical life, not vice versa. That is, she takes the view, like 
Pippin, that the justification for the Science of Logic depends on the Phenomenology of 
                                                
174 For an elaboration of Rose’s critique see Claudia Alvares, Humanism After Colonialism (Oxford: Peter 
Lang, 2006). 
175 Williams, ‘Between’, 9. 
176 HCS, 48. The quaestio quid juris is the question of whether the categories have objective validity.  
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Spirit. The Phenomenology provides a developmental justification of current categories 
of thought and their constitution of experience; whilst the Logic is an immanent 
development of the categories necessary for thinking (now motivated by the 
phenomenology).177 Neither is committed to the view that Hegel’s every move in the 
Logic or his every application of the logic to social philosophy is correct, but both 
regard his work as nevertheless extremely fruitful for understanding the concepts by 
which we understand being.178 Speculation not only accounts for the conditioned by the 
pre-condition but accounts for the very act of accounting (positing).179 It is thus a self-
validating logic and ground of thinking and knowing, providing categories for thinking 
being, in a more expansive and thorough way to Kant, without having attained 
completion or perfection. As Hartmann shows, there is no non-circular way into 
transcendental philosophy, but Hegel’s response to this is to apply the transcendental 
philosophy to everything. What appears at first as a non-transcendental introduction to 
thought turns out later to have been transcendental and justified as such. There is no 
fixed and given ground from which all else is derived, but the ‘whole domain [of 
knowledge] is self-grounding, self-validating. From “outside” it looks like a petitio 
principii, but only from outside. From inside we can demonstrate its systemic 
virtues.’180 Rose calls this ‘beginning in the middle’; Pippin expresses it thus: 
 
the question of what comes to count as, in general, an authoritative explanation of 
objects and events, the decisive classificatory procedure, or evaluative criterion, can 
never itself be resolved by appeal to an ultimate explanatory principle, or general 
regulative ideal, or basic argumentative strategy. There are, finally, no rules to tell us 
which rules we ought to follow in regulating our discursive practices, no intuitions 
certifying the axioms out of which such rules should be constructed, and no 
transcendental argument for the necessary conditions of any experience. What we 
always require is a narrative account of why we have come to regard some set of rules 
or a practice as authoritative. In Hegel’s “phenomenological” version, such an account 
must always appeal to a pre-discursive context or historical experience (sometimes 
simply called “life”) as the origin of such authoritative procedures and rules (even while 
Hegel also maintains that such a context or experience is itself the “product” of a kind 
of prior reflective principles, now become implicit, taken for granted, in everyday social 
life). Our account of our basic sense-making practices is thus tied to an account of the 
aporiai “experienced in the life of Spirit,” and so such a justification is 
everywhere…“dialectical,” and not “logical.”181 
                                                
177 Hegel’s Idealism, 38. 
178 Robert B. Pippin, ‘Hegel and Category Theory’, Review of Metaphysics 43 (June 1990), 839-48; 
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179 See Klaus Hartmann, ‘On Taking the Transcendental Turn’, Review of Metaphysics, 20.2 (Dec 1966), 
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180 Hartmann, ‘Transcendental Turn, 238. 
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readings of Hegel: ‘This approach to Hegel obviously places a very great emphasis on Hegel’s theory of 
sociality, an issue as relevant to his doctrine of “Absolute Knowledge” as to his more familiar discussions 
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For Rose, then, Hegelian speculative logic therefore provides a theory of categories (the 
concepts by which we understand being) on the basis of phenomenology. These 
concepts are both a logic and metaphysics.182 Her reliance on the phenomenological 
motivation and justification for Hegel’s categorial logic is evident when at every point 
she indicates her alternative to neo-Kantian social theory or poststructuralism it is by 
reference to (political) history.183 Consider: in 
 
the erstwhile critical reduction of ‘religion’’…‘the object ‘religion’ is given as a 
positivity…Criticism, Kritik, was quasi-transcendental in its inquiry into the preconditions 
or possibility of its object, but it was restricted to independently specifiable conditions, and 
did not address the formation of its object; and it was, of course, negative and destructive. It 
did not produce a speculative exposition of the historical separation of the institutions of 
Caesar from the institutions of God, which would require neither a sociology nor a 
philosophy of religion, but an investigation into the changing relation between meaning and 
configuration, revelation and realization.184 
 
Or: Hegelian speculative philosophy ‘comprehends the dualisms and deconstructions of 
the first response as the dynamic movement of a political history which can be 
expounded speculatively out of the broken middle.’185 Or: to ‘mediate Christianity with 
speculative thought…would call for the expounding of the truth and untruth of 
Christianity world-historically.’186 And: ‘Not that comprehension completes or closes, 
but that it returns diremption to where it cannot be overcome in exclusive thought or in 
partial action – as long as political history persists.’187 Rose pits the ‘political history 
which would come to know’ itself against the various ‘deconceptualizations and 
displacements’ of political history in the theories she examines in The Broken 
Middle.188 One reason for the brokenness of the middle is (as Pippin stated above) the 
central role of the experience of aporiai in social reality. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
knowledge as, in effect, a social institution, and so to have interpreted his intimidating theory of “the 
Absolute” in terms of social reconciliation (and to have connected his position with many of the aporiai 
of the modern social science tradition), is Gillian Rose in her original and persuasive book (1981). See 
especially her claims about the relation between the Kantian themes of intuition/concept and the young 
Hegel’s doctrine of “recognition.” There is a parallel between her claim about the way the social science 
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“empty,” liberal, individualist political theory is “blind,”…) and the claim I am making about the history 
of the modernity problem.’ 
182 See chapter 2 §4 and chapter 4 §3.1. 
183 C.f. DN, 124, 208-12. Rose noted the importance of history to Adorno too: TMS, 145. 
184 JAM, 37-8. 
185 MBL, 71; c.f. HCS 214. 
186 BM, 39. 
187 BM, xiv. 
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‘expound the metaphysics of thinking with its political history’ and that Levinas’ ethics suffered ‘from its 
separation from politics and history.’ 
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A phenomenological reading of political history thus grounds Rose’s social theory, and 
marks its difference from neo-Kantian social theories. Her motto could have been “no 
social theory without history,” 189  or better, “social theory ultimately depends on 
phenomenology,” on phenomenological accounts of ethics and meaning – not given 
moral-social facts (Durkheim), not arbitrarily-individually chosen meanings (Weber), 
but socio-historically narrated accounts of changed views of reason with an assessment 
of which configuration’s concepts are more rational and better resolve the difficulties in 
earlier accounts. When social theory takes the longer historical view, its object (such as 
‘society’ or ‘religion’) is no longer given but seen to result from earlier forms and 
changes. On a Hegelian view, the only finally adequate form of justification and 
explanation is historical-phenomenological. ‘In Hegel’s thought, ‘spirit’ means the 
structure of recognition or misrecognition in a society. ‘Objective spirit’ is inseparable 
from absolute spirit, the meaning of history as a whole.’190 Although this sounds 
grandiose, it follows from the view of rationality Hegel developed. What, then, is the 
precise nature of this speculative, historical, phenomenological theory?  
 
4.1 Phenomenology   
Rose’s speculative social theory proceeds somewhat like Hegel’s Phenomenology: at 
once the immanent critique of current social forms and the historical-philosophical 
reconstruction of past forms: beginning in the middle. Rose regards many of Hegel’s 
works, especially his early writing, as phenomenological, because ‘the illusions and 
experiences of moral and political consciousness are presented in an order designed to 
show how consciousness may progress through them to comprehension of the 
determination of ethical life.’191 For example, Hegel often begins with what appears 
most natural or immediate to natural consciousness (e.g. the family) in order to show 
how in fact such social forms ‘presuppose an overall economic and political 
organization which may not be immediately intelligible.’192 In the Phenomenology, 
‘natural consciousness’ is the consciousness that either does not recognise it is 
determined, or misrecognises how it is determined. ‘Philosophical consciousness’ 
                                                
189 C.f. JAM, 51. C.f. Pippin, Philosophical Problem, 70: ‘no reliance in a philosophical account on any 
principle or faculty or axiom or procedure, without a “phenomenology” of why we have come to regard 
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presupposed in such strategies. Anything else would be a regression to positivism’. 
190 HCS, 44. 
191 HCS, 53. 
192 HCS, 54. 
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examines the range of forms of misrecognition and the way natural consciousness learns 
from them and draws certain conclusions. It concludes inter alia, that: a 
phenomenological and historical mode of categorial justification comes to replace an a 
priori mode; misrecognition is intrinsic to any recognition, so the process of trying to 
learn must continue; any social theory and ethics has to account for the mixture of 
passivity and activity in subjectivity (hence Sittlichkeit is placed alongside Moralität); 
dichotomies must not be rigidly employed. The result is “absolute knowing”, which is 
comprehensive thinking not omniscience. In contrast to natural consciousness, the 
‘absolute is the comprehensive thinking which transcends the dichotomies between 
concept and intuition, theoretical and practical reason.’193 This learning from immanent 
critique, which entails the possibility of theories and improvement in theories, parallels 
Hegel’s move from the Phenomenology to the Logic and is the reason Osborne and 
Gorman’s charges that Rose cannot account for either social theory or social 
determination do not work.194  
 
Dario Parinetti’s summary of the key components of Hegel’s phenomenology as a 
conceptual rather than causal history will clarify Rose’s position: 
 
1. Hegel’s theory of concepts is a conceptual history and, as such, like naturalistic 
conceptions of logic, is descriptive rather than prescriptive. 
2. The descriptive character of Hegel’s logic does not imply that the theory is non-
normative. A conceptual history will be shown to be a description of relations between 
concepts, rather than of facts about concepts.  
3. Hegel’s position does not entail a rejection of naturalistic accounts of concept 
acquisition. It only entails a rejection of the naturalistic stand-point as an adequate one for 
grounding a philosophical understanding of concepts.195  
 
In contrast with phenomenology, normal historiography or ‘pragmatic history looks for 
the sense or meaning of a series of facts…Pragmatic history, in Hegel’s view, is mostly 
concerned with providing causal explanations for historical events…To represent 
historical events as following from causes such as the contingent intentions of agents or 
the climate of a nation – as pragmatic historians did – is to miss the point of what we 
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want to understand in history’.196 In the realm of spirit (Geist), reasons and not simply 
causes are at work (a Kantian point). As Houlgate explains, ‘only those sequences of 
events which have been brought about by the development of human self-consciousness 
and by the pursuit of consciously articulated goals can really count as 
historical…Change is historical when those involved in it understand it as fitting into a 
narrative scheme of things, when they are conscious of its having historical 
significance.’197 Gorman argues that Rose’s theory of modernity and her approach to the 
Holocaust may be defended only on a ‘weak teleological philosophy of history’ that 
maintains a central place for mutual recognition.198 A weak teleology of history does 
not trace the multiple contingent causes of events but involves retrospectively 
‘reconstructing the dialectical intertwinement of justificatory conceptual systems and 
the forms of life they legitimise, by tracing the pattern of their emergence, development, 
breakdown and reconfiguration in history.’ 199  Historical events ‘do not have an 
immanent telos’ but ‘become historical only when they enter into narratives’ and 
‘world-historical’ when they are judged to shift us from one phenomenological phase to 
another that better accounts for ourselves than previous ones.200  
 
Rose related Sittlichkeit, history and ethical theory in a particular way. The ‘form’ of 
ethics is a question of its historical appearance and preconditions, which ‘shows how 
speculative thinking is social/political/historical.’201 Rose sometimes uses speculative 
thought and experience as synonyms for phenomenology, since Rose’s version of 
speculative philosophy is intrinsically historical. 202  For Hegel the Logic and the 
philosophies of nature and spirit are rationally commensurable, but the Logic presents 
the a priori development of the categories that are necessary for any thought or 
experience überhaupt, whereas the historical realisation of the movement of the 
absolute idea occurs within the realm of contingency and error.203 Likewise, when Rose 
says speculative thought is intrinsically historical, she means both the historical 
                                                
196 Parinetti, ‘History’, 66. C.f. Iain Macdonald, ‘What Is Conceptual History?’ in Hegel: New Directions, 
ed. by Katerina Deligiorgi (Chesham: Acumen, 2006), 207-26. 
197 Introduction, 19. 
198 Gorman, ‘Whither’, 48, which he takes from the work of Pinkard and Pippin (Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s 
Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1994), 331-43; and Hegel’s 
Idealism). He thinks Rose’s later work does not have this philosophy of history, whereas I am about to 
argue it does. He argues her later work is genealogical rather than phenomenological, but I think he 
ignores the way Rose assimilates genealogy to phenomenology. For the same reason I disagree with his 
view that Rose’s later work is perspectival.  
199 Gorman, ‘Whither’, 66. 
200 Gorman, ‘Whither’, 66. 
201 Letter from Rose to J. M. Bernstein, 27 March, 1987, box 36. On ‘form’ see below, chapter 3 §2.2. 
202 HCS, 52. 
203 E.g., Introduction to PhR. 
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expression of the categories of the absolute idea in society and politics and the 
categories themselves. 204  The difference between the rational necessity and 
completeness of the logical categories and their necessarily imperfect socio-historical 
realisation explains Rose’s comments about the surprise involved in reason and reason’s 
moveable boundaries. 205  The rational reconstructions of shapes of spirit and the 
categories therein, which is phenomenology, cannot be deduced a priori (Hegel is not 
deducing nature or history from a priori categories).206  
 
The historical nature of speculative thought in Rose’s social theory includes the 
recognition that the ethical, political, religious and aesthetic terms in social theory have 
a history. 207  In Rose’s interpretation, speculation is similar to Nietzschean or 
Foucaultian genealogy but without the risk of genetic fallacies. 208  ‘Without any 
necessary assumptions of linearity or progression, this alternative description of mutual 
positings and their breakdown also reopens the way to conceive learning, growth and 
knowledge as fallible and precarious, but risk-able. This risk refers to the temporarily 
constitutive positings of each other which form and reform both selves.’209 Hence her 
claim that the two terms of a speculative sentence are filled in over periods of history, 
such that Hegel ‘suspends the history of philosophy within the philosophy of history, 
                                                
204 There is, though, also a historical precondition for Hegel’s presuppositionless derivation of the 
categories, on which see Houlgate, Opening and Kolb, Critique. Houlgate, Introduction, 24: ‘The 
categories of modern consciousness are historical products, but they are not therefore intrinsically limited 
categories because they are the categories through which we have become fully aware of our historicity 
and freedom.’  
205 E.g. JAM, 1-10. Michael O. Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 1994), 78: ‘imperfection is a necessary condition of the social world’s being as it ought to be.’ 
206 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 139. 
207 HCS, 180. PhSp §41. C.f. Howard Caygill, The Art of Judgment (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), which 
began life as a Ph.D. thesis under Rose. He concludes, 393-4: ‘By confronting the tradition with its own 
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philosophy, in other words, can only happen on occasion.’ Caygill presents Kant’s third Critique as self-
consciously aporetic, aiming to state clearly the aporia of judgement not solve it (because aporetic 
philosophy does not believe in solutions); aporia are grasped by understanding their history, and this 
involves seeing their relation to politics and society. It is an excellent example of Rose’s aporetic 
approach to philosophy-and-sociology (MBL, 7-14). 
208 On a Rosean Hegel and Foucault see Kimberly Hutchings, ‘Hard Work: Hegel and the Meaning of the 
State in his Philosophy of Right’, 124-142 in Brooks (ed.) Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. C.f. Bierbricher, 
‘Critical Theories of the State’ on the difficulties of explaining historical change without generating 
universal laws of ‘if x, then y’ form (as sociology tends to), nor losing causality and so explanation 
altogether (as some Nietzscheans and Foucaultians do). C.f. Adorno’s idea of objectivity as ‘sedimented 
history’, Negative Dialectics, trans. by E. B. Ashton (London: Continuum, 1983), 163; Brian O’Connor, 
Adorno’s Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of Critical Rationality (London: MIT, 2004), 
59-60, and ‘Adorno and the Problem of Givenness’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:227 (2004), 
85-99. 
209 MBL, 13.  
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and the philosophy of history within the history of philosophy.’210 (A speculative 
sentence is of the form ‘A is B,’ whilst meaning that A is identical to and different from 
B. See the next section). Social theory and explanation are therefore primarily 
historical-philosophical rather than the scientific demonstration of highly probable 
correlations. The latter are only moments within a larger whole.  
 
History is also the basis of Rose’s distinction between the Aristotelian and Hegelian 
forms of aporia. Aristotle’s aporia concentrated on the difficulty (metaphysical and 
epistemological) of connecting universal and particular,211 whereas ‘the re-construction 
of the history of [ethical] form, the recognition of experience, must be intrinsic to any 
abstract statement of how there is aporia in Hegel’.212 As J. M. Bernstein put it in a 
paper expressing their joint views, the absolute is ‘the fate of subject and substance, the 
experience that has developed from Sittlichkeit to Legal Status to 
Morality…Institutional history and metaphysical history are the same and different.’213 
Here again, what subjects are, how they live and think, are deeply bound to social 
institutions (substance). The changes Bernstein enumerates are changes of shapes of 
spirit throughout European history as phenomenologically reconstructed by Hegel, to 
which Rose remained committed. It is important to note, then, that the content of the 
terms of a speculative proposition in social theory do not simply yield themselves 
through pure a priori thinking (marking a difference from logical speculation). Their 
content is revealed through their historical use, which is the entry point for (the 
necessity of) contingency, surprise, inversions.214  
 
Rose’s historical version of speculation entails a philosophy of history – nicely 
described as ‘weak teleology’ – the nub of which she puts thus: 
 
                                                
210 DN, 3. EL §161: ‘The way the concept proceeds is no longer passing over or shining in an other. It is 
instead development since what are differentiated are at the same time immediately posited as identical 
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is, by contrast, the development, by means of which that alone is posited that is already on hand in itself.’ 
C.f. EL §159. 
211 See Edward Booth, O.P., Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1983), cited in BM, 165-9. Booth shows Aristotle was not rigid in 
applying the laws of the excluded middle and non-contradiction precisely because he recognised the 
aporetic nature of metaphysics. 
212 Rose, letter to J. M. Bernstein, 27 March, 1987. 
213 ‘Speculation and aporia’, 2 April 1987, box 36, 5. 
214 See Pippin, ‘Logic of Experience’. 
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This is how the philosophy of history should be conceived, not as a teleology of 
reconciliation, not as replacing the exhausted attempt to create a Christian civilization, but 
as perpetual repetition, as the perpetual completing of the historic Good Friday by the 
speculative Good Friday. There is no end of religion and no end of history, but a perpetual 
‘speculative justification’ to complete the faith which ‘justifies nothing’. 
Hegel is not sanguine that the rational completing of the meaning of religion will make 
possible a rational ethical life in the way a realization of the principle of the Christian 
religion would have done. But he is sure that misrepresentation and irrational political life 
will continue in history, and that philosophy will have to be more armed against its 
irrationality not less. But this philosophic rationality may not bring freedom.215 
 
Once an idea is realised in the world the idea’s own conceptual necessity has a certain 
force.216 To take one of Hegel’s examples, once the idea of the infinite worth of the 
individual is brought into history by Christianity, it can be seen that slavery is rationally 
untenable, although this takes quite some time.217 The idea itself plays a role in the 
eventual end of slavery’s sanction by the state. There is merely surface tension between 
saying a concept can only be understood through its history of use and that a concept 
has a kind of independent force once it is unleashed in the world. Both are aspects of 
(the movement of) the concept. To understand a concept through its use and 
development is to understand the concept itself, its inner necessity. Coming to see that 
slavery is wrong is coming to understand better what the infinite worth of individuals 
means. Hence Rose’s is a social theory that provides rational justification for 
institutions, not simply descriptions. This is how Rose and Hegel avoid the genetic 
fallacy, prevent philosophy collapsing into sociology of knowledge, and manage the 
tension between historicism and realism in epistemology: 
 
we do not form the concepts at all and…the concept in general is not to be considered 
something that has a genesis at all…It is wrong to assume, first that there are objects which 
form the content of our representations and then our subjective activity comes along behind 
them, forming the concepts of objects by means of the earlier mentioned operation of 
abstracting and gathering together what is common to the objects. On the contrary, the 
concept is what is truly first and the things are what they are, thanks to the activity of the 
concept dwelling in them and revealing itself in them. In our religious consciousness this 
surfaces in such a way that we say, ‘God created the world out of nothing’ or, to put it 
otherwise, ‘the world and finite things have gone forth out of the fullness of divine thoughts 
and divine decrees’. In this manner it is recognized that the thought and, more precisely, the 
concept is the infinite form or the free, creative activity, which is not in need of some stuff 
on hand outside itself, in order to realize itself.218   
 
                                                
215 HCS, 127. C.f. Kant’s ‘A Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: ‘Is the Human Race Continually 
Improving?’’ (from The Contest of Faculties), esp. §7.  
216 EL §147. 
217 EL §163.  
218 EL §163 Addition 2, C.f. §213 Addition. 
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Hegelian philosophy is historically rational: developmental justification occurs by 
reference to past forms of life and their reason-giving, but it does not thereby lose the 
concept of objectivity and thus may enquire after the rationality of contemporary life 
forms.219 The combination is designed to avoid dogmatism (or foundationalism) and 
scepticism. Hegel’s position refuses the restriction of epistemological options to the 
dogmatic view that the truth is out there to be had directly or the sceptical alternative of 
reason as pragmatic, relative or sophistic. 220  Rose thus makes phenomenological 
reconstruction essential to any rational justification in social theory (one sees the 
Hegelian roots of the Frankfurt motto that epistemology is social theory). The shape of 
spirit and its justification emerge from a history of experiences of contradiction, 
determinate negation, reformulation and readjustment. This enables a way of 
understanding how we are determined subjects:  
 
This perspective is comprehensive, Begreifendes, conceptual in the sense of complete, not 
in the sense of the abstract concept. It conceives or grasps the absolute as it is determined in 
all the shapes of consciousness. It is not a static or prejudged knowledge but comprehends 
the shapes of consciousness as they appear in their contradictions….The absolute or 
substance appears as consciousness and its oppositions or differentiations. To know that 
consciousness divides itself into abstract concept and oppositions is not the same as 
consciousness’ knowing of that opposition. It is a knowing which knows consciousness and 
its oppositions and is therefore comprehensive.221  
 
A more comprehensive social theory will have a grasp of both consciousness and its 
oppositions as both part of the same shape of spirit. Hence Rose’s claim that the 
‘identity of religion and the state is the fundamental speculative proposition of Hegel’s 
thought, or, and this is to say the same thing, the speculative experience of the lack of 
identity between religion and the state is the basic object of Hegel’s exposition.’222 The 
religion-state speculative identity is intended to direct attention to the whole history of 
the harmony and disharmony between ‘subjective disposition (die Gesinnung)’ and 
‘absolute ethical life’,223 custom and constitution. Other modulations of this appeared as 
the ‘antinomy of law’ (in Dialectic of Nihilism) and as the diremption between law and 
ethics (in The Broken Middle); each a way of thinking about the relation between formal 
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law and informal ethical life, as mediated by the ‘third’ of theory or the individual 
(respectively). We will return to speculative sentences below; for now, the main point is 
Rose’s social theory asks and has the means to answer what makes social forms and 
institutions rational and whether they are more or less rational than other forms. Its 
historical-rational form is both more thoroughly historical than transcendental sociology 
and more explicit about making normative-because-rational assessments. That is why it 
better expresses the experience of coming to learn, on a group and historical level (not 
just individually).  
 
The question can always be raised, however, as to whether the phenomenological 
account is sufficiently historical or whether it has filtered out the messy reality of the 
past in order to make conceptual sense. Rose would answer in the affirmative. Any 
totality and any position are always only provisional and, as David Elder-Vass notes, 
explanations are always abstractions in which we make judgements about which are the 
most important causal factors, and we may err significantly.224 Yet phenomenology as 
Rose construes it foregrounds this feature of theory and judgement, which is the best 
way to address it, since error is ineliminable.  
 
If the phenomenological learning process is the motivation and justification for the 
standpoint of the Logic then Hegel provides the most profound logical grounding for 
sociology because logic is social. Hegel’s Phenomenology was the first work to relate 
internally epistemology, sociology of knowledge and the sociology of philosophy. In 
one sense, socio-logic just is logic; though to accept this is to deny any complete 
epistemological grounding in formal logic.225 Rose’s social philosophy may prevent 
certain intellectual missteps, then, just because it appreciates the logical as well as the 
social underpinning of sociological thought. This is apparent if one compares to Rose 
Randall Collins’ epic work, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of 
Intellectual Change.226 Collins seeks to operate with a minimal of theoretical and 
normative baggage, observing the operation of philosophers in their various contexts, 
across history and culture, in order to draw immanent lessons from the process. Some of 
his conclusions coincide with Rose’s; for instance, ‘we are always in media res, in the 
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middle of things’ such that the ‘successive layers of context for the minds of 
philosophers display no sharp borders. There is no criterion for arbitrarily stopping’.227 
Increasingly comprehensive explanations are a central component of Rose’s speculative 
philosophy, as is “beginning in the middle.” The Broken Middle is in part an essay on 
the way in which social philosophies are determined by fundamental features of modern 
societies. But Collins’ empiricism will only take him so far, and problems occur as he 
attempts to extend his work into philosophy. In the epilogue, Collins seeks to draw out 
epistemological lessons from his huge survey. He concludes that conceptual universals 
come from the external world rather than the mind’s spontaneity; he reverts, in other 
words, to pre-Kantian empiricism. In this case, the “error” is not serious for Collins’ 
sociological findings, but is not much use philosophically. Collins is attempting to 
justify the use of universal concepts against what he regards as postmodern scepticism 
about universals. He thus aimed at the same philosophical result as Rose, but with less 
sophistication. Collins’ second mistake is more sociologically deleterious, however. 
Collins underplays the force of ideas themselves within philosophy, by leaving out the 
question of the truth of ideas. That is, at times he inadvertently reduces philosophy to 
sociology of knowledge. As Austin Harrington observed his account then becomes 
circular and question begging: he seeks to explain the social success of ideas through 
their social success. 228  We have already seen Rose’s critique of this. 229  One of 
advantages of Rose’s social philosophy is an appreciation of Hegel’s logic and 
phenomenology in order to help avoid these sorts of glitches. A further advantage of 
Hegel’s logic is its ability to account for its own logical and social preconditions, and 
thus to be its own metatheory, which relates to what Rose termed its triune rather than 
dualistic or dichotomous nature. 
 
4.2 Triune rationality 
A common response to the central antinomy of sociology – whether society makes 
people or people make society – is, “both.” This employs the category Hegel terms 
‘reciprocity’. It prevents the chicken-and-egg situation between the two terms. 
‘Reciprocity is, to be sure, the proximate truth about the relationship of cause and effect 
and it stands, so to speak, on the threshold of the concept.’230 The problem is it leaves 
                                                
227 Collin, Sociology of Philosophies, 860-1. 
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each side ‘as something immediately given’ rather than ‘coming to know them as 
moments of a third, higher [dimension], which is precisely the concept.’ 231  He 
continues:  
 
If we consider, for example, the customs of the Spartan people as the effect of its 
constitution and then, vice versa, this as the effect of its customs, this consideration may for 
all that be correct; but this construal, for this reason, does not provide any ultimate 
satisfaction, since by this means neither the constitution nor the customs of this people are 
in fact comprehended. That happens only by virtue of the fact that those two sides, and 
equally all the remaining particular sides revealed by the life and history of the Spartan 
people, are known to be grounded [begründet] in this concept. 
 
What is this third moment called the ‘concept’ (der Begriff) and how does it provide 
better comprehension of sociology’s central antinomy? Two ways of thinking about the 
concept are helpful to bear in mind before approaching Hegel’s Logic directly, after 
which I will outline Rose’s appropriation thereof. One way to think about Hegel’s idea 
of the concept is as an emergent whole.232 An emergent social structure is an entity 
within a society, which endures for a time as relatively stable or self-identical, which 
has causal powers. Such entities are emergent insofar as they exist only by virtue of the 
arrangement of their parts. By contrast, an aggregate of parts is indifferent to its 
arrangement (the mass of a whole, for instance, is just the sum of the mass of the parts). 
Emergent properties are explained by parts-in-relations. That does not explain away the 
whole (or higher level, if you prefer) because the whole just is the parts-in-relation. A 
whole may be therefore more than the sum of its parts and its emergent properties have 
real causal powers. For Hegel, this is the difference between a mechanic whole and its 
parts, and an organic whole.233 The importance Rose attached to the institutions of the 
middle – that is, of civil society – could be seen to stem in part from their role in social 
causation (though this is to go beyond Rose’s own statements). Her view coheres with 
Adorno’s that the social totality is ‘a reality. He does not posit it as an interpretative 
heuristic, as something whose status concerns us only in so far as it assists our 
understanding. Rather…it is the case that society acts as a totality and it is only when 
we begin to read social phenomena as its moments that their deeper significance can be 
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appreciated.’234 Rose would insist that causally efficacious social entities within society 
historically arise and pass away. 
 
Indeed, Roy Bhaskar, the creator of the emergence paradigm within contemporary 
sociology, later turned to dialectics as a conceptual form of emergence providing ‘an 
analogue of real material emergence’235 and as a corollary saw material emergence as ‘a 
genuine ontological analogue of Hegelian preservative determinate negation.’ 236 
Bhaskar wished to distinguish his own version of emergence from Hegel’s, because he 
thought the ‘Hegelian totality is constellationally closed, completed.’237 Rose had 
already moved away from this version of Hegel by 1981, undoubtedly under the 
influence of Adorno, and it is now of course a mainstream position within Hegelian 
scholarship. William Outhwaite called Bhaskar’s critical realism, ‘a model which 
attempts to bring together metatheoretical and substantive theoretical considerations, 
and which can do justice to the multiplicity of social relations under conditions of 
advanced modernity.’238 I am arguing this characterises Rose’s work too. 
 
If one way to think about the Hegelian concept is as an emergent whole, another is to 
ask after the nature of an adequate explanation. Kant had pointed out the necessity for 
presupposing teleology in order to understand some systems (such as nature or history 
or a blade of grass),239 and Hegel agreed. There is no need to read this as a crude 
version of teleology, and one of the achievements of Hegel Contra Sociology was to 
offer one of the earliest Anglophone interpretations of Hegel to avoid this error. Causal 
explanations explain one thing in terms of another, but thereby create an infinite regress. 
Richard Winfield comments that since cause and effect are indifferent to their content, 
even mutual cause/effect relations, such as reciprocity, lead to infinite regresses.240 By 
contrast, to understand something conceptually is to see its parts and the relations 
among them as internally connected. Rather than the relations between contents being 
indifferent to the contents, the relations are an unfolding of the content; the unfolding is 
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a self-unfolding; the causality is final as well as efficient. To understand the whole is to 
understand how everything connects. That is a virtuously circular understanding, 
because any part of the system leads eventually to every other. Precisely because we are 
led around the system we avoid the infinite regress of cause and effect. This is the 
difference between Hegelian and neo-Kantian circularity. For Hegel ‘it was precisely 
the distinguishing feature and ultimate aim of every philosophical science to 
comprehend a “whole” in accordance with its immanent self-organizing character, that 
is, as an organism, and simultaneously through this comprehension to unfold itself as a 
methodically structured and organized system.’241 Complete knowledge of this kind is 
clearly impossible, which is why Rose emphasises the provisional nature of such 
knowledge, what I have here called ‘implied totalities’. It is a system without 
totalisation.242 
 
Hegel’s Science of Logic is divided into three parts: the Logics of Being, Essence and 
the Concept. Concept translates Begriff, a holding together, comprehension. The section 
on the concept examines various ways of thinking about self-differentiated unity: the 
universal, concept, judgment, syllogism and absolute idea.243 The concept is defined by 
the interrelation of universal, particular and individual (Rose uses ‘singular’ rather than 
individual). 244  Rose calls this thinking triune, rather than trichotomous, precisely 
because the three terms form a unity. ‘The three moments of the concept are the 
universal, the particular, and the individual. These terms approximately parallel the 
traditional genus, species, and individual.’245 ‘Socrates’ is an individual, ‘man’ is a 
particular. Hegel’s universals exist in individuals as a concrete universal. The normal 
use of ‘concept’ to designate ideas such as ‘tree’ or ‘person’ is in Hegel’s view an 
abstract understanding of concept because it does not employ fully developed concepts 
with all their determinations – the combination of universal, particular and individual.246 
Hegel’s particular is ‘a definite content or quality defined over against other such 
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qualities, but now that content is seen as a particularization of some universal unity.’247 
His individual is a single subsistence, a ‘type of organic internally-articulated and self-
sufficient individual in which the dichotomy between ‘particularity’ and ‘universality’ 
was somehow resolved’. 248  The differentiated unity of universal, particular and 
individual is the unity of the concept.  
 
The unity of the concept is Hegel’s equivalent to Kant’s unity of apperception.249 The 
unity is negative: Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception and Hegel’s concept are 
not identical with any of their moments but do require those moments to exist because 
they are (at least potentially) the self-reflexive awareness of those contents.250 In Kant’s 
apperception the knower both judges and (potentially) knows she is making a 
judgement in this way. In Hegel’s logic, a judgement is both a positing of a relation 
between the three moments of the concept and the awareness of this positing. In 
idealism the judger simultaneously judges and takes herself to be making a judgement 
using certain categories. And this raises the question not only of the truth or validity of 
the specific judgement but also of the criteria for the categories by which judgements 
are made. Whereas Kant had twelve categories based on classical logical forms of 
judgement, in Hegel’s logic the categories are derived rather than taken as given.251 The 
shift from the logic of essence to concept is therefore not the discovery of an extra thing 
in the world but a different way of viewing the moments: as taken-to-be-moments-of-a-
whole rather than as immediately given moments. But this means one must at the 
philosophical level think simultaneously about the world and categories for how to 
think about the world. Hegel saw that the rationality of the latter is historically and 
socially formed and justified. Hence for Rose epistemology is social theory and Hegel is 
one of the first great modern social theorists, who, like Rose after him, had an expansive 
conception of social theory. In this way, by combining phenomenology and logic, 
Hegel’s philosophy is its own metaphilosophy. Hegel viewed the Logic as the immanent 
exploration of the structures and content of the categories that constitute both reason 
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and the world. 252  The Logic develops ‘the concepts of particular areas of the 
experienced world by deriving pure, a priori conceptual determination immanently from 
the logical structure of reason, and by then looking to experience to find the particular 
empirical phenomena which manifest those determinations and which provide us with 
the contingent details that extend and fill out our understanding of those determinations’ 
– a combination of both empirical investigation and a priori dialectical generation of 
categories. 253  This logical derivation of categories is immanently, dialectically 
developmental. The categories of thought dialectically sublate themselves in a process 
of increasing complexity and refinement, until, at the end, they are seen as various 
‘definitions of the absolute’.254 Hegel himself, then, combines empirical investigation 
with speculative logic, and keeps the latter open to revision by the former (though to 
what extent speculative logic is or could be finished or completed is an ongoing debate). 
Hegel acknowledges that speculative logic is often not necessary in everyday reasoning, 
geometry or the natural sciences, but it is ‘the only method for determining the inherent 
character of thought.’255 Conceptual thinking does not replace explanation in terms of 
reciprocity but contextualises (sublates) it in the whole-as-self-relating-and-developing 
(the concept). It switches the bad infinite (regress) of reciprocity for the good infinite 
(regress) of conceptual/speculative thinking. But just this is the ‘formulation of 
fundamental concepts and principles which govern all conceptual explanation.’256 So 
Hegel’s philosophy does not necessarily give different empirical explanations of social 
phenomena from those provided by transcendental sociology but it can account for itself 
better: it is the ‘most general conceptual framework for all the sciences.’257 As a 
philosophy that includes its own derivation and ground, it is its own metaphilosophy.  
 
In Hegel’s view, the threefold division of the Logic is reflected in modern society’s 
threefold division between individual/family, civil society and state, which is why 
modern society better reflects the concept. In pre-modern societies, the universal (the 
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whole society) is immediate: there is too much unity, insufficient provision for the 
differences of individuals and social roles (his discussion of Antigone in 
Phenomenology). In modern society, these differences have been accommodated: now 
the universal is quite formal, largely procedural, thinner on content, and more content 
comes from the individuals themselves. This difference is built into the institutions and 
social structures of modern society. This room for difference is a great achievement of 
modernity but is one-sided. The state should be a way of addressing this one-sidedness 
by its role as the larger context within which civil society and individuals attain full 
rationality.258 The individuals (and their families) and civil society are more immediate 
than the state but presuppose and depend on the state to work in the way they should, 
namely, as means to and modes of freedom.259 In the state the individuals and their 
particular desires and roles have reference to the universal, the common good. This 
larger unity must already exist for civil society to be there in the first place. ‘To think 
about civil society we need to be able to distinguish a formal process of interaction from 
the particular content and particular interactions of its members.’260 This is ‘not a 
fragmenting of unity so much a new kind of unity.’261 The diremptions of modern 
society are part of its unity; it is a broken middle.262 
 
In Hegel’s syllogisms each moment can mediate between the others: universal-
particular-individual, universal-individual-particular, particular-individual-universal.263 
As Hegel remarks,264 the particularity of individuals (their physical and spiritual needs) 
mediates them, via civil society, to the universal state. But equally the individual is the 
middle term between state and civil society insofar as her will and activity realises (we 
could say, reproduces) the law and economy whilst simultaneously satisfying her needs 
by use of civil institutions. And finally the state mediates between individual and civil 
society by making both possible. ‘Since the mediation joins each of the determinations 
                                                
258 See Neuhouser, Foundations. 
259 Kant expounded the state as the basis of individual freedom (The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, 
trans. by John Ladd (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 43), as did neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen, Paul 
Natorp and Rudolf Stammler, discussed in HCS and DN. We will see some of the differences below. C.f. 
Chris Thornhill, German Political Philosophy: The Metaphysics of Law (London: Routledge, 2007), 239-
60. 
260 Kolb, Critique, 58. Kolb, 59, parallel to Rose, argues that ‘Weber’s categories…do not move on to the 
level of explicit totality.’  
261 Kolb, Critique, 68. 
262 The ‘entirety of society’ is, for Adorno, a ‘unity containing contradictions’: ‘Lyric Poetry and 
Society’, Adorno Reader, 211-29 (214).  
263 EL §198. For an excellent discussion of this feature of conceptual thinking as it relates to historical 
societies, see Dieter Henrich, ‘Logical Form and Real Totality: The Authentic Conceptual Form of 
Hegel’s Concept of the State’, in Hegel, ed. by Pippin and Höffe, 241-67. 
264 EL §198 Remark. 
 71 
with the other extreme, each joins itself precisely in this way together with itself; it 
produces itself and this production is its self-preservation. – It is only through the nature 
of this joining together, through this triad of syllogisms with the same terminus, that a 
whole is truly understood in its organization.’265 For Rose these are schematic rather 
than exhaustive statements, intended to direct sociological investigation, yet they do so 
in a slightly altered way from neo-Kantian sociology. Some of the main meanings of 
Rose’s term the ‘third’ are now visible: teleology, differentiated unity and emergence as 
contexts for relating two terms (a condition and pre-condition). The third can thus be the 
speculative social totality, or it can be specifically a third thing alongside two others, or 
the intersubjective positings between two (or more) people.266 
 
The essential structure of modern societies for Hegel is the triangular relation between 
individual, civil society (which includes the economy) and state.267 Individuals (from 
families) are related to two different kinds of structures, each in a fundamentally 
different way and with different forms of mediation: civil society is the realm in which 
individuals may rightly pursue their individual needs and goals, the state is the sphere 
wherein they relate themselves to the universal needs and goals. Hegelians know this as 
the result of, and to gain its justification from, a history. It is a more complex structure 
than the individual-society dichotomy. It is not a trichotomy because it does not split the 
terms from one another but is triune because it understands the terms through one 
another.268 Hence we exist in ‘a triune structure in which we suffer and act as singular, 
individual and universal; or, as particular, as represented in institutions of the middle, 
and as the state – where we are singular, individual and universal in each position.’269 
As the Frankfurt Institute put it, ‘insight into the dynamic structure of society requires 
the untiring effort to attain the unity of the general and the particular.’270 It is the 
internality of the individual, singular and universal to one another that marks conceptual 
thinking, which in reference to the state, means individuals and state constitute one 
another, are internally not externally related. 
 
The syllogistic form of mediation for the political constitution resulted...from the fact 
that it can be understood not as a kind of free-floating power hovering over and above 
the individual members of civil society, but only as something that expressly requires 
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these individual members as its bearers and functionaries. It is always singular 
individuals who have the task of mediating the particular interests of an estate or class 
with the universal interest of the state. These individuals are identical with the bearers 
of the political powers, and thus with the government functionaries and officials and the 
individual members of the legislative body (or bodies).271 
 
Sparta’s customs and constitution can in this light be seen as the unfolding of a self-
moving whole, not simply the back-and-forth between two pre-defined terms; in the 
whole understood conceptually the parts are essential to the whole, not accidental 
properties.272 The picture is not of an enduring substrate with subtractable predicates; 
rather a conceptual whole is ‘organic’: each part is necessary to the whole and is itself 
only in the whole; in this sense, each part is or expresses the whole.273 The concept also 
names what it is that makes the thing the thing that it is. The concept is similar to 
Aristotelian form: it is what makes, say, an eye an eye; what it is we understand by 
‘eye’ that is not the same as listing all its properties. If the eye is removed from the body 
(the whole) it dies, and is no longer properly an eye, but a piece of flesh. Contrast this to 
a cog as part of a machine: separate from its whole, it remains what it is. The difference 
between reciprocal and conceptual thinking is the difference between understanding the 
relation between things in terms of ‘efficient causes all the way down’ versus their 
relation in terms of ‘what they are’.274 Hegel suggests we need to posit (retrospectively, 
phenomenologically) something like “the concept (or spirit) of Sparta” as what develops 
and expresses itself in the reciprocal interaction between customs and constitution: ‘it is 
a specific spirit which makes itself into an actual world which now exists objectively in 
its religion, its ritual, its customs, constitution and political laws, and in the whole range 
of its institutions, events and deeds. That is its creation – that is this people.’275 The 
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purposiveness or teleology – that is, the self-organising nature – of the state, is internal 
to the state itself because it is a product of human will (it is not a regulative idea, 
externally imposed, as Kant’s teleology of nature in Hegel’s view).276 This is the whole 
that reciprocal thinking does not yet see.277 ‘In this respect, the absolute idea is 
comparable to the old man who says the same religious sentences as the child does, but 
for the old man they have the meaning of his entire life.278 Again, conceptual circularity 
is different from transcendental circularity. ‘To escape the clutches of the Logic of 
Essence, the determiner has to become both determiner and determined, and the 
determined has to be both determiner and determined. Only then will the defining 
distinction between determiner and determined determinacy be removed. Once this 
occurs, the determination of determined determinacy will give way to self-
determination, to which Hegel will link the concept and the universal.’279 One may say 
it is ungrounded in the sense that each part is both ground and grounded; it as a ‘chain 
of syllogisms returning into themselves…a form of thinking that can be described best 
as a “synoptic conceptualisation” [Zusamndenken].’280 This is the difference between 
Rose’s conceptual critique and the quasi-transcendental metacritique. Both accept that 
transcendentally functioning pre-conditions for empirical features of society are 
themselves empirical but the fluidity of conceptual thinking is less prone to reifying the 
pre-condition into something non-immanent. Weber, for example, arguably remains at 
the level of logic of essence insofar as his dichotomies (structure versus will, procedure 
versus content) prioritise one term over the others.281 This applies to his methodological 
individualism although his ideal types could be used in a conceptual manner. Whether 
all the metacritiques Rose accuses of this mistake actually commit it is debateable, but 
the import is clear. 
 
Thus far, this account of the concept as an emergent or organic whole, with both 
ontological and epistemological components, has emphasised the unity of the totality 
and concept, arguably like Hegel himself. (In fact, Rose thought, ‘Hegel himself 
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provides an account of why his view is ‘not secure’282). For Rose, however, the concept 
is always internally fractured, dirempted, both ontologically and epistemologically. 
What in Hegel Contra Sociology she calls the circle and the breaks in the circle,283 she 
later thought of as the broken middle. Thus any social totality always contains tensions 
and diremptions, never perfectly realises itself. Modern society’s diremptions are a key 
focus for Rose, not only as essential to the nature of modernity (though, she would also 
argue, to human society tout court, albeit in different forms) but also to critiquing social 
philosophy where it imagines its theories can mend these socially produced and existing 
diremptions. (In chapter 4 we will see the implications of this for ethics and mutual 
recognition. In chapter 2 I will further refine Rose’s view of the social totality in 
comparison to Adorno). This is why the category of Schein from the Logic of Essence 
remains central to Rose’s social philosophy: modern society includes moments of 
conceptuality and essentiality, such that categories from both are needed to understand 
it.284 Thus whereas the concept makes a thing what it is, insofar as it defines what 
something really is (and for idealism human consciousness has a constitutive role in the 
process), any concept of the Geist of a people will always be a provisional, retrospective 
reconstruction, a far more complex judgement than the biological metaphors may 
suggest. Only after the development has occurred, for instance, can the social theorist 
begin to grasp the concept of Sparta. There is a large measure of contingency in the 
coming to be of any form of Geist. Hegel regarded Sparta’s concept (as with all the 
Greek world) as substantial unity (Sittlichkeit), and the concept for modern society as 
freedom.285 But for Rose the freedom is one that can never fully work, there will always 
be unbalance between individual, state and civil society: the broken middle. ‘These 
institutions of the middle represent and configure the relation between particular and 
state: they stage the agon between the three in one, one in three of singular, individual, 
universal; they represent the middle, broken between morality and legality, autonomy 
and heteronomy, cognition and norm, activity and passivity.’286 Rose’s stress on the 
disunity within the whole avoids the over-simplification that organic language for the 
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modern state could entail (and shows the influence of her teacher Henrich).287 Rose’s 
stress on the breaks between universal, particular and singular express the fact that the 
state and its members not only express one another internally but also differ from one 
another. The state is both internal and external to its members, hence the importance of 
the speculative rather than simple identities (or disjunctions) between politics and 
ideology, state and religion.  
 
It is clear from this example just how different phenomenological conceptual history is 
from normal, causal history. If the concept or spirit of Sparta as substantial unity or 
Sittlichkeit were supposed to explain (or deduce) its entire history in detail, Hegel’s 
theory would clearly be incredible. Instead, Hegel is focused on the rationality of the 
shape of spirit, the fundamental way of thinking that underlies and is produced by 
ethics, politics and epistemology. Speculative or phenomenological social theory is thus 
only one line of enquiry, and it cannot replace other kinds of history or sociology (Rose, 
we have seen, has no illusions about this). Yet that does not make its rational basis 
irrelevant to other kinds of social theorising. Indeed, three years after Rose’s book both 
Anthony Giddens’ The Constitution of Society and Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction were 
published in English. Each of these theories – structuration and habitus – was an 
attempt to get past the prioritising of one side of sociology’s antinomy and the 
objectivism-subjectivism dichotomy then dominating sociology and its classical 
tradition. In that sense they are close to Rose’s own position.288 As Simon Binney 
pointed out in a letter to her, with Hegel’s philosophy she had ‘deconstructed’ the usual 
dichotomies of ‘individual/society, freedom/necessity, idealism/materialism’, and was 
therefore very close to Bourdieu, Giddens and Bhaskar.289 Thus it appears that as social 
theory advanced it did so in the Hegelian direction Rose set out. Her reply to Binney 
was not a model of perspicacity: ‘the quest must be for the third position which I have 
continued to seek to formulate, not by turning to those works of my contemporaries 
which you mention but more to the different traditions of historical jurisdictions which 
emerge, recognised and unrecognised, in the works of those you mention.’290 When the 
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phenomenological approach to political history and law is seen as central to Rose’s 
social theory, however, her remark makes more sense.291  
 
4.3 Speculative propositions 
Rose relates the triune rationality of speculative philosophy to speculative propositions 
or sentences. Speculative sentences in the Logic are about categories of thought, such as 
‘being is the indeterminate immediate.’ 292 That is, speculative sentences combine 
subject and predicate terms both of which are ‘logical categories or universal 
concepts.’293 The speculative sentence states identity and difference between the two 
terms.294 The subject and predicate are conceptually different but not distinct. There is 
also a related but distinct ‘pre-systematic’ 295  dimension of speculative thought: 
dialectical attention to the form of ordinary subject-predicate sentences already reveals 
the complexity of speculative philosophy (without the need for any particular theory of 
language). Here the subject-predicate sentences do not combine only two universals but 
may combine a universal and particular, such as ‘God is love.’ These sentences begin 
with the subject as a ‘meaningless sound, a mere name’ and only the combination of 
subject and predicate provides any meaning.296 Why, then, bother with the subject at 
all? In part because ordinary consciousness implicitly knows there is a difference 
between the subject and predicate, even though the predicate is supposed to express the 
essence of the subject: ‘it is not simply the universal which we want directly given, but 
the universal as manifested in a concrete manner.’297 Once again there is difference but 
not complete distinction. Thus speculative sentences express the movement of triune 
rationality through the tension between their form ‘A is B’ and their content ‘A is B and 
not B’. 
 
In each case, systematic or pre-systematic, the identity between subject and predicate is 
more complex than initially realised; and ‘only’ the ‘dialectical movement of the 
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proposition…is…a speculative account.’298 In each case, the idea of the subject as a 
substance supporting accidents falls away in the face of this movement of the subject 
and predicate: 
 
Since the concept is the object’s own self, that is, the self which exhibits itself as the 
object’s coming-to-be, it is not a motionless subject passively supporting the accidents; 
rather, it is the self-moving concept which takes its determinations back into itself. Within 
this movement, the motionless subject itself breaks down; it enters into the distinctions and 
the content and constitutes the determinateness, which is to say, the distinguished content as 
well as the content’s movement, instead of continuing simply to confront that movement.299 
 
For example, ‘the tulip is red’ is usually taken to indicate a self-sufficient subject (the 
tulip) to which is ascribed an accidental predicate (redness), though the tulip could 
imaginably be yellow, and so redness cannot be taken to be essential to the nature of 
what it is to be a tulip. In a speculative sentence however, the predicate does express the 
essential nature of the subject, such that the subject can no longer be thought of as an 
inert substance supporting accidents. This tulip is essentially red. The subject is no 
longer a firm point of reference but something now thought in a different way, and of 
course the same thing is happening to the predicate.300 But this will only work if there is 
both a dialectical movement back and forth between the two terms and if the speculative 
sentence is set within a whole discourse of speculative sentences providing context and 
meaning to one another. Since speculative sentences articulate the nature of thought, 
and thought is inherently developmental, the sentences themselves must be part of a 
whole development of thought and reason, which no single speculative sentence can 
achieve.301 The subject of the subject-predicate sentence proceeds by the same self-
developing or negative self-articulation as the self-conscious subject;302 and just this 
thought undermines the conception of the self-conscious subject as a substance with 
externally attached accidents. 
 
Rose’s use of speculative thinking within social theory is closer to what Surber calls its 
pre-systematic use than the systematic use in Hegel’s Logic, since the terms in question 
are not the fundamental categories necessary for thinking per se but the historically 
given terms by which we understand our social world. In Rose’s view, speculative 
philosophy is required for understanding the human social world because it dialectically 
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and progressively relates finite and infinite; it knows what Spirit is in and for itself, a 
matter of ‘practical self-consciousness’.303 History, reason and Geist cannot properly be 
understood in ‘ordinary, finite terms’,304 which is why positivism does not suffice.305 
Speculative social theory therefore takes less for granted than its transcendental or 
quasi-transcendental cousins, just as it does in logic. For example, it provides a 
powerful way of handling contradiction and antimony. Here we may consider a very 
different kind of sociology from Rose’s own writing, in order to see how her social 
philosophy is equally capable of providing a logic of descriptive/empirical sociology. In 
2012 Rebecca Catto and Linda Woodhead published the results of large-scale, multi-
disciplinary, team research project into Religion and Change in Modern Britain.306 
Their approach can be read as exemplifying various aspects of Rose’s philosophy.307 
They used a combination of methods, including qualitative and quantitative.308 They 
bore in mind the position of researcher and theory with respect to society, and 
approached theories as both explicans and explicandum: ‘far from being neutral voices 
speaking on the post-war religious condition, these [secularisation] theories are integral 
to it. And, as such, they offer an important route into some of its deepest 
presuppositions.’309 They emphasise an historical perspective on the multiple levels of 
mediation of religion and secularism, both of one another and by other social forms 
such as policy, media and law. They propose a dialectical relation between ‘religion’ 
and ‘secular’ as mutually determining, since ‘“secular” gains substance in relation to the 
kind of “religion” it rejects’.310 And they offer a speculative conclusion: ‘post-war 
Britain emerges as both religious and secular…Neither makes sense without the other, 
and their shifting meanings must be analysed in relation to their changing linkages, 
configurations, commitments and mutual hostilities.’311 Here we have an example of 
some of the best contemporary sociology, combining various forms of empirical data 
collection and analysis, affirming that sociology needs to think in terms of 
contradictions and determinate negation, must use increasingly comprehensive levels of 
explanation and historically informed analyses, and be aware of its own role within its 
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object of study. Although the empirical and descriptive work in this volume fits the 
criteria of Rose’s social theory, it still leaves open the normative questions that need to 
be tackled. Rose’s work thus offers significant advantages to social theorising. It 
provides a deep methodological basis for social theory in logic itself; and a 
sophisticated framework for relating the methodological, logical, descriptive, 
metaphysical and normative moments of social theorising.  
 
5 Double critique and implied totality 
The second main task of this chapter is to show how Rose first used her social 
philosophy to critique speculatively both society and social theory, and relate that 
critique to the implied totality it suggested. Rose’s first foray in this direction was to 
critique the bourgeois property form in relation to social contract theory and the 
subjectivity fostered by both. From a speculative perspective, the implied totality of 
absolute ethical life then emerged to view.312 This was Hegel’s Absolute and why his 
philosophy has no social import if it cannot be thought. As noted, Rose knew any 
totality she posited would be an imperfect grasp of society not only because our 
knowledge is finite but also because society itself is always dirempted. Hence I refer to 
the totalities she proposes as ‘implied’ because they never fully exist. Hence absolute 
ethical life is for Rose a facetious term, both necessary and impossible. Rose regarded 
law as an essential way to gain a provisional yet comprehensive view of the social 
totality. She explored the connections between legally determined social forms and the 
forms of consciousness they produced (both existentially lived and philosophically 
expressed in theory). Law is, for Rose, a privileged view of the totality for several 
reasons. It is universal (it applies across the whole nation-state, which is primary for 
Rose) and yet applies to particulars. Individuals must negotiate individual laws and the 
ethos they create. Law and ethics are both rationalised in modernity but also mediate 
one another. Mutual recognition is the actuality of law, ethics and politics, though they 
are all dirempted internally and in relation to one another; thus the totality must always 
be conceptualised through its multiple mediations and diremptions. Throughout her 





                                                
312 See HCS, 51-63. 
 80 
5.1 A simultaneous critique of society and social philosophy   
Rose carried out her first critique of society and social theory by repeating Hegel’s 
critique of Kant and Fichte in his essay on natural law. 313  Hegel criticises the 
contradictions involved in the ethical, political and legal dimensions of the social 
contract theories of Kant and Fichte, and proposes an alternative.314 The crux is the way 
in which the individual is imagined within the state of nature: it is both a natural 
condition – what would remain when all society was stripped away – and acknowledged 
to be a fiction. As a consequence, ‘although the natural will has the liberty to choose 
whatever it wishes, it is still always bound to choices that are given to it rather than 
determined by freedom.’315 The so-called natural will in the state of nature is according 
to Hegel merely the least developed picture of the will that is still coherent. It is the will 
at the stage of ‘abstract right’ in The Philosophy of Right. It is simply a desiring will, 
the part of the will essential to private economic transactions and interests, inflated to 
take the position of the entire will, obscuring its other textures, such as intersubjectivity 
and universal morality. The result is not only a mistaken political anthropology but a 
view of the state as subservient to private economic exchange, and so not a sovereign 
political body at all.  
 
This fiction imports into philosophy certain features from current bourgeois society and 
treats them as natural, such as the atomised individualism and economic rationality of 
the private property owner. The philosophy of Kant and Fichte thus reinforces some of 
the problematic aspects of subjectivity and social forms in their society, as when it treats 
the atomised individual as a fixed substrate to which can be attached accidental 
predicates, precisely the form of thinking speculative philosophy is designed to surpass. 
Hegel’s speculative philosophy then enables the individual and the family, or the 
individual and society, or the society and the state (and so on, through various 
combinations) to be imagined as mutually defining rather than mutually indifferent 
terms forced into some kind of external connection (such as Fichte’s form of social 
                                                
313 HCS, 51-97. 
314 Hegel, The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, Its Place in Moral Philosophy, and Its Relation 
to the Positive Science of Law, trans. by T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1975 
[1802-3]). Pinkard, Biography, 62, notes that ‘natural law’ in Hegel’s context meant the ‘normative 
foundations of law in general’, a wider category than the current English term. Rose’s discussion here is 
also based on System der Sittlichkeit. For further connections between Hegel’s logic and political 
philosophy see PhR passim but e.g. §40, 302, 312, 324, and his philosophy of history (e.g. PhR §341-60). 
315 Winfield, Reason and Justice, 84. 
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unity (in Hegel’s view)).316 Such triune thinking underlies Hegel’s combination of 
Moralität and Sittlichkeit in ethical theory.317 For Rose, speculative philosophy provides 
the insight that Kant and Fichte have, in effect, taken what is given in their society and 
justified it (in a transcendental manner) rather than allowing the aporia and 
contradictions of society to point towards some alternative.318 The form and content of 
thinking are very clearly related in this instance.319 Rose detects a parallel between the 
Fichtean concept of subjectivity as the absolute positing ego, the legal personality of 
bourgeois property law, and the moral subject in Kantian Moralität, because all exclude 
some of their determinations and the knowledge that they are so excluding portions of 
actuality.320 Fichte’s concept of the self, the subject of Moralität and Moralität as a 
form of ethical life, all repeat and reinforce the structure of the property holder, which 
itself reflects the Roman legal person’s absolute dominion over his property (res). Kant 
explicitly assumed the categories of Roman law in order to give a transcendental 
deduction of them,321 whereas Hegel opposed Kant’s attempt ‘to turn Roman civil law 
categories into a rationally grounded law of nature’.322 This results from inflating the 
role of property ownership into too dominant a place in society, and from failing 
sufficiently to see their positing of ethical theory as a positing.  
 
Rose would expand on this critique in her next book (see chapter 3), both of Kant and of 
poststructuralism, as unknowingly relying on and importing features of different legal 
systems. In the present case, although Rose never defines ‘bourgeois property form’ or 
‘private law’, she clearly relies on the general Marxist view of these terms. Private law 
was a distinctively Roman legal category for property and ‘the regulation of property 
                                                
316 PhR §308. Allen W. Wood, ‘Editor’s Introduction’ in Elements of the Philosophy of Right 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991), xvi: ‘…Hegel thinks that the greatest enemy of personal and 
subjective freedom is a ‘mechanistic’ conception of the state, which views the state solely as an 
instrument for the enforcement of abstract rights; for this sets the state up as an abstraction in opposition 
to individuals.’ 
317 Pippin, Idealism as Modernism, 92-128, ‘Hegel, ethical reasons, Kantian rejoinders’. 
318 Hegel viewed this as a failure to follow the development of the concept of freedom all the way from 
abstract right to morality to ethical life. In abstract right, for example, what and how much any person 
possesses is indifferent, precisely because the ideas here are abstract and one-sided (PhR §49). 
319 Hegel compares the differences in his and their moral thought to an adolescent who thinks everything 
is bad, a believer in Providence who accepts the status quo too easily, and an adult who negotiates both 
limitations and change (EL, §234 Addition). 
320 HCS, 187. PhR passim, e.g., §4, 8. 
321 Metaphysical Elements of Justice. 
322 Milbank, ‘Secular Order’, 214-5. A charge upheld by, e.g., Wolfgang Kersting, ‘Politics, Freedom, 
and Order: Kant’s Political Philosophy’ in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. by Paul Guyer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1992), 357: ‘Insofar as self-sufficiency defines the citizen and the 
rational legal competence to be a colegislator is granted to the citizen only as a possessor of property, a 
contingent economic factor becomes decisive in the assignment of a rational right. In contradiction to his 
declared goal of a critical foundation for right and politics free of all empirical features Kant elevates a 
contingent factor to the rank of an a priori principle of justification.’  
 82 
would constitute by far the largest part of Rome’s civil law.’323 The private-public 
distinction in Rome was new at the time, different from surrounding societies and 
generated by the role property had in Roman society. ‘What set the Romans apart from 
all other high civilisations was their property-régime, with its distinctive legal 
conception of property; and with it came a more sharply delineated private sphere in 
which the individual enjoyed his own exclusive dominion.’324 Whereas ‘the Greeks had 
no clear conception of ownership, indeed no abstract word for it at all… the 
distinctively exclusive quality of Roman property, [was] the degree to which it belonged 
to the individual to the exclusion of others’.325 ‘In this way, the “Roman citizen asserts a 
claim against all the world, based on an act of his own will”. The concept of dominium, 
then, marks out the private sphere with an unprecedented clarity, and the private is 
inseparable from property…The partnership of dominium and imperium, then, sums up 
both the distinction between public and private and the alliance of property and state 
that was so distinctively Roman.’ 326  Despite significant differences between the 
liberalism of Kant and Fichte and Roman imperium (such as the desire of liberals to 
protect the individual from sovereign power), there are important continuities, based on 
property, which then determine class and class relations, the public-private spheres, and 
so on. The bourgeois property form should thus be investigated against the background 
of Roman law. Doing so can highlight, for instance, ‘an interesting violation of the 
Lockean view that those who create value by mixing their labor with the land are 
entitled to private property in that value’, namely, that ‘whatever the laborer produces 
during the period of the contract belongs to the capitalist, not to the laborer.’327  
 
The religion-state speculative identity suggests a further link between bourgeois 
property law as social form on the one hand, and the form of morality and subjectivity 
in modern society on the other. That is, the legal ‘person’ is the bearer of property rights 
in abstraction from all other characteristics and relations.328 ‘A corollary of defining part 
of oneself as a legal “person” in contradistinction to other legal “persons” is that a 
further dimension of oneself is isolated: subjectivity, the substratum in which the 
                                                
323 Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Ellen Meiksins Wood Reader, ed. by Larry Patriquin (Boston: Brill, 2012), 
114-5. 
324 Meiksins Wood, Meiksins Wood Reader, 117. 
325 Meiksins Wood, Meiksins Wood Reader, 117. 
326 Meiksins Wood, Meiksins Wood Reader, 117-8. 
327 David Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital (London: Verso, 2010), 119-20. It is, of course, not 
only a violation but a dialectical reversal of the Lockean view. 
328 For an independent elaboration of this view, though inspired by similar sources to Rose, see N. E. 
Simmonds, ‘Judgment and Mercy’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13.1 (1993), 52-68. 
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accident of being a bearer of property rights inheres. “Subjectivity” is thus even more 
cut off from the totality of social relations which determine it’.329 The legal and political 
form of property in bourgeois society, combined with a non-speculative way of 
thinking, expresses and reinforces the mutually constitutive relationship between 
subjective morality (Moralität) and its corresponding form of subjectivity. 
‘“Subjectivity” is the correlate of the legal definition of persons as bearers of private 
property rights. Misrepresentation of the absolute is the correlate of subjectivity.’330 The 
subjectivity correlated with legal personality tends to be inwardly hypertrophic, since 
intentions are the source and content of morality, and outwardly disconnected from 
others and from the consequences of the subject’s actions.331 This subjectivity often 
ends up both unworldly because too inward and yet ruthless because it can justify 
evil.332 Morality is now thought of as “the autonomous realm of what ought to be,” 
good intentions divorced from consequences. But this quickly degenerates into casuistic 
self-justification: so long as the agent can present his actions as well intentioned, he is 
guaranteed to have acted correctly.333 The absolute as the unity of people, constitution 
(or law) and custom (or ethics), is then misunderstood in two ways: as an imposed and 
formal unity (Fichte) or projected into an otherworldly realm by religion. It is in this 
sense that ‘the standpoint of subjective morality arises out of bourgeois property 
relations’.334 
 
Another example of law providing a view onto the social whole is found in the work of 
Wayne Martin. In ‘Antinomies of Autonomy: German Idealism and English Mental 
Health Law’,335 Martin shows that the antinomy between the duty to care for patients 
and patients’ autonomy cannot be removed from within the liberal political paradigm 
but it can be mediated through considering what structures should be in place to 
contextualise it, so that the patient has the opportunity to experience her care as neither 
alien nor imposed but as open to her recognition and appropriation, even if only 
retrospectively. (Recognition and appropriation are, as noted above, central to Rose’s 
Hegelianism, in distinction from some other Frankfurters). The doctor-patient relation 
                                                
329 HCS, 92. 
330 HCS, 99. 
331 Rose saw this analysed by Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by 
Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958). 
332 HCS, 125-6. 
333 This is Hegel’s critique of the Romantic debasement of Kantian ethics, not Kantian ethics itself. See 
PhR §140-1 and the explanatory notes of both Houlgate and Wood. 
334 HCS, 93. 
335 Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 9 (2011) Freiheit/Freedom; ed. by Jürgen 
Stolzenberg and Fred Rush, 191-214. 
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therefore has to be referred to wider legal, social and professional frameworks. This is 
the movement familiar from Philosophy of Right: a seemingly immediate relation turns 
out to be comprehensible and actual only through being embedded in and mediated by 
various facets of state and civil society. These mediations occur over time, partly as a 
result of past failures. Martin outlines three Hegelian premises he used when 
considering mental health legislation:336  
 
1) ‘Autonomous determination can be determination by another, as long as that other is 
an other whom I rightly recognize as appropriately not-other.’ (The speculative 
combination of freedom and necessity).  
2) Within geistig reality, dialectic runs all the way down; it is the realm of 
contradiction.337  
3) We aim to make the world our own in the sense of being at home in it; the world’s 
rationality and our rationality are congruent. 
 
Martin then discusses the case of a person who took a decision about his medical 
treatment, which he recognised as his own whilst simultaneously acknowledging the 
ways it was influenced by others. This suggests the task of structuring various social 
forms (family, civil society, laws, professional bodies) as ‘appropriately not-other’, to 
foster this experience.338 One of the ways this works is by offering the person different 
perspectives on themselves – as a sufferer in need of care, as an autonomous rights-
bearer, as a biochemical organism – within different time scales. The antinomies will 
always remain – the problems involved here are objectively difficult choices to which 
no philosophy can give definitive answers – but the aim is to design institutions (rather 
than focus on the doctor-patient relationship alone) to enable justice to be done to both 
sides of the antinomy. Martin suggests the Hegelian approach to the antinomic structure 
of both reason and society is still more comprehensive than many others. It involves 
every realm of society, ideas, institutions, and different temporal perspectives. One can 
see emerging from this history – immanently, not imposed – an ideal form of 
subjectivity that knows its determinations as mediations of itself rather than ignoring 
(‘dominating’ or ‘suppressing’) them and its coherence with the ethical life and laws of 
its country – in short, absolute ethical life. Recognition and appropriation in Rose 
                                                
336 Martin, ‘Antinomies’, 203-4. 
337 C.f. PhR §33 Addition. 
338 Hegel thought about this in terms of ‘love’ early on, then as ‘life’, then Geist: Williams, Hegel’s 
Ethics, 208-9. 
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obviate the method-system separation, allowing some grasp of the social whole through 
phenomenological reconstruction. The structure of finding the self in the other suggests 
the ideal of mutual recognition for politics and ethical life rather than the subject-as-
lone-property-holder. A different idea of freedom then emerges, one that includes 
necessity (in the form of social determinations) rather than tries to oppose freedom and 
necessity (as in Kant and Fichte).339 Martin’s example shows how this could work in 
practice.  
 
As a final example of Rose’s social philosophy, I submit it coheres with Ellen Meiksins 
Wood’s project of a ‘social history of political thought’, though Meiksins Wood writes 
substantive histories whereas Rose focused on philosophical issues. Meiksins Wood’s 
approach accepts neither the context-free approach of earlier versions of political theory 
that treated works of political philosophy as unaffected by their contexts; nor its 
contemporary opposite, Quentin Skinner’s (Nietzschean) ‘history of ideologies’, that 
treats political philosophies as so immersed in their contexts as to curtail their ability to 
speak more widely.340 She thinks Skinner and the Cambridge school actually limit 
‘context’ to discourse and ignore the real social and political context, which includes 
‘[l]ong-term developments in social relations, property forms and state-formations’.341 
These are exactly the features Rose focuses on: the speculative identity of religion and 
state as a history of transformations of the two as they relate to one another. Both, of 
course, have in common some Marxism. Meiksins Wood argues political philosophy is 
best understood as both a product of its time and yet able to speak more universally, just 
like Rose’s historical rationality. Both emphasise the importance of thinking in terms of 
processes. Both think we do not yet know what could replace current forms of 
economics and politics and their social relations;342 which brings us to Rose’s concept 
of absolute ethical life. 
 
5.2 Absolute ethical life 
In Hegel Contra Sociology, private law and the bourgeois property form serve as a view 
of the social whole but the speculative treatment of this whole implies or suggests 
another social whole: absolute ethical life. Many readers of Hegel Contra Sociology 
came away with the feeling that Rose is undecided between absolute ethical life as ‘a 
                                                
339 TMS, 151, describes Adorno’s view of Geist as ‘both formed by society and has a partial autonomy.’ 
340 On her method, see especially Ellen Meiksins Wood, Citizens to Lords, 1-27 and Larry Patriquin, 
‘Introduction’, Meiksins Wood Reader, 1-17. 
341 Meiksins Wood, Citizens to Lords, 13. 
342 Meiksins Wood Reader, chapter 8.  
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merely heuristic, negative function’ or as something more substantial.343 Indeed, some 
commentators did not think she had explained what the Absolute (her shorthand for 
absolute ethical life) was at all.344 This is because on the one hand Rose insists on 
mutual recognition as the form of absolute ethical life, whilst on the other she refuses to 
specify, on principle, what that would look like in detail. Here I summarise the picture 
of the Absolute in Hegel Contra Sociology; expand on it through a 1987 paper by 
Bernstein expressing his and Rose’s shared views; and then highlight some of the 
problems in this early formation. 
 
Arguing that transcendental sociology cannot properly acknowledge the antinomy of 
freedom and determination, Rose claims the Absolute can, which gives Rose’s version 
of Hegel’s philosophy its social import. She then traces the Absolute in Hegel through 
the rest of the book to substantiate this. In chapter 2 absolute ethical life is ‘a critique of 
bourgeois property relations’345 and the indication of a different property relation; but 
just what that is remains ‘elusive’.346 In chapter 3 absolute ethical life emerges as a form 
of life implied by the historical trajectory of forms of freedom from Sittlichkeit in 
Greece, through the subjectivity produced by Roman law and Christianity, to the culture 
of reflection with its Moralität and formal property law. Chapter 4 examines the 
illusions generated by bourgeois society in relation to work and the appropriation of 
wealth, linking the deformations of current ethical life to property, law, labour and 
political economy. Chapters 3 and 4 suggest philosophy has taken over from religion 
and art as providing the predominant means of formation of subjectivity in modern 
society (a ‘culture’ or ‘vocation’ or Bildung). Chapter 5 traces the historical 
development of forms of ethical life in more detail and suggests philosophy itself has 
been deformed in its attempts to replace art and religion as the primary culturing source 
in modern society. Chapter 6 sees Hegel’s Science of Logic as a speculative re-reading 
of Kant and Fichte to produce an implied unity of theory and practice that enables the 
Absolute to be thought (but not known in detail). Chapter 7 summarises what has been 
learned for sociology and for Marxism. 
 
As the unity of finite and infinite is implied by the very distinction in theoretical reason, 
the unity of law and morality is implied by that distinction in practical reason. Absolute 
                                                
343 Gorman, ‘Whither’, 53. 
344 E.g. Geoffrey Hawthorn, ‘Ideal Speech’, London Review of Books, 3.21 (19 November 1981), 15-16.  
345 HCS, 97. 
346 HCS, 97. 
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ethical life is the implied unity of theoretical and practical philosophy, law and morality, 
finite and infinite. Its content – whatever we can discern thereof – arises from 
reconstructions of what we have learned about them through phenomenological 
experience (or experience speculatively exposited). That is the only way the Absolute 
can be shown, in areas such as religion, politics, art, labour, and so on. Absolute 
knowing is this speculative-phenomenological approach to the history of ethical and 
political life. As noted above, spirit is ‘the structure of recognition or misrecognition in 
a society’, and absolute spirit is ‘the meaning of history as a whole’,347 meaning a 
phenomenological reconstruction of how we arrived where we are, which Hegel showed 
was the only adequate form of understanding and justification of beliefs and 
institutions. Thus, absolute spirit is a position taken on the lessons to be learned from 
the philosophy of history with a particular view to the different forms of recognition and 
misrecognition involved in individuals’ relationships to society. Rose arrives at absolute 
ethical life by extending existing ethical values and practices, rather than applying a 
pre-determined universal norm,348 since the content of the norm is filled in over time 
through different attempts to apply it. This, as we have seen, is how speculative pairs of 
terms work in Rose, re-cognising and re-appropriating their meaning. One must 
therefore distinguish the ‘1) – not knowing i.e. positing the Absolute – and 2) – the re-
cognizing i.e. knowing which is precisely knowing of the history of the formation and 
deformation of the aporia – which is speculative or absolute.’349 Rose’s condensed 
expression indicates the difference between proposing an ethical or social form without 
fully taking into account its social (and not only logical origins), and the Hegelian 
attention to the act of positing as well as what is posited, which includes our inability to 
know what a moral law is unless we know how to apply it. The history of a concept’s 
application, judgements about good or bad applications, and the difficulties involved 
therein, are therefore part of the concept itself.350 ‘Positing’ in the first sense is 
insufficiently historical, whereas recognition is historically better informed.  
 
The problem with this extension of phenomenologically justified values, however, is the 
deformation of imagination by current, ‘relative’ ethical life. (This lies behind Meiksins 
                                                
347 HCS, 44. 
348 C.f. PhR §1-2. A strategy common to Bernstein, Adorno and Albena Azmanova, The Scandal of 
Reason: A Critical Theory of Political Judgment (New York: Columbia University, 2012). 
349 Rose, letter to Bernstein, 27 March 1987. 
350 Bernstein, Adorno, 151-64. C.f. PhR §1; LW, MBL, 1-14: acknowledging aporia differentiates a 
comprehensive philosophy from an ideology, it provides it some contact with the difficulty of reality and 
opens philosophy to correction. 
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Wood’s reticence too). Rose says absolute ethical life should be viewed ‘as equally 
‘lost’ and ‘not yet attained’.’351 For Rose this means absolute ethical life is implied by 
current ethical life (as its perfection) but not pre-judged, not completely known. Hence 
there is a twofold ‘necessity’ to current ethical life, which is both the rationality 
discernible in current ethical life and the way that rationality is changed, hidden, 
distorted (the necessary illusions identified by Frankfurt School ideology critique).352 
Current ethical life can be viewed heuristically as a lost version of its ideal, most 
rational self to which we strive to attain. Absolute ethical life therefore contains current 
ethical life because it will sublate it. (This is the logical form of the concept in Hegel: 
after a sequence of categories has developed we see at the end that each was a partial 
expression of the full concept). The Absolute exists between real and logical possibility, 
as Bernstein suggests: 
 
the imaginary space between logical and real possibility which the critique of the 
“Postulates” elaborates is precisely the space of modernist art practices…some 
empirical events themselves can have an equivalent status, possessing a kind of unreal 
reality, or, more exactly, as making a promise about what is empirically possible as a 
form of life which is implied by their mere existence but which cannot be further 
specified or justified. Certain empirical events have the status of both actualizing a 
possibility and in so doing making a promise about the future; it is this notion of an 
event that is a promise that I want to claim as filling the space between logical and 
actual possibility.353 
 
In one sense, the Absolute is ‘actuality’: ‘If actuality is not thought, then thinking has 
no social import’.354 Actuality (Wirklichkeit) is Hegel’s way of talking about what 
things really are and should be. For instance, when we ask, “is that really art?” we are 
asking about the actuality of a putative artwork. Or if we ask whether pot-smoking is 
actually religious we are enquiring after what religion essentially is. When Hegel says 
the concept drives actuality he means, for example, that insofar as a phenomenon is 
really religious then it actualises the concept of religion. Beyond this, Hegel also 
attended to two things: how the determination of individuals is also a determination of 
ethical life; and how those determinations are often either ignored or misrecognised. 
                                                
351 HCS, 168. J. M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 1992), 60: ‘judgements of beauty are memorial: in making 
aesthetic judgements we judge things ‘as if’ from the perspective of our lost common sense, a common 
sense that may never have existed (evidence for it deriving strictly from the torsions of the analytic 
articulation of aesthetic experience). This ‘remembered’ common sense is…both presupposed in the 
judgement of taste and yet to be obtained.’ 
352 HCS, 165. 
353 Bernstein, Adorno, 419.  
354 HCS, 229. The similarity between this sentence and the refrain of ‘Hegel’s philosophy has no social 
import if the absolute cannot be thought’ brings out the point. 
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These two observations have important structural consequences for the account. Rose’s 
social theory is interested in the actuality and concepts recognised and misrecognised in 
ordinary ethical life. ‘Phenomenology acknowledges the actuality which determines the 
formation of consciousness. The recognition of actuality takes the form of a 
presentation of the various attempts at reform and revolution which displace the real 
determinants of consciousness and action and therefore do not effectively change those 
determinants but reinforce them.’355 When the social influences on subjectivity are 
misrecognised they tend to be reinforced. Throughout her work Rose thus attempted to 
reveal some of the unrecognised or misrecognised social influences on social 
philosophy, and to provide a logic for thinking about the relationship between 
subjectivity and society that acknowledges both the givenness of social reality and the 
contribution of social actors.356    
 
For Rose and Bernstein, in 1987, the Absolute is not only formal but material and 
existential: it acknowledges the other as essential to the self.357 For example, at the end 
of the section on ‘Evil and Forgiveness’ in the Phenomenology, the other is 
acknowledged as grounding the self’s autonomy.358 In Philosophy of Right, the will’s 
freedom and self-reference are only possible when sustained within a larger structure 
that reflects the structure of the will – the state.359 In terms of Sittlichkeit, the Absolute 
is ‘a community in which the self recognizes itself in absolute otherness.’360 For Rose, 
this structure of mutual recognition lies behind Hegel’s analyses of law, recognition in 
the master-slave dialectic, and the Trinity; it is the structure of both the concept and 
absolute ethical life.361  
 
Rose believed Hegel allows subjects to see the reality of socially generated illusion and 
thus to see through them to some extent. For instance, the commodity form influences 
the way people relate to their own labour and themselves (as commodities): this is a real 
experience and yet a certain illusion, caused by the economic organisation of society 
rather than being a fundamental necessity.362 Hegel allows for the process of stepping 
                                                
355 HCS, 232. 
356 HCS, 227-9. 
357 See Brady Bowman, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 2013), 52, on the relation between logical, existential and material forms of Hegel’s logic. 
358 C.f. §480, 482-3. 
359 Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, 327. 
360 Bernstein, ‘Speculation and Aporia’, 5.  
361 Rose’s annotations to Bernstein, ‘Speculation’, 5. 
362 Rose felt Derrida did not allow this reference to political-economic reality: DN, 162-6. 
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back from this illusion and thinking differently, without mistaking this as a solution, 
since new insights are not yet new social forms.363 Hegel, Rose thought, allows people 
to see how they are being determined, which both does not stop that determination and 
yet undermines it to some extent. (Rose seems wrong about Hegel’s view here).364  The 
current, overall, organising social form can therefore be critiqued by reference to 
another, implied totality – absolute ethical life. This also acts as a criticism of some 
postmodern philosophy since the current totality is not “western metaphysics” as a 
whole but a particular historical form – capital – and its related metaphysics:  
 
Capital, not metaphysics, writes our metaphysical fate…Marking the excess beyond 
metaphysics in terms of nick-names…provides a pseudo-recognition of particularity. 
Because, however, the concrete illusion is not ‘identified’, then the specific other is 
suppressed again…Only the absoluteness of the absolute preserves the otherness of the 
other; while, again, the otherness of the other conditions the absoluteness of the 
absolute.365   
 
Or, later: ‘Instead of working with the general question of the dominance of Western 
metaphysics, the dilemma of addressing modern ethics and politics without arrogating 
the authority under question is seen as the ineluctable difficulty in Hegel, Nietzsche and 
Kierkegaard’s engagement with modernity.’ 366  Rose wrote: ‘speculative thinking 
transforms the critique of epistemology and the critique of morality into recognition of 
what the theoretical and practical concept has suppressed – historically and politically – 
its absolute is therefore intrinsically aporetic – both ‘absolute’ knowledge and ‘absolute’ 
ethical life’.367 Like Adorno’s negative dialectics, Rose’s Absolute tries to discover 
what the current form of ethics and epistemology hides from view,368 but unlike 
negative dialectics (in her opinion) it offers a universal, a version of the infinite it 
knows to be imperfect but knows it cannot do without: absolute spirit. And it is more 
willing to justify some aspects of society, to acknowledge the development of the 
concept in history. Unlike some postmodern social theory, naming the reigning 
                                                
363 Jerrold Seigel, Modernity and Bourgeois Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2012), 142: 
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transcendental conditions for knowledge, each of which would create a different form of experience.  
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universal ‘capital’ directs attention to the need for sociological explorations in place of 
condemnations of ‘metaphysics’. Rose’s Absolute is a form of ideology critique. ‘It is 
only by acknowledging the lack of identity as the historical fate (Bestimmung) of a 
different property structure that absolute ethical life can be conceived. This ethical life 
includes relations (lack of identity), but these relations do not give rise to the illusion 
that they afford the immediate and absolute basis for the ‘moral’ freedom of the 
individual.’369 That is, the perspective of absolute ethical life shows current ethical life 
and its forms of recognition as always a mixture of recognition and misrecognition, 
since the ideal is full mutual recognition. The absolute – in its different forms as 
knowing, ethical life and subjectivity – depends on a ‘triune relating…where 
recognition/master-slave/the Christian Trinity/the concept of law, come together in 
Hegel: to recognize another there must be a third.’370 The mediation between two terms 
by a third is a key component of triune rationality. Absolute ethical life would be the 
unity between individual will (including disposition: subjektive Gesinnung) and the 
general will (expressed in laws), and the Sittlichkeiten of civil society groups.371 It 
would be a society explicitly and intentionally organised to bring about this harmony. 
Rose, like Hegel, believed the threefold structure of modern society (individual/family, 
civil society, state) provided the best opportunity for such harmony thus far in history, 
not least because mutual recognition was immanent to it. She thought too that such 
harmony was impossible to achieve and did not rule out improvements in its realisation 
(nor has she any grounds to rule out further rational ‘surprises’ in terms of major social 
change). All of this comes from her speculative (historical-phenomenological) 
approach, whereas non-speculative approaches delivered individualist social contract 
theories (and, later, denials of metaphysics vulnerable to dialectical reversal, ontological 
violence (chapter 3), over-moralised politics, triumphalist and hasty theoretical mending 
of diremptions (chapter 4) (and we could perhaps add: amoral systems theory)). 
 
6 Objections 
Aside from the problems considered earlier, two main objections would be raised 
against Rose’s work from this point onwards. The first, made by Peter Osborne and 
Tony Gorman, is that she abandons a Marxist critique of political economy and as a 
result is unable to move beyond immanent phenomenology to anything more 
substantive. The second, put most forcefully by John Milbank, is that she refused to 
                                                
369 HCS, 62. 
370 Letter to Bernstein, 27 March 1987. C.f. PhSp §50. 
371 C.f. Neuhouser, Foundations, passim. 
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entertain the possibilities of improvement and the partial repair of dirempted social life, 
leaving absolute ethical life too vague to be helpful.  
 
6.1 Political economy and substantive theory  
As we have seen, Rose makes private property central to her notion of bourgeois 
society, and an alternative property form central to Hegel’s notion of the Absolute. ‘By 
acknowledging the contradictions of bourgeois enterprise and private property, Hegel 
hoped to surmount and contain them.’372  
 
Throughout all Hegel’s writings reference is made to a series of property forms. Out of 
these distinct historical ‘types’, Hegel tried, time and time again, to compound an 
alternative…This alternative is never definitively explicated. The fundamental paradox of 
Hegel’s thought is that he was a critic of all property forms, but his central notion of a free 
and equal political relationship is inexplicable without concepts of property…and hence 
incomplete without the elaboration of an alternative property relation.373  
 
Real recognition can ‘only be achieved in a just society’,374 which is to say it ‘requires 
different property relations.’375 Rose’s tone gives the impression that Hegel believed 
private property to be wrong, though she briefly acknowledges that in fact Hegel 
thought private property was necessary but should not be inflated into such a prominent 
position in society, and that formal property law is better than the arbitrariness of 
feudalism. 376  She nevertheless underplays Hegel’s view that private property is 
necessary to the realisation of freedom and subjectivity.377  
 
Rose thus announced at the end of Hegel Contra Sociology the project of a ‘critical 
Marxism’ that would combine Marx’s analysis of capital with analysis of capitalism as 
a culture (in Hegel’s sense: a form of life that indirectly shapes subjectivity and 
consciousness in both good and bad ways).378 Her main criticism of the Marxist 
tradition was not ‘Marx’s analysis of Capital, but…any presentation of that analysis as 
                                                
372 HCS, 74-5. 
373 HCS, 86. David MacGregor, Hegel, Marx, and the English State (Toronto: University of Toronto, 
1992) argues Hegel did have a coherent and radical view of property and a ‘structural solution to poverty: 
worker ownership of the means of production’ (156, n.15). Part of his case is made by using Hegel’s 
Heidelberg lectures, which only became available in 1983 (in German), two years after Rose’s book was 
published. 
374 HCS, 74. 
375 HCS, 83-4. 
376 HCS, 181. 
377 PhR §41; Speight, ‘Hegel’s Critique’, 389-90. Minogue picked up this problem in his review. Perhaps, 
however, she later remedied this, since BM, 229, is sceptical of Arendt’s going to ‘great length to 
disqualify private property.’ 
378 C.f. HCS, 231.  
 93 
a comprehensive account of capitalism, and in any pre-judged, imposed ‘realization’ of 
that theory, any using it as a theory, as Marxism.’379 Yet critical Marxism never fully 
arrived. Osborne and Gorman noted the disappearance of full-blooded Marxism from 
The Broken Middle and later works, attributing it to her absorption of Kierkegaard’s 
Christian influence. In my view, her commitment to a ‘critical Marxism’ announced at 
the end of Hegel Contra Sociology had already ceased by Dialectic of Nihilism three 
years later. The connection between property, law and subjectivity is still there and is 
still seen as the commonality between Hegel and Marx, but the insistence on the need 
for different property relations is absent in this and all her other books, whilst her 
emphasis on law and jurisprudence remains. Critical Marxism was replaced by 
jurisprudential wisdom, itself superseded by the broken middle. Thus the analysis of 
‘the contradictory relations between Capital and culture’380 focuses on antinomies of 
law and diremptions between state and society (both in modern, capitalist societies) but 
is not aimed at ‘revolutionary practice’ nor linked to ‘analysis of the economy’.381 
 
A more important question, at least from a position sympathetic to Marxist critique of 
political economy, is whether Rose’s work is compatible with such critique. It seems to 
me it is. Robert Bernasconi declared, ‘I find her reading of Hegel much closer to other 
Marxist theories than she would have us believe’.382 In the 1987 paper ‘Speculation and 
Aporia’, capital rather than ‘western metaphysics’ was the focus of attention. This may 
explain her later attacks on Derrida’s version of Marxism as lacking any connection to 
institutions or property relations: such a hollowed out Marxism is no Marxism at all.383 
Yet as Osborne notes, Rose discusses Marx only occasionally and not at length and her 
view of Marx must be surmised from these different treatments. 384 The fact is Rose did 
not address such questions in enough detail to be put on one side of the debate or the 
other, though her emphasis did shift away from private property towards other 
diremptions in her later work. Thus Rose’s work also seems compatible with those like 
Habermas and Honneth who accept capitalism for the time being and seek to ameliorate 
it.  
 
                                                
379 HCS, 235. 
380 HCS, 235. 
381 HCS, 235. Perhaps Kołakowski was again an influence here. 
382 Bernasconi, ‘Review’, 43. 
383 Gillian Rose, ‘A Ghost in His Own Machine’, review of Points and Spectres of Marx by Derrida, The 
Times 27 July 1995, 32. She remarks there that Marxist teleology should not be abandoned but 
‘overhauled’. 
384 See Osborne’s forthcoming paper in the Telos special issue edited by Brower Latz and Pound. 
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Nevertheless, it is not the case that Rose’s work is incompatible with theory or specific 
analyses of determination per se, as Osborne and Gorman charge. She uses 
phenomenology not to oppose substantive positions but to lead to them, improve them 
and justify or critique them. The philosopher does not abandon or disown ‘the edifice’ 
of her civilisation but inspects it.385 Having said that, Rose only forwards her own 
substantive positions in tandem with the critique of others, which makes them difficult 
to discern and not as fulsome as one may wish, though this may be a consequence of her 
shortened career. 
 
6.2 Vagueness    
The Absolute is implied but not known: since it never fully exists it cannot fully be 
known but only imagined. Hence Rose insists ‘there are no statements about the 
absolute in Hegel – there are speculative propositions about experience. This 
recognition is developed speculatively and without positing an absolute’.386 This means 
there are no straightforward descriptions about absolute ethical life, but the speculative 
exposition of dirempted experience to bring out suggestions of the lost and impossible 
unity such diremptions can be made to reveal. Yet what good is an Absolute that 
remains elusive and ‘an unspecific unity of concept and intuition’?387 Does it not 
thereby lose all its social import? 
 
Rose so emphasises Hegel’s anxiety that determinate negation appears to have slipped 
out of sight, and one is left to puzzle about her attitude to Hegel’s “speculative” 
anticipation of a resolved social future. It is clear that she wishes to stress our 
confinement to the “logic of illusory being”, yet Hegel does not present his account of 
the absolute “Notion” as something abstractly known outside of historical purpose. On 
the contrary, it is only unfolded – as both presupposed and anticipated – by way of the 
historical passage through illusory being. And for precisely this reason, Hegel never 
denies us access to anticipation of the resolved future, and indeed gives some 
description of it in terms of a market economy mitigated by local corporations and 
centralized state. No equivalent vision is provided by Rose. Nor does she comment on 
such a crucial question as her attitude to the capitalist market.388 
  
It appears the Absolute retains the structure of a regulative ideal, a contradictory ought, 
the same structure Hegel criticised in Kant. Or does Rose’s Absolute turn out to be a 
Kantian transcendental object – thinkable in some way but not knowable? A difference 
                                                
385 BM, 286. 
386 Letter to Bernstein, 27 March 1987. 
387 HCS, 83. 
388 John Milbank, ‘Living in Anxiety,’ Times Higher Education Supplement (June 26, 1992), 20-2 (22). 
C.f. Milbank’s referees report on The Broken Middle, box 36, p.4; and his ‘The Sublime in Kierkegaard’, 
Heythrop Journal 37 (1996), 298-321. 
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between Kant and Hegel on Rose’s reading is that Hegel fully embraces the antinomic 
structure of the ‘ought’ and has arrived there on a phenomenological, speculative basis, 
which changes its function somewhat.389 The Kantian ought ‘does not deny the whole 
world, but acknowledges part of it, the partial or formal law of private property 
relations. It thus looks as if it recognizes the universal or ethical’,390 but the moral law is 
not complete as it claims. ‘The law defines actuality as an infinite task and thus draws 
attention away from the real significance of the acts of the moral subject.’391 The 
problem with the Kantian ought – on Rose’s somewhat one-sided reading – is its 
inability properly to actualise itself, its tendency to remain implicit rather than realised 
in individual character and group ethos.392 Whereas:  
 
The absolute is the comprehensive thinking which transcends the dichotomies between 
concept and intuition, theoretical and practical reason. It cannot be thought (realized) 
because these dichotomies and their determinations are not transcended…Once we 
realize this we can think the absolute by acknowledging the element of Sollen in such a 
thinking, by acknowledging the subjective element, the limits on our thinking the 
absolute. This is to think the absolute and to fail to think it quite differently from Kant 
and Fichte’s thinking and failing to think it…Thinking the absolute means recognising 
actuality as determinans of our acting by recognizing it in our acts. Thus recognizing 
our transformative or productive activity has a special claim as a mode of 
acknowledging actuality which transcends the dichotomies between theoretical and 
practical reason, between positing and posited.393 
 
For Rose, by the end of the Phenomenology, philosophical consciousness realises the 
inevitability of antinomies and diremptions, and Hegel offers an elaboration of, not 
escape from, that situation. For instance, rather than seeing ethical and juridical 
antinomies as an illusion (Kant thinks there cannot be a clash of duties in an ultimate 
sense), they are regarded as intrinsic to ethical life and thought. The Absolute remains 
as a form of ideology critique – current ethical life always retains some form of 
misrecognition – but does not provide a ‘how to’ for policy or a political programme. 
Despite this, mutual recognition can be a substantive guiding principle (see chapter 4). 
                                                
389 I owe this point to Peter Osborne in comments made during the ‘Thinking in the Severe Style’ 
symposium. 
390 HCS, 187. 
391 HCS, 187.  
392 C.f. e.g., PhR §108, 111, 330, 333; and his Lectures on the History of Philosophy: The Lectures of 
1825-1826. Volume III Medieval and Modern Philosophy, ed. by Robert F. Brown; trans. by R. F. Brown, 
J. M Stewart and H. S. Harris (Berkeley: University of California, 1990), 244-6. On Hegel’s critique of 
Kant’s ethics see Fabian Freyenhagen, ‘The Empty Formalism Objection Revisited. §135R and Recent 
Kantian Responses’, 43-72 and Robert Stern ‘On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Ethics. Beyond the Empty 
Formalism Objection’, 73-99 in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, ed. by Brooks. 
393 HCS, 218. C.f. EL §234 Addition. 
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Yet there is a tension within the Absolute between its force as a critique and her stress 
on its unknowability: 
 
The overall intention of Hegel’s thought is to make a different ethical life possible by 
providing insight into the displacement of actuality in those dominant philosophies 
which are assimilated to and reinforce bourgeois law and bourgeois property 
relations…However, as long as these relations and law prevails [sic] the absolute can 
only be thought by an abstract consciousness…This accounts for the difference between 
the unconvincing nature of Hegel’s attempts to state the absolute by comparison with 
the powerful speculative rereadings of law…Hegel had no ‘solution’ to the 
contradictions of bourgeois productive and property relations. He searched for a 
different concept of law but it could only be explicated abstractly.394  
 
The extent to which the Absolute is so different from current political-ethical life that 
we cannot fully imagine it undermines its role not only as a guide to action but even as 
ideology critique. Hegel’s own view was that philosophy had discerned the essential 
nature of the state as, roughly speaking, predicated on freedom, self-determination and 
mutual recognition between citizens and between ruler and ruled,395 but that within the 
essential structures entailed by this basis the details of law and policy had latitude based 
on the needs of the day and ethos of the state and its people.396 Rose is therefore 
following the Frankfurt School appropriation of Hegel for the needs of the present, 
pressing his philosophy into the service of critique, but in this early work she 
underplays Hegel’s appreciation of modernity. Robert Bernasconi identified the 
problem: the Absolute  
 
takes account of the fact that it arises in a society governed by the ‘reality of 
unfreedom’…and is as yet only abstract, a ‘concept’, a ‘result to be achieved’,…it is 
neither predetermined nor imposed, but speculative. Clearly a strong sense of 
‘speculative’ is required here. It cannot mean only that the absolute is indeterminate, 
although her idea of the just society is undoubtedly that…Nor could the speculative 
simply carry the sense she gives it of a lack of identity between concept and object, in 
that sense every Sollen could be understood as speculative.397 
 
It seems Rose underemphasises the moment of the concept in favour of the moment of 
social determination. That is, her philosophy has more space to fill in the details of 
absolute ethical life than she realised at this early stage. Perhaps the best that can be 
made of Rose’s Absolute is to read it as something like Armatya Sen’s work on justice, 
where the focus is less on realising a fully worked out ideal than on achieving real 
                                                
394 HCS, 223. 
395 On this last point see Alan Brudner ‘Hegel on the Relation between Law and Justice’, 180-208 in 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, ed. by Brooks. 
396 E.g. PhR §214. 
397 ‘Review’, 43. 
 97 
increments in justice beginning from where we are, in the middle.398 But if so Sen has 
the better of Rose in two ways: he provides more detail and substance than Rose, and he 
writes more accessibly without losing critical or analytical power, giving his work far 
more reach and influence than Rose’s. To echo Pleasants, in these two respects Sen is a 
better critical theorist than Rose.  
 
One is forced to ask whether Rose overplays the difference between Hegelian 
speculation and neo-Kantian Geltungslogik, especially in the claim to have produced a 
‘wholly different mode of social analysis’.399 Certainly they are different on a formal 
logical level and this can effect the social analysis itself, but the fact that Rose is close 
to Habermas, Bourdieu and Giddens in many ways certainly gives one pause. The 
problem seems more acute for Rose’s ‘broken’ Hegel. For example, Hegel criticises 
Kant for using the kind of thinking that attempts social explanations by a regressive 
chain of causation or by reciprocity. Hegel’s alternative, the concept or conceptual 
thinking, is to consider everything as interrelated moments of the whole. But, as finite 
beings, that is not possible, as Rose herself insists: we have to draw a line somewhere in 
our analysis of mediations.  
 
The Absolute seems to be a regulative ideal just like Kant’s, though with the crucial 
difference that it includes Sittlichkeit. But Sittlichkeit in a modern, pluralist nation state 
is unlikely to be able to do as much work as Hegel imagined it could in his day. Thus 
either one accepts that Kant’s Rechtslehre is as good as we can do at the national scale 
and hope to encourage moral Sittlichkeit in small communities (to which Bernstein 
comes close); or one tries to save some Sittlichkeit within national law at the risk of it 
seeming irrational, overriding pluralism, or imposing a Sollen; or one must try to find an 
ethical culture thin enough not to impose itself unduly but thick enough to act as a 
Sittlichkeit at the national level. Clearly, Rose must attempt the third option, and it is no 
surprise that when she does so in her later work she is close to Axel Honneth who also 
turns to mutual recognition to navigate this Scylla and Charybdis, as we will see in 
chapter 4. 
 
The tightrope Rose is trying to walk is however not of her own making but in the nature 
of modern societies. Consider a tension in Rose’s exposition: the organic unity of 
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(idealised) Greek ethical life simply is not fully compatible with modern self-
consciousness. The Absolute therefore cannot be a completely coherent statement of 
what ought to be; it is a projection of contradictory and yet equally valid social goals; a 
form of value pluralism that reminds us to question whether the current balance is 
working. It is a postulate – both necessary to and guiding thought – yet impossible, and 
known by Rose to be contradictory. Since the Absolute is a contradictory idea, it cannot 
be stated, it can only be implied by, or shown through, speculative statements. A 
speculative statement calls attention to the identity of identity and difference, ‘A = B 
and A ≠ B’ (e.g., ‘religion and the state is one and the same thing’). Here the importance 
of Hegel’s speculative logic to the rest of his thought becomes clear. Hegel’s concept of 
‘autonomous negation’ does not grant ultimacy either to the law of non-contradiction400 
or to the law of the excluded middle.401 It is precisely in the human, cultural (geistig) 
realm, when trying to think the Absolute and the infinite, that such laws break down.402 
The antinomies encountered suggest the need for a different form of reason. 
Nevertheless, Hegel developed a substantive, positive political and social philosophy of 
his own, whereas Rose’s work is largely critique of other theories. As many critics have 
pointed out, Rose’s own theory actually depends on there being a substantial, positive 
theory, which she never offers; put otherwise, her critique is parasitic on the ‘edifice’ of 
politics and its philosophical justifications. In fact, Rose was well aware of this: 
 
Neither politics nor reason unify or ‘totalize’: they arise out of diremption – out of the 
diversity of peoples who come together under the aporetic law of the city, and who 
                                                
400 E.g., EL §115: the law is valid for reflective thinking but not simpliciter for speculative or conceptual 
thinking. §119 Addition 2; Burbidge, The Logic of Hegel’s Logic, 66. 
401 This logical law says a specific predicate must either be ascribed to a subject or not. The phrase 
‘broken middle’ may be an allusion to this. There is increasing recognition of the unhelpful nature of too 
strong an insistence on the law of the excluded middle in sociology. See David Voas and Abby Day, 
‘Recognising Secular Christians: Toward an Unexcluded Middle in the Study of Religion’ (2010) (ARDA 
Guiding Paper Series; State College, PA: The Association of Religion Data Archives at The Pennsylvania 
State University), http://www.thearda.com/rrh/papers/guidingpapers.asp, accessed 11 November 2014. 
The phrase ‘broken middle’ may also allude to Hegel’s remarks in Faith and Knowledge: ‘the most 
interesting point in the Kantian system…[is] the point at which a region is recognized that is a middle 
between the empirical manifold and the absolute abstract unity. But once again, it is not a region 
accessible to cognition…It is acknowledged as thought, but with respect to cognition all reality is denied 
to it…What it lacks is the middle term (Mittelglied), which is Reason…the middle’ (85, 94). 
402 According to Dieter Henrich the SL provides a form of logic that justifies these claims, elaborated 
from ‘autonomous negation’. Henrich taught Rose around the same time he was working out the details 
of his exposition. Not much of his work is available in English so I have relied on the early summary in 
Henrich, Between, as well as the exposition of Henrich’s corpus in Bowman, Absolute Negativity. (C.f. 
Houlgate, Opening, 79-81; George Hartley, The Abyss of Representation: Marxism and the Postmodern 
Sublime (Durham, NC: Duke University, 2003), 53-82). In Henrich’s view, PhR ‘is simply 
incomprehensible without a projection of the Science of Logic and its ontological apparatus into the 
argument’ (Between, 327). Thus Henrich is both a systematic Hegelian (in Brooks’ terms) and puts the 
SL’s autonomous negation at the heart of Hegel’s social and political thought. Rose followed Henrich in 
these two orienting moments. 
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know that their law is different from the law of other cities…Philosophy issues, too, out 
of this diremption and its provisional overcoming in the culture of an era – without 
‘disowning’ that ‘edifice’, it (philosophy) steps away to inspect its limitations, 
especially when the diremptions fixated in the edifice have lost their living connections. 
We should be renewing our thinking on the invention and production of edifices, that is, 
cities…not sublimating those equivocations into holy cities.403 
 
Rose thus accepts her works’ reliance on and implication in the politics of her context 
and its philosophical justification and lack thereof. And she does, in her work as a 
whole, have substantive commitments to mutual recognition as the actuality of ethics 
and politics; to the problems with the bourgeois property form and its legal 
enforcement; to proper balance between individual, civil society and state, which 
involves a commitment to institutions of the middle. That is why she must be read in the 
synoptic way my reconstruction enables. In contrast to some of her interlocutors, she 
insists the possibility of legitimate power still exists, and if the possibility is abandoned 
then the possibility of critique is diminished. She also insists that theory alone cannot 
heal diremptions in society and, as a theorist, saw it as one of her main tasks to point out 
where other theories mistakenly attempted to do so. As we have seen this involves a 
view of the whole without either totalising or reductionism. Her work leans towards 
therapy rather than solution though it is not without substantive commitments, and we 
will see in chapter 4 that an account of mutual recognition can be fleshed out to provide 
more of what Rose’s theory needs in this respect. Her later work thus improved on the 
earlier, in a way that responds to these objections.  
 
7 Conclusion 
This chapter set out Rose’s Hegelian-Frankfurt social philosophy as a way of holding 
together the methodological, logical, descriptive, metaphysical and normative aspects of 
social theory. It showed the way she used it to propose absolute ethical life as a social 
totality implied by the experience of the diremptions of bourgeois property law and their 
reflection in the antinomies of social contract theories. It has thus shown the basis for 
the coherence of her social theory and the unity of her trilogy, and the way she used her 
social philosophy to critique simultaneously society and social theory by relating 
philosophical and metaphilosophical issues. It supported Rose’s claim that her Hegelian 
speculative philosophy offers a better approach to social theory than the classical and 
early Frankfurt sociological traditions. Rose’s main criticism was of their neo-Kantian 
or transcendental structure, whereby one term becomes the precondition for all others 
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but thereby remains unknowable and unexplainable, affecting their judgments about 
society. Transcendental social theory is less able than speculative social theory to 
account for its own social determinations. Hegel’s speculative phenomenology avoids 
this problem by historical-phenomenological knowing and a logic that articulates the 
structure of that knowing in a totality. The Phenomenology provides the motivation and 
some justification for the categorial structures explored in the Logic; even if the Logic 
fails as a complete system it nevertheless has much to teach us about how reason works. 
Rose’s social philosophy is thus its own metaphilosophy, which incorporates the meta-
level into the substantive level of knowing, by considering its own logical and social 
preconditions. The use of speculative propositions brings into view the diremptions of 
society and theory so they can be speculatively handled. It relates philosophical claims 
about the nature of reason, phenomenology and metatheory, with sociological claims 
about society as permanently dirempted in various fundamental ways. Awareness of 
these features of philosophy and society are, for Rose, components of practical wisdom 
in modern society.  
 
Nevertheless, the case should not be overstated, as Rose’s language sometimes does. 
Both Biernacki and Pleasants make parallel critiques of social theory, and a range of 
contemporary Hegel scholars support the broad thrust of Rose’s Hegelianism. Thus both 
the critical and constructive sides of Rose’s social theory are well-motivated and 
plausible, contrary to its initial reception. Yet Rose’s social theory has varying degrees 
of proximity to other powerful approaches to social theorising: Weber, Habermas, 
Adorno, Bhaskar, Bourdieu, Giddens. Her aim to ‘retrieve Hegelian speculative 
experience for social theory’404 does not mean she believed the only worthwhile works 
in social theory were The Philosophy of Right and Hegel Contra Sociology. Her ‘essay’ 
was an attempt to clarify the logical basis of social theory so as to provide a better self-
understanding for the discipline to enable it to guard against mistaken methods and 
conclusions, not to rule out other forms of social theorising, which she accepted as 
necessary and valuable. She did not disregard transcendental sociology, but offered a 
more comprehensive historical-phenomenological basis for social theory. Her 
philosophy alerts social theory to its tendency to slip into neo-Kantianism. Her Hegelian 
framework, through its historical nature, is able to account for the good practice of 
empirical sociology, to avoid reducing philosophy and social theory to the sociology of 
knowledge, and to account for the role of totalities in social theory. Epistemological 
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totalities are necessary to explanation but only imperfectly and provisionally available. 
Social totalities are more than the sum of their parts – ‘organisms’ for Hegel, ‘emergent 
wholes’ for contemporary social theory. Rose places a cautionary mark against all 
quasi-transcendental theories, including metacritiques, which have usually understood 
themselves to be as critical as it is possible to be. To an extent, Rose’s Hegelian social 
philosophy equates to the ‘wary’ or alert use of Weber’s ideal types, that is, a use in 
which, heeding Weber’s warning, the types are known to be posited even though 
referring to real structures.405 Yet Rose is clearer than Weber on our ability to know the 
truth about reality and moral norms because she draws on Hegel’s phenomenology and 
logic for the structure of social theory. With the appropriate qualifications in place then, 
one may affirm Rose’s claim to find in Hegel a different mode of social analysis from 
classical sociology, though it is clearly a part of Frankfurt social theory, to which we 
now turn.  
                                                
405 C.f. Frankfurt Institute, Aspects of Sociology, 119: Weber’s sociology ‘sought to transcend blind 
facticity with such concepts as the ideal type, yet was not able to do so because of its own inherently 
positivistic presuppositions; and thus the ideal types again dissolved into mere facts.’ 
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2 
Rose’s Frankfurt Inheritance 
 
…perfect rationality is a self-defeating goal. 
  – Leszek Kołakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial 
 
1 Introduction 
With some details of Rose’s Hegelian social philosophy in place, the way is open to 
nuance those ideas whilst locating Rose more precisely within the Frankfurt and 
philosophical traditions. The relation between Rose’s work and that of Bernstein, 
Kołakowski and Henrich is completely unremarked in the secondary literature, but I 
show in this chapter, based on new archival research, how it adds significant nuance and 
precision to an understanding of Rose’s social philosophy, and allows the synoptic 
vision necessary to a proper understanding of her mature thought. This is one of my 
original contributions. Another is to show the key features of Rose’s Frankfurt theory 
that created a structural openness in her thought to religion: self-limiting rationality and 
metaphysics as an unsatisfiable yearning, a posing of questions necessary to ask but 
impossible to answer with any finality. The current chapter thereby prepares for the next 
stage of the argument, since Rose’s view of both reason and metaphysics as limited and 
necessary plays a decisive role in her notions of jurisprudential wisdom and the broken 
middle. 
 
In the first part of this chapter I set out the similarities between Rose and Bernstein as a 
way of further delineating the shape of Rose’s social philosophy and her understanding 
of the nature of philosophy as a modernist enterprise (§2). This clears the way for a 
discussion of the main feature of philosophy so understood: the search for self-limiting 
rationality or non-rationalised reason, a wider or more textured reason than the version 
dominant in society, which admits its reliance on what eludes it (§3). This feeds into 
Rose’s notion of implied totality (§4). Since Rose belonged to the Adorno-Hegel strand 
of the Frankfurt School, I compare Rose to Adorno in order to bring out useful contrasts 
between them, but I focus in particular on her distinction between her version of 
speculative thought and Adorno’s negative dialectics (§5). Rose’s Adorno-esque 
modernism involved a different view of philosophy’s nature and task from some 
analytic philosophy, whilst her view of the social totality provided a sociological 
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element missing from some continental philosophy without succumbing to their critique 
of ‘totalising’ systems.  
 
2 Rose and Bernstein: aporetic ontology, philosophical modernism 
Bernstein acknowledges Rose in several books as an intellectual colleague.1 He wrote, 
‘There is no one to whom I am closer intellectually and spiritually than Gillian Rose; 
what is best in this work would not have been there without her.’2  Bernstein’s 
arguments that critical theory must work more centrally with Hegel’s doctrines of the 
causality of fate or the dialectic of ethical life were a shared concern.3 Rose dedicated 
Judaism and Modernity to Bernstein and acknowledges his help in reading drafts and 
discussing her work in several of her books. She mentions him as one of the few 
philosophers doing similar work to her in her RTÉ interview. In Bernstein’s 1987 
conference presentation of their shared Hegelianism he said: 
 
…Gillian and I are Hegelian-Marxists…exoterically hegelians and esoterically 
marxists…What is esoteric for Marx and exoteric for Gillian and I is Hegel’s ‘doctrine’, 
or better, procedure of developing speculative propositions…That speculative thinking 
engages and intrigues an aporetic ontology is what, if anything, distinguishes our 
comprehension of speculative thinking; and has implicitly and explicitly sustained our 
dialogue with one another over the past decade or so.4 
 
The aporetic ontology, explored through speculative propositions, has two 
consequences relevant here: philosophical modernism and a turn to a modern version of 
phronesis. Bernstein wrote an essay after Rose’s death on their shared view of 
philosophy’s vocation as responding to the questions of meaning and justice created by 
                                                
1 Ethical Life (dedicated to Rose); Fate of Art; Adorno; Theodor W. Adorno, The Culture Industry: 
Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. and with an introduction by J. M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 
1991). There are many archived letters between Rose and Bernstein indicating deep friendship. They read 
one another’s work generally and qua publishers’ referees. 
2 Fate of Art, vii. 
3 Bernstein, Ethical Life, 8. 
4 Bernstein, ‘Speculation and Aporia’ (non-capitalisation in original). There are two drafts of this paper in 
the archive, both of which Rose has edited for Bernstein. I have quoted above from the second draft; the 
first draft is not dated. Rose wrote at the top of the first page of the version she annotated more heavily 
(the earlier draft), ‘keep our differences marked’. This is an important warning I have attempted to heed 
throughout. C.f. Bernstein, Ethical Life, 207: ‘Castoriadis’s social ontology is an aporetic ontology; it 
poses the being of the social-historical as neither act nor product, neither instituting nor instituted, but as 
the continual passage from one to the other without rest or resolution. At its most extreme point, this is to 
say that we can attempt to think the being of the social-historical as instituting praxis – the perspective of 
agency and autonomy; or as instituted – the third person perspective of the always already produced, and 
so of heteronomy; what we cannot think through or get behind is the as itself that is the place of exchange 
between instituting and instituted. The instituting/instituted as, which cannot be got behind, is what 
forever, so long as there are social doings at all, prescinds reason from determinacy.’ 
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modern disenchantment. It is worth citing at length. 5  For them, much analytic 
philosophy has ‘become a series of conceptual puzzles’, whilst ‘most of what passes for 
continental philosophy…is as academic in its way as the most baroque constructions of 
analytic philosophy.’ ‘The post-modern pragmatist systematically denies the existence 
of big problems: to insist that society is suffering from the destruction of tradition…is to 
be nostalgic for a long lost, never to be recreated unity. Contemporary philosophy not 
only insists on the absence of big problems; it charges those who think that there are 
such problems with being unmodern and naïve.’ The urgency of the philosophical task 
for Rose and Bernstein lies in its nature as a response to ‘wounds tearing the flesh of 
spirit’: the pressure put on meaning and truth after the death of God. Bernstein describes 
this as philosophical modernism or avant-gardism. Hence ‘the motivation of all 
philosophical modernism since Kant: to demonstrate the limits of the disenchantment of 
the world by showing how scientific truth is not the whole truth…and thus inscribing a 
space of unavoidable and legitimate anthropomorphism.’ ‘This is the leitmotiv of 
Rose’s philosophy: there is an unavoidable anthropomorphism in every concept; no 
concept can escape equivocation and complicity.’ Rose’s works  
 
reveal a wholly modernist sensibility, a sensibility formed by the gaps and absences of 
modernity…If cultural modernity is the lapse of tradition, then every philosophical 
modernist must discover philosophy anew, re-invent it, transfigure it. The exacting 
nature of this endeavour is exacerbated by disenchantment, by the absence of any 
certainties, foundations, absolutes. But these sceptical conditions cannot be dissolved, 
only reformed…The key to Rose’s philosophical practice was her way of utterly 
inhabiting the gaps and absences of the modernist agenda. As a modernist, she knew 
that we are unable to re-unite the dualisms between knowledge and truth, unable to 
provide a conception of virtuous politics or a power wholly drenched in legitimate 
authority. Perhaps her hardest and most stringent criticisms are addressed to those who 
seek, through force or fantasy, to deny the brokenness of our condition….For Rose, if 
the dualisms could not be engineered back together again, neither could they be 
dismissed or dissolved: we may not possess a conception of truth worthy of its name, 
but every attempt to dismiss it ends up reducing human knowing to conventionalism or 
relativism or traditionalism. We may be very unclear about what virtue could be for 
us…but a politics based solely on a conception of humans as utility maximisers or 
rationally self-interested is quite implausible….[Yet] she never leaves the dualisms of 
the present as mere abstract concepts. Inhabiting those dualisms means revealing them 
as human creations inscribing our relations with others and ourselves. 
 
The turn to phronesis is related to the theory-praxis question within Frankfurt (and more 
generally Marxist) thinking. Gorman, a Ph.D. student of Rose’s, argues that she and 
Bernstein had a ‘shared project’ and ‘common front’: 
                                                
5 Jay Bernstein, ‘Philosophy Among the Ruins’, Prospect 6 (March 1996), 27-30. Quotations in the rest 
of this paragraph and the next are from this essay. For Rose’s direct comments on her own view of 
philosophy see LW and the interviews with RTÉ and Elaine Williams. 
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a commitment to the method of immanent critique, genealogy and phenomenology 
without historical completion, as a means of rescuing lost forms of knowledge, political 
wisdom and ethical life…to trace the historical roots of the deformation of reason, as it 
is reflected in modern/postmodern social theory, jurisprudence, politics and aesthetics, 
in order to open up new ways of resuming the values of classical theory (i.e. the 
Platonic-Aristotelian praxis and phronesis) within the present…[recognising that] the 
deformation of reason renders impossible the direct expression and reinstatement of 
these values.6 
 
Gorman shows their similar analyses of modernity, indebted to Weber, focused around 
disenchantment and rationalisation, nihilism, injustice, the simultaneous gain and loss 
of freedom, the separation of the three validity spheres of knowledge, morality and art. 
Both agreed it was impossible simply to think oneself out of modernity’s deformations 
of reason because they were institutionally and culturally produced. Both criticised the 
two common responses to modernity’s malaise of retreating into cynicism, boredom, 
despair, or into idealised, ‘other-worldly’ communities. The latter will be ‘corrupted 
within by their opposition to the overly rationalized world without.’7 In response, an 
expanded, non-instrumental version of reason is required.8 Hence, ‘speculative thinking 
is, as such, a form of political insight, political wisdom, phronesis, theory mediated self-
reflection.’9 But any theory centrally based on and promoting phronesis cannot be 
immediately or straightforwardly action-guiding since that would remove the element of 
judgement and leave easy application of rules.10 Modern phronesis must therefore take 
more account of social mediation of both the agents’ actions and the consequences of 
action than virtue theory tends to do.11 One suspects this is behind Rose’s lack of 
support for MacIntyre’s (and Milbank’s) virtue ethics based on a teleological aim to 
life: amidst deep pluralism, teleology feels didactically imposed or is a solution only for 
a small group in society able to accept the telos around which virtue coheres.12  
 
3 Self-limiting reason 
                                                
6 Gorman, ‘Nihilism’, 18.  
7 Gorman, ‘Nihilism’, 24. 
8 MBL, 6-7; RTÉ interview; Bernstein, Adorno, 4. 
9 Bernstein, Ethical Life, 158. 
10 See Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Virtue theory and abortion’ in Ethics in Practice ed. by Hugh LaFollette (3rd 
ed.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 158-67 on the unrealistically high expectations of action guidance 
expected of moral theories, which applies, mutatis mutandis, to Rose’s social philosophy.  
11 We return to this in chapter 4 §3 when more of Rose’s social philosophy is in place. 
12 See the argument of Fabian Freyenhagen, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy: Living Less Wrongly 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2013) in support of the failure of ethical theory generally to 
appreciate its context within social harms; and Axel Honneth’s attempt to avoid the overly thick 
description of neo-Aristotelianism in The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social 
Conflicts, trans. by Joel Anderson (Cambridge, MA; MIT, 1995). 
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A central issue within German Idealism was reason’s autonomy, its independence from 
external authority. Hegel, for Rose, accorded reason a nuanced not absolute autonomy. 
Reason was based in and reliant on a shape of spirit, its ethical life, its institutions, and 
so on. Yet reason, via the individual, was able to take some distance from itself and the 
shape of spirit on which it depended, and thereby gain a certain freedom with respect to 
what determines it. This achievement is never perfect, such that reason and the subject 
are always partly free and unfree. Rather than setting these boundaries of reason or the 
subject once for all, they should be investigated as they change. ‘Only an expansion of 
reason, rationality, and cognition will answer the dilemma of disenchantment…the 
direction of expansion will be the inclusion in reasoning of ineliminable moments of 
dependency and particularity. The depth, pervasiveness, ineliminability, and 
constitutive role in rationality of dependence on sensuous particulars is…Adorno’s 
central thought.’13 For Rose, too, reason is grounded not only on itself but also on 
physical particulars and moments that exceed reason’s grasp, such that no perfectly 
complete or autonomously grounded reason exists.14 The result is, as Rose put it, ‘the 
reassessment of reason, gradually rediscovering its own moveable boundaries as it 
explores the boundaries of the soul, the city and the sacred’;15 and ‘a rationalism which 
constantly explores its own limits without fixing them…renegotiate[ing] knowledge and 
responsibility under their historically and politically changing conditions.’ 16  Rose 
believed postmodern versions of this idea had reduced reason’s powers and thereby 
critical purchase on our own lives. The ‘different ways of severing existential eros from 
philosophical logos amounts to a trauma within reason itself.’17 Reality ‘is always 
pervaded with meanings neither party intends, but which are recoverable by reflection 
when challenged.’18 Hence it is possible to make progress in finding ‘the actuality of 
the concept’.19 Rose would come to express this version of self-limiting reason as 
‘aporetic’ rather than ‘deterministic’ philosophy. Her view of reason did not carry 
sceptical or relativistic implications as with some postmodern thinkers. 
 
Self-limiting reason has both existential and cultural-political implications, which are 
intertwined in Rose’s work: she identifies ‘the existential drama…at the heart of 
                                                
13 Bernstein, Adorno 31.  
14 JAM, ix-10. 
15 MBL, 11-2. 
16 JAM, 17.  
17 JAM, 2. 
18 JAM, 4. 
19 JAM, 4. Once again we see a difference between Hegel and Rose’s Hegel. For Hegel, a self-limiting 
reason sounds contradictory.  
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Hegelian rationalism.’20 Zygmunt Bauman believed Rose’s version of reason ‘speaks 
directly to the experience of men and women that happen to live in times of contingency 
and face the awesome task of patching up meaningful lives out of a world cut to 
fragments and time sliced into episodes. This is the best reason on offer; a kind of 
reason we truly need and one we can afford.’21 Like her teacher, Leszek Kołakowski, 
Rose thought, ‘We may admit that no traditional metaphysical questions are soluble and 
still deny that this is a reason to dismiss them or declare them meaningless…There is no 
absolute beginning in thinking…Inevitably, we start and end in the middle of our 
itinerary.’22 And ‘we never start from the beginning…Philosophies voice the aspirations 
and the choices of civilizations [which] are never perfectly coherent’.23 Hence, ‘we 
believe that contradictions which actually exist may well be overcome so that a 
synthesis is established between them; but we also believe, in accordance with the entire 
experience of history, that a contradiction which vanishes is merely replaced by a new 
contradiction, so that no universal synthesis is possible.’24 Shapes of spirit – the social 
and philosophical arrangements worked out in a particular society – are rational to some 
extent, though never perfectly so. As such they are available for assessment and 
comparison, at least in some ways, extremely difficult though the task is. To deny this is 
to accede to cultural relativism and bar the way to phenomenology. The always-
unfinished, existential-cognitive appropriation of a preceding reality forever beyond 
complete comprehension has parallels to theology. Self-limiting reason, for Rose, could 
begin to open Frankfurt theory to religion.25 This remains a suggestion in her work 
rather than a developed argument however. 
 
Bernstein shows how a self-limiting reason ‘involves the elaboration of the 
interconnection of three elements: local reason and rationality, sensuous particularity 
(nonidentity, alterity, otherness, the body), and judgment.’ 26  Indeed, ‘part of the 
rationality of ordinary communicative interaction derives from the fact that in it 
                                                
20 HCS, Preface. 
21 ‘Review of Judaism and Modernity’, Sociological Review 42.3 (August 1994), 572-6 (576). 
22 Metaphysical Horror (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 8-11. 
23 Kołakowski, Horror, 99. 
24 Leszek Kołakowski, ‘In Praise of Inconsistency’, Dissent 11.2 (April 1964), 201-9 (206). 
25 Picked up especially by Milbank, Theology and Social Theory; Shanks, Innocence; Rowan Williams, 
The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). Of the large 
literature here see, e.g., Christopher Craig Brittain, Adorno and Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2010); 
Nicholas Adams, Habermas and Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2006); Jürgen Habermas, 
An Awareness of What is Missing (Cambridge: Polity, 2010). 
26 Bernstein, Ethical Life, 172. 
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reflective and determinant judgment remain entwined and mutually dependent.’27 This 
creates the need for a dialectic between local and universal reason. By contrast,  
 
the Enlightenment conception of discursive reason, [is] reason as subsumption, 
entailment, inference, system, and so on; that is, reasoning as governed by forms whose 
force is indifferent to content. In fact, most concepts we employ are non-topic-neutral 
(unlike the logical constants and such terms as ‘several’, ‘most’, ‘although’, etc.), and 
therefore are not and can not be governed by pure (logical) forms…While topic-neutral 
constraints might be conceived of as providing the outer boundaries of rationality, 
actual inferences, and hence patterns of inference, are dependent on the practices in 
which concepts are employed.28 
 
Reasoning and arguing should therefore involve a dialectic between local and universal 
reason. Adorno’s style is an attempt to perform this, to evidence the fundamental place 
of particulars and judgement within fully adequate cognition. ‘His style is thus designed 
to induce his reader to think in that different way which he believes is desirable and 
possible. It is an indirect exhortative method.’29 ‘Adorno’s works are exemplars of 
negative dialectic, that is, they are informed by the idea that concepts, as ordinarily 
used, are distorting and mask social reality.…The question of communicating his ideas 
becomes the question of what the reader should experience when confronting the text, 
and Adorno insists that expressing the relation of the thought to its object should be 
prior to any concern with ease of communicating that thought.’30 Thus, ‘in the same 
way in which “getting” a musical work can require coming to hear in a new way, and 
this really the only route to it, so for Adorno every significant piece of philosophical 
writing is soliciting from the reader a “conversion,” a coming to 
see/experience/understand the object in a new way.’31 He ‘explicitly opposes the 
disavowal of the responsibilities and risks of authorship (authoring belief) implied in the 
ideal that philosophy should provide demonstrations that no one could rationally 
deny.’32 Rose’s style in The Broken Middle (and to some extent in some other works) 
                                                
27 Bernstein, Ethical Life, 170. The two kinds of judgement refer to Kant’s third Critique. 
28 Ethical Life, 168. See chapter 4 for some ethical implications. For Bernstein, the poststructuralists are 
to be understood as pursuing this ‘local reason’ in contrast to Enlightenment universal reason, which 
makes them also modernist philosophers. For Rose, however, they have tipped over into an anti-realism 
and nihilism. This marks one of the key differences between Rose and Bernstein, the other being the 
openness to religion apparent in Rose’s later works. 
29 Rose, ‘Review of Negative Dialectics’, 599. 
30 TMS, 11-2; c.f. Hammond, Philosophy and the Facetious Style. Rose traces Adorno’s concern with 
style as method to Nietzsche. 
31 Bernstein, Adorno, 360. 
32 Bernstein, Adorno, 132. Søren Overgaard, Paul Gilbert, Stephen Burwood, An Introduction to 
Metaphilosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2013), 169: ‘the style they [early analytic 
philosophers] adopted was inappropriate to the seriousness with which pressing problems of life and 
action should be treated, and, indeed, with which they had to be treated by those unable to enjoy the 
gentlemanly existence of Oxford philosophers.’  
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attempts the same task. It was also intended as a literary equivalent to legitimate 
authority rather than illegitimate power, because its irony, facetiousness and poeticism 
(its Kierkegaardian indirect communication) force the reader into doing work, 
undergoing an experience of thought, rather than providing ready-made propositions; 
but is not without its difficulties. Gorman proposes a criticism of Rose’s conception of 
style as method, of theory as praxis:  
 
Rose commits herself to the critique of all forms of universalism, aiming to expose the 
hidden interests behind their respective claims to disinterestedness. Yet this critique is 
nonetheless oriented by the goal of universal, mutual recognition. Crucially, however, 
Rose no longer identifies this goal with the realisation of a future form of society. Now, 
the accomplishment of mutuality resides solely in its being accomplished in and 
through the work of critique and incessant self-relinquishment.33 
 
Yet this will not quite work. Rose does not reduce praxis to style and/or theory. On the 
contrary, Rose was acutely aware of the limits of theory, which drives her critique of 
theory that would ‘mend’ society’s diremptions in thought but not actuality. Indeed, 
Gorman goes on immediately to quote Rose as characterising politics as risking action 
on behalf of all people.34 The ‘accomplishment of mutuality’ does not result solely from 
intellectual work and self-relinquishment, but these are two important sites for 
promoting it, especially for the audience of Rose’s books. In Kierkegaardian fashion, 
Rose wants her writing to create existential anxiety within her readers, so as to cause 
their transformation. This is an aspect of her modernism, enabling her readers to 
experience modernity’s diremptions and the problems they cause, not merely think 
about them in a detached manner. She pushes her readers to see the moveable 
boundaries between the soul and the city, between their subjectivity and their society, 
perhaps so they may take up political or institutional action. Philosophy in her view 
should be transformative of the self. She aimed not to present readers with facts about 
society but to question their own relation to and understanding of it. Rose’s terms 
‘anxiety of beginning’, ‘equivocation of the ethical’, etc., are designed to allude to this 
dialectical (rather than narrowly logical) situation. Rose used this rationality to unsettle 
dualisms in order to ‘make it possible to reconstruct the modern political history of 
unfreedom – above all, the inversions of morality and legality, autonomy and 
heteronomy.’35 It is important to emphasise this element of an at least partially adequate 
learning, of the possibility of rounding on ourselves in order to increase freedom, of the 
                                                
33 Gorman, ‘Critical Marxism’, 34. 
34 MBL, 63. 
35 JAM, 19. 
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attainment of a defensible view of a concept, because in The Broken Middle Rose so 
warns against premature closure, against fleeing the anxiety of beginning, the 
equivocations of the ethical and the brokenness of the middle, that she sounds to some 
as if she is exactly like the postmodern philosophers she criticises for epistemological 
and ethical nihilism. As we have seen, however, it is not that Rose refuses the 
possibility of any (provisional) resolution to philosophical or social problems – 
phenomenological history is in one sense the history of the series of such solutions – but 
she is concerned to avoid two errors where such proposals are concerned. First, 
imposing an alien view on a society; second, any proposed improvement must assess 
how it will filter though various social and political diremptions and be corrupted by 
them. Where, for instance, Milbank thinks Rose lacks solutions or imagination, Rose 
thinks his are too hasty.  
 
Simon Jarvis raised another problem with the style of The Broken Middle: ‘the question 
of the truth of this work, because it aims at much more than correctness, will not be 
entirely separable from that of its reception. It must be too early to say yet whether the 
original rubrics of Rose’s work – the triple configuration of “anxiety of beginning”, 
“equivocation of the ethical” and “agon of authorship” – will remain an idiolect, or 
whether they can take the critical purchase for which they hope on the ethical and 
political life which they address.’36 Twenty years on and the critical purchase is yet to 
emerge, despite signs of increasing interest in Rose’s work. This highlights the risk of 
failing to find an audience inherent in avant-garde style and drawing a different map of 
the intellectual terrain. This risk seems not to have paid off for Rose. In Bernstein’s 
opinion, Rose’s work ‘failed to find a wider readership’ because ‘she too often focused 
on easy, fashionable or little known “continental” targets rather than taking on the more 
permanent and recalcitrant philosophical mammoths of modernity: Enlightenment 
rationalism, naturalism, scientism, pragmatism, liberalism.’37 There is a moment of 
truth here, although with continuing critiques of poststructuralism Rose also seems 
prescient. 
 
4 Social totality 
The self-limiting nature of reason – its imperfection, its inability to offer mathematical, 
QED type proofs – and an aporetic ontology feed directly into the imperfect nature of 
                                                
36 Review of BM in Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 27/28 (1993), 92.  
37 ‘Philosophy Among the Ruins’, 30. 
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the social totality. Three forms of the totality may be discerned in Rose’s work. The 
most encompassing is absolute ethical life, though it is also the least substantive. There 
is also the totality as the emergent whole of society as it currently exists; or, in 
Hegelese, substance is a subject. Then, third, there is the totality of a sub-section of 
society, say the economy, or universities, or the publishing industry. There are, further, 
four aspects of the idea of a social totality implicit in Rose’s use of the latter two forms. 
First, there is an epistemological aspect, that a satisfying explanation must be a 
conceptual one, which grasps the whole by understanding the relations among all the 
parts. Second, the substantial aspect of the totality is the theorisation or depiction of the 
whole itself. Examples could be: a view of the national and global economy arrived at 
by the Bank of England in order to set interests rates; the view of Baltimore society 
conveyed in The Wire or of English society in Our Friends in the North; Roman 
Catholic theorisations and enactments of the Eucharist as a kind of concrete universal 
expressing the heart of Catholicism;38 or a comprehensive history or biography. Clearly 
such theorisations are partial and no conceptual grasp of such large totalities will be 
perfect and should always stand open to revision, which is why for Rose the concept is 
always a broken circle or a broken middle, yet clearly many disciplines and significant 
actions depend on conceptual knowing and totalities as wholes. The third aspect of the 
totality follows: it is interpretative.39 The totality does not immediately appear but 
underlies immediate appearance in the way picked out by Hegel’s essence/appearance 
distinction. The two-level structure of transcendental accounts is apparent here but so is 
the difficulty of judging which essence is most determinative of which appearance 
(something emphasised by critics of this approach). Critical theory maintains a fruitful 
tension between ‘society’ as a critical-philosophical idea and the empirical facts that 
discipline any interpretation.40 Finally, there is a normative moment, insofar as the unity 
of law and ethics in absolute ethical life would allow citizens to see the law as 
expressing their own ethical life; law would be less alienated and less rationalised. The 
interpretative and normative moments differentiate Rose’s social philosophy from some 
other kinds of sociology. It aims to raise consciousness, critique society, critique 
theorisations of society, and prompt thought about alternatives. The nature of the 
                                                
38 For the idea of rituals and ceremonies as forms of Hegelian concepts see Byung-Chul Han, 
Psychopolitk: Neoliberalismus und die neuen Machttechniken (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2014), 92-
6. 
39 TMS, 79: the philosophical ideas Adorno used to interpret society (such as nature, totality, 
essence/appearance) ‘cannot be translated, tout court, into empirical terms because…they depend on a 
notion of totality and “a view of the totality is necessarily philosophical”.’ 
40 TMS, 78. 
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prompt is delicate; it must be open enough not to shut down imagination (which is 
difficult since our ideas of absolute ethical life are tainted by rationalisation, the 
domination of exchange-value, and reification), but it thus risks not giving the 
imagination enough to feed on.  
Absolute ethical life is thus both the most overarching totality and one aspect of 
understanding individual phenomena. As a Hegelian, Rose thinks everything is 
mediated (even the immediate is in fact mediated and its experience as immediate must 
be understood through Schein or semblance: it contains a moment of truth and hides its 
truth). This mediation leads ultimately to the idea of absolute ethical life as the 
overarching totality in which alone the individual can be understood. (The fact/value 
distinction is therefore not ultimate, though of course it has its place in the relative 
autonomy of some areas of research from normative questions). This is why Rose, 
unusually amongst Frankfurt thinkers, insisted on the social import of the Absolute, on 
retaining recognition and appropriation, and method and system, from Hegel. 
Recognition begins with the experience of an initial shock, bumping up against the 
difference between the object and the subject’s idea of it (the possibility of this 
difference is the basis of Rose’s view of experience). To do justice to this experience 
requires the subject to appropriate the moment of recognition, to work through it, to find 
its mediations. As Hegel knew, a change in the (subject’s view of the) object creates a 
change in the subject – or it can, if it is appropriated. The work of appropriation is never 
finished, which is why the path of knowing must be continually re-trod, and this is the 
meaning and unity of method and system in Hegel, and why Rose retained them. This is 
no epistemological pedantry; it goes to the heart of Rose’s approach to the Holocaust. 
Rose not only charges much contemporary thought with mystifying the Holocaust, she 
gambles that it can be appropriated much more significantly than most people are 
willing to accept, both individually and in cultural, artistic and political realms. Thus, 
although appropriation is never finished or perfect, individuals and cultures reach 
resting places for thought (with varying degrees of adequacy), which are available for 
later revision. A view of the totality, properly understood, is thus not ‘totalising’ as 
poststructuralists (and Adorno) feared.41 
 
                                                
41 On appropriation c.f. Rahel Jaeggi, Alienation, trans. by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith, ed. 
by Frederick Neuhouser (New York: Columbia University, 2014 [2005]). 
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Rose refused ‘the super-eminence conferred on ‘the Holocaust’ as the logical outcome 
of Western metaphysical reason’.42 She noted the dialectical reversal that frequently 
occurred in works on the Holocaust, in which philosophy, history and sociology are 
used to explore it, and then at the end of the work the very tools that have enabled the 
exploration are indicted for contributing to the Holocaust and then abandoned. Rose 
insisted on the continuities between our reason, philosophy and society and those of 
Nazi Germany: like Adorno’s verdict on culture, they are indicted and still necessary. 
Rose objects to the abandonment of reason and notions such as truth and justice, and the 
rescinding from any involvement in power and complicity in its violence (in short, the 
rejection of metaphysics and politics), as a response to the Holocaust. ‘The possibility 
of structural analysis and of political action are equally undermined by the evasion of 
the anxiety and ambivalence inherent in power and knowledge.’43 That is why Rose 
argues for shifting the balance from regarding the Holocaust as ineffable to analysing its 
historical and political causes, because it operates as an evasion of the continuity 
between our own thinking and acting, our own society and politics, and those 
represented by Auschwitz. She sums it up as a shift from ‘Holocaust piety’ to 
‘Holocaust ethnography’.44 Rose detects two responses to disappointment in reason’s 
role in abetting domination and genocide: she argues postmodernism responds to the 
Holocaust with melancholia rather than mourning, a distinction she took from Freud.45 
In mourning, the subject works through her grief to appropriate her loss and be able to 
move on. In melancholia this work is not performed, the grief becomes permanent, 
distorting perceptions of self and world; it is ‘a refusal to let go’.46 Hence Rose’s 
alternative – Mourning Becomes the Law – means that the slow, gradual work of re-
assessing reason and its moveable boundaries ‘can complete its mourning’ and return to 
the creative, active nature of law and power.47  
 
Rose regarded Adorno as an ally on this front. Adorno’s aphorisms “To write poetry 
after Auschwitz is barbaric” and “the metaphysical capacity is paralysed” are cited by 
Rose as ‘dramatic irony in the major, sustained, philosophical reflection of an 
                                                
42 MBL, 11. 
43 MBL, 36. 
44 MBL, ch.2, ‘Beginnings of the Day: Fascism and Representation’, 41-62 (reprinted in Modernity, 
Culture and ‘the Jew’, ed. by Bryan Cheyette and Laura Marcus (Stanford: Stanford University, 1998), 
242-56). 
45 On Freud’s distinction see Jonathan Lear, Freud (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 168-72. Rose also uses 
the terms ‘aberrated’ and ‘inaugurated’ mourning. 
46 MBL, 11. 
47 MBL, 12. 
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authorship devoted to defending comprehension against fundamental ontology in the 
wake of ‘Auschwitz’’. 48  Further, neither wished to abandon metaphysics or 
transcendence but to develop an immanent transcendence that would reform the 
metaphysical tradition. Adorno criticised any transcendence that could remain 
untouched by history. For Rose, a rational account of ethical and political action must 
be corrigible and so responsive to historical experience. Metaphysics in Rose means, 
‘speaking with generality about the real or actual’;49 ‘an overall proposal concerning the 
character of reality as known by agents.’50 Metaphysics cannot be ‘settled by appeal to a 
tangible state of affairs or set of facts, yet at the same time [it is] not a question that can 
be relegated to a matter of taste or private judgement’.51 It concerns ‘the classical 
preoccupations of philosophy…eternity, reason, truth, representation, justice, freedom, 
beauty and the Good.’52 Furthermore, ethics and metaphysics are connected, so that to 
separate them is to undermine both.53 ‘Ethics and metaphysics are torn halves of an 
integral freedom to which they have never added up.’54  
 
Metaphysics involves putting the concepts of truth, goodness, justice, and so on, into 
some kind of connection, but in a way that acknowledges the imperfection and failure of 
the account.55 Like her teacher Dieter Henrich, Rose thinks metaphysics is unavoidable 
because reason seeks totality and ‘thoughts of closure’, and impossible, because these 
can never be settled or completely successful.56  Dieter Freundlich’s summary of 
Henrich’s view expresses central parts of Rose’s own:57 refusals of metaphysics and 
‘detranscendentalized’ social philosophy avoid whatever cannot be subject to 
                                                
48 BM, 288. My interpretation relies on: Theodor W. Adorno, Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, ed. 
by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Edmund Jephcott; Stanford: Stanford University, 2001 [1965]; Adorno, 
Negative Dialectics, 361f; Adorno, Kant’s Critique; Bernstein, Adorno, 371-456; Chris Thornhill, 
‘Adorno Reading Kant’, Studies in Social and Political Thought 12 (2006), 98-110; O’Connor, Adorno, 
86-109; Carl B. Sachs, ‘The Acknowledgement of Transcendence: Anti-Theodicy in Adorno and 
Levinas’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 37.3 (March 2011), 273-94; Williams, Lost Icons, 122-9. 
49 Williams, ‘Between’, 3.  
50 Williams, ‘Between’, 7. 
51 Williams, ‘Between’, 5. 
52 MBL, 1. 
53 MBL, 2. 
54 MBL, 9. 
55 Given this view it seems odd Rose did not engage more with normative political philosophy from 
Rawls onwards. It may be simply that her field of philosophy was continental. There are brief remarks in 
MBL’s introduction about communitarianism and libertarianism, which she charges with being 
inattentive to equivocation and unifying metaphysis and ethics too closely, as if there can be a fully 
rational-political whole. Whilst suggestive, these remarks are hardly satisfying. 
56 These points are well brought out in Richard L. Velkley’s ‘Introduction’ to Dieter Henrich, The Unity 
of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy, ed. by Richard L. Velkley, trans. by Jeffrey Edwards et al 
(London: Harvard University, 1994), 1-15. 
57 Quotations in the rest of the paragraph come from Dieter Freundlich, Dieter Henrich and 
Contemporary Philosophy: The Return to Subjectivity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 167. Henrich has 
Habermas in his sights here. 
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‘methodologically controlled procedures of reasoning.’ The ‘relative epistemic certainty 
attainable through methods modelled on the sciences is bought at too high a cost.’ 
Important questions are no longer asked. Henrich implies ‘the turn away from the 
metaphysical tradition from Plato to Leibniz that was brought about by the rise of 
empiricism and its aftermath has meant the loss of a whole dimension of human 
understanding and experience, a dimension that may be worth exploring again, 
especially in the light of the way in which it was rediscovered and kept alive for some 
decades by German Idealists from Kant to Hegel.’58 Adorno saw in Kant a yearning for 
transcendence and metaphysics, despite the strictures he placed on both. The theological 
resonances are clear. 
 
There are, however, differences too. It is telling that Adorno glosses ‘aporia’ as 
‘however you do it, it’s wrong’, whereas Rose glosses it as exploring a way through to 
find ‘good enough justice’.59 Metaphysics for Rose is an attempt to navigate the aporia 
between the law or universal and the particular;60 ethics is its development: ‘being at a 
loss yet exploring various routes, different ways towards the good enough justice, which 
recognises the intrinsic and the contingent limitations in its exercise.’61 
 
Despite her unique emphasis on appropriation, Rose is clearly influenced by Adorno, 
who also used the concept of the totality in his social philosophising in a nuanced 
way.62 On the one hand, his ‘analysis of the underlying processes of society is not based 
on any notion of society “as a whole”. The emphasis on commodity exchange means 
that the “whole” of society cannot be the object of analysis.’63 Adorno rejected the 
‘illusion’ ‘that the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality of the real.’64 Here, 
Adorno denies the adequacy of philosophy to grasp the whole from pure reason alone 
(of course, Rose did not believe Hegel had tried to do so). On the other hand, Adorno 
believed it was possible to obtain a grasp of the whole society in a particular if one 
                                                
58 Freundlich, Henrich, viii. 
59 Adorno, Metaphysics, 137 and Rose, LW, 116. 
60 LW, 115. 
61 LW, 116. 
62 Rose thought reification did most of the work for Adorno, such that his use of ‘totality’ refers to 
reification. For sympathetic yet critical discussions of Rose’s analysis of reification see Owen James 
Hulatt, ‘Texturalism and Performance – Adorno’s Theory of Truth’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of York, 2011), 59-60 and 79-80, and Chris O’Kane, ‘Fetishism and Social Domination in 
Marx, Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sussex, 2013). On 
the role of the totality in Adorno’s social philosophy see his contributions to The Positivist Dispute, 
Negative Dialectics, esp. 158-65, and O’Connor, Adorno, 23-53, which I have found extremely helpful 
for the present discussion. 
63 TMS, 143. 
64 Adorno, ‘Actuality of Philosophy’, 120. 
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sufficiently attended to it in its mediations by means of a constellation.65 ‘In sociology, 
interpretation acquires its force both from the fact that without reference to totality – to 
the real total system, untranslatable into any solid immediacy – nothing societal can be 
conceputalized, and from that fact that it can, however, only be recognized in the extent 
to which it is apprehended in the factual and the individual. It is the societal 
physiognomy of appearance. The primary meaning of ‘interpret’ is to perceive 
something in the features of totality’s social givenness.’66 It seems the whole, like 
universal history, must be construed and denied. For both Adorno and Rose, philosophy 
provides critical concepts (totality, essence/appearance, etc.), whilst sociology provides 
empirical discipline. Philosophy without sociology may wander into wild supposition; 
sociology without philosophy may be swamped in detail. Martin Jay comments: ‘as 
Gillian Rose has perceptively noted, Adorno’s use of totality must be taken as an 
example of his general anti-realist use of concepts. The inevitable gap between concept 
and object…meant that Adorno’s own concepts were themselves not to be taken as 
perfectly true to reality.’67 Thus Rose and Adorno are able to deal with the objection 
raised by Hans Albert against the use of totality within social philosophy, namely that it 
is unverifiable, because they refuse the positivist metaphilosophy on which the 
objection rests. Adorno replied it was not a fact available to be verified but was 
nevertheless real.68 
 
In the previous chapter we saw Hegelian conceptual thought does not think in terms of 
efficient causes all the way down. Adorno developed an implication of this because he 
‘specifically rejects the notion that social influence can be understood as some kind of 
causality.’69 As a consequence of the increased complexity of society, there is no social 
centre, no simple causality. Instead there is ‘integration – where the universal 
dependence of all moments on all other moments makes the talk of causality 
obsolete’.70 Dialectics immerses itself in the object, hence the importance of empirical 
sociology,71 yet it ‘does not possess a canon of thought which might regulate it.’72 This 
                                                
65 In the words of Horkheimer, ‘Each individual inquiry should have a certain character as key to the total 
situation.’ (Wheatland, ‘Debate About Methods’, 128).  
66 Adorno, ‘Introduction’, The Positivist Dispute, 32. 
67 Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas (Berkeley: University of 
California, 1984), 265. 
68 Adorno, ‘Introduction’, The Positivist Dispute, 32-3. 
69 O’Connor, Adorno, 28. 
70 O’Connor, Adorno, 29, citing Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 267. 
71 Adorno, ‘Free Time’, in The Culture Industry, 96, discusses interviews carried out by the Institute, 
which provided ‘a virtually text book example of how critical-theoretical thought can both learn from and 
be corrected by empirical social research.’ 
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highlights the risk of knowing and theorising, attention to which, as we have seen, is the 
only way to maintain epistemological discipline (not a pre-determined method). This 
produces a view of society as ‘full of contradictions and yet determinable; rational and 
irrational in one, a system and yet fragmented;’73 a fine gloss on the broken middle 
avant la lettre. Yet the dialectical approach to society does not lack mooring points. For 
Adorno, exchange value within capitalism was the single most important key to the 
social whole (exchange value is the only way in which the commodity can appear).74 
The danger is this becomes reductive, and Rose thought Adorno gave insufficient 
weight to human praxis, the state, power and social class. 75  Rose identifies the 
diremptions between law and ethics, and between state and society, as two other crucial 
keys to the social whole. She was adding to the list of important social determinations 
not replacing exchange or commodities as central to society.76 
 
5 ‘From Speculative to Dialectical Thinking’ 
Rose wrote an essay characterising Adorno’s negative dialectics as a regression from 
Hegelian speculation.77  This was an obvious provocation, since Adorno designed 
negative dialectics to improve upon Hegel’s speculative thought, and Rose’s speculation 
is obviously very close to Adorno’s negative dialectics.78 Some commentators have 
even identified them: Stewart Martin believes her ‘anti-metaphysical account of 
Hegelian speculation secretly elaborates Adorno’s negative dialectics.’79 One suspects 
facetiousness at work here, aimed less at Adorno than postmodern uses of Adorno 
prevalent at the time Rose wrote the paper.80 Nevertheless despite the similarity, as 
Nigel Tubbs has argued, Rose thought the essential difference between her and Adorno 
was that Adorno did not sufficiently allow for development, learning or growth 
(personal or socio-historical), which undermined critical consciousness and the 
                                                                                                                                          
72 Adorno, ‘Introduction’, The Positivist Dispute, 9 (c.f. 43). 
73 Adorno, ‘On the Logic of the Social Sciences’, The Positivist Dispute, 106. 
74 TMS, 27. 
75 E.g. TMS, 28, 37. 
76 Hence, Gorman, ‘Critical Marxism’, 26: ‘Rose agrees with both Lukács and Adorno that Marx’s 
analysis of the commodity form is the necessary point of departure for the speculative critique of culture 
and society’. Marcus Pound argues Rose remained committed to Marxism throughout her work: ‘Political 
Theology and Comedy: Žižek through Rose tinted Glasses’, Crisis and Critique 2:1 (9 February 2015), 
http://crisiscritique.org/uploads-new/Pound.pdf, accessed 10 February 2015. 
77 JAM, ‘From Speculative to Dialectical Thinking – Hegel and Adorno’, 53-63. For a parallel argument 
to Rose’s that defends Hegel’s superiority against Adorno see William Maker, ‘Two Dialectics of 
Enlightenment’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 66 (Autumn/Winter 2012), 54-73. 
78 C.f. Philip Walsh, Skepticism, Modernity and Critical Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 
esp. 94-8, 137-40. 
79 Stewart Martin, Adorno and the Problem of Philosophy (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Middlesex 
University, 2002), 189.  
80 The essay was first presented at a conference on critical theory in 1987. 
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possibilities of experience generating critical thought.81 There are two main aspects to 
this. 
 
The first aspect is the relation of critique to social change. Hegel claims a negation of 
the negation is positive because it retains the moment or memory of what was negated 
and part of the character of the result comes from that moment. Adorno denies this: 
negation does not lead to an affirmative or positive result. The whole may be critiqued 
but the whole remains despite the critique.82 Critique is thus of limited potency in 
contemporary society.83 Adorno thinks contradictions persist until society changes. 
Critique can only point them out, ‘it cannot go with Hegel in thinking that critique is 
already a step beyond the state of affairs criticized.’84 We have seen Rose handled this 
problem by reference to the kind of Sollen found in Hegel’s thinking: recognising the 
Sollen as such allows for the role critique can play (which varies between contexts) 
whilst giving primacy to changes in social form above intellectual critique. Rose thinks 
the critique is a partial step beyond the current situation for those who appropriate the 
critique if they are able use it to gain some freedom from social determination. It may 
make a difference to the subjectivity of the individual. For Rose, Adorno underestimates 
praxis and phronesis. Adorno arguably ‘lost hope of discovering behind present social 
facts dynamic objective possibilities,’85 he believed in late capitalism there is only ‘the 
antinomic alternatives of critical thought, illusionless but impotent, and mere 
reduplication in consciousness of the world of administered controls.’86 For Rose, 
Adorno had regressed from speculative to dialectic thinking because his thinking had at 
that point become fixed and ahistorical. 
 
The second aspect is the possibility of progress in thought. Adorno differentiates his 
constellations from Hegel’s concepts because in constellations ‘there is no step-by-step 
progression from the concepts to a more general cover concept.’ 87  Adorno’s 
constellations ‘are not progressive but combinative: a nonprogressive 
combination…The configuration of concepts therefore does not present itself as a 
                                                
81 Tubbs, Contradiction of Enlightenment, 134-46; Philosophy of the Teacher, 41-4. Joanne Morra, 
‘Review of Judaism and Modernity’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73.4 (1995), 649 concurs. 
82 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 158-60. 
83 Gillian Rose,‘How Is Critical Theory Possible? Theodor Adorno and Concept Formation in Sociology’, 
Political Studies 24:1 (March 1976), 69-85. 
84 O’Connor, Adorno, 49. 
85 Jay, Totality, 202. 
86 Andrew Arato, ‘Introduction’ to ‘Esthetic Theory and Cultural Criticism’, Frankfurt School Reader, 
201. 
87 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 162. 
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progressively sufficient identification of the object.’ 88  In Hegel’s logic there are 
different forms of movement: in the Essence section the movement is diversity or 
reflection, whereby new forms are accumulated without being either lost or unified; in 
the Concept section the movement is development, in which new terms develop by 
incorporating previous terms.89  
 
…Rose notes the way in which Adorno misses the ironic dimension in Hegel’s system 
and accordingly remains at the level of a dialectic that fails to think itself consistently. 
Adorno appears as the apostle of irreconcilable non-identity, the renunciation of 
comprehensive theory; but to arrest the dialectic as dialectic is to leave the terms of the 
contradictions of dialectic untouched. By contrast, Hegel’s thinking insists not on a 
return to identity but on the ‘speculative’ projection of a continually self-adjusting, self-
criticising corporate practice.90 
 
Yet these differences should not be overstated. Adorno insists the concept wishes to be 
identical with its object, though it never can, and constellations provide ‘emphatic’ and 
‘definite’ knowledge.91 He remarks his real difference from Hegel is not to be found in 
individual distinctions but the intent of their work: Hegel wished to affirm unity, 
Adorno wishes to oppose identity in his attempt to resist the ‘universal coercive 
mechanism’ of society (but found too in traditional philosophical systems).92 Rose is 
thus somewhere between Adorno and Hegel. She has clearly found (or imported, or 
both) much of Adorno’s critique of Hegel already in Hegel; she insists on diremptions, 
the historicality and sociality of self-limiting reason, the imperfection of any 
knowledge; yet she is more insistent on the possibility of definite and emphatic 
knowledge than Adorno, she stresses the possibility of appropriation, which entails 
some kind of synthesis and totality, to which Adorno was averse (and which remain 
unfashionable).93 Yet the synthesis entailed is a broken one. 
 
                                                
88 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 162-6; c.f. Stewart Martin, ‘Adorno’s Conception of the Form of 
Philosophy’, Diacritics 36.1 (Spring 2006), 48-63 (55).  
89 E.g. EL, §79-89, 161; PhR, 31. 
90 Williams, ‘Between’, 14. C.f. Simon Jarvis, ‘What Is Speculative Thinking?’, Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie 1:227 (2004), 70; Howard Caygill, ‘Critical Theory and the New Thinking: A Preliminary 
Approach’, 145-53 in The Early Frankfurt School and Religion, ed. by Margarete Kohlenbach and 
Raymond Geuss (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 149: ‘…Gillian Rose identified in Adorno’s 
reading of Hegel…a desire for a simplified notion of dialectic in Hegel that did not fully recognise the 
claims and the power of speculative thought.’  
91 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 159. These terms come from a footnote in Negative Dialectics, almost as 
if Adorno wishes to sneak back in what he is at pains to deny in the main text. 
92 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 145. 
93 Analogously, Bernstein argues in Adorno that Adorno unnecessarily restricted the possibilities for 
ethical and metaphysical experience to modernist art, when they can be found in everyday life, instances 
of individual moral courage and social movements. 
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Another way to approach the difference here is between determinate critique (bestimmte 
Kritik) in Adorno and determinate negation (bestimmte Negation) in Hegel. Adorno 
critiques forms of life to find a counter-image, but will not be drawn on what the good 
life is. The good is not what we have now, and is extremely underdetermined by our 
negative knowledge of it. Attempts to imagine the good life will almost certainly 
reinstate current damaged life, since our thinking is so dominated by reification. For 
example, according to Rahel Jaeggi94 Adorno thinks gift-giving as currently practised is 
deformed because it does not treat the other as a subject, but Adorno will not conclude 
that some other version of gift giving is part of the good life and can be used as a means 
to measure or critique society. Rose’s historical phenomenology could argue, however, 
that gift-giving is so universal we can be reasonably certain it is part of the good life. 
Adorno thus refuses too much knowledge: ‘the dilemma of enlightenment and 
domination has priority over presenting speculative exposition or Bildung – the relation 
of universal and particularity as it is actually and potentially negotiated by the 
singular.’95 This stems from Adorno’s ethical negativism.96 Adorno accepts individuals 
can attain to some moral good, but he thinks this happens rarely, fleetingly, and does 
not ‘add up to either a good life or to knowledge of what the good life would consist in’; 
that it is not obvious which are genuine goods, and to tell ourselves otherwise is an 
illusion.97 Even a decent life is not right but only amounts to resisting wrong, because 
we will have largely left in place the social conditions that produce poverty for half the 
globe, grave environmental pollution, and the possibility of more large scale violence. 
One of Adorno’s examples of a moral good is a good family life that creates individuals 
with robust egos who will not be so easily prey to propaganda and social pressure. Yet 
notice that family life is not rare but common; not fleeting but lifelong; and known as 
such; and is most likely one component of the good life. It therefore runs against 
Adorno’s views of what we know about goods. Likewise, Adorno risks making family 
life instrumental – it is good only because it helps people resist society – but the burden 
of proof surely lies with his view. Thus once Adorno opens the door to let in some 
positive goods he cannot shut it quickly enough to keep out the normative force of those 
goods. And that means there is more to normativity than the negative, than avoiding the 
                                                
94 Rahel Jaeggi, ‘“No Individual Can Resist”: Minima Moralia as Critique of Forms of Life’, 
Constellations 12.1 (2005), 65-82. 
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bad. Even granting the negativist thesis that the imperative to avoid extreme bads 
carries enough normative force to generate much of ethics without the need to invoke 
any good, most of life is not occupied with avoiding extreme bads, which implies some 
positive values, duties, virtues, or ends are required to shape and guide behaviour 
beyond knowledge of what bads to avoid. Rose believed Adorno could not bridge his 
moral and political philosophies and that his ethics remained individual rather than 
social.98 
 
These reflections suggest Rose’s essay opposing Hegelian speculation and Adorno’s 
dialectics is best seen as a way of registering differences over moral and political 
thinking and the nature of critique. Indeed, before Rose had produced her interpretation 
of Hegel she had already written, the ‘idea that Adorno is an Hegelian Marxist is a 
misleading oversimplification…In this general sense of ‘sublating’ the tradition, not 
rescinding it, Adorno betrays an Hegelian inspiration, but his conceptual apparatus, 
such as the criticism of identity thinking, negative dialectic, reification, is never 
Hegelian in origin.’99  
 
6 Conclusion 
The archival research behind this chapter revealed significant aspects of Rose’s work 
hitherto unrecognised in the secondary literature and provides crucial steps towards 
three of my original contributions: important features of her social philosophy, the 
synoptic vision necessary to appreciate the broken middle, and the relation between 
Rose’s work and religion. Rose was a critical theorist in the Hegel-Adorno tradition 
with strong similarities to J. M. Bernstein. As such her thought includes a Weberian 
analysis of modernity, a combination of sociology and philosophy, a realist-idealist 
epistemology rather than positivism or relativism, and immanent critique aiming at 
emancipation and reflexive self-knowledge. Her speculative philosophy involves an 
aporetic ontology; a vision of philosophy as a modernist cultural practice opening the 
way to modern forms of phronesis and praxis; and a self-limiting rationality 
acknowledging its inability fully to grasp reality (which she thought paralleled 
theological admission of mystery in reality). Failure to acknowledge this has led to a 
mischaracterisation of her work as overly theological and a mistaken view of her 
                                                
98 TMS, 76. A similar charge is made by Lambert Zuidervaart, Social Philosophy After Adorno 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007), 157-81.  
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her interpretation of Hegel.  
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epistemology as non-realist. Appreciating her work as Frankfurt critical theory explains 
Rose’s hesitation about normative solutions as downplaying the deformation of reason 
and institutions, the rationalising fate awaiting ethical action. Her Adornian heritage 
also explains her concern with style, though Kierkegaard was important here too. 
Rose’s speculative philosophy has a great deal in common with Adorno’s negative 
dialectics, but is more insistent on and optimistic about the possibilities for learning, 
justice and transformation on both individual and cultural-political levels. This was 
driven partly by the place she accorded recognition and appropriation in speculative 







Even now there are places where a thought might grow… 
  – Derek Mahon, ‘A Disused Shed in Co. Wexford’ 
 
1 Introduction 
Thus far I have shown Rose’s social philosophy as a Hegelian-Frankfurt enterprise, 
incorporating its own social and logical preconditions to achieve maximal 
metaphilosophical awareness. I have shown Rose held a sophisticated idea of a social 
totality as a necessary normative and theoretical ideal, a view she had in common with 
Hegel, Marx and first-generation Frankfurt thinkers. Since Rose’s work is a 
simultaneous critique of society and social theory, in this chapter I focus on Rose’s 
critique of social philosophy in The Dialectic of Nihilism, and show how it contains, 
though partly implicitly, elements of her critique of society and further elements of her 
own constructive position. This furthers my claim about the integrated nature of Rose’s 
work as a whole, and addresses the second part of her trilogy to show the latter’s unity. I 
reconstruct a significant feature Rose’s social philosophy – ideology critique via 
jurisprudence – that is unknown in the secondary literature. I show how her ideas of 
self-limiting reason and of metaphysics led into a view of social philosophy as 
‘jurisprudential wisdom’ in contrast to narrow forms of legal positivism. These 
elements are essential for having a non-reductive view of Rose’s mature social 
philosophy of the broken middle, which I address in the next chapter.  
 
In The Dialectic of Nihilism, the ‘antinomy of law’ names the speculative unity of law 
and ethics in absolute ethical life, which, we have seen, is an extrapolation from the 
ever-shifting diremptions between law and ethics. Rose used the perdurance of this 
antinomy to perform an ideology critique of social philosophy in Kant and the post-
Kantian tradition. She developed the argument broached in Hegel Contra Sociology that 
Kant reflects the bourgeois property form, itself similar to Roman law, by examining 
the Roman legal influence on Kant’s form of rationality as a whole. She critiqued the 
post-Kantians by the second main form of Frankfurt School ideology critique, which is 
to discern where theorists mistake ‘theory for reality’.1 She charged certain neo-
                                                
1 Arato, ‘Introduction’ to ‘Esthetic Theory and Cultural Criticism’ in Frankfurt School Reader, 201. 
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Kantians of thinking to remove antinomies and metaphysics from jurisprudence, but 
only by unintentionally transferring them onto their conception of society; she accused 
prominent poststructuralists of ontologically ossifying social diremptions, or 
ahistoricising them, and so precluding the possibilities of critique, change and justice. 
The critique of society thus receded into the background in this work, though by reading 
Rose’s work as a whole, and especially her trilogy of works as constituted around the 
speculative handling of diremptions and absolute ethical life, we can nevertheless see 
accruing to Rose’s social philosophy further constructive components, which she called 
‘jurisprudential wisdom’. Jurisprudential wisdom is social philosophy able properly to 
handle the antinomy of law and discern its effects on both society and social theorising.  
 
In order to exposit this jurisprudential wisdom, once again some ground clearing is in 
order. First I clarify Rose’s term of art ‘antinomy of law’ (§2.1); then I outline Rose’s 
argument in Dialectic of Nihilism (§2.2); and sketch her view of the state-society 
relation as influencing philosophy (§2.3), to which we return in more detail in the next 
chapter. I am then able to assess Rose’s argument about Roman law and the form of 
rationality in Kant, as a test case of her ideology via jurisprudence (§3). This reveals the 
continuity between her previous and subsequent books and substantiates my claim that 
Rose had a coherent, though developing, social theory underlying and unifying her 
different publications; brings out further what she regarded as important within her 
theory of modernity; and shows some of its key developments. I find Rose’s remarks 
about Kant ultimately untenable but the broader position from which she makes those 
remarks still valuable. In §4 I show some of the implications of the constructive 
elements of her philosophy in relation to political philosophy and jurisprudence; 
namely, support for a social and political philosophy inspired by Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right, the use of law to gain a view of the social totality, and an expansive view of 
jurisprudence as examining the links between the metaphysical, ethical and legal.  
 
2 The ‘speculative identity of form and history’ 
2.1 The antinomy of law 
The term antinomy of law is ‘the dual implication of rule and regularity, of force and 
generality, known to the tradition as regulae iuris and to us as ‘diachrony’ and 
‘synchrony’’.2 The regulae iuris means the unwritten but generally practised principles 
                                                
2 DN, 2. 
 125 
of interpretation of written laws;3 they contain a tension, present in Justinian’s Digest, 
between describing existing practice and stipulating normative conditions for law. The 
antinomy of law, in short, names the tensions between law and ethics and the hovering 
between description and prescription. ‘The connection and the conflict of law [des 
Rechts] with ethics presents the fundamental problem of the entirety of law in its entire 
history’. 4  She associates this with the ‘mystery of the categorical imperative: 
inconceivable but absolute.’5 In her next book, The Broken Middle, Rose called the 
antinomy of law ‘the dual implication of law and ethics.’6 It is ‘the ‘juridical’ and 
‘litigious’ in law, for both of these terms carry impositional and ethical connotations.’7 
This distinction connects to several aspects of law, seen in the explicit glosses on the 
‘antinomy of law’ in Dialectic of Nihilism: 
 
a) The ‘characteristic compound in modern states of individual freedom with individual 
depoliticization.’8 For instance, modern individuals are both legal ‘persons’ (they have 
rights) and ‘things’ (they are the commodity labour-power).9 In this sense, the antinomy 
of law is one way of thinking about what we may call “actually existing autonomy.”  
b) Universality/particularity:10 law, like metaphysical and linguistic terms, must be 
universal and yet apply to particulars.  
c) Freedom/necessity:11 law as coercive yet enabling freedom (rather than the question 
of free will versus determinism), with the focus on how the tension is worked out in 
different contexts.  
d) Agents’ activity and passivity in law, agents as both actors in and subject to law; both 
judges of and judged by other judged judges.12 (In the background is the Kantian trial of 
reason by reason, culminating in Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism as a normal condition, 
                                                
3 DN, 18. (This holds for the first emergence of ius in Roman law, in contrast to lex, though in later times 
regulae iuris became synonymous with maxims and written law. See Peter G. Stein, ‘The Roman Jurists’ 
Conception of Law’ in A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, ed. by Andrea 
Padovani and Peter G. Stein, 7 vols (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007) 7: 1-30; R. W. M. Dias, ‘Review of Peter 
Stein, Regulae Iuris: From Juristic Rules to Legal Maxims’, Cambridge Law Journal 25.2 (1967), 269-
71; Barry Nicholas, ‘Review of Peter Stein, Regulae Iuris: From Juristic Rules to Legal Maxims’, 
Journal of Roman Studies, 58.1-2, November 1968, 269). 
4 DN, 45, citing Hermann Cohen, Rose’s square parentheses.  
5 DN, 2. 
6 BM, xiv-xv. 
7 BM, xv (referring to DN 2, 17 n.30). 
8 DN, 3. 
9 DN, 3. 
10 DN, 15. 
11 DN, 18. 
12 DN, 65. 
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in which all values are undermined by valuing objective truth (the sociological 
dimensions of which were pursued by Weber)).13  
e) The relation between political structures and ideology,14 state and religion, rules and 
ethos. 
f) von Ihering’s positing of egoism and altruism as human motivation.15  
 
Each of these is surely difficult, but are they strictly speaking antinomic? This depends 
on whether antinomy is equated with contradiction. Rose differentiated the two. ‘An 
antinomy is a conflict of two arguments or doctrines, each of which taken in itself is 
cogent, but they cannot both be valid, and one cannot establish superiority over the 
other.’16 In her later work, Rose equated antinomy with aporia and preferred aporia to 
contradiction because, ‘While ‘contradiction’ is a logical term, which, applied to social 
structure, implies possible resolution, ‘aporia’ is prelogical, it refers to lack of way, and 
implies no exit from its condition.’17 Rose’s view is that the internal structure of law 
and its metaphysical correlates and the social outworking of both are internally in 
tension and produce dilemmas and paradoxes (e.g., the well known legal problems 
associated with tolerance, equality, free speech, and the antinomies listed above). The 
historical fact that no finally satisfactory answer has been attained to these questions 
supports the characterisation of law and metaphysics as antinomic18 and attests to the 
wisdom of Rose’s aporetic rather than deterministic mind-set in philosophy.  
 
Others take a similar view. As H L A Hart argued in response to the perennial 
difficulties in conceiving law, the ‘price of uniformity’ is distortion. 19  The 
contemporary Hartian John Gardner writes, ‘there is no bigger picture. I don’t have a 
                                                
13 For Weber see Bernstein, Adorno; for Nietzsche see J. M. Bernstein, ‘Autonomy and Solitude’ in 
Nietzsche and Modern German Thought, ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson (London: Routledge, 1991), 192-
215; for Kant see Adorno, Kant’s Critique, 55: ‘acting in accordance with laws appears as a function of 
freedom – or, conversely, freedom manifests itself as a function of law….This is the kernel of Kant’s 
philosophy. It does in fact articulate a very dark secret of bourgeois society. This secret is the reality that 
the formal freedom of juridical subjects is actually the foundation of the dependency of all upon all, that 
is to say, it is the foundation of the coercive character of society, its conformity with law.’ 
14 DN, 5. 
15 DN, 38. C.f. Rudolf von Ihering, Law as a Means to an End in The Great Legal Philosophers: Selected 
Readings in Jurisprudence, ed. by Clarence Morris (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1959), 
397-417. 
16 TMS, 54; c.f. 149-50. 
17 BM, 206 n.217. C.f. ‘The Dispute Over Marx and Weber’, in which she contrasts contradiction (in 
Marx) with paradox (in Weber) in much the same way. ‘A paradox is repeated and cannot be transcended 
or resolved.’ The connections with her later use of Kierkegaardian repetition are striking, but see also 
‘Antinomy’ in TMS 149-50. 
18 Ironically, Rose has this in common with much postmodern thought but we saw in chapter 1 this is now 
a dominant theme of Hegelian interpretation. 
19 The Concept of Law (2nd ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1994 [1961]), 38-42.  
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theory of law, let alone…a…comprehensive theoretical position’.20 Neither does Rose 
present a comprehensive theory of law. She does present mutual recognition as the 
actuality of law but she does not work out many details of this view. She uses the 
historically shifting form of the antinomy to discover latent problems in other social 
philosophies. Once again Rose’s works are best construed as therapeutic interventions 
concerned to oppose the reduction of rationality and philosophical resources of critique; 
they do not aim to solve narrowly defined technical problems but to aid theorising by 
locating metatheoretical problems and their theoretical counterparts. The important and 
damaging reductions at work in poststructuralism included abandoning the self-
legislating, or autonomous, self; ignoring the mutual mediation of law, politics and 
ethics; and downplaying the centrality of law for politics, ethics and social theory. 
 
2.2 The argument of Dialectic of Nihilism 
The context for Rose’s book on poststructuralism and law is ‘the difficulty in the 
conceiving of law since Kant’.21 Poststructuralist reception of Nietzsche and Heidegger 
‘has taken them to overcome legality’ in a ‘reconstruction of the history of law which 
blinds us to the very tradition which it disowns and repeats.’22 The wider context is, as 
Darrow Schechter writes, the post-Kantian ‘crisis of legal anthropology’.23 The legal 
subject was, like the Kantian moral subject, rational and self-legislating. The correlative 
view of anthropology, ethics, jurisprudence and reason was put under pressure by the 
post-Kantian tradition and Rose wrote to avoid having the baby thrown out with the 
bathwater. Since the Roman period, juridical thinking posited person, thing and 
obligation as a fundamental, trifold distinction, and Rose believed this was a true and 
useful distinction, which could adequately respond to the criticisms made of juridical 
rationality and the legal person by using a sufficiently textured view of reason and self-
rule, including one attending to the inner life of the individual. Like Hegel, she believed 
that in politics ‘law itself is a legitimate means…there is no legitimacy or legitimate 
ends without law.’24 She presupposes, in common again with several Frankfurt thinkers 
that  
                                                
20 John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General (Oxford: Oxford University, 2012), v. 
Nevertheless, Gardner thinks the tension between law’s rightness and positedness may be resolved in an 
analogous way to resolutions of the Euthyphro dilemma. 
21 BM, xiv. 
22 DN, 1. 
23 The Critique of Instrumental Reason from Weber to Habermas (London: Continuum, 2010), 7. For an 
excellent survey of this crisis in post-Kantian German thought see Chris Thornhill, ‘Law and Religion in 
Early Critical Theory’ in Frankfurt School and Religion, ed. by Kohlenbach and Geuss, 103-27. 
24 Schechter, Instrumental Reason, 14. 
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the emergence of modern reason is inextricable from the emergence of modern law: that 
rationality acts as a means of maintaining temporally and locally overarching sequences 
of predictability, calculability and organisation – that is, of securing conditions of legal 
regularity through society. Modern rationality, on this account, is co-genetic with the 
construction of the thinking person as a universally identifiable centre of imputation, 
and as a legislatively empowered agent, capable of ordering its social and cognitive 
relations in accordance with generalised conceptions of validity.25 
 
Rose introduces Dialectic of Nihilism as part of ‘a larger endeavour to retrieve the 
speculative identity of form and history’.26 Rose is again probing an aspect of what 
Hegel called a ‘shape of spirit’, the identities and differences between a form of life and 
a form of consciousness. Here, the issue is to examine ‘the historical connection 
between psychology and objective spirit. In this way its law may become knowable.’27 
We will return to this claim in the next section, but for now it is best explained by an 
abstract for a paper entitled ‘Legalism and Nihilism’, in which Rose wrote,  
 
the various “ends” of metaphysics [attempts to show metaphysics is finished], 
sociological as well as philosophical, always appear in historically-specific 
jurisprudential forms; and…it is these jurisprudential traditions which themselves found 
and recapitulate metaphysical categories. This paradox is presented [by Rose] neither as 
an hermeneutical circle nor as the convention of discourse but as a speculative identity: 
an interlocking of form and history to which only jurisprudential wisdom can do 
justice.28  
 
Rose proposes the speculative identity and difference between law and metaphysics 
(broadly construed), insofar as each confronts similar problems (such as agency, ethics, 
will, subjectivity) and uses related categories (such as person, thing, action, power, 
property, possession, validity, cause and effect). The speculative identity of form and 
history is, in this case, her way of showing ‘the discovery of the concepts and 
institutions of Greek, Roman and German law at every level of philosophical and 
sociological thinking – methodological, formal and substantive’.29  She shows the 
influence of Roman law on Kant, 30  Homeric law on Heidegger, feudal law on 
                                                
25 Thornhill, ‘Law and Religion’, 103-4. 
26 DN, 5. C.f.  above, chapter 1 §4.1. 
27 DN, 124. By contrast, 83: ‘Heidegger takes us so far away from the antinomy of law, of theoretical and 
practical reason, of knowledge and ethics, that this ‘place’ in which we are de-posited is irrelevant to a 
life which is lived, understood and transformed in and through that antinomy.’ 
28 ‘Legalism and Nihilism’, unpublished abstract, no date, box 47. 
29 Rose, ‘Parts and Wholes’, 99. 
30 Kant of course did not try to end metaphysics but establish it as a “science” (Wissenschaft), but Rose 
includes him in this list as the starting point of examining the link between philosophy, sociology and law 
in the post-Kantian tradition. Kant, however, also argues in Elements of Justice, Preface, 205 (Ladd, 3) 
(the translation used by Rose) that no complete system of justice is possible because justice (despite being 
a pure concept) is applied in ‘empirical diversity and manifoldness’. 
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Foucault,31 modern private (property) law on structuralism and poststructuralism. The 
earlier philosophical tradition faced up to these problems, the poststructuralists 
presented their work as a departure from law’s categories and the problems associated 
with them; but since they cannot escape either, the result is to fail both to tackle the 
problems fully and to use the accumulated wisdom of the tradition in dealing with 
them.32 Poststructural antinomianism is thus ‘expounded as a series of regresses to 
identifiable types or epochs of legal form…[P]ost-structuralist nihilism completes itself 
as law – unreflected but always historically identifiable’.33 This reversal is the dialectic 
of nihilism – one to which it is subject rather than intentionally performs. 
 
The neo-Kantian attempts of Cohen, Lask, Stammler and von Ihering34 to simplify law 
to one principle (in order to remove its antinomies and aporias) went hand-in-hand with 
their attempts to eliminate metaphysics from Kantian philosophy. But the antinomies 
returned in different forms, usually transferred to their conceptions of society.35 Rose’s 
critique thus echoes Ernst Cassirer’s, who ‘in contrast to neo-Kantian 
jurisprudence…maintained that the dichotomy between positive law and legal values, 
ideals, or principles…could not be brought to a conclusion, not even through the 
transcendental method…For Cassirer the antithesis rather epitomizes the infinite task of 
jurisprudence’. 36  Derrida, following Benjamin and paradigmatically for 
poststructuralism, regards law as ultimately unjust.37 Rose sees the poststructuralist 
version of law as an inverted natural law: the given law that all human law merely 
interprets is now irrational and violent rather than rational and beneficent, an 
‘ontological injustice’ rather than original justice.38 Rose instead treats law through 
Schein. Law appeals to ethical and anthropological principles that have some validity 
                                                
31 For a sympathetic and critical discussion of Rose’s criticisms of Foucault see Andrew Cutrofello, 
Discipline and Critique: Kant, Poststructuralism, and the Problem of Resistance (New York: State 
University of New York, 1994). 
32 Cutrofello, Discipline and Critique, also frames poststructuralism as an attempt to escape from 
‘juridical’ thinking. 
33 BM, xiv-xv. 
34 Sometimes spelled Jhering. 
35 DN, 4 and e.g. 36-40. 
36 Deniz Coskun, Law as Symbolic Form: Ernst Cassirer and the Anthropocentric View of Law 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 329. Coskun’s ‘dichotomy’ equates to Rose’s ‘antinomy’. 
37 DN, 169. 
38 DN, 99; a theme John Milbank developed from Rose. Marx criticised Savigny’s historical school of 
jurisprudence along similar lines: they made ‘history self-justifying’ and ‘derive[d] right from fact.’ 
‘Absolute skepticism, absolute immoralism, and absolute relativism…were the foundations’ of the 
historical school. Humanity’s animal nature was the only relevant juridical fact. Hence slavery was 
justified based on the law of nations. In Marx’s view this was ‘indiscriminate and immoral “positive 
law”’. Donald R. Kelley, ‘The Metaphysics of Law: An Essay on the Very Young Marx’, The American 
Historical Review 83.2 (April 1978), 350-67 (360). 
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and yet can also be a move for power unguided by those principles. Hence, whereas 
Hegel showed ‘the antinomy of law as the speculative identity and non-identity of the 
state and religion – of ‘politics’ and ‘ideology’…– so I read the antinomy in the work of 
our contemporaries as presenting us with a pale cousin: the nihilistic identity and non-
identity of law and metaphysics’. 39  Poststructuralism extracts from Nietzsche an 
‘unhealthy scepticism towards all human, social and political values, assimilates all 
signification to a general sociology of control, and then yearns for the raptus of a 
Singularity which cannot be named, known, or negotiated.’40 A healthy scepticism 
accompanies a speculative philosophy, whereas an unhealthy scepticism colludes with 
an ossified and unproductive dialectic. Too much or too little emphasis on aporia is a 
problem for thought. 
 
If law and metaphysics are always speculatively identified, always antinomic and 
necessary,41 the poststructuralist attempt to escape metaphysics and law is a mistake, 
and fails to learn sufficiently from the tradition it claims to have surpassed;42 whereas 
the neo-Kantian attempt to eliminate law’s antinomy mistakes the nature of law.43 
Rose’s strategy for substantiating this is to show the form of Kant’s theoretical and 
practical philosophy as under the influence of Roman law; show the difficulties of the 
jurisprudence of four neo-Kantians as they eliminate the antinomy of law; and 
immanently critique some poststructuralists to show their failures to theorise law, ethics 
and society and their unwitting reliance on various legal forms. The claim to have 
finished with all the difficulties entailed by theorising subjectivity, representation, law, 
metaphysics and values turns out to land these theorists back in the middle of all the 
difficulties, but with less awareness of what determines their thought. They are thus 
subject to a dialectic. As Adorno and Horkheimer argued enlightenment and myth, as 
two forms of reason, are always entwined, so Rose argues there is no escaping from 
                                                
39 DN, 5. Cutrofello, Discipline and Critique, 132, also concludes that Foucault and Derrida lack a 
sustainable ethics. 
40 JAM, 19. C.f. Keith Ansell-Pearson, ‘Nietzsche and the Problem of the Will in Modernity’ in Nietzsche 
and Modern German Thought: 186-7: ‘be sceptical about recent claims that Nietzsche’s philosophy of 
will to power is able to provide the foundation for a postmodern conception of human agency – a 
conception which eschews a metaphysics of the ego or subject in favour of a radical historicization of 
subjectivity – since the positing of a notion of power as subjectivity or autonomy represents an 
insufficient motive for the constitution of an ethico-political community in that each individual’s desire 
for autonomy (will to ‘power’) could easily result in a war of all against all. Without some conception of 
a substantive, not merely formal, ethics subjectivity remains either trapped within itself as in the case of 
the beautiful soul or faced with the constant threat of a Hobbesian warlike condition breaking out.’ 
41 Thornhill, German Political Philosophy has different terminology from but shares many substantive 
views with Rose (without using her work). 
42 C.f. Pippin, Modernity. 
43 C.f. Thornhill, Political Philosophy, esp. 239-60. 
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metaphysics and law. She agrees with Nietzsche that nihilism is now a normal 
condition, since values always threaten to undermine themselves (or, dialectally reverse 
themselves), but Rose denies anti-ethical or antinomian consequences follow from this, 
as found in Weber or poststructuralism (but not in Nietzsche in her view).44 Antinomian 
poststructuralism attempts to evade law (both as a form of reason and laws in society) 
yet relies on legal forms: this is its dialectic. Its refusal of law and metaphysical-ethical 
reasoning is its nihilism. (Rose confusingly operates with two meanings of nihilism 
without spelling them out: a “neutral” version in her interpretation of nihilism as a 
normal condition, and a “bad” version in the poststructuralist refusal of knowledge, 
ethics and reason).45 
 
Much of post-Kantian philosophy comprises each generation accusing its predecessor of 
failing to complete the task of overcoming metaphysics, so it is plausible for Rose to 
say attempts to overcome metaphysics end up recapitulating it. This could support 
Rose’s view that metaphysics is ineliminable or it could mean success still awaits. More 
important here is Rose’s idea that legal concepts fill the vacuum left by the banished 
metaphysics. She traces the antinomies of metaphysics as they migrate from law to 
society (neo-Kantians) to language (poststructuralists), without accomplishing their 
alleged solutions (supporting her view that antinomies are permanent). 46  Raising 
awareness of the social and intellectual factors determining consciousness was one of 
Hegel’s aims, as a condition for responding with freedom to those determinations. 
Poststructural unawareness of the role of law and jurisprudence in social philosophy 
therefore undermines its ability to negotiate its determinations. Its (and so our) relation 
to law and legal ideas remains hidden, incubating the social pathologies resulting from 
over-reliance on one or another competing tendency in society.  
 
Dialectic of Nihilism is therefore Rose’s contribution to ideology critique. The archives 
at Warwick contain a planned table of contents for an earlier incarnation of Dialectic of 
Nihilism entitled Essays in Speculative Jurisprudence. On March 17, 1982, Rose wrote 
(in a letter to the publisher Blackwell who had given her a contract for it), that the book  
                                                
44 Peter Goodrich, Reading the Law: A Critical Introduction to Legal Method and Techniques (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986), 214. 
45 For a similar critique of Heidegger as promoting unethical unreason see Coskun, Symbolic Form, 57-
86.  
46 For arguments that metaphysics and its aporias are inescapable, see Leszek Kołakowski, Horror; 
Modernity on Endless Trial; Is God Happy? (London: Penguin, 2012); ‘In Praise of Inconsistency’. 
Kołakowski was an important influence on Rose here. 
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seeks to expose the dependence of theoretical philosophical and sociological thinking 
on unexamined and historically specific legal concepts. In the first part I show that 
recent linguistic theory has reverted from a civil law to a natural law framework. In the 
second part I show that the transition from moral and legal philosophy to sociological 
and historicist approaches continued to rely on juridical thinking. The argument in these 
two parts is a recasting of the question of ideology…a new way of posing the problem 
of ideology, a way which acknowledges the dependence of theory on historically 
specific legal concepts…my work is more an essay in the philosophy of consciousness: 
it seeks to expose the juridical and litigious presuppositions of our formation.47 
 
This is not the usual Marxist approach to law and ideology, in which law is regarded as 
ideologically shaped by capitalist economic and political forms. 48  Part of her 
contribution in this regard is to produce a ‘different map’49 of the terrain of social 
philosophy: ‘The book is an attempt to reconstruct the philosophy of law since Kant’50 
(within, it should be added, the continental rather than Anglophone tradition). We return 
to this in §3. 
 
Throughout the book she continues to forward her own social philosophy in three 
important ways. (Many reviewers of Dialectic of Nihilism were unsure about her own 
position but it is much clearer when connected with her earlier and later work. This 
evidences my view that her work is an interconnected whole). First, she uses the 
Frankfurt combination of philosophy and sociology to examine the connection between 
formal reasoning and forms of social rationality (here, as affected by legal forms). 
Second, she uses the speculative logic she took from Hegel to think about freedom and 
law. The speculative identity and non-identity of freedom and unfreedom, and the 
antinomy of law, are approached through historical-philosophical phenomenology. 
Whereas Kant offers a somewhat ahistorical contrast between inclination and reverence 
for the law, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche look at various ways in which this inner split is 
socially and historically conditioned and played out. This is not a rejection of Kant but a 
                                                
47 The letter and the plan are in box 47. The introduction to the earlier version was headed ‘Roman Civil 
Law and the Problem of Ideology’. We may note Rose’s focus on theories rather than general 
consciousness, or what Hegel called ‘philosophical consciousness’ rather than ‘natural consciousness’. 
But the two are related. 
48 E.g. Hunt, ‘Marxism, Law, Legal Theory’; Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their 
Place (University Park: Pennsylvania University, 1990). Rose does not mention any of the theorists 
Jessop surveys but in the plan for Essays in Speculative Jurisprudence (which became DN), she has a 
chapter dealing with Pashukanis, the Frankfurt School and Renner (presumably Karl Renner, one of the 
founders of sociology of law), so one presumes she was aware of this Marxist approach. Certainly she is 
not competing with it. 
49 Written on a plan for Dialectic of Nihilism, 2 February 1984, box 20. Repeated in notes for a paper she 
was due to give later that year called ‘The dialectics of nihilisms’. 
50 Letter, 13 January 1992, box 24. 
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sublation.51 Third, developing themes from Hegel Contra Sociology, law is a central 
category of social philosophy and should be recognised as such (contra the 
antinomianism of postmodern thought).52 Social philosophy emerges from the ‘middle’ 
of ‘civil society and civil law’ and should recognise its context.53 In her next book, Rose 
would expand on these themes as the ‘broken middle’, the dirempted relations between 
state and civil society and between law and ethics. Already in 1984 she wanted to 
approach in an ‘aporetic way’ the ‘antinomy of culture’ and ‘the tradition which holds 
us’.54  
 
Such is the broad architecture of the argument of Rose’s third book. It is an argument 
for the antinomic and aporetic nature of metaphysics and law, their speculative identity, 
the importance of both in social philosophy, and performs an ideology critique by 
uncovering the jurisprudential presuppositions behind various social philosophies. It 
leads into a Hegelian political philosophy, an expansive jurisprudence, and the use of 
law to gain a view of the social totality.  
 
2.3 The post-Kantian condition 
The antinomy of law is thus one part of the speculative identity of form and history, the 
relation between philosophy and its context in the state-society relation (the middle), or 
the influence of objective spirit on philosophical consciousness. ‘The separation in 
modern states of public from private law, of the realm of needs or economic life from 
the realm of politics and citizenship, arises from specifically modern forms of private 
property and formal equality. This separation gives rise to the illusion of sovereign 
individuality which is represented in the absolute demands of morality and religion, and 
reproduced and justified in Kant’s critical philosophy.’55 Notice Kant expresses the 
modern form of the antinomy of law: law and metaphysics have always been antinomic 
but the form of those antinomies changes with legal-social-political regimes. We have 
come to expect this from Rose’s historical version of speculation (c.f. the sub-title of 
The Broken Middle: ‘out of our ancient society’). The speculative handling of these 
oppositions displays the phenomenological perspective Rose took from Hegel on the 
                                                
51 DN, 4; c.f. Thornhill, Political Philosophy, 251-2: critics of Marburg neo-Kantians repeated this call 
for socio-historical thinking. 
52 The antinomianism of Levinasian ethics and political theology features in BM and MBL. 
53 DN, 212. 
54 DN, 212. 
55 DN, 2. A common claim within Marxist scholarship. See Jessop, State Theory, 48-78 for an overview 
in relation to law. 
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combination of freedom and unfreedom in modern subjects. Speculation ‘reduces the 
paradox’ of law but does not eliminate it.56 
 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit shows how the confrontation between master and 
slave becomes internalized in the ‘person’ as the struggle between the good will and 
natural desire and inclination. Opening up an historical perspective on the development 
of the idea of ‘persons’ as the bearers of equal rights and the hypertrophy of their inner 
life, Hegel expounds the antinomy of law as the characteristic compound in modern 
states of individual freedom with individual depoliticization. In the Grundrisse Marx 
examines how Capital posits individuals as ‘persons’, the bearers of rights, and as 
‘things’, the commodity ‘labour-power’. The theory of commodity fetishism 
subsequently developed in the first volume of Capital is not simply an account of how 
material relations between ‘persons’ are transformed into social relations between 
‘things’. It is an account of the ‘personification’ and ‘reification’ intrinsic to the 
juridical categories of ‘commodity’, ‘capital’, and ‘money’. Emphasis on the 
differences between Marx’s and Hegel’s thinking has obscured the continuity of their 
preoccupation with the antinomy of law. The juridical opposition of free subjects and 
subjected things, which characterizes not only relations between different classes but 
the relation of the individual to itself in modern states, forms the speculative core of 
Hegel’s and of Marx’s thinking.57 
 
Rose argues her preferred speculative thinkers express the fluidity between the two 
sides of the various antinomies thrown up by this legal-political structure better than 
Kant. Rose’s rationale for starting with Kant is twofold. First, the antinomy of law in 
Kant itself reflects the paradox of state and civil society; thus her claims intersect: law 
and metaphysics are speculatively identified, internally aporetic, and both reflect their 
social context. Second, Kant’s critical philosophy expresses in a powerful and 
sophisticated way the relationship between social philosophy and the state-society 
structure, which still conditions modernity, and it provides the starting point for future 
approaches to metaphysics within the philosophical tradition. We are all post-Kantians 
now. Thus Rose: ‘I think you can only be a serious student of post-Kantian philosophy 
if you understand that the relationship between Kant and Hegel is fundamental. And 
that means you include not just the argument about metaphysics but social and political 
philosophy.’58 More specifically, most poststructuralists were, in Rose’s eyes, neo-
Kantians, where to be neo-Kantian is to be trapped in thought, unable to render 
objective the subjective mediations of thought. From a Hegelian point of view, the 
poststructuralists have thus no more escaped the problem of scepticism and the 
objectivity of knowledge than had Kant’s transcendental idealism. The argument about 
the influence of Roman law on Kant begins the book because he bequeaths the modern 
                                                
56 The phrase comes from the plan of the book’s outline, 2 February 1984. 
57 DN, 3. 
58 Elaine Williams, ‘Interview’. 
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form of the antinomy of law with which philosophy still wrestles, and hence is the 
context the poststructuralists want to escape (via Nietzsche’s reaction to Kant). It is 
therefore this argument I assess below to display her notion of jurisprudential wisdom 
as an ideology critique and a mode of social philosophy. 
 
3 Ideology critique via jurisprudence: Kant and Roman law  
3.1 An elective affinity  
Rose’s argument about Kant can be parsed into three connected claims: 
 
(1) Kant’s form of rationality as a whole is shaped by Roman legal thought: ‘In Kant’s 
concept of pure reason, in the familiar opposition between persons and things I find 
litigation, contract and property.’59 That is, the Roman legal distinction between persons 
and things does much work not only in his political and ethical philosophy60 but in 
generating the form of rationality that uses the ‘interlocking set of oppositions: 
ends/means, persons/things; absolute/relative; subjective/objective.’61 This is not the 
usual Hegelian gravamen that Kant smuggles content into the form of the categorical 
imperative;62 it is a much more far-reaching claim about the whole shape of his thought: 
‘the split between the ideal and the real itself depends on importing features of the real 
into the very form of the ideal’.63 Notice it is not, as it stands, a criticism; it is simply an 
observation.  
 
(2) Kant’s argument for freedom is based on a usucapio defence, that is, ‘ownership 
granted by law which suffices to transfer the dominium after a specific period of 
possession, even though the original acquisition did not take place according to the fully 
legal form of mancipatio (sale).’64 Contra Kant, our possession of freedom is not by the 
equity of natural justice but homologous to a ‘right of necessity’ (permitted in cases of 
necessity but not a moral or legal right and so not extendable to other cases).65 This is a 
criticism of Kant’s self-understanding of his practical defence of human freedom and of 
the defence itself.  
                                                
59 Rose, ‘Parts and Wholes’, 99. C.f. her remarks (TMS, 59) about Adorno’s ‘close analysis of the 
vocabulary which Hegel uses and shows how it abounds in verbs and adjectives pertaining to work 
(labour), production, domination and coercion.’ 
60 DN, 21. 
61 DN, 20. 
62 DN, 20. 
63 DN, 19. 
64 DN, 13 referring to Justinian’s Institutes, II.VI. 
65 Kant, Elements of Justice, 233 (Ladd, 39). 
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(3) In Kant ‘the form of freedom is the form of private law.’66 Private law is law 
governing property possession. Human freedom theorised as noumenal freedom ends up 
subservient to guaranteeing legal personality and property: ‘the transformation of 
philosophy and science into critical jurisdiction draws attention to its basis in absolute 
property or dominium, which is unjustifiable and ultimately shored up by a categorical 
imperative, an unconditioned imperium which cannot be called to account.’67 This is a 
criticism.  
  
Each of these claims will take some unpacking, beginning with the aims of the 
argument itself. As with her remarks about neo-Kantian social theory in her previous 
book, the tone and substance of her claims are unevenly matched. The argument is not 
that the Roman legal influence on the form of Kant’s philosophy invalidates his entire 
thought; the argument is that Roman attitudes to property skew Kant’s picture of 
freedom, the self, and social and political philosophy, because he freezes the 
property/thing distinction and inflates the role of property. Nor does she argue social 
philosophy should escape legal influence; it should instead consciously negotiate its 
relation to law and theorise law itself as a topic of social philosophy. Beyond such 
critical aims, Rose is supporting the Hegelian view that freedom is compatible with 
external influence, and that freedom can be actual and be theoretically known as such 
(whereas for Kant freedom remains transcendental and so beyond theoretical knowledge 
or appearance within the phenomenal realm; it can only be warranted by practical 
reason (I will come back to this)). Nor need Rose be read as denying the importance of 
Hume, Newton or theological influences on Kant’s theoretical and practical 
philosophy;68 she is adding to the list of influences on Kant’s thought, though implicitly 
claiming Roman law as a dominant influence.  
 
Even with the aims of the argument in mind, it is not easy to assess the three claims. 
Some reviewers believed Rose’s claims could only be substantiated by showing direct 
historical influence on Kant,69 which Rose does not do. I submit this is the wrong thing 
to look for because Rose’s argument is best construed as discerning a Weberian elective 
                                                
66 DN, 20. 
67 DN, 24.  
68 On the latter, see Christopher J. Insole, Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem 
(Oxford: Oxford University, 2013). 
69 Scott Lash, ‘Review of Dialectic of Nihilism’, Theory and Society 16.2 (March 1987), 305-9; W. T. 
Murphy, ‘Memorising Politics of Ancient History,’ The Modern Law Review 50 (May 1987), 384-405. 
No reviewer sets out Rose’s argument as I do here. 
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affinity between the form of Kant’s philosophy and Roman legal thinking, and referring 
his philosophy back to a structure of state and civil society.70 This of course must be 
historically mediated, but how exactly Kant comes by his Roman influence is not the 
key issue.71 The issue is the relationship between Kant’s thought and Roman law (not 
Kant’s view of that relation). It is ideology critique as revealing necessary illusions. Her 
reading is similar to a hermeneutic of suspicion therefore, but in a way that wishes to 
sublate Kant’s work not reject it.72 Weber never defined elective affinity, but its 
meaning was reconstructed by Richard Herbert Howe.73 The basic idea concerns 
‘interrelationships of networks of meanings’,74 ‘whether and how strongly they [two 
phenomena] mutually favour one another’s continuance, or, conversely, hinder or 
exclude one another’. 75  Weber acquired the term via Goethe’s novel (Die 
Wahlverwandtschaften), itself named after a term from chemistry. The chemists of the 
period discussed the process in which substances A and B are joined, but uncouple in 
the presence of substance C, and A now joins with C. A and C then have a stronger 
chemical affinity than A and B. Sociological judgements of elective affinity look for 
shared characteristics; they are portrayals of ideal types not foundations for syllogisms; 
likenesses not logically necessary deductions.76 ‘The greater the number of positive 
inner affinities between two elements vis-à-vis the total possible number, the more 
strongly are the elements joined. That is their “degree” of elective affinity.’77 Rose’s 
main evidence for discerning an elective affinity between the form of Kant’s philosophy 
and Roman law are the three above claims: interlocking oppositions connected to the 
person/thing distinction, how Kant’s defence of freedom actually works (contrary to his 
own view), and the parallels between Roman private law and freedom in Kant. These 
elements of Kant’s thought also take in his picture of the subject, state and law. This is 
                                                
70 DN, 50 n2: ‘In this context ‘to sublate’, the standard translation of Hegel’s aufheben, implies to carry 
an opposition back to its source.’ 
71 See Thornhill’s Introduction to Political Philosophy; Donald R. Kelley, ‘Gaius Noster: Substructures 
of Western Social Thought’, The American Historical Review, 84.3 (June 1979), 619-648; Dieter 
Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First Critique’ in 
Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: The Three ‘Critiques’ and the ‘Opus postumum’ ed. by Eckart 
Förster (Stanford: Stanford University, 1989), 29-46; William E. Conklin, Hegel’s Laws: The Legitimacy 
of a Modern Legal Order (Stanford: Stanford University, 2008), 48-52. 
72 C.f. BM, 283. 
73 ‘Max Weber’s Elective Affinities: Sociology Within the Bounds of Pure Reason’, American Journal of 
Sociology 84.2 (September 1978), 366-85. 
74 Howe, ‘Elective Affinities’, 382. 
75 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. and trans. by Gunther 
Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California, 1968), 341, where the two phenomena in 
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76 Howe, ‘Elective Affinities’, 378-9. 
77 Howe, ‘Elective Affinities’, 381-2. 
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Rose’s way of pursuing the Frankfurt School theme of the various connections between 
rationality in the social sense and the more narrowly logical use of reason.78 Finally, 
there is no contradiction between ideology critique and discerning an elective affinity, 
because affinities need not be obvious and once seen may reveal problematic features 
otherwise unnoticed. In this light, (1) becomes a criticism when it supports problematic 
features such as (2) and (3). I now assess each of Rose’s claims. 
 
3.2 Kantian rationality and the person/thing distinction 
Rose argues (1) by reading Kant’s critical writings, especially the first Critique, through 
the definitions of property and possession in the Metaphysical Elements of Justice. She 
proceeds as follows.79 Kant is concerned with both the canon of reason (its proper use in 
limiting knowledge to the combination of sense experience and concepts) and our 
‘possession’ of freedom. Kant’s first Critique uses ‘practical [my emphasis] ideas of de 
jure, property, possession, justification’ to ‘expound’ the transcendental deduction of 
theoretical knowledge. Here she cites The Critique of Pure Reason A84-5/B116-7, 
which is entitled ‘On the principles of a transcendental deduction in general’, where 
these ‘practical’ terms are found. She references Schopenhauer’s observation that 
Roman legal terminology is used so much, especially in this section, it appears 
essential, not accidental, to Kant’s thought.80 (Rose’s additional references to Kant are 
to: B, xiii and A, xx in the first Critique; the third Critique; the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals; The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (which is the first part of 
The Metaphysics of Morals)). Given the technical nature of Kant’s vocabulary however, 
it begs the question somewhat to call these concepts in this context ‘practical’. Further, 
Schopenhauer, in the passage Rose cites, goes on to say that although the impression 
Kant gives is that moral thinking is specifically Roman legal in character, it is not; it is 
merely a form of judging like any other.81 On the one hand, this could imply that Kant’s 
thought really was influenced by Roman thought, because he construed all thought as 
Roman legal trial; on the other hand, it could imply that Kant’s metaphor is a metaphor 
that can apply to any kind of weighing up of reasons.82 So far, so inconclusive.  
 
                                                
78 C.f. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 53-5 and Bernstein, Adorno, 140. 
79 DN, 12-16. All quotations in this paragraph are from this section of the text unless otherwise stated. 
80 DN, 11 n.1. The text is ‘On the Basis of Morality’ from 1841. 
81 Arthur Schopenhauer, The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, trans. and ed. by Christopher 
Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2009), 169-72 (171-4 in German pagination). 
82 Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999), 176: ‘the capacity 
we ascribe to ourselves in regarding ourselves as subject to moral obligation is of exactly the same kind as 
that we ascribe to ourselves in thinking of ourselves as judging according to rational norms’. 
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Rose’s argument is further put into doubt if we turn to the work of Dieter Henrich83 and 
Ian Proops84 (building on Henrich) who have shown that the form of argument used in 
the Transcendental Deduction is based on a form of legal argument called a deduction, 
which traces a legal claim (usually to land) back to its source in order to prove its 
legitimacy. Legal deductions came into existence in Europe in the fourteenth century, ‘a 
time when the tradition of Roman law was not yet revitalized and the modern theory of 
law had not yet been founded.’85 Indeed, Roman law did not make significant inroads 
into the German speaking principalities until the end of the fifteenth century.86 This 
supports Rose’s view of the influence of some legal thinking on the whole of Kant’s 
thought – Proops discusses deductions in the first two Critiques, Henrich in all three – 
but not Roman law.87 Henrich notes ‘the idea of an acquisition of legal titles does not 
necessarily presuppose a particular legal system with reference to which the entitlement 
becomes decidable. The Natural Right Kant uses as his paradigm recognizes an original 
acquisition. The conditions of its rightfulness can be determined prior to any particular 
legal system.’88 In short, Kant’s deductions are not Roman.  
 
After highlighting the legal vocabulary in the Transcendental Deduction, Rose’s next 
move is to read the ‘critical writings’89 through the 1797 The Metaphysical Elements of 
Justice because that is where Kant defines the terms ‘possession’ and ‘property’, and 
how they may be held lawfully (de jure) (i.e. even without physical proximity). This is a 
clever idea but has problems. There appears to be slippage in Rose’s argument between 
Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy.90 Rose thinks Kant is pursuing both the 
canon of reason and freedom in terms of the de jure possession of property, but that 
when Kant explains, in Elements of Justice, what he thinks de jure possession entails, it 
rests on a claim of ‘natural justice’,91 which is a kind of ‘given’.92 Rose thinks the 
                                                
83 ‘Notion of a Deduction’. 
84 ‘Kant’s Legal Metaphor and the Nature of a Deduction’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 
(April, 2003), 209-29. 
85 Henrich, ‘Notion of a Deduction’, 33. 
86 J. M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 180-1. 
87 ‘Deduction’ in the sense identified by Henrich does not occur in Justinian’s Institutes nor in W. A. 
Hunter, A Systematic and Historical Exposition of Roman Law in the Order of a Code (London: William 
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when, for example, Aquinas reasons back to God from observed phenomena. 
88 Henrich, ‘Notion of a Deduction’, 36. 
89 DN, 13 n.8. 
90 Noted by Lash, ‘Review’, 305. 
91 Kant, Elements of Justice, 251 (Ladd, 59). 
92 Rose is just wrong here – see the discussion of the derivation of property as an acquired right via 
reference to the will of all in Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 2000), 235-61. 
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‘meaning of deduction and justification has shifted at this point’ because the ‘complex 
machinery of justification rests on a simple appeal to natural justice’.93 Let us accept, in 
the mode of discerning elective affinities, that ideas from the 1797 text may be used to 
exposit those from 1781,94 we must still register the fact that the context of the 
quotations Rose gives from Elements of Justice is Kant’s argument for the possibility of 
de jure (noumenal) possession of a physical object, whereas freedom for Kant is 
explicitly not a physical object, so this sort of argument would not apply to it, nor does 
Kant imagine it does.95 In the case of discerning an affinity, however, this is not 
decisive. Rose could respond that the de jure possession needed by Kant to make sense 
of possession of objects is paralleled by the transcendental nature of freedom, which 
exempts it from ever being experienced. Perhaps Kant does think of freedom as a 
property we possess, despite lacking entirely convincing proof of its legitimacy. 
‘Property’ and ‘possess’ here are ambiguous between physical objects and 
predicates/characteristics, which may be part of Rose’s point. Yet Kant can reply that 
his noumenal/phenomenal distinction is transforming Roman private law, rather than 
vice versa. Nor is it fair to Kant to imply that because we lack theoretical knowledge of 
noumenal freedom we thereby lack any legitimate way to regard ourselves as free and 
must treat the idea as a given.96 Quite the contrary, we have solid practical reasons to 
regard ourselves as free, such that freedom is fundamental to being a person.97 
 
3.3 The usucapio defence of freedom 
The idea of a canon of reason in the first Critique is raised by Rose but immediately 
dropped and her discussion focuses entirely on ‘a specific case of unlawful possession: 
the defence of the ‘usurpatory concept’ of freedom’98 (claim (2)). Rose’s reference is 
again to A84-5/B116-7, but Kant there writes: ‘concepts that have been usurped, such as 
fortune and fate,’ have no ‘clear legal ground for an entitlement to their use either from 
experience or from reason.’ This passage sets up Kant’s demonstration of the legitimacy 
of the twelve categories because they are limited to making experience possible, in 
contrast to the illegitimate metaphysical use of notions such as fortune or fate. Thus, 
                                                
93 DN, 13-4. 
94 Similar to the procedure of phenomenology: HCS, 69, 164. The relevant legal terms are present in the 
first edition of the first Critique. 
95 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:29, 46-7 (pp.176-7 in Practical Philosophy, trans. and 
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Critiques (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 141-66. 
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97 Ward, Kant, 141: freedom ‘is proved by our moral experience.’ See also Guyer, Kant on Freedom.  
98 DN, 12. 
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either Kant does not have in mind here that our freedom is usurped, because he is 
discussing the theoretical concepts of the categories; or, if he does (after all, the second 
edition of the first Critique was published in 1787, only one year before the second 
Critique), then he will go on to show, in the second Critique, that freedom does indeed 
have legitimacy and is not usurped. The characterisation of the human claim to freedom 
as ‘usurpatory’ tilts the scales too hastily in favour of Rose’s affinity claim, as did 
calling the legal vocabulary ‘practical’.   
 
Kant’s view of freedom is admittedly a moving target.99 Nevertheless it is problematic 
that Rose discusses only the Groundwork and not the Critique of Practical Reason 
because Kant defends human freedom in the latter. Kant offers what is now called (after 
Henry E. Allison) the Reciprocity Thesis: ‘freedom and unconditional practical law 
reciprocally imply each other.’100 In this section Kant considers two problems. In 
Problem I he starts by assuming that a moral will is only determined by the form of the 
moral law (not any material content), and ends up finding that such a will must be 
transcendentally free, because it is not determined by any material and so natural causal 
factors, but only by the rational form of a law, which is an intelligible idea and so 
transcendental. In Problem II he starts by assuming a will is free, and discovers that it 
must be determined by the form of law, since it cannot be determined by anything 
material, but only the intelligibility of a rational law’s form. Hence, unconditional moral 
law and transcendental freedom imply one another.101 Now, in the Groundwork, Kant 
freely admits there is circularity here.102 Yet, as Ian Proops has shown, the treatment of 
the moral law as a ‘fact of reason’ (in the later second Critique) does not mean it is 
insusceptible of any proof, contrary to the Hegelian objection, because philosophical 
proof for Kant is probative, not demonstrative as in mathematics.103 A legal deduction 
was a two-step proof, in which a fact was established and then its force for the 
legitimacy of a juris question displayed. Precisely because the fact is legally relevant, its 
legitimacy for the court’s consideration must be established. Hence the fact of reason 
also needs a proof. Kant’s proof for the fact of the moral law (at least in the second 
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Critique)104 is our experience of obligation. We first experience moral obligation and 
infer from there to our transcendental freedom.105  
 
Rose never refers to the second Critique in her argument, which is odd, not least 
because it is the deduction there that most parallels the usucapio. The parallel is 
between taking the moral law as a fact of reason and inferring freedom from it, and the 
usucapio that takes as given a long-term possession and shows the innocent (if unusual) 
means of acquiring the possession. Yet, even if Rose had registered the parallel, what 
would it illuminate? The implication seems to be that Kant’s defence of freedom 
ultimately takes freedom for granted rather than proving it, and that freedom, as a given, 
is of dubious provenance. Yet Kant already admits the impenetrability of freedom to 
theoretical reason, and he is explicit that refusing to presuppose freedom undermines 
practical judgments, hence the very need for a defence of our freedom.  
 
Unsatisfied with the idea of de jure property in Kant’s political philosophy as (what she 
takes to be) a foundation for our freedom, and ignoring the second Critique, Rose 
moves straight on to the third Critique’s idea of purposiveness without purpose as a way 
of expositing the kingdom of ends as finally lacking proper coherence, as a kingdom of 
‘righteousness without a right’.106 The kingdom of ends depends, she says, on ‘a life 
lived in one reality “as if” it were proceeding in a different reality’, since the way in 
which Kant separates ideal from real employs features of the real in the form of the 
ideal. Yet the “as if” characterisation of the kingdom of ends is not accurate because the 
kingdom of ends is for Kant a postulate, which is something we must believe if we are 
to make sense of our reason and moral life.107 Further, freedom and autonomy for Kant 
are intrinsically communal, albeit in the noumenal realm outside of time and space, due 
to their reference to the kingdom of ends.108 Kant could then be read as providing these 
ideals as the immanent development of the mores of his society, in which case he 
should be praised for avoiding imposing an external Sollen on his society.109  
 
                                                
104 5:30. 
105 Kant’s theory is thus partly phenomenological (in the Husserlian sense), contra one strand of the 
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106 DN, 17. 
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In sum, Rose’s view of the usucapio does not seem to bring out any features of Kant’s 
views of freedom not already apparent from Kant himself, even if there is some parallel 
between Roman usucapio and the proof of freedom via the Reciprocity Thesis. Kant’s 
deductions, however, are alien to Roman law. Thus far it appears the affinity is weak. 
Further, Rose’s other charge – that freedom in Kant is akin to a right of necessity – 
conflicts with her usucapio analogy. A usucapio is fully provided for within the law,110 
whereas the right of necessity is a case on which no law can be made.111 Given Rose’s 
failure so far to pin her charges on Kant, it seems the contradiction belongs to her not 
him. 
 
3.4 Freedom and private law 
Rose has a series of suggestions to support claim (3), that Kant’s form of freedom is 
that of private law (a mixture of Roman and modern). Discussing Kant’s idea that 
persons have dignity because no price can be set on them, she cites Bucklan on Roman 
law: ‘The topic of Res or things may be roughly described as the main body of the law: 
the discussion of all those rights which have a money value, to the exclusion of such 
rights as liberty, and patria potestas which cannot be expressed in terms of money.’112 
Private right is commonly acknowledged as the largest part of Kant’s philosophy of law 
too. According to Manfred Kuehn the difference between physical and intelligible 
possession is ‘almost absent’ in common law but central to Roman law; and Kant made 
intelligible possession a postulate of pure practical reason, such that intelligible 
ownership is necessitated by reason.113 As such, intelligible possession always exists, it 
precedes the state and the state is required not least to secure peaceful ownership of 
property. Rose’s critique of Kant’s view of property and freedom is echoed in Marx’s 
critique of Savigny. Marx believed Savigny simply treated Roman contingency as 
justice, not questioning private property or the original seizure it may involve: ‘private 
property…arose out of the simple act of prehension, or willful [sic] seizure, and then 
somehow was given legal status by receiving customary acceptance and general social 
formulation. Out of factum, in juridical terms, came jus.’114 Similarly, Eduard Gans’ 
critique of Savigny was to state the latter’s positions thus: ‘Possession is a fact, a natural 
condition and not a right…but nonetheless the possessor has rights because of his 
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possession.’115 Rose is here on firmer ground. There are even affinities, unmentioned by 
Rose, that support her case. Stoic philosophy suited the Roman temperament and there 
are some affinities perhaps between Kant and Stoic outlooks.116 Kant’s view of freedom 
as independence is similar to the neo-Roman tradition of Renaissance republicanism. 
Kant extends this idea: not only the sovereign but no private citizen should have power 
of interference over another.117  
 
One could, as Rose appears to do, also view Kant’s systematic approach to law as more 
akin to the Roman civil tradition than to common law, since Kant’s prioritising of 
ahistorical normativity is an exception to the usual German interpretive and historical 
legal tradition.118 Against the background of the historical debate in the middle ages 
between codified Roman (civil law) and geographically variable Germanic (common 
law) traditions,119 Kant could appear as siding with the former. Further, Kant’s practical 
philosophy shares certain characteristics with natural law, which was an important 
element in Roman law. Yet when one recalls that the Roman tradition stemming from 
Gaius (which Justinian’s Institutes transmitted) emphasised the practical, conventional 
and historical above the purely rational, natural and timeless, Kant in fact seems closer 
to the natural law tradition than to Roman law. Friedrich Carl von Savigny took the 
Roman law as the paradigmatic foundation of his historical legal school precisely 
because of its preference for the concrete and historical. Indeed, in Donald Kelley’s 
lengthy article on the career of Roman law throughout western thought, Savigny is the 
modern Roman and Kant is simply not on the scene.120 It appears, then, that Hastie was 
correct to say Kant’s practical philosophy ‘corrected and modernized’ Roman law 
according to ‘rational and universal principles’, such that the influence within Kant’s 
philosophy runs the opposite way to Rose’s suggestion, namely, from his own 
transcendental philosophy to his Roman-influenced philosophy of law.121 
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Rose asserts that the various connected twofold distinctions in Kant’s work can be 
traced back to the Roman person/thing distinction as a hidden influence, organising 
their logic. At first sight this seems unlikely since Kant’s major, driving division is 
always between the empirical and a priori, or phenomenal and noumenal. Ideology 
critique, however, must find what is not obvious. Perhaps Kant’s unusual (for the 
German tradition) valorisation of private law and property vindicates Rose’s suggestion. 
Thus: ‘persons and things, conditioned by each other’ cannot coherently be made into 
‘unconditioned values’, they cannot become ‘an Ideal of Reason, or the form of the 
intelligible, since the basic opposition which is thereby formalized is that of the bearers 
of the substance of Roman private law.’122 Idealising and reifying Roman categories, in 
other words, leads to a contradiction. Kant’s picture of freedom is one of the Roman 
absolute property owner combined with the modern view of atomised subjectivity.123 In 
‘the sphere of private law…Kant’s doctrine of legal order most closely reflected early 
liberal ideas,’124 by giving property and possession a central place in any legitimate 
Rechtsstaat; indeed, it is the peaceful acquisition and transfer of property that 
distinguishes the Rechtsstaat from the state of nature. To Kant’s mind, the thought of an 
object that no-one could possess was incoherent,125 in contrast to traditions of the 
commons or sacred objects, which allowed for communal use without ownership. 
Property, for Kant, is required by pure practical reason. This leads, for example, to his 
view that active citizens may only be ‘persons of independent economic substance’;126 
and to his innovation of rights in rem over a person, that is, the possession of persons in 
a thing-like fashion. This applies in the case of spouses (who mutually possess one 
another), children and servants (the latter two in asymmetric relations to parents and 
masters). Rose, however, pushes her argument too far. Not only is the category of rights 
in rem restricted to a few cases, it creates greater equality for women and protects the 
rights of children and servants: a progressive view for eighteenth century Prussia.127 It 
also makes slavery impossible.128 Most importantly, freedom in Kant is centrally about 
performing the self-legislated, universal moral law, something she underplays.129  
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Rose points out that Kant wanted to use ‘for the present age’ Ulpian’s ‘three famous 
maxims…live honestly, hurt no-one, give each his due’.130 Yet as Arthur Ripstein notes, 
Ulpian’s comment was regularly used at the time, so there is nothing particularly affine 
between Kant and Roman law on that score; Kant even admitted to putting content into 
the phrase rather than merely following it.131 Indeed, the rationalisation and codification 
of law was a normal practice from the fourteenth century and continuing into the time of 
Kant and his contemporaries Johann Gottlieb Heineccius and A. F. J. Thibaut.132 Here 
again, then, the influence runs from Kant to Rome. Furthermore, why not see Kant as 
idealising persons and obligations, rather than persons and things? Or, since the 
fundamental Roman legal division is between three terms not two (persons, things and 
obligations), idealising all three (which may put him closer to Hegelian triune logic)? 
Or, why not see the Roman distinction as neutral enough to be common to any number 
of ways of thinking?133 For J. M. Kelly, the ‘Greek inspiration of these [Ulpian’s] 
maxims seems unmistakable;’134 they are not uniquely Roman.  
 
It could be objected against my foregoing treatment that I miss the mode of Rose’s 
handling of Kant’s texts, by being too wooden and literal. Clearly there is an echo in 
Rose’s argument of Adorno’s approach, based on the view that when texts are read only 
to divine the author’s intentions, whole swathes of thought are ignored, such as the 
general climate of their thinking and its relation to their own society.135 I do not think 
this objection, holds, however, as I have tried to read Kant’s texts in relation to their 
social and historical background as Rose presents it. Her argument is that Kant’s 
rationality reflects Roman law, which is similar to the bourgeois property form and the 
public-private split it creates, and that Kant’s version of autonomy supports dominium 
over property. I have argued her charge does not stick even with this wider context in 
mind. Where Rose’s charges are on target, she picks up where Kant does express 
elements of bourgeois society (as we will see in §4.1); where she is not, she blames 
Kant for bowdlerised uses of his thought. Indeed, although Rose opposed the Hegel 
myth prevalent at the time, she accepted a caricatured picture of Kant overturned by 
later scholarship. Furthermore, Rose should have known better, as she had written of 
                                                
130 DN, 20; Element of Justice, 42-3. 
131 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 37 n.14; Kant writes ‘we give them a meaning that he himself indeed 
may not have had in mind’ (Elements of Justice, Ladd, 42). 
132 Kelley, ‘The Metaphysics of Law’. 
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metaphysical foundations of social thought.’ Kelley, ‘Gaius’, 621. 
134 Kelly, A Short History, 67. 
135 Adorno, Kant’s Critique, 161-2. 
 147 
Adorno’s criticisms of philosophy:  
 
It is difficult…to judge the move from revealing irreconcilable antinomies in central 
concepts to establishing the social origins of those antinomies. This is partly because 
the move is always accomplished by means of chiasmus and analogy, and partly 
because there are no criteria by which to judge that this move is the only one which can 
account for the antinomies discerned, nor any reason why the subject/object relation 
should be considered uniquely as a social relationship. The only partial criterion is the 
internal cogency of the analogy.136  
 
If ‘autonomy is the supreme concept in Kant’s moral philosophy, and by implication 
also of Kant’s theory of knowledge’,137 and Rose is interested in how such autonomy 
really exists and functions in modern societies, it would be no surprise she would 
welcome a reading like Adorno’s, which connects Kant’s view of autonomy to the 
coercive nature of the law on the statute books. Yet, Rose did not regard law as merely 
‘the foundation of the coercive character of society’;138 law for her was also enabling – 
socially by granting rights and psychologically by affecting the inner life of individuals 
(enlarging it, to the extent of hypertrophy). Nor does she undialectically oppose 
autonomy to mutual dependency. Thus, her reading differs somewhat from Adorno’s, 
though it highlights the precarious nature of Rose’s Adornian interpretative social 
philosophy and ideology critique (the fact of which both Rose and Adorno were well 
aware139).  
 
To summarise: Rose developed a form of ideology critique aimed at revealing 
determinations of the formation of philosophical consciousness by different epochs of 
jurisprudence. She compares affinities between patterns of thinking and judging within 
an historical legal form and those within a social philosophy, to discern problems in the 
latter. With regards to Kant, she claims that bourgeois property law, as a form of 
objective spirit in his society, influenced his philosophy, which expresses it without 
being as critical of it as it should be. The similarities between property in Kant, Roman 
law and his society provide the springboard from which Rose investigates this link. I 
argued in the case of Kant the ideology critique does not quite work because there is not 
enough affinity between the form of Kant’s philosophy in general and the form of 
Roman law to support Rose’s claims. The recourse to Roman law as ideology critique 
does, however, highlight problems with Kant’s practical philosophy, and suggests his 
                                                
136 TMS, 76. 
137 Adorno, Kant’s Critique, 54. 
138 Adorno, Kant’s Critique, 55. 
139 O’Connor, Adorno, 23-52. 
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application of freedom was more dominated by property than his statements on freedom 
as the dignity of autonomy imply. Although it is a far-reaching criticism it does not 
quite fit the bill of the form of Kant’s rationality as a whole. Her critique does reveal 
problems with legal formalism in general, which beset current legal and political forms. 
Since she takes Kant’s philosophy as in some ways expressing current social forms, this 
is no accident. Her critique seems to work better on the poststructuralists than on 
Kant,140 but its concatenated form leaves some ambiguities in place. If Rose is arguing 
there are forms of objective spirit bodying forth feudal and Homeric legal forms still 
operative in contemporary society and influencing unduly the work of Foucault and 
Heidegger, she is not clear about where these forms of objective spirit are located 
(which is not to say they do not exist). If, conversely, she is arguing simply that their 
models of power and politics are somewhat defective because they rely too much on 
earlier models of power fully to address contemporary questions of legitimacy, then she 
is not making an argument about the influence of objective spirit on consciousness as 
she believed, but an argument about more straightforward theoretical inadequacy 
(following perhaps from an insufficient appreciation of the intellectual tradition, which 
certainly is part of her argument in any case). This seems more like a Nietzschean 
genealogical critique, discerning sedimented remnants of past legal epochs pushing to 
the surface in different thinkers. This ambiguity is somewhat resolved in her later work, 
when she criticises poststructural/postmodern philosophy for an inadequate response to 
rationalisation in the Weberian sense. We return to this in the next chapter.  
 
4 Jurisprudential wisdom 
I have spent some time on Rose’s argument about the form of Kant’s philosophy despite 
judging it a failure because the opening of Dialectic of Nihilism is instructive in three 
ways. First, it shows how Rose’s ideology critique via law is supposed to work: a social 
philosophy and legal epoch are expounded and compared for affinities and 
illuminations. Second, despite Rose’s misfire against Kant, she fleshes out the charge of 
legal formalism in Kant’s philosophy. Rose’s argument is more successful when re-
                                                
140 For dissenting views see the reviews of DN by Bennington, Murphy, and Lash, in support of Rose see 
those by Norris, Grier, Beck and Raffel. Cutrofello, Discipline and Critique unintentionally confirms 
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Foucault’s (and Derrida’s) attempts to avoid juridical thinking leaves them without an ethic, whereas 
Rose’s sublation of juridical thinking does not suffer from this problem. 
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directed as a criticism of elements of Kant’s practical philosophy than against the whole 
form of his thinking. It serves to support a social and political philosophy inspired by 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Third, it begins to reveal her concept of jurisprudential 
wisdom as the use of law to gain a view of the social totality, and an expansive view of 
jurisprudence as examining the links between the metaphysical, ethical and legal. It also 
shows Rose’s integration of the jurisprudential tradition with her Hegelian and 
Frankfurt sources. Having discussed the first, I turn now to the other two. 
 
4.1 The legal formalism charge 
If Rose fails to show Roman legal influence on the form of Kant’s thought as a whole, 
she succeeds in providing greater background and substance to Hegel Contra 
Sociology’s critique of the bourgeois property form shaping Kant’s practical 
philosophy, including his view of subjectivity, the state, property, and the relation 
between public and private law. Kant’s use of Roman categories in his legal, social and 
political philosophy can be criticised for being too thin, excluding Sittlichkeit. If Rose 
had pitched her argument against elements of Kant’s practical philosophy, rather than 
the form of his philosophy as a whole, she would have been on much firmer ground. 
Her argument could then be read as supporting Hegel’s critique of Kant’s philosophy of 
right. ‘Hegel draws from Roman law throughout his works’,141 writes William Conklin, 
and Hegel developed two ideas in so doing. First, the person in Roman law is not the 
subject. A subject has interiority into which s/he can withdraw when faced with 
externality, but ‘the Roman subject was only recognized as an abstract legal person 
emptied of intentionality.’142 Second, this abstractness means Roman law ‘defined the 
subject to the point that the social relationships, with which Hegel is concerned, were a 
forgotten remainder.’143 That is why Hegel says Rome had an abstract existence: 
‘ethical life is sundered without end into the extremes of the private self-consciousness 
of persons…and abstract universality’,144 a bad logical conclusion of differentiation: 
‘all individuals [Einzelnen] are degraded to the level of private persons equal with one 
another, possessed of formal rights, and the only bond left to hold them together is an 
abstract, monstrously insatiable self-will.’145  
                                                
141 Conklin, Hegel’s Laws, 48. 
142 Conklin, Hegel’s Laws, 50. 
143 Conklin, Hegel’s Laws, 50. 
144 PhR, §357. 
145 PhR, §357. Rose is beginning to broach the problem of juridification, that is, laws protect individuals 
but can also hollow out the ethical life of the social spheres they regulate. See Daniel Loick, 
‘Juridification and Politics: From the Dilemma of Juridification to the Paradoxes of Rights’, Philosophy 
and Social Criticism 40.8 (October 2014), 757-78. 
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Society structurally generates the view of the person as abstraction (with its attendant 
obligations) in place of the real (and actual) subject; i.e., the rights of a person are 
respected but their feelings, particularity, and biography – that is their subjectivity – are 
downplayed. ‘Roman law is a formal justice, for an intentional subject is masked by the 
abstract person.’146 The abstraction that is “formally equal persons” has its uses but 
should not be confused with subjectivity and the latter should not be ignored.147 Civil 
society may and should mitigate this error.148 (Though in Rose’s view it will not 
militate against it because modern society, including civil society, structurally creates 
the illusion of the abstract person). Conklin describes Roman legal universals as ‘reified 
from social relations.’149 This was the basis of Hegel’s ‘critique of legal formalism in 
his own day.’150 In the Phenomenology, §477-83, Hegel says this regime of legal 
personality is the actualisation of Stoic philosophy. The Stoics retreated from what was 
actual and sought their essence in their interiority. This led to a kind of scepticism since 
everything could be negated but nothing positive established; but since only a few 
individuals adopted this view, it lacked social actuality. In Rome, qua Stoicism writ 
large, the unity of ethical substance was lost as individuality gained actuality. The 
independence of consciousness was acknowledged as a reality but resulted in too much 
individualism and abstract universality, such that unity had to be imposed. Just as 
Stoicism ended up in the alienated Unhappy Consciousness, so legal personality ends 
up in alienated culture – the very realisation of its actuality is at the same time its 
perversion and loss of self. The legal person suffers the same fate as Stoicism because it 
finally realises it is unreal because it rests on the will of the actual ruler (the Emperor) 
who can do as he wills; and because the legal person has no content of its own, unlike 
subjectivity, so it seeks it in property. The legal person ‘is immediately just as much a 
topsy-turvy inversion. It is the loss of its essence. – The actuality of the self which was 
not on hand in the ethical world has been attained by its return into the legal person, and 
what was unified in the ethical world now comes on the scene as both developed and as 
alienated from itself.’151 Rose’s critique of Kant’s political philosophy can be read as an 
elaboration of Hegel’s remarks. Hegel (and Marx and Nietzsche) did not improve on 
Kant by escaping the influence of Roman law but by handling it differently. They pay 
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more attention to the outworking of the aporias and antinomies of law and reformulate 
their views in light of them.152 Whilst debates on the legitimacy of the formalism 
complaint against Kant continue, Rose’s reprise of Hegel’s critique of formalism 
certainly applies to problematic formalism in contemporary legal and political 
culture.153 
 
Rose’s critique thereby provides reason to reconsider a more Hegelian approach to 
social and political philosophy.154 Hegel believed in three levels of freedom with 
corresponding forms of law and reasoning. The first and crudest was abstract right, in 
which humans are legal persons. The picture is of atomised individuals asserting their 
will over possessions in pursuing particular purposes. This gives individuals actuality, 
self-ownership and freedom (i.e., neither slavery nor serfdom) and is therefore ‘epoch-
making and deeply liberating’ but it cannot generate any substantial political or legal 
universality.155 Hegel offers  
 
a critique of more positivist types of early liberalism, which assumed that the 
distillation of the legal person from the property law of Roman law can provide a basis 
for substantial legal and political freedoms…The legal person of Roman law, in 
consequence, must be carried over, as one subordinate element, into higher and more 
mediated spheres of legal freedom, and ownership only acquires its justification where 
it is enshrined as a necessary but subsidiary component in the objective form of a more 
generally mediated and more substantially rational common will.156 
 
The second level regards humans as subjects: ‘that is, where they recognize that their 
wills are restricted by those of other persons, who have equally legitimate legal claims, 
and that the realm of human freedom must be regulated by universal moral standards 
and duties.’157 This is expressed as morality: using reason to determine duties and 
rights. Kant’s philosophy is its highest expression. The third level is the substantial 
unity-in-difference of a state that allows for civil society and the economy as 
distinguishable arenas. Hegel’s three levels of right and society become part of Rose’s 
broken middle. As we saw in the first chapter, Rose does not think antinomies would be 
resolved even in the highest level of a state embodying absolute ethical life because 
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tragic conflict and structural illusions always remain, but the more a state embodies 
absolute ethical life the more it ‘reduces the paradox’ of political aporias by mediating 
between them. Rose’s position attempts to incorporate Hegel’s belief in the state as the 
legitimate, rational framing of modern life, and the Weberian-Marxist-Nietzschean 
pessimism about the state as a monopoly of violence and coercion, which, qua 
monopoly, is frequently irrational and unjust. The broken middle recognises the 
perdurance of both moments in modern politics. 
 
4.2 Jurisprudential wisdom and social philosophy  
At the end of Dialectic of Nihilism, Rose names her approach ‘jurisprudential 
wisdom’.158 We can discern within it two tasks for social philosophy. The first, as we 
have seen, is a form of ideology critique uncovering the connected legal and 
metaphysical categories at work in social philosophy. This in itself implies a view of 
social philosophy as involving metaphysical, legal and ethical connections. The second 
is to use law and jurisprudence to gain a view of the social totality in both senses noted 
in chapter 2: an overall view of society leading into absolute ethical life. Rose’s reaction 
against poststructuralism was based on its ‘displacing or rejection of social and political 
theory and a return to a less sociological position.’159 This stems from responses to 
Kant, whose ‘Copernican revolution in philosophy left us with no legitimate theoretical 
knowledge of the whole, the infinite, things in themselves, the totality.’160 The neo-
Kantian Geltungslogik (including metacritique) kept the form of condition/pre-condition 
but not the unknowability of noumena because it dropped the phenomena/noumena 
distinction. It then became ‘an inquiry into the constitution of scientific object domains 
rather than into the conditions of experience as such. Geltungslogik describes the 
unknowable but productive principles of these scientific regional ontologies.’ 161 
Derrida’s différance is an example of an unknowable but productive principle. 
Deconstruction is neo-Kantian in its logical basis, but suffers in comparison to the 
original neo-Kantians such as Weber, Durkheim, Marx, Ihering and Cohen, because it is 
not as sociologically moored. It also relies on an opposition between force and 
expression, which is a metaphysical distinction, just as Comte’s attempt to reject 
metaphysics rested on the (metaphysical) appeal to natural and social ‘forces’.162 On the 
one hand, then, the loss of confidence in a view of the totality as a legitimate aim for 
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social philosophy fragmented epistemology and ontology, as well as various areas of 
enquiry from one another – not least sociology from philosophy. On the other hand, 
Rose is arguing that, approached phenomenologically (and so historically), law provides 
a necessary view of the totality; a way to view what social philosophies may otherwise 
exclude. 163  The view of the totality afforded is not perfect, but the inevitable 
imperfection does not give permission to give up on attempts at comprehensive views. 
Within discourses – competing academic discourses, for instance – one can keep 
provisionality, ambiguity and agnosticism in play; but when it comes to law or policy, 
definitions are enacted, the stipulated essences imposed. This is unavoidable, but 
postmodern aversion to the possibility of legitimate coercion led many to seek to avoid 
it. The substitution of the free-floating nature of academic disputes, in which definitions 
can remain in dispute, for the decisionism necessary for power to operate – and to judge 
whether power is operating legitimately or illegitimately – was a major failure of 
poststructuralism in Rose’s view.164 Law is a sine qua non of social philosophy. Chris 
Thornhill reached a similar conclusion: 
 
Formative for the politics of a modern society is a constitutive and co-evolutionary 
relation between law and power, which both furthers the abstraction and easy 
generalization of political power and generates juridical instruments to multiply, 
transmit and legitimize this power, as iterable and inclusive power. The result of this is 
that in contemporary societies, power usually needs to organize and explain itself 
through the enunciation of formal laws and rights, normally framed in a constitution, 
which it then reflects as a countervailing prerequisite of its legitimacy…legitimate 
power in modern society necessarily depends on constitutional laws, norms and rights 
(which it reflects and constructs for itself)…165  
 
Hence Rose writes, 
 
Attention to these litigious and juridical features of theoretical and logical discourse 
seems to me to be a way of returning to the question of the social basis of science 
without falling back into oppositions between theory and methodology, abstract and 
concrete, event and structure. It permits one to work from the perspective of the 
“whole” without pre-judging its content or form…This approach revives what Hegel 
called “absolute method” (the paradox is intended)…It acknowledges that any general 
statement or programme based on contraries like parts and wholes does have a formal 
actuality which nevertheless reveals as much by what it excludes as by what it includes: 
or, to put it in juridical terms, that the legalism of the methodological mind is itself de-
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posited by institutions of law. I hope that this approach will bring law and methodology 
back into history and history back into the question of law.166 
 
(Secondarily and implicitly, Rose can be seen as making a point about the historical 
indebtedness of sociology to jurisprudence since the Savigny-Thibaut-Hegel period, and 
so proposing a disciplinary self-understanding of sociology opposed to August Comte’s 
original vision.167 Comte opposed his newly created ‘sociology’ to law. In his three-
stage history of humanity, the theological was replaced by the metaphysical, which was 
superseded by the positive; law belonged to the second stage, sociology to the third. 
There is, however, a strong case to see sociology as emerging out of the discipline of 
law,168 including the Savigny-Thibaut debate on jurisprudence169).  
 
Rose’s discussion of the similarities between Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism 
and Weber’s examination of legal-rational authority is a useful example the way law 
enables a view onto the social totality. As she put it in a lecture ‘…Marx and Weber 
were very well aware that the distinction between persons and things is a distinction 
from Roman law.’170 Marx describes money, qua commodity, as universal, impersonal 
and rational. These are the features by which Weber describes legal-rational authority, 
so that money can be seen as an example of legal-rational authority. Money is a thing, 
but things are defined in opposition to persons: as Marx and Weber knew, in and since 
Roman law they have been mutually defining terms. As Marx notes, qua thing, money 
relies on persons to operate: commodities cannot take themselves off to market.171 This 
introduces a series of paradoxes into the form of commodities and the social life 
pervaded by them, which are the sites of inversions of intention and dialectical 
reversals. These paradoxes are the focus of Lukács’ analysis of capitalism as a culture, 
of a society pervaded by the commodity form.172 These paradoxes are, that money qua 
formal standard is universal, but is also particular as arising out of concrete activity. It is 
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impersonal in the way it mediates exchanges between people; but insofar as it mediates 
between people it thus requires persons. Thirdly, money is rational as the basis of 
calculations, but it is irrational in the way it differentiates people through the 
contingencies of distribution, market fluctuations, etc. The three features of the 
commodity form of universality, impersonality and rationality equally imply the three 
features of particularity, personality and irrationality; and these cannot be strictly 
demarcated but dialectically flow into and out of one another. Commodities rely on the 
legal distinction between persons and things and thereby involve a mixture of rationality 
and irrationality. Viewing commodities as a form of legal-rational authority can then 
reveal the mixture of person/thing and rationality/irrationality at the heart of legal-
rational authority, and thereby its presence in other forms such as bureaucracy.173 This 
analysis goes further in seeing the person-thing distinction transposed into persons and 
things themselves. The most famous aspect of commodity fetishism is the way persons 
are treated as things and things as persons,174 but Rose points out that both persons and 
things are treated as both persons and things. Things (commodities) are of course 
treated as things, yet insofar as they are reified (and Rose accepts reification as a central 
category of capitalist society)175 they begin to govern human life, to exert control over 
humans, and so in a sense become persons whilst persons become things before them. 
Persons too are both personified and “thingified”.176 ‘A person is a legal term for the 
bearer of rights and duties, including the ownership of labour power, and labour power, 
which is part of the individual, becomes the thing which can be bought and sold.’177 
Here, then, an originally Roman legal distinction between persons and things is seen to 
structure, in various permutations, the commodity form, and so society as a whole and 
the people within it; and to provide a perspective on the dominant form of rationality in 
modern society.  
 
The historicality of Rose’s approach and its “failing towards” totality thus follows Marx 
and Weber in providing a way to theorise substantively about society, but it also follows 
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Hegel in bringing both elements into the logic of social theory itself. In chapter 1 we 
saw Hegel’s logic was a theory of logical categories that was its own metatheory 
because it included its own logical possibility within itself by developing the logical 
categories we use to think. Hegel’s phenomenology and logic show our current 
categories are historically attained but nevertheless some are a priori necessary. Rose’s 
social philosophy is its own metatheory because it includes within itself both its logical 
and its socio-historical preconditions, by learning from phenomenology the historically 
developed nature of moral and epistemological categories, some of which gain in 
reliability as they survive the phenomenological testing process. Rather than a theory of 
ideal conditions, which produces an abstract model of society that can never be attained, 
‘better to include the pre-conditions in the notion of the desired order, and operate with 
something realistic’: a social theory should ‘include…its own conditions, rather than 
taking them for granted and then declaring itself unavailable for most of mankind 
through the absence of suitable pre-conditions’.178 Of course social philosophy lacks the 
a priori necessity to be found in pure logic. It is impossible to think without using the 
categories of cause and effect, but people and societies can get along without recourse 
to mutual recognition. In that sense, it will be a social philosophy ‘for us’, for those 
already committed to certain values; yet it does not eschew attempts at a certain 
universalism and completeness. The fact that choosers of fundamental values are always 
culturally formed does not render value choice arbitrary, and phenomenology provides a 
way to show the logical testing of various forms of value. Phenomenology scrutinises 
the rationality of its preconditions so it need neither rubber-stamp current historical 
forms with a rational imprimatur nor be viciously circular. Such phenomenology 
explains the Frankfurt School commitment, shared by Rose, to ‘rational reconstruction’, 
a hybrid between normative and descriptive theory.179 Asking where we stand in 
relation to the Hegelian dialectic is thus to  
 
investigate the possibility of an ethics which does not remain naive [sic] and ignorant of 
its historical and political presuppositions and hence of its likely outcomes. Such an 
ethics requires a comprehensive account of substance and subject, of modernity and 
subjectivity; an account, that is, of the modern fate of ethical life: of the institutional 
and individual inversions of meaning in the modern state and society, where increase in 
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subjective freedom is accompanied by decrease in objective freedom, where the 
discourses of individual rights distract from the actualities of power and domination.180  
 
Having a view of the totality also requires having a view of theory’s relation to that 
totality, since the two are internally related. Absolute ethical life then emerges from the 
speculative reading of the social totality. It is an unattainable goal but nevertheless held 
up as a model for society. A full depiction of it is deliberately kept vague, so as not to 
impose an unacceptable morality or political culture on a population. On the other hand, 
mutual recognition is seen as both immanent to modern society – so not imposed – and 
capable of providing a robust enough picture to help society move towards absolute 
ethical life, of which it is a major part – so answering some of the vagueness problem 
raised against Rose.  
 
Rose argues social philosophy cannot be fully performed without a jurisprudential 
perspective. She reads Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche as early socio-political philosophers 
aware of how legal conceptions and forms filter through into social philosophy. 
Ignorance on this score prevents social philosophy from full self-comprehension and 
leaves it more exposed to the inversions of its proposals. Such expansive knowledge 
was arguably easier for Hegel and Marx, who were taught law at university and lived in 
a less complex society with less academic specialisation. To have a grasp of the 
empirical working of law and theoretical perspectives on it and to connect them with 
moral and political philosophy is a huge task, not easily accommodated within 
disciplinary boundaries181 (and Rose focused on the theoretical end of the spectrum).182 
Here again, Rose’s Frankfurt anti-positivism is important. In 1981 Rose argued that 
speculative logic better described the best practice of social theorists and that explicit 
awareness of it could prevent substantive errors. George Steinmetz’s 2005 edited 
volume makes a complementary argument: although many humanities scholars oppose 
the theory of positivism, in practice it frequently remains the ‘epistemological 
                                                
180 MBL, 70-1. 
181 A key theme for Roger Cotterrell (e.g., ‘Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy’, Jurisprudence 
15.1 (2014), 41-55) and John N. Adams and Roger Brownsword, Understanding Law (4th ed.; London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2006). Hence the Frankfurt School began as an interdisciplinary project – there is 
simply too much for one person to do. I suspect this partly explains the theoretical and meta-theoretical 
nature of Rose’s writing at the expense of more empirical studies.  
182 Just how focused is apparent in the way she tackles neo-Kantian jurisprudence but ignores Eugen 
Ehrlich, one of the founders of the sociology of law. Despite this, the empirically grounded sociology of 
law was by no means alien to von Ihering, Weber, Durkheim, Marx, and other thinkers upon whom she 
drew. 
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unconscious of the contemporary social sciences’.183 Despite having been ‘declared 
anachronistic’ in the 1900s (Lenin), 1930s (Parsons), 1960s-70s (Adorno, Gouldner, 
Giddens), ‘positivism’s uncanny persistence in the human sciences up to the present 
moment’184 endures. Rose’s argument therefore remains contemporary. The broken 
middle is not an ideal theory never finding perfect expression in real conditions. Rose 
does not develop a universal concept of law or democracy or society or community and 
then lament its imperfect realisation in various places and times. She neither gives up on 
rationality and universality nor expects the complete kind of universality that some 
philosophical approaches do. The subtle differences at the metatheoretical level, in what 
is expected and demanded from theory and reason, and the differences between what 
people believe they are doing and what they actually do, have effects at the substantive 
level.  
 
Rose’s view may be a minority but it is not a lone voice. Sean Coyle, for example, 
argues many of the same points as Rose: ‘From the earliest times, philosophical texts on 
politics put law at the centre of their reflections upon the character of the ‘City’’.185 
Since H. L. A. Hart’s legal positivism, however, there has been amongst some a 
narrowing of jurisprudence, separating it from any metaphysical, social or moral ideas, 
relying on ‘facts’ and philosophers’ ‘intuitions’. ‘This separation was not simply a 
dogma…but a determination of the field of inquiry itself’.186 Some legal philosophers in 
this mould would claim that their ‘characterisation of legal order applies to law in all its 
manifestations, not simply that of the liberal order…But many of the assumptions 
involved…indicate a specifically liberal vision of legal order…the modern liberal order 
is the immediate context to which, for better or worse, jurisprudential understandings 
must be directed. It is this ‘City’ that the jurist’s explanations must elucidate.’187 Theory 
and society are reciprocally conceptualised, whether intentionally or not. Whereas 
Rose’s implied totality of the unity of law and ethics concerns what it would be like for 
us to embody our shared ethos and normative commitments in law, and thereby 
explicitly foregrounds its beginning in the middle, the ‘veil of ignorance’ approach has 
                                                
183 Webb Keane, ‘Estrangement, Intimacy, and the Objects of Anthropology’ in Politics of Method, 59. 
C.f. Catherine H. Zuckert, ‘Introduction’ in Political Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Authors and 
Arguments, ed. by Catherine H. Zuckert (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2011), 1-15. 
184 George Steinmetz, ‘Introduction’ in Politics of Method, 2. One could add Hegel’s arguments against 
natural law, the later Wittgenstein against the Vienna circle, the sociological Positivismusstreit. 
185 ‘Legality and the Liberal Order’, The Modern Law Review 76.2 (2013), 401-18 (401). C.f. Rose, ‘The 
Dispute Over Marx and Weber’. 
186 Coyle, ‘Legality and the Liberal Order’, 402. For a general survey of the field in this vein see 
Cotterrell, ‘not Legal Philosophy’. 
187 Coyle, ‘Legality’, 402. 
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led some liberal thinkers to conflate the universal and particular in the wrong way. 
 
We can thus take the work of Sean Coyle as an example of the Rosean approach,188 with 
the following caveat. Coyle’s criticisms of legal positivism apply only to some of the 
field. Hart himself, for instance, was very alert to the antinomy of law: ‘Many such 
assertions either fail to make clear the sense in which the connection between law and 
morals is alleged to be necessary; or upon examination they turn out to mean something 
which is both true and important, but which it is most confusing to present as a 
necessary connection between law and morals.’189 One of the advantages of Hart’s 
positivism as a theory of law is its ability to say, ‘This is law but iniquitous,’190 and thus 
to identify laws before an answer to normative questions is settled. As with Rose’s 
critique of sociology, then, Coyle’s critique of legal positivism should not be taken as 
condemning jurisprudence as a whole.  
 
Coyle shows the effects of expecting the wrong kind of universality from philosophy of 
law. Within some strands of legal positivism the ‘status of the philosopher’s ‘necessary 
conditions’ thus hovers uneasily between a stipulative definition and a sociological 
claim that a certain form of regulatory framework is in fact most prevalent among 
existing forms of social order.’191 This wavers between the attempt to define the concept 
of law universally in abstraction from all its manifestations, yet also the assumption that 
something like the current English or American system is close to the real nature of law, 
which fits exactly Rose’s description of the quasi-transcendental form of metacritiques 
as vacillating between transcendental and empirical in the wrong way. Where this 
happens, legal positivism tries ‘to ascertain the necessary or ‘essential’ conditions for 
the existence of a legal system; but…the identification of those conditions (in place of 
some other list) serves to articulate a sociological judgment about the instances of legal 
order that actually exist.’ 192  Choices about central cases are already based on 
conceptions of law, and central cases are taken as illuminating the nature of law. Thus 
there is a fundamental methodological unclarity within this kind of legal positivism 
between describing actual practice and making universal claims, precisely because it is 
                                                
188 From Positivism to Idealism: A Study of the Moral Dimensions of Legality (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
Coyle cites DN on page 17 but is not heavily reliant on her work.  
189 Hart, Concept, 202. As Gardner, Law as a Leap, 48-9 notes, legal positivism is a thesis about legal 
validity not a whole theory of law, so compatible with various views of law-ethics relations. But this 
focus on validity can distract attention from metaphysical issues. 
190 Hart, Concept, 210-1. 
191 Coyle, Positivism to Idealism, 3. 
192 Coyle, Positivism to Idealism, 2. 
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neo-Kantian (in Rose’s terms). Once again we meet the circularity of socio-logic in 
which thought and reality, subject and object, are internally related, because the way the 
object is conceptualised partially constructs the object itself (and the subject in relation 
to it). The difference between neo-Kantian and speculative circularity is again a crucial 
issue. Phenomenology as Rose practises it also wishes to achieve something close to 
universality, it does not wish to confine itself to the parochial or particular, but it is 
more aware in practice that such universal forms are never attained. The legal 
positivism Coyle identifies may even acknowledge this in theory but its way of going 
on does not reflect it. The theory is not consistently its own metatheory, and so 
(unconscious) metatheoretical errors create theoretical errors. ‘The possibility of fruitful 
inquiry into the moral nature of law is therefore obscured by the prevalence of disputes 
about the characteristics of the ‘concept’ of law, so that jurisprudential argument 
consists largely in advancing rival and incompatible versions of this concept, which 
jurists then assert and oppose to each other… [They] have largely abandoned the 
traditional attempt to comprehend the ethical nature of that experience’.193 The same 
pattern sometimes repeats itself in the circularity and non-neutrality of political theories 
grounded in the state of nature.194 Such theory assumes that in the state of nature a 
collection of individuals will want to decide their situation through equal discussion to 
reach a consensus – an already liberal impulse. Likewise, the narrow analytic 
jurisprudence criticised by Coyle eschews metaphysical elaborations of law and wishes 
to reach reflective equilibrium between rational clarification and ‘intuitions’. As Coyle 
points out, the danger is always that intuitions and common sense have been smuggled 
in rather than transformed. The testing of intuitions against reason is inevitable, but the 
question is how that process is thought of and carried out. If the process is described as 
rational clarification to reach reflective equilibrium there can be no objection. It is the 
wider set of expectations and ways of going on that determine just what these mean; and 
this is where problems arise.195 Legal positivist ‘conceptual analysis’ does help clarify 
to a great extent but it can also mistake the nature of its enquiries and goals due to its 
overambitious hope and metatheoretical inaccuracies.  
 
                                                
193 Coyle, Positivism to Idealism, 3-4. C.f. Brian Leiter, ‘Marx, law, ideology, legal positivism’, Virginia 
Law Review 101 (forthcoming 2015), n.p., n.23: ‘there is no subfield of Anglophone philosophy as 
intellectually corrupt and confused as general jurisprudence.’ Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465672, accessed 16 April 2015. 
194 ‘Legality and the Liberal Order’; c.f. the discussion in chapter 1 of Hegel’s critique of natural law. 
195 C.f. Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay, ‘Beyond Bourgeois Individualism: the Contemporary 
Crisis in Law and Legal Ideology’ in Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond, ed. by Eugene Kamenka and R. 
S. Neale (Kent: Whitstable Litho, 1975), 127-41. Cited in DN, 176-7. 
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Even if these methodological (in the loose sense of the word) cautions against 
reductionism and metatheoretical ambiguity are accepted, it may still be objected that 
jurisprudential wisdom fails to provide satisfaction if it does not forward any specific 
theses or positions. Even if one accepted Hart and Kant had made metatheoretical and 
substantive errors, their work remains extremely powerful and generative for 
contemporary thinking. Rose’s own work risks lapsing into unfairness without 
recognising these real achievements. Yet since Rose accepts the need for different 




Jurisprudential wisdom was a development of Rose’s social philosophy in several ways. 
It continued the critique of society and social philosophy on the basis of a Hegelian 
philosophy and metaphilosophy that speculatively posited absolute ethical life as a 
social totality. It used law as a way to view the social totality and argued explicit 
knowledge of law was necessary to social philosophy and must be pursued in 
connection with its ethical and metaphysical entanglements. Law is a condition of 
possibility of ethics and politics, and of social philosophy, and a privileged place for 
observing the speculative identity of metaphysical ideas and their social manifestations 
and inversions. Indeed, one of social philosophy’s tasks is to bring to explicit awareness 
the tensions and aporias in a culture or form of Geist, to make them exist for and not 
just in philosophical consciousness, to make them an und für sich. Shifting law within 
philosophical consciousness from an sich to an und für sich is Rose’s unique form of 
ideology critique of philosophical consciousness and its formation. The increasing 
distance between the disciplines of philosophy and sociology created distortions in the 
theorising of law and ethics, including their abstraction from one another. The 
‘speculative identity of form and history’ nevertheless reveals the interlinking of legal 
and metaphysical categories and forms of thinking in social philosophies. 
Jurisprudential wisdom aims to reveal these connections and separations in order to 
enable a better assessment of their role within theory and society, to assist philosophical 
consciousness in self-comprehension by revealing law as one crucial condition of its 




Jurisprudential wisdom also provided support for a Hegelian political philosophy in 
which theories reflect their social context and therefore should do so as thoroughly and 
knowingly as possible by incorporating their own social and logical preconditions into 
their theorising. Thus, rather than grounding a theory on some allegedly universal and 
given starting point, constructive and critical theories should deliberately and 
reflexively ‘begin in the middle’ by taking a phenomenological view of their own 
history. It follows that a theory should begin by assessing what “we” do and think in 
order to clarify and criticise it to reach out towards something more comprehensive 
(more universal), but not in the hope of removing all ambiguity or settling on complete 
universality. This leads Rose to share Hegel’s view of individual, civil society and state 
as fundamental to modern society yet in tension, and his attempt to sublate not abandon 
the rationally self-legislating legal and moral person into a thicker concept of the 
subject. It also follows that theory and metatheory must be kept in constant interaction. 
The recurrence of positivism in social, political, ethical and legal theories shows how 
difficult it is to maintain these deceptively simple requirements. The combination of 
descriptive and normative moments in Frankfurt theories alerted Rose to the sensitivity 
of theory to metatheoretical commitments, and we saw that jurisprudence has the same 
sensitivity, insofar as it often involves both moments. Social philosophy should not 
expect to eliminate the antinomies of law, especially the tensions between law and 
ethics and between facts and norms, but to provide a workable mediation of them, 
which can contribute to a “good enough justice”. At the same time, social philosophy 
must be critical rather than affirming injustice, oppression, or social pathologies. Legal 
formalism can become one such pathology, antinomianism another. Mutual recognition 
may be capable of avoiding both such mistakes, or at least revealing them as mistakes. 
These themes were developed in Rose’s later 
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4 
The Broken Middle 
 
Incremental improvements upon unsatisfactory circumstances are the best we can hope 
for, and probably all we should seek. 
  – Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land 
 
1 Introduction  
By now we have seen Rose’s view of reason as phenomenologically constituted, self-
limiting and speculative; her stress on the importance of law for social theorising; and 
her opposition to the elimination of metaphysics therefrom. We have seen that absolute 
ethical life as the implied unity of law and ethics plays both a theoretical and normative 
role for social theorising. A false version of the unity of law and ethics imagines their 
seamless integration, a cosy Sittlichkeit expressed unproblematically and without 
remainder in positive law. An alternative false version entirely separates law and ethics: 
an ethically pure community opposes a wholly illegitimate and coercive legal and state 
apparatus. Rose referred to these visions as ‘community’ and opposed them on the basis 
of her socio-philosophically grounded awareness of the necessary tensions between self, 
society and state. In this chapter I fill out Rose’s picture of these tensions, which 
provide a critical theory of fundamental features of modern society and at the same time 
a critique of social philosophies that ignore these features. I show Rose’s mature social 
philosophy, the ‘idea and analysis’ 1  of the broken middle (§2), operating as a 
phenomenology of modern theory and society (§2.1) via the two main diremptions 
occupying her attention, namely, between state and civil society (§2.2) and between law 
and ethics (§2.3). The latter section includes Rose’s critique of postmodern (‘new’) 
ethics (§2.3.1) and her alternative of ‘suspended’ and ‘equivocal’ ethics (§2.3.2): in 
ethics as in epistemology theory must reflect the dialectical mediations between subject 
and object, which means incorporating mediation at the beginning of ethical thinking. I 
show in §3 how Rose has both a useful balance in intellectual mood in relation to 
politics, and a normative stratum to her social philosophy insofar as mutual recognition 
is one of its intrinsic moments. This overcomes the charge that Rose’s work lacked the 
means to ward off the relativism or ethical nihilism she detected in poststructuralism. 
My exposition continues to trace Rose’s chronological and conceptual trajectory, 
                                                
1 MBL, 38. 
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focusing on 1992’s The Broken Middle, though I refer to her later works as I proceed 
where they illuminate her thought by application and example. In the previous chapters 
I clarified key features of Rose’s work by using other thinkers, some unknown to Rose, 
who were nevertheless good examples of her thought at work (Bhaskar, Bourdieu, Catto 
and Woodhead, Coyle, Giddens, Habermas, Martin, Meiksins Wood). Likewise here I 
go beyond Rose’s own examples of her social philosophy and consider other work that 
may be taken to exemplify and fill out her thought. I discuss Sara Farris’ recent work on 
the ‘Muslim question’ to show the enduring relevance of the state-society diremption 
(§2.2). I refer to other theories of recognition (§3.1), which complement Rose’s work 
insofar as they give further definition to her main normative ideal, and I suggest how 
her retention of the recognition-appropriation dialectic from Hegel shapes her ethics of 
recognition in a novel and noteworthy way. This chapter therefore completes my 
examination of Rose’s trilogy, shows its unity as the core of her coherent social 
philosophy, and how that theory may be used in various fields of social theorising. It 
shows how Rose integrated the thought of Marx, Arendt and Weber into her Hegelian-
Adornian philosophy, and puts in place the final major pieces of the synoptic vision of 
her whole work necessary to a proper appreciation thereof.  
 
2 The broken middle 
The broken middle was Rose’s term for her mature vision of her social philosophy as 
well as for a characterisation of modern society, one she felt often lacking from social 
philosophies, although its effects were discernible on them. The continuity between The 
Broken Middle and Rose’s earlier work thus emerges from the foregoing exposition. As 
with her earlier books, however, its range and ambition (and in this case, obscurity) 
repay a prefatory remark about the aims of its argument. The argument has three 
connected moments: it is, first, an immanent critique of contemporary theory (§2.1); 
designed, second, to further Rose’s meta-philosophical position on philosophy and 
reason; whilst, third, developing Rose’s social philosophy via an examination of the 
state-society diremption (§2.2) and the law-ethics diremption (§2.3). Whereas her 
previous book developed ideology critique of theory by reference to jurisprudence, here 
the critique is at once immanent and by reference to the failure of theories to give due 
attention to the nature of society as a broken middle. Rose constantly weaves together 
the theoretical and metatheoretical dimensions of the broken middle, but for heuristic 
purposes I discuss her phenomenology of contemporary theory and modernity’s 
fundamental diremptions separately below. The Broken Middle further fleshes out 
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Rose’s view of philosophy and reason. ‘The book is about philosophy, its possibilities, 
objects, burdens and conditions’.2 Hence her book ‘means to be a configuring and re-
configuring of philosophy in its most basic conceptual, existential and historical 
elements.’ It is therefore ‘necessarily meta-philosophical and philosophical at the same 
time.’ It ‘represents Rose’s vision of the necessity and nature of a contemporary self-
limiting rationalism.’ She shows that comprehension goes hand in hand with 
‘acknowledging what escapes comprehension, existential pathos or politics’. As we 
have seen, Rose believes her approach enables philosophy to play its role in culture by 
speaking to the existential and political questions of modern life. 
 
Rose was also again drawing a different map of the theoretical terrain: uniting Hegel 
and Kierkegaard; arguing for an essential continuity between ostensibly opposed 
political theology and postmodern philosophy; offering alternative and surprising 
interpretations of and links between thinkers; offering a set of terms to think through the 
material (violence in love and love in violence, agon of authorship, anxiety of 
beginning, equivocation of the middle, pathos of the concept).3 She stated ‘the general 
aim and ambition of the work’ was ‘to rewrite/reconceive the map of the intellectual 
terrain (accepted from Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze – as discussed in the 
propaedeutic to this work Dialectic of Nihilism) in a way that must be the concern of 
everyone engaged in debates across the humanist and social scientific disciplines…more 
specifically, to show that speculative exposition…can accommodate everything post-
modernity is convinced it omits, and still produce a critical account of modernity.’4 
 
These aims explain Rose’s “high altitude” style. The worry may arise that her work is 
too high altitude to be useful, which is why Bernstein, Pippin and others are needed to 
explain the thinking behind her work. In response, it may be noted that high altitude 
views have their place. Rose’s social philosophy is focused on the macro-picture 
because it aims to combine both theoretical and practical philosophy; to connect an 
epistemology with social philosophy, ethics, jurisprudence and politics. Its ambition is 
unfashionable but not an a priori mark against it. Rose’s first two books were detailed 
studies of the whole corpus of Adorno and Hegel, with extensive reference to the 
                                                
2 The quotations in the rest of the paragraph are from J. Bernstein’s reader’s report on BM for the 
publisher, 18 April 1991, n.p., box 36. (There is no name on the document but in a letter to ‘Stefan’ (21 
April 1991, also box 36) Rose quotes the report in explaining why she had suggested Bernstein as a 
referee). 
3 For a summary of some of these terms see Gorman, ‘Whither’, 57 and the conclusion to this chapter. 
4 Letter to John Milbank, 12 June 1991, box 11. 
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relevant literature of critical theory, sociology, German idealism and neo-Kantianism; 
hence Rose, as it were, earned her high altitude view by the detailed background work. 
Ambitious, large-scale, high altitude theories gain traction by the compelling and 
illuminating nature of their vision, but they face a double danger. On one side they are 
vulnerable to the death of a thousand cuts. As each specialist disagrees with the reading 
of his or her figure, period or area, the plausibility of the overall scheme is called into 
doubt. Conversely, they run the risk of reductionism insofar as their single narrative or 
cluster of central ideas explains everything passing through it. As Edith Wyschogrod 
remarked about Judaism and Modernity, Rose’s ‘major difficulty lies in a lumping 
together of virtually all the thinkers discussed as having failed in their efforts to 
comprehend the conceptual underpinning of modernity and as having done so on 
virtually identical grounds. All are alleged to have denounced or misrepresented reason 
and to have replaced it with Reason’s “sublime Other”, thus precluding efforts to think 
the split itself.’5 Yet contra Wyschogrod, Rose’s work as a whole is in fact complex 
enough to refer to several sources of error – rationalised reason, insufficient awareness 
of preconditions, inflexible transcendentalism, avoidance of law or metaphysics, 
mishandling of fundamental diremptions – and is therefore not crudely reductive. This 
example of distorting Rose’s work by reading only one part of it shows the necessity of 
the comprehensive and synoptic reconstruction I provide. She is perhaps more 
vulnerable to the first danger, since her readings of individual figures remain 
controversial (not least because they are unusual), and one can always disagree with her 
focus on the two diremptions (perhaps one thinks other diremptions are more important, 
or society is not so dirempted as she thinks, and so on). All large-scale theories face this 
problem and their success is best measured not by perfection in every detail but how 
illuminating and generative they are. 
 
2.1 A ‘phenomenology of modern theory’ and society  
J. Bernstein describes The Broken Middle as a ‘phenomenology of modern theory that 
works within the dialectic of ethical life rather than being about it’.6 Through this 
phenomenology Rose brings out the connections between her Hegelian epistemology 
and social theory. It is speculative thought shown through critique rather than abstract 
statement. She also criticises the sociological failures of her contemporaries’ social 
theory and ‘the separation of sociological thinking (methodological and substantive) 
                                                
5 ‘Review of Judaism and Modernity’, Modern Theology 11.2 (April 1995), 268-70. 
6 Bernstein, Ethical Life, 8.  
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from philosophical thinking which leads to the posing of sociological questions without 
a sociological culture. In Dialectic of Nihilism I examine the systematic destruction of 
social thought in post-structuralism; in my article on architecture I examine the absence 
of sociological thinking in post-modernism’. 7  Rose shows the ways in which 
postmodern works explicitly witness to the broken middle and how they fail to do so, 
yet how that very failure can be read as another witness to the broken middle. This re-
articulates Hegel’s criticism of theories that fail to take account of their uses in society.8 
When theories propose solutions without considering their mediation through social and 
political diremptions, their solutions are liable to be subverted and distorted by those 
diremptions, often producing the very opposite of what was intended. She saw this 
phenomenon explored by, for example, Weber’s work on Protestantism and capitalism 
and Goethe’s examination of Pietist beautiful soulism, but insufficiently appreciated by 
postmodern theory and political theology. More generally, the phenomenology of 
theory repeats the meta-philosophical critique of her earlier work by showing disparities 
between expressed theoretical commitments and actual theoretical practices. This 
served as a basis to critique poststructuralism, postmodern political theology, the 
anthropology and politics of Girard and Mann, architecture, and forms of 
psychoanalysis. My focus in this chapter, however, is to bring out the constructive side 
of Rose’s social philosophy. 
 
As Bernstein indicates, central to her social theory is Hegel’s idea of the dialectic of 
ethical life (also called the causality of fate (to connote a culture- or society-wide return 
of the repressed)). The dialectic of ethical life names the contradictory ethical 
experiences that occur when we try to ground our selves and subjectivity otherwise than 
on mutual recognition.9 That is, those parts of ethical life, which mutual recognition 
nurtures, but which are suppressed or alienated in contemporary society, react 
negatively back onto individuals, who may either experience them as a hostile fate or 
alternatively may discern in them their own suppressed ethical life.10 The diremptions 
suffered in society – between self and society, general and concrete other, moral and 
ethical, universal and particular, determinate and reflective judging – cannot be put back 
together, but may nevertheless be felt as two torn halves of a whole we have never 
                                                
7 Letter to Warwick Registrar, 26 October 1989. 
8 Milbank, ‘Living in Anxiety’, 20. 
9 Bernstein, Ethical Life, 185. 
10 See Bernstein, Ethical Life, 82-7, 159-96; Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: 
Twelve Lectures, trans. by Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity, 1987 [1985]), 28-9 discussing 
Hegel’s The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate. 
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experienced. Speculative thought interprets the experience of them as fragments of a 
whole. We may then seek some sort of improvement, trying to move towards that ideal 
but implied whole – absolute ethical life – without imagining we may ever arrive or 
permanently heal the diremptions. This means recognising ‘an always already 
presupposed alterity which in its alterity conditions the self-possession of the subject.’11 
Individual autonomy thus depends on an otherness. Autonomy does not mean complete 
self-mastery but an appropriate measure of self-possession and appropriation of 
givenness in dialectical relation to undergoing influence from otherness. 12  (The 
recognition and appropriation of otherness is an important meaning of Bildung in 
Rose’s oeuvre). The subject depends on substance in a ‘speculative recognition of self 
in otherness.’13 This doctrine is behind Rose’s discussions of the shifting boundaries of 
reason, the city, the soul and the sacred. As Bernstein summarises it: 
 
In the aporia of autonomy modernity attains its limit and refutation. Metaphysically, 
this aporia concerns the rigid dualism of passivity and activity, subject and object (only 
the purely active belongs to the subjectivity of the subject); formally, this aporia 
concerns the question of what the content of the will is, whether the will can have a 
content and remain a free will; materially, this aporia concerns the changing, shifting 
and indeterminate, boundaries of the self or subject, where such a being can be said to 
begin or end. If there can be no essential determination of the self or subject, and if the 
shifting boundaries of identity – from the extreme of the pure activity of thinking and 
willing to the extreme of sheer external givenness – are co-extensive with the will, then 
the hope of instituting a substantial conception of autonomy must collapse.14 
 
If the struggle against heteronomy, viewed not only as the wills of others but also the 
resistance of the self and nature, is pursued as aiming at complete autonomy, it turns out 
to be a struggle against our own suppressed life. This heteronomy must be recognised 
for what it is – an essential part of ourselves – and the political and ethical life for which 
we struggle must include rather than suppress it.15 Hegel framed this as a critique of 
Kantian moral formalism (better, thinness), to which he opposed life, love, forgiveness 
and recognition as necessary components of any ethical theory hoping adequately to 
represent our ethical lives and experience, in a universality thick enough to be 
substantive. But these concepts undermine full autonomy in the sense that they show 
our interdependence and they cannot be demanded of others (in the manner of perfect 
                                                
11 Bernstein, Ethical Life, 61. 
12 C.f. Axel Honneth’s critique of poststructuralist abandonments of the subject upon the realisation that 
full autonomy was unavailable: ‘Decentered Autonomy: The Subject After the Fall’ in Disrespect: The 
Normative Foundations of Critical Theory, trans. by Joseph Ganahl (Cambridge: Polity, 2007 [2000]), 
181-94. 
13 Bernstein, Ethical Life, 82. 
14 ‘Autonomy and Solitude’, 193-4. 
15 For the psychoanalytic connotations of ‘suppression’ here, see Bernstein, Ethical Life 58-87. 
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duties) but must be freely given. Bernstein here provides a way to flesh out Rose’s 
speculative view of activity and passivity, personification and reification. 
 
The internally linked critique of theory and society emerges in another way too, as 
another form of the critique of rationalised reason. Again Bernstein draws it out from 
the dialectic of ethical life. From within the diremption of universal and particular, the 
universal is usually privileged in legal-rational thinking, such that normativity is 
thought to be ‘the deriving of judgments from universal premises or procedures’, 
whereas from Rose’s speculative view that sees universal and particular as pointing to 
but never actually making a whole, the particular is also given its due such that the 
‘validity of rules and norms that are to protect those injurable particulars must make 
essential reference to them’.16 This involves freeing ‘reflective judgment from its 
confines in aesthetics by showing it as a general ethical and cognitive strategy…For the 
same reason that we cannot discursively vindicate why the deep luminosity of the blue 
of the sky in ‘this’ painting is essential to the beauty of the whole, although we can art-
critically point to it, so the injurability of the body (which negatively reveals the body’s 
‘integrity’) cannot be wholly vindicated as morally relevant in discursive-subsumptive 
terms.’17 Hence:  
 
Belief in moral reason becomes irrational when it excludes either self-reflection or the 
conditions of its employment [when it ceases to be speculative] but the conditions for 
the employment of moral reason are not themselves rational in the narrow sense since 
they must include sustaining belief in reason and morality as life practices; and, 
tendentially, all object-oriented, heteronomous moral codes and theories undermine 
belief in valuing since they devalue or suppress the activity of valuing, valuing-giving 
and creating, itself.18  
 
This is a classic case of dialectical inversion. A morality that seeks greater security by 
basing itself on objective reason, safe from the whims of the subject, ends up 
undermining itself by cutting away at its own conditions of possibility.  
 
The dialectic of ethical life matters for Rose’s social philosophy not only as it relates to 
subjects’ reliance on one another in mutual recognition but also in the way theoretically 
articulated ideals relate to their social context. As Rose put it, the political ideal of 
                                                
16 Both quotes from Bernstein, Ethical Life, 166. 
17 Bernstein, Ethical Life, 166-7. Reflective judgement refers to Kant’s third Critique. Partly at issue is 
whether the epistemology of the third Critique fundamentally revises that of the first. Bernstein thinks so 
and Rose’s critique of rationalised reason would seem to agree. 
18 Bernstein, ‘Autonomy and Solitude’, 199. 
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moral autonomy is quite compatible with social and political heteronomous restrictions 
on freedom:19 
 
‘Spirit’ in this sense of ‘spiritual-animal kingdom’ pervades Hegel’s phenomenology, 
his exposition of modernity and the paradoxes of subjectivity. Kant’s inner, moral 
autonomy is seen to be quite compatible with its purported contrary – outer, legal 
heteronomy. Viewed dynamically, an increase in subjective freedom and autonomy 
may mean a decrease in objective freedom, that is to say, an increase in heteronomy. It 
is this dynamic and predicament of modernity according to which social actuality tends 
to undermine and to invert overt moral and political intentions that post-Kantian 
philosophy and social theory have sought to expound – without trying to overcome 
these meanings and their inversions, whether metaphysically or post-metaphysically, as 
long as they continue to be generated by their legal and political and productive 
preconditions.20 
 
Rose’s comment here is directed less at Kant than at the sociological realities of 
political rhetoric about freedom existing alongside restrictions in freedom, such as 
income, class and gender inequalities, propaganda, and all those social forces restricting 
the growth and exercise of genuine autonomy. In the spiritual-animal kingdom, for 
example, the master-slave relation is internalised within each person, and people treat 
each other as means whilst assuming they are treating one another as ends. One 
temptation of this arrangement is to invest in a fantasised unity, such as race, a 
community or the state, to lessen the discomfort of the unhappy consciousness. Another 
temptation is to imagine such inversions can be solved or “overcome” by theory, when 
in fact they are caused also by political and economic conditions. This situation is 
created most fundamentally by two structural and mutually reinforcing social and 
political conditions: the diremptions between state and civil society, and between law 
and ethics. These diremptions are absorbed into the persons within said society. The 
former creates people internally divided between a self-regarding economic realm and a 
universally moral political realm; the latter fosters the illusion of a personal ethic 
unaffected by social, political, historical conditions (an abstract, unmediated form of 
ethics).  
 
Modern politics offers no unified focus of domination: the boundaries which separate 
the state from civil society and Innerlichkeit [inwardness] from the rational, methodical 
organisation of everyday life are now drawn within each individual, while the non-
legitimated boundaries between states still corrupt the inner boundaries, now located 
within each individual soul producing the modern phantasies of exclusive monopolising 
                                                
19 For a recent investigation into the co-existence of the trumpeting of freedom as an ideal alongside the 
growth of political authoritarianism, see Owen Jones, The Establishment: and How They Get Away With 
It (London: Allen Lane, 2014). 
20 JAM, 68. 
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of the means of violence, which take the shape of racism, fascism, religious and ethnic 
exclusivity.21  
 
These diremptions, their presence in contemporary theory, and the way they are 
expressed in multiple forms in combination with gender, race, class and religion, are the 
focus of The Broken Middle. Rose nowhere argues that these two diremptions are the 
only way to understand society (she refers to other diremptions such as formal equality 
and class inequality), but she does think they are structurally fundamental and as such 
necessary to any adequate social philosophy of modernity. 
 
2.2 The state-civil society diremption  
A central dimension of the broken middle as a theory of modernity is the contradictory 
core of the modern nation state with its civil society: Rose glosses the middle as ‘the 
political diremption of the modern state.’22 She remarked that since 1989 we have been 
returned more forcefully to the same sorts of questions that occupied Europeans from 
1789.23 As with all sociological terms, the meaning and content of ‘civil society’ is 
debated.24 Ernest Gellner pointed out that civil society can be contrasted with, first, 
small, fragmentary societies lacking in centralised political power but in which people 
are too tied in to roles to have the kind of freedom in modern civil society (ancient 
agrarian groups); second, centralised political units in which there is little freedom 
because political power is fused with moral certitude (Marxism); third, large political 
units without individualism or countervailing pluralist institutions but which have 
effective infrastructures and economies (some modern Muslim societies). ‘The simple 
formula for Civil Society, then, is political-coercive centralization with accountability, 
rotation and fairly low rewards for those manning the political apparatus, and economic 
pluralism.’25 For Rainer Forst, civil society ‘refers to a collective of free citizens who 
organize their common life in an autonomous and co-operative way.’26 Its meaning is 
triangulated by the ancient Greek notion of a common life governed by self-rule to 
prevent despotism and ensure the community’s interests; the idea in Adam Smith, Hegel 
                                                
21 MBL, 97-8. 
22 BM, 309. 
23 BM, xi. C.f. Outhwaite, Future of Society, 103: ‘…I continue to think both that we require some 
concept of civil society and that civil society politics in both its Western and Eastern European forms 
from the 1970s onwards remains one of our most fruitful political experiences and resources.’ 
24 For a discussion of the difficulties see Robert Fine, ‘Civil Society Theory, Enlightenment and Critique’, 
Democratization 4:1 (1997), 7-28; and Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, ‘The Paradox of Civil 
Society’, Journal of Democracy 7.3 (1996), 38-52. 
25 Gellner, Conditions, 93. 
26 ‘Civil Society’ in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. by Robert E. Goodin, Philip 
Petit and Thomas Pogge (2nd ed.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2007 [1993]), 2: 452-62 (452). 
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and Marx of the differentiation between society, state and economy in modernity, in 
which the focus is individual freedom and the market; and the response to this in 
Ferguson and de Tocqueville of a less individualistic realm of freely created 
associations and intermediary bodies. The classic work by Jean Cohen and Andrew 
Arato offers the ‘working definition’ of ‘a sphere of social interaction between economy 
and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere 
of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of 
public communication… institutionalized and generalized through laws, and especially 
subjective rights, that stabilize social differentiation.’27  
 
These characterisations should contextualise Rose’s use of the concept of civil society. 
As usual Rose prefers not to offer definitions, partly heeding Nietzsche’s dictum ‘only 
what has no history is definable’;28 partly because in this case a ‘grand theoretical 
explanation…would hypostatize the distinction…It would probably result in glib 
philosophical generalizations, oversimplified sociological observations and misguided 
or dogmatic political recommendations.’29 Instead the distinction should serve as an 
‘interpretive standpoint which can be of utility in historical investigations, sociological 
inquiry, normative discussions and political action.’30 It will become apparent below 
that Rose indeed views the diremption as an interpretive standpoint, and offers Arendt 
as an example of its exploration. The broken middle is ‘a condition and a means of 
investigating that condition’;31 it is, as any reflexive sociological concept should be, 
explicandum and explicans.   
 
Rose’s account takes off primarily from Marx’s ‘On the Jewish Question’, particularly 
Marx’s observation that state and civil society both presuppose and contradict one 
another, and that the shift from feudal to modern societies involved depoliticised work 
and property and a bifurcation within the individual.32 A ‘permanent “mismatch” 
                                                
27 Civil Society and Political Theory (London: MIT, 1994), ix; c.f. the fuller definition on p.346. In 
contrast to the rather gloomy view of Keith Tester, Civil Society (London: Routledge, 1992), Rose does 
not think the modern tension between individual freedom and social order, particular and universal, is so 
damaging to the ideal of civil society to render it useless or diminish its importance. 
28 Toward a Genealogy of Morals book 2, §13, 453 in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. by Walter Kaufman 
(London: Penguin, 1976). 
29 John Keane, ‘Introduction’ in Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives, ed. by John 
Keane (London: Verso, 1988), 14 (cited by Rose in BM.) Simon Jarvis’ review of BM labels her 
terminology as ‘figures’ rather than ‘ostensive’ definitions. 
30 Keane, ‘Introduction’, 14. C.f. Habermas, Philosophical Discourse, 37-40; Schechter, Instrumental 
Reason, 154. 
31 Gorman, ‘Wither’, 55. 
32 On the Hegelian antecedents of Marx’s views on this issue see, in particular, Henrich, ‘Logical Form 
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between the economic and political spheres is a defining characteristic of modern 
capitalist systems of production.’33 As a result, people lead a double life: in political life 
they regard one another as communal beings, but in civil society they act as private 
individuals, treating others as means rather than ends and being so treated, and thus are 
not entirely free. Indeed, ‘political life declares itself to be only a means, whose end is 
the life of civil society.’34 As Rose put it, ‘Marx argues…that the reduction of the 
modern state to guaranteeing the conditions that secure the competition of civil society 
has the result of dividing each individual citizen into a competitive, ruthless, natural 
being and a fantastical being for whom the collective good of the state becomes a focus 
of his or her fantasy life’.35 The resulting modern legal status then involves ‘abstract 
legal personality, private property and decay of public, political life’.36 This interacts 
with Kantian morality’s inner autonomy/outer heteronomy distinctions, providing an 
example of the way in which philosophical meanings are inverted by their embodiment 
in society. Hegel’s figure of the spiritual-animal kingdom is a way of addressing these 
inversions. The dynamic movement of Geist means Hegel can see how the social 
undermines and inverts political meanings, yet ‘without trying to overcome these 
meanings and their inversions…as long as they continue to be generated by their legal 
and political and productive preconditions.’37 That is, insight into these inversions 
cannot solve them by imposition of a philosophical Sollen. Yet people do succumb to 
the temptation to mend the diremptions by theory alone, usually by appeal to some 
universal: ‘Spirit is dirempted by modern legality and tries to mend its diremption: 
racism, Naziism’.38 The centrality of misrecognition in Rose’s account of Geist avoids 
                                                                                                                                          
and Real Totality’, 246: ‘neither state nor society can be reduced to a function of the other, as if either one 
represented the original actuality of the other. Conceived together, on the other hand, they serve to 
constitute a syllogistic totality – and in such a way that both also are organized internally and 
autonomously through further “mediations” in each case. If the state itself can be said to emerge from 
society, it does so precisely as a formal implication and more developed stage of the former in terms of a 
syllogistic “conclusion” [Schluss-Folge].’ See also MacGregor, Hegel, Marx, and the English State; and 
Andrew Buchwalter, ‘Religion, Civil Society, and the System of an Ethical World: Hegel on the 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’, 213-32 in Hegel on Religion and Politics, ed. by Angelica 
Nuzzo (New York: State University of New York, 2013). 
33 Keane, ‘Introduction’, 7. 
34 Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. by Robert C. Tucker (2nd ed.; London: 
W. W. Norton, 1978 [1972]), 44. 
35 Letter to Jacqueline Rose dated 13 December 1994, box 14. 
36 Draft of ‘Derrida, De l’esprit – diremption of spirit’, Warwick workshops in continental philosophy, 30 
November 1990, box 24. The rest of the paragraph and its quotations are from this source. 
37 JAM, 68. 
38 C.f. the abstract for ‘Social Utopianism and Architectural Illusion’ for a conference on postmodernism 
and the social sciences, St Andrews University, 28-30 August 1989, no pages, box 23: ‘architecture 
becomes social utopianism’ and it ‘thereby’ acquires an illusory independence, which means it becomes 
non-speculative and does not see its place in the whole. The illusion of independence ‘arises from the 
split between civil society and the state which continues to generate spurious holisms designed to heal the 
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this premature and dangerous pseudo-reconciliation of diremptions. It allows for ‘this 
political history of separation and its violent overcoming [to be] reconstructed – not by 
restricting philosophy to antimetaphysical deconstruction’, but by understanding and 
reconstructing the relationship between metaphysics and its embodiment in politics and 
law, which Rose calls the ‘speculative identity of form and history’ and a 
‘phenomenology of form’.39 Its advantage over the anti-metaphysical deconstructionist 
focus on narrative and difference is, as noted earlier, its ability to cope with illusory 
being (Schein). As we have seen, in Marxism and Frankfurt theory, this becomes the 
idea that a phenomenon is not fully understood unless its connections to the totality are 
known and grounds the idea of necessary illusions. From Rose’s speculative point of 
view it is ‘both legitimate and necessary to see the state as emerging from the free 
activity and the union of human beings as subjects of right’ as much as ‘an organization 
for satisfying the needs of socialized human beings…The state must be grasped in both 
ways at once to the extent that the very concept of the state presupposes both these 
modes of mediation.’40  
 
Rose does not contradict herself by positing modernity as diremptive without examining 
her act of positing; her view arises from historical-sociological investigations. 
Modernity ‘is discovered to be diremptive and is not defined, quasi-a priori, as a 
‘project’’;41 this discovery occurs by investigating modernity’s political history and 
sociology. As we saw in chapter 1, philosophy and politics, ‘arise out of…diremption 
and its provisional overcoming in the culture of an era’.42 Diremption does not mean the 
absence of relation, but the relation of mutual dependence and tension. Law and ethics, 
and state and civil society, both require one another but pull apart.43 Rose’s aporetic 
universalism is a form of rationality that explicitly works through this tension. ‘While 
arcadian and utopian universalism would reconcile and posit the unity of particular and 
universal, aporetic universalism explores and experiments with the disunity of singular 
and universal.’44 Her social theory follows the architectonic of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
                                                                                                                                          
split, such as ‘nation’, ‘race’, ‘public realm’, and ‘community’ – the latter with its implications of local, 
apolitical common-wealth.’ 
39 Letter to Jay Bernstein, 27 March 1987. 
40 Henrich, ‘Logical Form and Real Totality’, 248. 
41 BM, 240. 
42 BM, 286. C.f. Abstract for ‘Social Utopianism and Architectural Illusion’. 
43 Similar findings result from non-Marxist analyses, e.g. Thornhill, ‘Political Legitimacy’, 161-2: ‘the 
modern political system cannot uncontrollably inflate or extend its politicality without eroding its own 
self-construction as constitutively political. It is required reflexively to acknowledge that its legitimacy 
must admit pluralism as its external factual prerequisite’. 
44 BM, 164. 
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Right, insofar as both affirm the structure of modern society in terms of the three 
spheres of individuality, civil society and the state. The shift from feudalism to 
modernity was marked by the centralisation of sovereignty by removing power away 
from multiple institutions in society, tending towards the lone individual facing the 
state. Hegel saw civil society as a response to this. For Rose, this is not so much a fix 
for the problem as a way of living with it: ‘the mediatory institutions that have been 
fragmented remain the only context for self-conscious subjects. The task is to find a 
structure of customs inscribed in the very idea of individual freedom.’45 And this 
prevents identifying either individual or community as the ‘solution to the political 
problem’, 46  which occurs when they become ways of fleeing the reality of the 
diremption of state and society.47 Such ‘utopian good is good exactly because it has no 
body, because it resists body and form.’48  
 
The broken middle is thus phenomenologically ‘locatable – in history, in polity, in 
institutions, in dominium.’49 Rose notes that one of the meanings of aufheben is ‘to 
carry an opposition back to its source.’50 Much of the social theory put forward within 
continental philosophy and political theology was in Rose’s view insufficiently 
sociological. She wished to show its failure properly to grapple with its own 
sociological preconditions (especially the two fundamental diremptions) causes 
theoretical problems, which in turn reinforces those diremptions. ‘It has become easy to 
describe trade unions, local government, civil service, the learned professions: the arts, 
law, education, the universities, architecture and medicine as ‘powers’. And then 
renouncing knowledge as power, too, to demand total expiation for domination, without 
investigation into the dynamics of configuration…Because the middle is broken – 
because these institutions are systematically flawed – does not mean they should be 
eliminated or mended.’51 Social theory must be able to ‘acknowledge that it does not 
know in advance whether such institutions are violent or peaceful’ but ‘is able to find 
out – by reconstructing the changing relation between universal, particular and 
singular.’ 52  Rose argues modern society cannot properly be understood without 
reference to the institutions of civil society mediating between state and individual, 
                                                
45 Kerr, ‘Review’ of BM, 366. 
46 BM, 283. 
47 See Jarvis’ review of BM, 91. 
48 James Wood, The Broken Estate: Essays on Literature and Belief (London: Pimlico, 2000), 210. 
49 BM, 288. 
50 DN, 50 n.2. 
51 BM, 285. 
52 BM, 264. 
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hence her criticism of the tendency in politics to reduce their power and in (some) 
theory to denigrate their legitimacy. Equally, theory cannot understand its own 
preconditions, or itself, if it ignores the state-civil society diremption.  
 
Rose held up Rahel Varnhagen, Rosa Luxemburg and Hannah Arendt as good examples 
of her social theory.53 Each of these women experienced the failure of society to fulfil 
its own universalist aims in their own person or self – they were excluded as women 
and Jews – and were sensitive to the social diremptions they inhabited (they inhabited 
them emphatically, as it were). This sensitised them to the social precondition of their 
own thought. ‘In her own way, each of these women exposed the inequality and 
insufficiency of the universal political community of her day, but without retreating to 
any phantasy of the local or exclusive community’. 54  They exemplified triune 
rationality and faced up to the broken middle: ‘this tension of middlewomanship is 
sustained in all three authorships: they neither opt to abandon political universality, 
even though it is demonstrably spurious; nor to resolve its inconsistency and antinomy 
in any ethical immediacy of love: ‘community’, ‘nation’, ‘race’, ‘religion’ or 
‘gender’…they cultivate aporetic universalism, restless affirmation and undermining of 
political form and political action, which never loses sight of the continuing mutual 
corruption of the state and civil society’.55  
 
Rose regarded the first two parts of Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (on anti-
Semitism and imperialism) as ‘the most sustained attempt to develop Marx’s account of 
the split between state and civil society from “On the Jewish Question”…to provide a 
political and sociological history of the modern “nation”-state, which…demonstrates 
the impossibility of democratic polity in the modern nation-state, in its birth, 
development and disintegration, and which is organised around the changing “split” and 
“tension” between civil society and state as revealed and charted by “the Jewish 
Question” and the “social question”’.56 Part one deals with the splits, tensions and 
equivocations in the state-society division, as it is revealed in the Dreyfus affair. Part 
two is a kind of ‘socio-political commentary on Luxemburg’s political economy of 
                                                
53 C.f. Philip Walsh, Arendt Contra Sociology: Theory, Society and its Science (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 
2. 
54 MBL, 39. Unlike, in her view, Levinas and Weil, who are too focused on the infinite demand of the 
ethical impulse to have patience with the necessary negotiation and compromise that good law and 
institutions require. JAM, 211-23; Shanks, Innocence, 117-28. 
55 BM, 155. The chapter on these three is almost one third of the whole book.  
56 BM, 217. 
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imperialism.’57 Luxemburg developed the idea that capital will only work if it has new 
areas on which to feed and this leads to imperialism once the initial economy of a 
country has entirely gone over to capitalism. The state is opposed to the nation, which 
produces tension over ethnicity and produces the antinomy that human rights are only 
protected as national rights. These two contradictions work out in different ways but 
they are the roots of totalitarianism and make fully democratic politics impossible. 
Arendt’s early work is speculative because it historically traces the equivocations and 
dialectical reversals of bourgeois emancipation, economic emancipation, and the nation-
state. Arendt saw an implied ideal that was never attained but she did not abandon it. 
This ideal is, for Rose, once again mutual recognition. ‘The law, therefore, in its 
actuality means full mutual recognition, ‘spirit’ or ethical life, but it can only be 
approached phenomenologically as it appears to us, modern legal persons, by 
expounding its dualistic reductions, when it is posited as modern legal status – the law 
of subjective rights separated from the law of the modern state.’58 In keeping with the 
Frankfurt tradition, Rose would likely agree that mutual recognition is the basis of 
rights, not vice versa, but such recognition only occurs after a struggle, hence Hegel’s 
analysis of recognition through the master-slave dialectic. ‘Civil rights are not original 
natural or metaphysical entities they are the legal-juridical expression of the mutual 
recognitions that constitute individuals as citizens of a political state…Insofar as legal 
form is construed as the protection of natural right, the structural and historical 
conditions of civil society are suppressed.’59 The rights-recognition axis maintains the 
historical-sociological nature of Rose’s phenomenology. 
 
To gain some context for viewing the diremptions as an analysis of society we can turn 
to Zygmunt Bauman’s work on assimilation and the Jewish Question. In his case study 
of German Jews in Modernity and Ambivalence,60 he shows the ways in which the 
process of assimilation was essentially contradictory, though it continued as such for 
approximately two hundred years. The Jew had to match up to the standards of the 
cultural elite, and the same cultural elite decided if the Jew had succeeded, which 
                                                
57 BM, 218. Though Rose is also critical of the later Arendt as too focused on the public realm (as it 
appears in revolutions and friendship) and scorning society, which she regards as Arendt’s impatience 
with the imperfection of durable institutions and laws that reinforce Sittlichkeit: BM, 225-36. 
58 MBL, 75. 
59 J. M. Bernstein, ‘Right, Revolution and Community: Marx’s ‘On the Jewish Question’’ in Socialism 
and the Limits of Liberalism, ed. by Peter Osborne (London: Verso, 1991), 91-119 (102-9). C.f. Williams, 
Hegel’s Ethics, 21; Matthew James Hann, ‘Egalitarian Rights Recognition: A Political Theory of Human 
Rights’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Durham University, 2013). 
60 (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 102-55. 
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resulted in constantly shifting goalposts. When, for example, Heinrich Heine and others 
became successful journalists, people began to dismiss journalism as a Jewish 
profession. Worse, the very attempt to prove oneself German rather than Jewish was 
often taken as evidence of subversiveness and dishonesty, as if Jewishness was being 
hidden. The results for the individual were often painful: trapped between two cultures, 
not entirely at home or accepted in either; and, sometimes worse, not knowing if one 
was accepted or not. Since some Jews (German born) assimilated much more quickly 
than others (eastern European immigrants), the pressures of assimilation were felt as 
well in this differential pace. Assimilated Jews had, on the one hand, to distance 
themselves from their fellow, more traditional Jews, in order to prove their own cultural 
fitness for assimilation; whilst on the other, felt the need to help more traditional Jews 
assimilate in order to prove assimilation was possible and desirable. These social 
pressures were often internalised by German Jews as shame, embarrassment and disgust 
at the Eastern Jews and their traditional ways. Yet people bore these socio-political 
contradictions within themselves because they wanted the rights and acceptance of full 
citizenship. Bauman shows that assimilation is not a constant throughout human history 
but emerges from the context of modern nationalisation. It depends on the nation-state’s 
claim to shared history, shared customs and a common spirit, and attempts to transcend 
local differences. The era of nation forming was a time of cultural intolerance of 
differences as the state sought to consolidate and centralise its power. Cultural 
conformity was frequently conflated with political loyalty and trustworthiness. The task 
of assimilation was to acquire the culture of those in power; which entailed the 
destruction of many old institutions, practices and forms of life. The impossible 
situation of assimilation was revealed in that its acquired nature meant the assimliant 
could never fully be accepted because s/he was not naturally of the right ethnicity or 
nationality. The nation sustained itself through the myth of naturalness, a denial of its 
artificial nature, in which the assimilant could never share.  
 
Against this background the continuing relevance of Rose’s work immediately appears. 
Muslims, for example, now face many of the same tensions faced by Jews. An editorial 
from September 2014 in The Independent,61 for example, ran the sub-heading ‘British 
Muslims are under constant pressure to condemn extremism. They deserve credit, not 
suspicion, for doing so’. This shows both the pressures on British Muslims to display 
                                                
61 ‘Far-right and Wrong’, Friday 19 September 2014, 27; Michael Martin, ‘What Does ISIS Want? 
Rethinking Difficult Questions’, March 9 2015, http://criticalreligion.org/2015/03/09/what-does-isis-
want-rethinking-difficult-questions/, accessed March 16 2015. 
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loyalty to the nation-state and the suspicion attaching to their accession to this pressure. 
For Rose, the ‘politics of the middle’ is managing the tension between ‘national and 
universal’, Volk and humanity, local and cosmopolitan.62 A good social theory must 
include an account of mediation, to show ‘how abstract individual rights are internalized 
so that each individual becomes unequal to him or herself, and…how this social 
insecurity of identity inhibits participation in the state and in politics. It would show 
how political antagonisms are mediated by social relations; and how crises of individual 
and class identity are mediated by political impossibilities.’63 Sara Farris’ recent article 
using Marx’s essay on the Jewish Question as a theoretical springboard to analyse her 
fieldwork on the current treatment of Muslims in contemporary France, as a focal point 
for the treatment of Muslims more generally in Europe, exactly fits Rose’s desiderata.64 
Farris’ work shows that ‘lack of social, economic and cultural rights prevent Muslim 
girls from entering the promised land of emancipation and equality in the public sphere, 
but also…reveals the contradictions at the heart of the political universalism of the state 
whereby religion is a mark of individual identity (or a particularity) that the French state 
politicizes, whereas social class and poverty are defined at the outset as non-political 
distinctions which can therefore continue to operate and divide.’65 These are exactly the 
issues – gender, class, religion – picked out by Rose as following from the state-civil 
society diremption and most important for guiding social theory and sociological 
investigation: the ‘triple diremption of modernity collected up in the overarching 
predicament of love outside the state: the diremption of civil society and state, of natural 
right and national sovereignty, of abstract equality and class and gender disparity.’66 We 
see here Rose does not limit herself to the two fundamental diremptions but also follows 
the other diremptions proliferating from them. Further, an allegedly neutral secular state 
in practice excludes religious people by imposing a specific form of secularism as a 
Sollen.67 Farris observes the construal of ‘freedom as the dismissal of religion and, as 
such, as a given, a priori category which does not require mediation…refers back to the 
“ought.”’ 68  Rose too ‘warns against philosophy’s pride of Sollen, against 
                                                
62 BM, 123. C.f. the work of Kate Schick. 
63 BM, 146. 
64 Sara R. Farris, ‘From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question. Republican Rigorism, Culturalist 
Differentialism and Antinomies of Enforced Emancipation’, Constellations 21.2 (June 2014), 296-307. 
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any…imposition of ideals, [or] imaginary communities’,69 stemming from a lack of 
mediation. 
 
Farris’ work also provides an excellent example of aporetic universalism at work, 
because it focuses on the antinomies of the universalism of the secular state. The French 
doctrine of state secularism, laïcité, is supposed to be an emancipatory universalism, yet 
is enforced on religious people, recently visible in the 2004 anti-veiling law. One 
antinomy here is to require individuals to achieve the so-called emancipation of 
secularism before they can access what are supposed to be the very means to achieve it 
– principally schools. Public schools in France are supposed to be the means of 
education into citizenship and integration into the body politic. Yet to be allowed to 
attend school, children must give up their religious symbols such as Muslim veils, Sikh 
turbans, Jewish skullcaps or large Christian crosses. They must already act like 
secularists before learning how to be true secularists. 70  The ‘separation and 
contradiction between the political state and civil society’ means individuals can 
technically participate in the universal state (Marx’s ‘political emancipation’) but still 
lack ‘human emancipation’ because they are stuck in particularities holding them back 
(religion, class, poverty, lack of property, etc.). Most Muslims can only get lower paid 
jobs because they are discriminated against on the basis of their religion; they also tend 
to be poorer and poorer students tend to receive lower grades.71 Yet such political 
emancipation without human emancipation is not real political emancipation. Trying to 
force emancipation is ‘an expression of the contradictions lying at the heart of the 
universalism of the political state itself. While envisaging equality and freedom as the 
ends embedded in the very fabric of the universalism of rights, the inequalities of civil 
society upon which the state was founded, meant the concrete absence of the means to 
achieve those ends.’72 
 
Yet, as Rose warned, ignoring the difficulties of the broken middle by an enforced 
Sollen (the hasty unity of laïcité in this case) only reinforces the diremptions and makes 
them worse. Hence Farris: ‘veiling rather than unveiling – religious visibility rather 
than invisibility – has come to signify emancipation: namely, emancipation from 
impositions that are perceived as ultimately imbricated with colonial paternalism and as 
                                                
69 BM, xi. 
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being fundamentally racist.’73 Now, Rose would likely share the feminist suspicions of 
requiring women to wear a veil, and think that universal equality puts the requirement to 
wear one into question (though not necessarily the act of wearing one, which must be 
decided in relation to context), but attempts to reach the goal of equality by means of a 
blanket legal ban causes its own problems. Farris notes that up till the end of the 1980s, 
integration in France was achieved through working class institutions (of the middle, in 
Rose’s terms) such as trade unions, sport clubs, political parties, and the Catholic 
Church.74 These have all diminished, leaving only the school or the law as the means for 
integration, leading to the current problems. Rose’s warning (in concert with many 
other writers) that the institutions of the middle were necessary to mediate between state 
and individual is thereby supported. 
 
Rose’s suggested response to such antinomies is to reform the universal, not retreat into 
some form of community or to abandon the state. Rose’s hesitation about the 
fashionable concept of “community,” whether in political theological ecclesiology or 
postmodern new ethics, was that when people talk about ‘community’ they ‘hope for a 
collective life without inner or outer boundaries, without obstacles, or occlusions, 
within and between souls and within and between cities, without the perennial work 
which constantly legitimates and delegitimates the transformation of power into 
authority of different kinds.’75 ‘The idea of community depends, however, not only on 
its contraries…but also on the implied opposition of the community to the political and 
social totality. The inevitable political predicaments of sovereignty and representation 
have been projected beyond the boundaries of the community onto the presupposed but 
not thematised environing body-politic.’76 The need then is to examine ‘the sociological 
actuality of how domination, including local domination, is to be legitimised as 
authority’. 77  This ‘configuration and reconfiguration of power…is our endless 
predicament.’78 Gellner’s observation about nationalisms summarises well Rose’s point: 
‘The rhetoric of nationalism is inversely related to its social reality: it speaks of 
Gemeinschaft, and is rooted in a semantically and often phonetically standardized 
Gesellschaft.’79 The modern Gemeinschaft groups, on which the political solution is to 
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be based, are themselves only possible because of the specific Gesellschaft achieved in 
modernity.80  
 
Rose, then, did not expect too much from ethical life or its carriers in contemporary 
society: another connotation accrues to the broken middle. One of the reasons civil 
society works is because individuals are distanced from their economic, social and 
political roles, and as such can move around, be substituted one for another, join and 
leave associations at will without undue penalty.81 Recognition of the brokenness of the 
middle prevents an unrealistic investment in the social and political order – considering 
it sacred (theocracy) or directly moral (in Marxist fashion) – without denying its 
normativity. Indeed, although civil society has now become routinised (unlike Marxism, 
which could not survive routinisation82), it still needs, and has, values.83 On the one 
hand, routinisation and modularity are essential to the success of civil society and the 
values and freedoms it rightly contains. On the other, much of the sociological and 
philosophical critique of modernity from the Frankfurt School objects to that 
routinisation and modularity as constantly carried too far and producing pathologies. 
The broken middle names this inescapable predicament, the necessary imperfection of 
current social forms and any provisionally achieved equipoise.  
 
The capacity of Rose’s social theory to do justice to these empirical studies answers two 
objections to her work. Just as one may wonder how much history is allowed into 
Rose’s phenomenology, so one may wonder how much social information is allowed 
into her social theory and meta-theory. Does Rose’s theoretical work lose touch with the 
facts on the ground, as Tim Murphy claimed? Is there a sufficient dialectic between 
empirical and theoretical work? This concern withers once the depths of Rose’s work 
are appreciated. As I have shown, there are references to more empirical studies in 
Rose’s work – Weber, Durkheim, Arendt, Marx, Lukács, etc. – which although not 
always explicitly mentioned are nevertheless part of the engine of her philosophy. 
Rose’s main inspirations, Hegel and Adorno, built their own social philosophies and 
epistemologies on detailed social and historical comprehension too. This is why Rose’s 
theory describes so well the logic of sophisticated contemporary empirical sociology, 
and the other contemporary examples I introduced.  
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A second objection could be that my exposition appears as if it merely takes instances 
of good practice in social philosophy and sociology and labels them “examples of 
Rose’s theory”. Yet if there is a fundamental structure to knowing and thinking, and if 
Hegel uncovered it (or a significant aspect of it), then it should work across a range of 
studies. Rose is far from alone in believing there is a fundamental socio-logic; Rose 
looked for it in a re-formulated Hegel, others look elsewhere.84 In principle, then, a 
refutation of Rose’s theory must focus on its details rather than on the possibility of a 
widely explanatory socio-logic (unless one takes a particular Wittgensteinian view, à la 
Nigel Pleasants). Indeed, the premise of critical theory is that Marx and Freud enabled a 
new epistemology, which could explain things to people and societies about themselves 
they otherwise missed, which can explain theories better than the theories themselves, 
and which works across a whole range of fields of thought. Most people would accept at 
least some version of the possibility of this practice. Likewise Rose’s theory can give 
reasons for criticism of both good and less good theorising within social philosophy, 
which is its purpose and proves the selection of good and bad examples is not arbitrary 
but exemplary of the theory’s power. 
 
2.3 The law-ethics diremption 
In chapter 1 I showed how absolute ethical life was a necessary but unattainable ideal; 
in chapter 3 I outlined the various forms of the antinomy of law as variations on the 
contrast between written and unwritten law, or law and ethics. Rose explicitly connects 
these ideas in The Broken Middle: ‘This book develops the work of Hegel contra 
Sociology and Dialectic of Nihilism by pursuing the diremption of law and ethics, 
expounded, in the earlier work, as the ideal law which Hegel was unable to obtain, and, 
in the later work, as the post-Kantian ‘antinomy of law’ which resurfaces in latter-day 
nihilism…What I there called ‘the antinomy of law’ appears here as the dual 
implication of law and ethics.’85 It is not sufficient to posit the diremption in general; 
phenomenological learning comes from the negotiations in specific cases.86 She thus 
calls the law-ethics diremption ‘modernity’s ancient predicament’.87 This facetious 
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phrase refers to fact that debates around law and ethics stretch back to Socrates and the 
Sophists yet have a specific modern form, inflected through the Kantian revision of 
Roman law in combination with capitalist private property: 88  ‘With the 
institutionalization of private property and contractual law, a market economy comes 
into being whose primary organizational unit, the business firm, disposes over 
purposive-rational methods of accounting, management, and production in the 
calculated pursuit of profit.’89 Thus the importance of the modern form of the law-ethics 
diremption: the ‘single most decisive event paving the way for modern society was 
undoubtedly the separation of ethics and law from one another and from religious 
custom (Sittlichkeit).’90 Where Rose’s first fundamental diremption followed Marx, the 
second accepts Weber’s pioneering analysis. Modern subjects, unlike their ancient 
counterparts, now experience the ‘paradox of life lived in the two apparently different 
realms of the social and political when both realms are juridical, equally constituted by 
the civil law. Unaddressable oppositions between morality and legality, autonomy and 
heteronomy, the good will and natural desire and inclination, force and generality, can 
be traced to an historically specific legal structure which establishes and protects 
absolute property by means of the juridical fictions of persons, things, and 
obligations.’91  
 
Rose pursued her analysis in Judaism and Modernity, which she described as 
speculatively examining the methods and new ethics of various thinkers in order to 
bring out their connections to ‘modernity and modern law.’92 Rose shows repeatedly 
how the theories in question ignore or misconstrue, in a way that undermines their 
results, the specifically modern diremption of law and ethics. ‘The modern fate of Geist 
– the law of civil society and state producing its diremption and violent overcomings 
thereof – will erupt again and again as long as this structure persists. Fear of 
‘contamination’ is just the contamination itself – collusion by not comprehending what 
can be reconstructed.’93 She thus aimed 
 
                                                
88 JAM, 250-1. 
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91 DN, 2-3. The adjective ‘unaddressable’ is unfair. Kant had his rationale for the oppositions, Rose 
simply preferred their handling by some post-Kantians. 
92 JAM, xi. 
93 JAM, 78-9. 
 185 
to address the great divide which has separated social and political theory from 
philosophy since Kant. All my work starts from Kant and Hegel and then follows these 
sundered trajectories through the major post-Kantian German traditions in philosophy, 
sociological theory, jurisprudence and comparative theology up to the present. I always 
relate the French thinkers of this period to these German foundations. My recent and 
special interest is to explore what happens to the conceiving of law and ethics when 
philosophy and social and political theory become separate disciplines in this way. This 
divided legacy resurges throughout twentieth century European intellectual history and 
may be the source of the impasse in so many current debates over post-structuralist 
philosophy and sociological theory.94 
 
Rose’s references to Weber throughout her writings, and her lectures on him, show her 
reliance on his theory of modernity throughout her work. As Bernstein points out, 
Weber’s work is a kind of sociological version of many of Nietzsche’s ideas, and Rose 
viewed Adorno in the same way.95 ‘Adorno’s philosophy is best seen as an inflection of 
Weber’s analysis of disenchantment and societal rationalization.’ 96  Once this is 
recognised, it is clear that the law-ethics diremption also refers to the Weberian problem 
of rationalisation. Rationalisation is the thread uniting Rose’s ideas on the law-ethics 
diremption, violence, and ethical politics. As David Ingram describes it:  
 
In his study of modern law, Weber stressed the parallel emancipation of individual 
moral conscience from ethical custom. For the first time ever, civil law appears as 
something posited, the legitimacy of which is tied to notions of sovereign consent (the 
social contract) institutionalized in democratic rules of procedural justice. It no longer 
requires the adoption of any particular moral or religious attitude, but only outward 
compliance with respect to behavior. In other words, it procures a realm of individual 
freedom in which it is permitted to do anything that is compatible with a like freedom 
for others….Yet Weber’s diagnosis of freedom reveals precisely the reverse 
phenomenon: an ineluctable erosion of freedom and meaning.97  
 
Society, law and economy all reflect the loss of meaning flowing from rationalisation. 
Ethical values and ideals seemed increasingly less rational as scientific truth and 
rationality replaced other forms of reason. Hence ‘Modern, secular reason is self-
undermining’.98 With rationalisation, society began to doubt ethical values and ideals 
(including even reason and truth), which in turn lost their motivating force. Agents’ 
ability to understand and guide their lives with practical reason is then undermined. This 
begins to threaten ‘the ethical meaningfulness of human existence’ and ‘in so doing, 
undermine the conditions of rational agency, of goal-directed meaningful action as 
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such.’99 In terms of law: ‘Modern legal practice – thinking, writing, deciding – is 
presented as a sort of hermetically sealed operation, formal logic without regard to 
“substance”, a world of its own entire of itself. And it is the elimination of all concrete 
determinations from this process which is said to be central – the transformation of a 
dispute into simply or essentially or foundationally one between abstract (disembodied, 
anonymous) bearers of rights, legal subjects.’100 And within the economy: ‘From an 
ethical viewpoint, this “masterless slavery” to which capitalism subjects the worker or 
the mortgagee is questionable only as an institution. However, in principle, the behavior 
of any individual cannot be so questioned, since it is prescribed in all relevant respects 
by objective situations.’101 The result is the legal subject and ‘the misrecognitions 
attendant on abstract legal personality, private property and the decay of public and 
political life.’102  
 
Rose’s embrace of the rationalisation thesis lies behind her disagreements with both 
postmodern ethics and postmodern political theology. As she puts it, ‘post-modern 
antinomianism completes itself as political theology, as new ecclesiology mending the 
diremption of law and ethics.’103 In terms of the latter, theological critics of modernity 
such as John Milbank (following MacIntyre) think the state and civil society form a 
seamless whole without any cracks from which to leverage resistance.104 Any forms of 
resistance fail from the outset because they use the same form of reason they oppose, 
and hence are co-opted by the state for its own ends. A voice somehow external to the 
state-society duality is therefore required. It will come from “the” (Thomistic) church 
because it retains and embodies pre-modern forms of life and thought. The best chance 
to restore meaning and morality is for churches with substantive stories, goals and 
virtues to provide an intelligible context for the ethical formation of individuals. Rose is 
sceptical of this strategy. She thinks it overestimates the difference of such groups from 
the surrounding society whilst underestimating the plurality of modern social forms. It 
also implies some sort of unique status for the church group, as if they alone are 
somehow exempt from the seamlessly monolithic nature of state and society.105 Even 
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when individuals from such groups have a set of virtues and an understanding of the 
world different from their surrounding society, all their actions take place in, and are 
filtered through Weber’s ‘objective situations’, the rationalising, disenchanting social 
forms of law, economy and society. Christianity, like Judaism (see below), is ‘a modern 
religion, practised according to private inclination and interest by individuals defined as 
legal persons, bearers of rights and duties (not as members of pre-modern corporations), 
within the boundaries of civil society separated from the modern state.’106 But ‘Judaism 
as a religion in civil society is no longer engaged in the unequal sharing (even less the 
monopoly) of the means of legitimate violence – it is no longer a community in the 
sense that it no longer possesses any means of coercion.’107 The problem with the 
“ecclesiology as solution” approach is that in modernity religion is partly privatised and 
is subject to mediation through multiple social forms and especially the fundamental 
diremptions of modern society. Rather than facing up to their place in the brokenness of 
the middle, such approaches use ‘love’ to ‘overcome the broken conceptuality of the 
modern state’.108 Much of its ‘normative thinking is naïve about its collusions in the 
reconfiguration of relation of power and domination…I argue that all thinking – 
including utopian thinking – embodies a political history which it either reflects or 
ignores.’109  
 
Yet if Rose declared any ethical resistance to rationalised reason and forms of life 
doomed from the outset because they are filtered through objective social forms, no 
remedial action would be possible. Once again the importance of the triune nature of 
Hegelian rationality makes an appearance. The identities between universal, singular 
and particular are filled with tension and contradiction, and thus can disrupt as well as 
express one another. There is no seamless web of society and state (though it is true that 
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ostensibly state-independent bodies often express the same rationalised logic as the state 
and end up as the state’s means of governing at arms length, as governmentality studies 
has made clear). And Rose indeed thinks that various institutions of civil society, such 
as trade unions, medicine, the arts, universities, local government and religious groups 
do have the potential to mediate between state and individual in a way that could sustain 
less rationalised forms of ethical life. (Think, for example, of the ethics and identity 
associated with being part of the medical profession and the importance thereof for its 
relation to the government). And, critiques of modernity notwithstanding, there are 
times when society attains ‘good enough justice’. Rose therefore has no reason in 
principle to exclude religious groups from the set of middle institutions; that is not the 
point. Rather, she thinks the theorising of much political theology overvalues and 
overestimates what religious groups are able to achieve, and underestimates how much 
such groups are affected by their surrounding society.110 Rose sees such political 
theology as the mirror image of poststructural social philosophy because it 
overestimates our ability to fix the broken middle’s diremptions whereas the latter 
underestimates it.111 
 
2.3.1 New ethics and the spirit of postmodernism 
Thus postmodern and political theological social theories can both be read as one form 
of the ‘flight’112 from rationalisation, rather than fully facing up to the broken middle. 
Rose terms this ‘the pathos of the concept: the simultaneous denial of comprehension, 
of any experience of coming to learn the diremption of law and ethics, and reduction of 
conceptuality.’113 This reveals itself in their eschewal of violence and authority, often 
linked to the turn to Judaism in continental philosophy as a source of ‘new ethics’, as if 
it was uncontaminated by the problems of modernity (which had, according to 
postmodernists, led Western reason and metaphysics to Auschwitz). ‘I write out of the 
discovery that both recent philosophy, in its turn to what I name new ethics, and modern 
Jewish philosophy, in its ethical self-presentations, are equally uncomfortable with any 
specific reflection on modern law and the state, which they assimilate to the untempered 
domination of Western metaphysics.’114  
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This desire to conceive of coercion and law as absolutely distinct from the good and the 
community…represents one of the main ways in which modern Jewish thought 
participates in a methodological and substantive divorce which characterises the 
development of modern philosophy in its separation of ethics from the social analysis of 
the ways in which authority is legitimised. This epochal difficulty in relating the 
analysis of the operations of modern power – its techniques and its technologies – to the 
reflection on the nature and actuality of the good…has given rise to the intellectual 
division of labour between philosophy and political sociology...115  
 
Rose believed the disciplinary separation of philosophy from sociology had led, in parts 
of the academy, to a false bifurcation between ethics and its wider setting in law and 
politics, and particularly of the crucial question of how state power can be legitimate 
(which of course provides criteria for where power fails to be legitimate). The 
sweeping, postmodern condemnations of modernity or metaphysics or reason per se are 
blunt instruments, hindering not helping the critique of power.116 Postmodern ‘thinking 
holds nature and freedom, ethics and politics so separate that no true mediation is 
possible’.117 The relation between the legitimation of power and modern forms of 
reason and Rose’s response to the problem of rationalisation therefore frames her 
critique of new ethics and the spirit of postmodernism. This spirit was the ‘idealising of 
the interpretive or discursive community…which rests its claim to authority by evading 
the difficulty of authority as such – the legitimation of domination and its coercive 
means.’118 It entailed a ‘confusion of [literary] criticism and political philosophy’.119 
New ethics is a philosophical form of the beautiful soul, which is, as Drew Milne 
describes Rose’s view,  
 
a symptom of modernity, the subject of privatized ethics that seek to separate moral 
thought from the aporia configured and reconfigured in political and legal institutions. 
Shorn of credible frameworks or institutions of duty, the beautiful soul lives through the 
aspiration to have an inner beauty of moral feeling without recognizing heteronomous 
authorities. Attempts to conceptualize such aspirations motivate postmodern ethics.120 
 
Rose saw new ethics as based on a mistaken view of reason, metaphysics and Judaism. 
Rather than a purely ethical or discursive community, Judaism was better conceived as 
involving ‘the negotiation and promotion of the good and the legitimation of coercive 
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institutions’.121 Law for Rose is best thought of along the lines of (what she thought of 
as) Jewish Torah: ‘commandment as a guideline (not a criterion)…the idea of mediation 
or negotiation’.122 The negotiation she has in mind in this quotation is the pre-modern 
Jewish community negotiating its own law in relation to the law of its conquerors, that 
is, of working to make power into legitimate authority. In modernity, however, the 
‘authority in crisis – the crisis which carries over from modernity to Judaism and from 
Judaism to modernity – requires political risk greater than that required in traditional 
society or traditional Judaism when the source of domination was not dispersed.’123 
Rose’s view also depends on the Hegelian view of the historically evolving nature of 
law and its mediations.124 Jewish law cannot simply be abstracted from its context and 
(de)posited in ours, because ‘the meaning of law and ethics is not determined by what is 
posited or intended, or even how it is posited, but by how positive meaning is 
configured within the prevailing modern diremption of morality and legality, autonomy 
and heteronomy, civil society and the state.’125 Without sociological attention to the 
mediation of law and ethics, the new ethics remains unable to address its determination 
by its preconditions. It separates law and ethics rather than mediates their diremption. 
 
Throughout her work Rose not only relies on Weber’s analysis of authority as 
legitimised domination126 but also ‘presupposes the definition of the modern liberal 
state as the monopoly of the means of legitimate violence’.127 His famous typology of 
the three types of authority – legal-rational, traditional and charismatic – throws up an 
immediate problem for contemporary thought. In a predominantly post-traditional, post-
charismatic society, in which tradition and charisma are culturally and structurally 
marginalised, the main form of authority is legal-rational. Yet legal-rational authority is 
rationalised (in the way criticised by the Frankfurt School) and contributed to the 
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problems of the twentieth century.128 In Rose’s view, much continental social theory 
had, in response to these problems, given up thinking about legitimating power as 
authority; hence its search for a new ethics, and hence its mirror image in the 
ecclesiology of postmodern political theologies. The Frankfurt School always accepted 
the necessity of power’s legitimation into authority’s valid coercion; it only rejected 
surplus domination. Part of what Rose means by the phrase ‘love in violence and 
violence in love’ is that coercion may be legitimate and good.129 She thought morality is 
in part an internalising of law’s coercion: as power became more centralised in the state, 
violence between citizens in society decreased. Yet the legitimation of power is never 
perfect and our participation in state violence (however exactly this should be 
understood) prevents us from being morally blameless (the desire for which she 
detected in the search for new ethics). The internalisation of legal coercion and 
violence, which may be good or bad, ought to be faced squarely and comprehended, in 
the Hegelian sense of understanding a determination of human action. ‘Acceptance of 
this inseparability of love and law, Revelation and coercion, prevents the enshrining of 
originary and incursive violence. On the contrary, the violence in love is explored’.130 
By contrast, ‘there has been a continuous attempt in modern philosophy to isolate 
violence, and to find thereby a secure niche for “pure” morality or politics or knowing. 
So law, power, reason and love have variously been logically refined until all the 
violence is removed from them’.131 Indeed, the concept of “violence” on its own is 
abstract; ‘mutual violence arises from specific legal forms, [it is] not…distinguishable 
solely in terms of “increasing” quantity, “function[ing]” transhistorically, across 
principles.’132 The attempt to isolate violence per se and create some social system 
without it is thus mistaken. Political theology often takes its lead here from René 
Girard, continental social theory often from Walter Benjamin. But Benjamin’s view of 
violence at the heart of law and the state ‘washes away distinctions between the 
                                                
128 E.g., Ira J. Cohen, ‘General Editor’s Foreword’, xiii, and Stephen Kalberg, ‘Introduction: Marx 
Weber: The Confrontation with Modernity’, 2-29, in Max Weber: Readings and Commentary on 
Modernity, ed. by Stephen Kalberg (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). 
129 Another meaning is highlighted by Rowan Williams, Lost Icons, 178: ‘Love stakes a position and so 
cannot help risking the displacement or damaging of another. It is never far from violence.’ C.f. Liz 
Disley, Hegel, Love and Forgiveness: Positive Recognition in German Idealism (London: Pickering & 
Chatto, 2015), 16-7, 70, 108, 147. Picking up from Williams, Disley observes that ‘violence’ is usually 
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130 BM, 171. 
131 Bernstein, ‘Philosophy Among the Ruins’, 30. 
132 BM, 146. 
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legitimate exercise of power and coercion and illegitimate violence.’133 This view of 
violence explains ‘too much and too little’, hence the inability of such views to 
appreciate fully the value of ‘liberalism and constitutionalism…any Kantian…theory of 
the state as resting on the rule of law, the protection of human rights, the rights of 
citizens, popular sovereignty and the like.’134 Rose lamented the lack in poststructural 
theory of any ‘social analysis of why political theory has failed’.135 As a result new 
ethics ‘intends a new transcendence, a purified reason, for it proceeds without taking 
any account of institutions which are extraneous to its idea, that is, without taking any 
account of mediation.’136 As an example of this failure, Rose refers to the reception of 
Le Corbusier’s architecture. His work is now regarded as too mechanistic and 
impersonal, but this judgement is made without due consideration of what happened to 
his intentions by various mediations and institutions, of ‘how the outcome of the idea 
and act is effected by the interference of meanings, that is, by institutions, which were 
not taken into account in the original idea, but which mediate its attempted realization; 
for example, by changes in the family, the occupational structure, property relations, 
ratio of public to private space, investment in planning, building and infrastructure.’137 
Once again, theory should think through the way its preconditions mediate its effects 
and intentions. 
 
Modern law is bound up in complicated ways with Sittlichkeit.138 ‘Law is both a 
phenomenon brought about through the existence of fragmentation and division in 
human societies, and a body of ideas which, in some sense, stands apart from, and aims 
to repair or suppress, instances of fragmentation and division.’139 For Rose, ‘our 
responsibility may change the meaning of the law; and the law may change the meaning 
of our cherished ethics’.140 Indeed ‘it is “morality” itself which has corrupted and which 
                                                
133 Seyla Benhabib, ‘Review of Richard J. Bernstein’s Violence: Thinking Without Banisters’, Notre 
Dame Philosophical Reviews, July 27 2014, https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/49514-violence-thinking-without-
banisters/, accessed 6 October 2014, discussing Benjamin’s essay on violence. 
134 Benhabib, ‘Review’. 
135 JAM, 7. 
136 JAM, 7. 
137 JAM, 7. In Rose’s later work (1992 onwards) she turned to architecture as another major view on the 
social totality and a way to show the tendency of theory to attempt to mend too hastily the diremptions of 
society (BM, 296-307; JAM, 225-57; MBL, 15-39). ‘She argues that architecture, like law, is the 
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art of educating power and of moderating between particular, singular and universal’: Tatiana Flessas, 
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Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (London: Yale University, 1998).  
138 JAM, 23, 48, 156-62. C.f. Coyle, Positivism to Idealism, 127-44, 163-79. 
139 Coyle, Positivism to Idealism, 177. 
140 BM, 267. 
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continues to corrupt us’, because ‘it is possible to mean well, to be caring and kind, 
loving one’s neighbour as yourself, yet to be complicit in the corruption and violence of 
social institutions.’141 The issue is morality thought in abstraction from its preconditions 
and mediated effects, from its ‘good intentions imbedded in unknowable preconditions 
and consequences’.142 The ‘strictly private and intimate relation now called “love”, 
becomes opposed to law – the duality of love (particularity) and law (universality) 
opening up the possibility of morality in its Kantian configuration.’143 There is however 
no individual ethics in abstraction from politics. When the mediation of ethics by 
politics is embraced, less abstraction and more comprehension are possible in both. 
Thus ‘it is the very opposition between morality and legality – between inner, 
autonomous “conscience”, and outer, heteronomous institutions – that depraves us,’144 
because it removes attention from the social determinations of action and so our ability 
to gain freedom by comprehending them.145 Hence Hegel  
 
tries to show how the attempt at self-determination requires…an understanding of 
oneself as occupying a place within a larger whole, except in his view that whole is not 
nature or the cosmos, but the history of a collectively self-determining subject. More 
concretely, it means that Hegel thinks he can show that one never determines oneself 
simply as a person or agent, but always as a member of an historical ethical institution, 
as a family member, or participant in civil society, or citizen, and that it is only in terms 
of such concrete institutions that one can formulate some substantive universal end, 
something concretely relevant to all other such agents.146  
 
To address this reality requires the dual-directional pull of speculative thinking. ‘This 
“contradiction”, origin of anxiety, is equally the anxiety of beginning’,147 it sets off the 
intellectual and existential working through of dialectics. The phrase ‘anxiety of 
beginning’ uses the genitive in two ways: it is the anxiety that begins the process (of 
phenomenology, of seeking truth), and it is the anxiety that attends the beginning, the 
‘way of despair’ on which we embark and the difficulty of that embarkation without 
foundations. Weber’s sociology provides an example of such speculative thought at 
work:  
 
the diremption between the moral discourse of rights and the systematic actualities of 
power in modern states and societies…reappears in modern philosophical reflection as 
                                                
141 JAM, 35. 
142 JAM, 35. 
143 Bernstein, ‘Right, Revolution and Community’, 109. 
144 JAM, 35. 
145 JAM, 36. 
146 Pippin, Philosophical Problem, 72.  
147 BM, 56. 
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the opposition between morality and legality or between ethics and law. The effective 
opposition between the discourse of rights and the actualities of state power is explored 
by classical sociology: the inversion of intended ethical meaning in its social 
institutionalization, what Max Weber called the “unintended consequences” of social 
action.148  
 
2.3.2 The equivocation and suspension of the ethical 
Rose’s recognition of the mutual mediation of law and ethics, the speculative to-and-fro 
between them, results in her doctrines of the equivocation and suspension of the ethical. 
The equivocation of the ethical has two main meanings in her work. First, the Hegelian 
idea that the full and true meaning of actions are available most fully only 
retrospectively, through the mediations between individual, groups and social 
structures. The initial position, the first positing by the agent, is always provisional; the 
fuller meaning only comes after one’s own and others’ reactions to the action and its 
effects occur. Rose like Hegel believes in free, right action as in some way universal, 
but that we ‘can formulate the content of such a universal law…[only] by reference to 
the history of ethical institutions, the history of what we have come to regard as 
counting as universal, as what all others would or could accept as a maxim. Just as 
when we attempt to “judge objectively” or “determine the truth,” we inherit an 
extensive set of rule-governed, historically concrete practices, so when we attempt to 
“act rightly,” and attempt to determine our action spontaneously, we must see ourselves 
as situated in a complex collective and historical setting’.149 And for both theory and 
practice ‘there is no “outside” or extra-conceptual explicans. There is only what we 
have come to regard as an indispensable explicans, and the narrative we need to give 
concerns that “coming to regard.”’150 As Rose put it, there is no ‘overarching law 
determining our participation’ in ethics and politics. 151  Within phenomenological 
historical narration, therefore, the equivocation of the ethical appears as the various 
inversions of meaning explored by, for example, Hegel in the ideal types of the 
beautiful soul, the hard-heart and pure culture; by Arendt in her history of 
totalitarianism; and in the numerous examples in The Broken Middle from Weber, 
Goethe, Durkheim, Kierkegaard and so on. Rose’s view of the social totality as a 
necessary but impossible context for explanation and interpretation, and her view of 
reason as limited, means any view of an action, including the agent’s, is only ever 
                                                
148 JAM, 21. 
149 Pippin, Philosophical Problem, 71; Robert B. Pippin, Henry James and Modern Moral Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000). 
150 Pippin, Philosophical Problem, 72.  
151 MBL, 35, in italics in original. 
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provisional. In this sense, secular meaning and action have the same structure as 
religious meaning and action: both open onto unknowability. Rose drew on Kierkegaard 
to make this point. 
 
The second meaning of the equivocation of the ethical is the permanent tensions 
between values. Rose shares many commonalities with the view known as value 
pluralism.152 She does not accept the separation of political philosophy from other areas 
of philosophy such as ethics.153 She believes values may vary socially and historically 
without being relativistic; that evaluative terms are unavoidable (against positivism); 
and that to instantiate some goods necessarily prevents instantiation of others.154 There 
is thus the need for political judgement in face of value pluralism, issuing in 
‘noncomprehensive systematisation’.155 Against the background of rationalisation and 
the law-ethics diremption, the equivocation of the ethical can be understood to resist the 
rationalisation of reason because it relies on both reflective judgement and determinant 
judgement.156 How best to combine plural, incommensurable values into a single 
decision cannot be decided by rules or procedures, it is a question of judgment. As 
Weber put it, ‘the various value spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict 
with each other’.157  
 
Whereas some discussions of value pluralism simply treat it as a given, the law-ethics 
diremption provides a soico-philosophical, historically reflexive explanation for it, 
based on Hegel’s phenomenological account of the differentiation of the three levels of 
society. According to Axel Honneth, the three structural elements of modern societies 
(individual, civil society, state) reflect three different forms of mutual recognition (love, 
esteem, respect).158 This produces a different form of morality from traditional views 
because the three modes of recognition are necessary for the moral point of view but 
                                                
152 Isaiah Berlin granted Rose a bursary to pursue Adorno studies in Germany during her Oxford doctoral 
studies (TMS, Acknowledgements). Perhaps he was one source of her view. 
153 William Galston, The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2004). 
154 Joseph Raz, The Practice of Value, ed. by R. Jay Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). 
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157 ‘Science as a Vocation’ in From Max Weber, 147. 
158 E.g. Honneth, ‘Between Aristotle and Kant: Recognition and Moral Obligation’, 129-43 in Disrespect. 
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cannot be in a harmonious relation since they are in ‘constant tension.’159 Their 
competing claims cannot be decided in advance or in the abstract. ‘Thus the entire 
domain of the moral is pervaded by a tension that can be resolved only in individual 
responsibility.’160 This is exactly what Rose means by reference to the ‘single one’ as 
the individual who must hold together the fractious relation of universal and particular 
in her own self. It is not a retreat from mutual recognition to individualist existentialism, 
but bearing the tensions of the broken middle within the self.161 
 
These tensions, structurally created yet borne in the individual, lead Rose to the 
discussion of Kierkegaard’s teleological suspension of the ethical.162 For Rose, to 
suspend the ethical means to step back from Sittlichkeit in order to explore its tensions, 
to recognise its flaws, perhaps to change it or allow that from time to time exceptions to 
it are possible and legitimate,163 and then to re-enter it and continue to live within it and 
perhaps somewhat at odds with it. The re-entry into the ethical – the affirmation of the 
necessity of Sittlichkeit notwithstanding reservations about its particular form – 
distinguishes suspending the ethical from ‘abolishing’ it, where abolishing the ethical 
gives up on the means of communal ethical life and politics because they are necessarily 
imperfect. Suspending the ethical requires ‘repetition’, or ‘movement backwards and 
forwards’, learning from the past before thinking about potential for the present and 
future.164 Rose’s interpretation of Kierkegaardian repetition in The Broken Middle 
therefore aligns it with her interpretation of Hegelian phenomenology: ‘The core of the 
book is chapter five where I try to show (and this is the spirit and endeavour of the 
whole work) that repetition and critical reconstruction are not incompatible: that it is 
possible to have faith and knowledge and politics in a way that does not require 
dogmatic reason or lead to existential scepticism or despair’.165 This matters because 
some of her critics thought her position in 1992 was no different from the 
postmodernism she criticised for providing no way out of constant agon.166 This is 
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clearly not the case as she associates re-entry to the ethical with Kierkegaard’s figure of 
the ‘knight of faith’, who lives out the sublime in the pedestrian, and ‘inherits the world 
in all its mediation and law’.167 She relates this to the subject’s dynamic internalisations 
of law and violence: 
 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous ‘suspension of the ethical’ avoids this sequestering of 
‘violence’ while exploring the development of individual faith in its violent encounter 
with love and law. Hegel’s phenomenological master-slave dialectic suspends the 
ethical – Sittlichkeit – in order to explore how the violence between two misrecognizing 
self-consciousnesses will be settled provisionally by death, enslavement, work or 
unhappiness; this same dialectic of development is then re-explored as Antigone in the 
restored context of ‘ethical life’. By initially suspending the ethical, both authors are 
able to bring a formation, an education (Bildung), into representation as a struggle – 
agon – in which ‘violence’ is inseparable from staking oneself, from experience as such 
– the initial yet yielding recalcitrance of action and passion. Without ‘violence’, which 
is not sacrifice but risk, language, labour, love – life – would not live.168 
 
For Rose, violence is involved in the misrecognitions of all our attempts to respond to 
our environment, in which we partly overcome and partly accommodate ourselves to its 
initial resistance. The imperfect processes for this – labouring, speaking and thinking, 
the coercions of politics, the imposing of will in social situations – are a kind of 
violence because they involve coercion and the imposing of will, and some destruction 
(whether of possibilities or alternatives, or of the wants or intentions of others). But this 
violence is necessary – it is present in good ethical and legal systems as well as in good 
personal relationships. To learn virtue, for example, requires the coercion of discipline. 
To deny the various textures of violence in favour of some allegedly violence-free love, 
especially as a social or political phenomenon, distorts both theory and reality, and 
distracts attention away from assessing how adequate the accommodations are. At least 
one impulse for such theory seems to be the desire to avoid the risks of authority 
devolving into illegitimate power, and of theoretically justifying that process. Yet the 
risk is ineliminable, so the promotion of a violent-free community or ethical theory 
cannot achieve this aim and distracts from the real task of assessing the legitimacy of 
current power forms.  
 
Rose’s mention of labour, language and risk/life/love reveals the proximity of her view 
to Habermas’, who makes work, language and power central concepts of his own work. 
In Knowledge and Human Interests169 Habermas posits three interests as necessary 
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preconditions for knowledge, and thus transcendental in the Kantian sense. But they are 
also empirical because they are a function of the way homo sapiens organise social life 
into work, language and power. The interests are: technical, which produces empirical-
analytic knowledge to enable control of the environment in work; practical, which 
produces mutual understanding via action-guiding norms through discursive language; 
and emancipatory, which produces freedom and self-transformation (both personal and 
political) through the self-reflexive analysis of reified powers. These have a quasi-
transcendental structure since the necessary preconditions both universally hover above 
the phenomenal world as its preconditions, and yet emerge from that phenomenal 
world, since they are a function of humanity’s natural being. Habermas does not simply 
posit their status as functions of humanity’s natural being, he arrives at them 
phenomenologically via Hegel and Marx: these functions are observed over time and it 
is difficult to imagine going back on this analysis. This fits Rose’s criteria for 
speculative phenomenology, yet she describes Habermas as neo-Kantian in Hegel 
Contra Sociology. Habermas is very close to Rose’s own position but there are subtle 
yet significant differences. ‘How the empirical and the transcendental, the real and the 
rational are connected does…make a difference.’170 Bernstein’s nuanced discussion of 
the way Habermas concedes the phenomenological position only to retract its force 
explicates the logic behind Rose’s criticisms. ‘Habermas…does conceive of the 
conditioned and unconditioned, transcendental and empirical, as lying on logically 
different levels…From the perspective of discourse ethics “there are no shared 
structures preceding the individual except the universals of language use”’.171 By 
contrast, for Bernstein and Rose, ‘moral norms are grounded in the reciprocities of 
everyday life, which is self-grounding, transcendental and empirical at once’.172  
 
What the Hegelian claims is not complete self-knowledge, but that our self-knowledge 
is non-detachable from the conditions that have made it possible; to affirm itself it must 
affirm them, and hence negativity (what denies ethical life) in general. This knowledge 
is ‘absolute’ in Hegel’s sense because what is absolute or unconditioned, knowledge of 
ethical life as ground, includes the conditions that made it possible. Thus there is no 
logical duality between the empirical (the conditions) and the transcendental (the 
unconditioned): both are ethical life.173  
 
To know ethical life is to know it as ground and grounded, as the ground of itself, a 
fractured whole. Ethical life therefore makes knowledge of ethical life possible – and 
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speculative knowledge of ethical life knows this. Ethical life, like speculative 
philosophy, is a virtuous circle and a fissured totality. To know the self is to know what 
is grounding and shaping the self, which is also ethical life. But to know and affirm the 
self is to know and affirm the ethical life making possible the self. One of the features 
of modern ethical life is the negativity of subjectivity, which paradoxically denies and 
dirempts ethical life. This dirempting negativity must be known as a condition and 
feature of the self too. 
 
Rose also criticises Habermas for excluding non-discursive reason from practical 
interest and its expression in language and normativity.174 Recall that speculative 
thinking, for Rose, is an addition to, rather than negation of, transcendental philosophy; 
a kind of “transcendental plus”; it is ‘transcendental but speculative’. 175  Every 
transcendental configuration of necessary conditions excludes something on which it 
relies.176 The speculative approach seeks to discern these excluded conditions by 
attention to what the transcendental frame distorts or hides. Habermas excludes non-
discursive rationality, a wider reason, a different form of morality, on which his 
discursive ethics nevertheless depends.177 For Rose, however, ethics must be handled 
speculatively because it is always suspended, ‘neither surrendered on the one hand, nor 
posited on the other’.178 Rose’s ethics is therefore both ‘universal and aporetic’, hence 
its reliance on ‘some dynamic and corrigible metaphysics of universal and singular’.179 
Despite the obvious power of Habermas’ work, at the very last moment it capitulates to 
the reigning diremptions within reason.180 It does not fully address its own contribution 
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to the rationalisation it otherwise criticises,181  nor sufficiently appreciate its own 
position within society, the internality of thought to being, of social theory to society.182  
 
3 Politics between moralism and realism 
In addition to the equivocation and suspension of the ethical, the broken middle as an 
idea and analysis also develops Rose’s substantive, immanent normative ideal of mutual 
recognition (§3.1), her idea of modern phronesis, and her intellectual mood striking the 
right balance between utopianism and despair. Again, subtle differences in 
metaphilosophical expectations (of which intellectual mood is a part) can have 
substantive theoretical effects. Rose’s political orientation avoids messianism and 
Realpolitik,183 moralism184 and brute power. Its balance of ethics and realism resembles 
Weber’s ethics of responsibility, though without his ultimate scepticism about value 
choices.185 This means accepting our participation in violence and resultant lack of 
moral innocence.186 Rose compares Weber’s Economy and Society to Machiavelli’s 
Prince by way of their discussions on the realities of power and values in their own 
time. Yet the Prince is normally viewed as ‘a canny, unethical set of instructions for the 
exercise of power’ and Weber’s work as ‘value-free social science’.187 Neither is true. 
The fact-value distinction is not a fact but a puzzle to work with.  
 
What we have come to accept as a categorical methodological precept or rule – with its 
justification in the distinction of fact from value and of social analysis from political 
commendation – viz., the separation of types of legitimate authority from judgements 
concerning the goals or values of the exercise of power, knowledge of coercion from 
practical interest in the good, has itself a history. This history comprises the difficulty, 
intrinsic to the political tradition from the ancient polis to the modern republican state, 
of relating political goals to means, the idea of the good to the reality of the monopoly 
of the means of legitimate violence.188  
 
From this perspective, both Machiavelli and Weber have a commitment to values 
(republicanism, reversing the decay of substantive politics) and research the realities of 
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power in the light of those values. Both of them understand politics as the need to 
impose form (to have institutions and respond ethically to circumstances) and to 
promote ‘the participation of virtuous citizens in the good.’189 Thus ‘Weber is the 
Machiavelli of the early twentieth century: an ultimate concern with the political good – 
with goal or value rationality – is overshadowed by the analysis of the realities of 
formal or instrumental rationality, the legal-rational type of authority and its legitimate 
employment of the means of violence.’190 And his ‘distinction between formal and 
substantive rationality may then be seen as a methodological transliteration of the 
historical difficulty of aspiring to and representing the good between citizens’ in a 
pluralist situation. 191  Rose implies that, in our situation, governance by formal 
rationality is necessary at the political level, even though it furthers nihilism and so is 
morally deforming.192 Our political best is not good enough, but rather than give up on 
such governance, we should take what reparative measures we can, such as 
strengthening middle institutions or encouraging virtue where possible without tipping 
into the imposed Sollen. The refusal to separate ethics from politics in order to generate 
an abstract individual ethics therefore has its political corollary. ‘Ethics and domination, 
the good and violence, the community and the law, do not belong to two worlds, to two 
cities, to two different methodologies. The counter-distinction of ethics from politics is 
itself the effect, the result, the outcome, the mediation, of the relation between the 
negotiated meaning of the Good, whether ancient virtue or modern freedom, and the 
historical actualities of institutional configurations.’ 193  Rose added Nietzsche to 
Machiavelli and Weber as her exemplars of this stance because they ‘renew the classical 
tradition in ethics for the modern world’.194 They are ‘the three great thinkers of power 
before ethics…In opposition to Christian eschatology, negotiating the dilemma of 
power and violence becomes the precondition for configuring virtue for the modern 
polity. The virtuous life involves some impure relation between power in the human 
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psyche and in human association.’195 All three (Rose borrows Weber’s terms), ‘weave 
the ethic of salvation into the ethics of responsibility to produce…[a] final definition of 
a mature “calling for politics”’.196 They thus restore ‘spiritual meaning, virtue, to 
politics as the means of violence.’197  
 
Rose’s doctrine of the broken middle reveals the tendency in thinkers to over-identify 
theory and praxis by ‘mending the middle’, i.e. by moving too quickly from theory to 
practice, or assuming correct theory is sufficient. Such a move fails to appreciate its 
own involvement in deformed reason and instrumental politics, and the intervening 
mediations between theory and the actualisation of theory. This re-works Adorno’s 
strictures on theory’s efficacy. Yet the broken middle also enables a different kind of 
failure to emerge to view: collapsing onto one side or another of a ‘double danger’, i.e. 
choosing one side of an aporia in a way that is too one-sided. The lack of 
straightforward connection between theory and praxis undergirds Rose’s picture of 
politics in terms of risk and mourning: action must be risked, the deleterious 
consequences reflected on and mourned, and action risked again.198 As Kate Schick has 
argued, although the importance of the question, ‘what ought to be done?’ cannot be 
denied, an impatient and narrow focus on it as a technical, problem-solving exercise can 
miss historical and contextual factors and result in worse outcomes.199 Thus Rose’s 
emphasis on ambiguity and equivocation: the need to explore the good and bad in 
political and philosophical accounts and responses, neither condemning all law and 
politics as unjust and violent, nor assuming the achievement of justice or progress, nor 
being complacent and self-satisfied.200 One aspect of the concept of the broken middle 
is therefore that of specifying some features of the kind of ethical and political 
phronesis Rose thinks modern society requires: acknowledging the irreparability of 
diremptions, tarrying with aporia, navigating double dangers, historical and contextual 
awareness, risking action and reflecting on practice in order to learn, navigating the 
impurity and complicity of any virtues. 
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Since Rose is engaged in phenomenology of theory, Murphy’s accusation that Rose ‘is 
not interested in anything empirical unless it can be used to batter someone else’,201 
somewhat misses the mark. Likewise, Osborne’s criticism that her work is politically 
impotent fails to give due emphasis to the central place of judgment and phronesis 
involved. A critical theory focused on philosophical consciousness depends on the 
internal connection and reciprocal influence Hegel discerned between philosophical 
consciousness and natural consciousness.202 To critique one is to critique the other, even 
if some dots have to be joined. Hence, ‘we do not know what the determinate negation 
of particular untruths would be so long as the practice and regimes (economic, political, 
social) of identitarian thought remain in control. The idea of negative dialectics is 
determined by this belief; its intention is to maximize critical agency while forestalling 
precipitous concretion.’203 This returns us to the accusation of vagueness raised in 
chapter 1 and provides Rose with further defence against the charge. Not only can the 
desire for solutions be too hasty, it can require more action guidance from theories than 
they are designed to give. Nor is this problem unique to Rose, it is rather ‘one of the 
recurring internal aporias of cultural criticism: quantitative or instrumental descriptions 
of the goals of life need to be shown up as inadequate and reductive, yet the character of 
the alternative ends up being merely gestured to by unsatisfactory phrases about 
“life”.’204  
 
3.1 Mutual recognition and Hegelian phenomenological reconstruction 
Rose’s political orientation stems partly from the Frankfurt School hybrid of description 
and normativity, a way of handling the fact-value distinction without acceding it 
unproblematic authority.205 As we have seen, Rose is alert to the constant danger that 
violence and the legitimisation of power will slip into brute violence and/or the 
justification of illegitimate power, but believes thinking through the risk is the best 
response to it. This approach combined with the avoidance of any imposed Sollen led 
Rose to follow Hegel in phenomenologically reconstructing mutual recognition as the 
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immanent telos of modern society’s ethics, law and politics.206 Mutual recognition is 
their actuality, their rational core and thus that at which policy- and lawmakers should 
aim. It is ‘the Hegelian Moment: the struggle for recognition is a drama in which the 
good (full mutual recognition) and the means (varieties of misrecognition) engender 
each other and may be negotiated but only by acknowledgement of mutual implication 
in the violence of misrecognition’.207 Mutual recognition, even though never fully 
achieved, is therefore the means to help navigate the risks attendant on law, politics, 
public-ethical action, and action that goes against Sittlichkeit.208 Geist in Hegel ‘means 
the attempt to reconstruct and present these inversions of subject and substance…hence 
the Phenomenology of Spirit is a drama of discursiveness which ironizes its passages 
and its aporiae so as to leave its reader exposed to the recognition of being already 
engaged in the struggle for recognition.’209  
 
This further answers critics of Rose who claim she retreats into existentialism and 
relativism;210 or that she offers too little by way of concrete application;211 or that she is 
unable to think of alternatives either to the present political arrangement or to the 
postmodern nihilist unending agon.212 Given Rose’s acceptance of the imperfect justice 
of rationalised law and the need to supplement it with institutions of the middle, impure 
virtue, and mutual recognition, this is rather unfair. It is true, however, that references to 
mutual recognition in Rose’s work remain largely gestural. Recently, however, Kate 
Schick and Liz Disley have begun to develop accounts of recognition using Rose’s 
work. 213  Furthermore, Axel Honneth has been developing his theory of mutual 
recognition for over two decades from the Hegelian Frankfurt tradition in which Rose 
also stood. His work therefore complements Rose’s in this area. Moreover, Robert 
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Pippin argued in a recent article on Freedom’s Right, that Honneth’s work would be 
better grounded and more complete if it was based on Hegelian theoretical philosophy 
as well as the empirical psychological and sociological work Honneth chooses as his 
foundation.214 Perhaps Rose’s work could complement Honneth’s in this regard: given 
the similarities between Rose and Pippin canvassed in chapter 1, Pippin’s article may be 
read as making explicit some connections between Rose’s speculative philosophy and a 
more developed account of mutual recognition. I begin with Pippin’s account of Hegel 
and then briefly discuss some aspects of Honneth’s theory compatible with Rose’s 
philosophy.215 Then I turn to the more specifically Rosean dimensions of recognition 
developed by Schick and Disley. Finally, I offer my own remarks on a Rosean account 
of recognition based around the centrality she accorded to recognition and 
appropriation. 
  
Honneth’s two most important Hegelian commitments – the historicality and sociality 
of Geist – depend on the self-constitution of rationality over time, which itself requires 
the account of the possibility of intelligibility (of how anything can make sense) in 
Hegel’s Science of Logic. The problem with Freedom’s Right is not what it says but 
what it omits: Hegel’s logic and metaphysics. Metaphysics is not merely mystification, 
nor can politics ignore it (contra Rawls). Hegel’s Philosophy of Right was grounded on 
his logic and metaphysics and without them key assumptions in Honneth’s account 
remain incompletely defended. Philosophical anthropology and psychology need a 
defence against contrary accounts, which shift them beyond empirical claim and 
counter-claim into what Hegel calls their actuality. This matters because people accuse 
Honneth of mistaking ‘the logic of education and discovery with the logic of 
justification, or Faktizität with Geltung’.216 Hegel’s account is the alternative to a 
Kantian norm of pure practical reason, an Aristotelian standard human form, Rawlsian 
contract from the original position, or Habermas’ ideal speech situation. Pippin thinks 
these sorts of norms are not wrong, they are just too thin for their required task; they are 
the stage of morality not ethical life. 
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Honneth re-works Hegel’s Philosophy of Right with its three differentiated spheres for 
realising freedom. The philosophical task is thus ‘historical-diagnostic’.217 A theory of 
justice ‘cannot be separated from concrete social analysis’.218 It is ‘neither an empirical 
social analysis nor pure normative assessment but some hybrid of both, what Honneth 
calls a ‘reconstruction’ of the rational core in such historically specific institutions’.219 
Humans are self-determining (not absolutely but even their biology underdetermines 
what they can be), and so self-determination is self-constitution. Hegelian 
phenomenology reconstructs different ways humans have constituted themselves and 
discerns an intelligibility, a rationality, in those attempts and in the shifts between them. 
Determinate negation makes sense, shows a development. This does not mean every 
step along the philosophical journey is necessary, only that an intelligible, overall 
narrative can be found retrospectively and this is what guides the rationality of the 
reconstruction. Hegel says this intelligibility is to do with freedom; he thought, in fact, 
the development of freedom was necessary. This is historical rationality – there is no 
eternal standard to access, only the reconstruction of the logic internal to practices in the 
past and present. The criteria for what counts as a good reason themselves change over 
time.220 Freedom in Hegel involves dependence – his paradigmatic examples are 
friendship and love; it is reflexive freedom not only negative freedom. That is, freedom 
is the ability to act in different spheres or contexts, not merely the ability to be self-
causing. Freedom is more like being able to speak a language than being able to move 
an arm (though it includes the latter). Being free ‘consists in being in a certain social 
relation, or unified set of social relations’.221   
 
Hegel connects the question of what sort of logic or intelligibility can make sense of an 
essentially historical being (humanity as self-constituting, as Geist) with the idea that 
reason itself (at least in some forms) is also historical and developmental. That is, 
reasoning and justification change over time. Any ‘account of anything will depend on 
an overall account of account-giving’222 and Hegel’s logic aims at the most general 
account of all the different ways there can be of making sense of things. It is about the 
very idea of discursive intelligibility. In the tradition prior to Hegel, such accounts were 
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focused on predication, but Hegel shows this is too restricted. The Science of Logic 
deals with (in Kant’s terms) real possibility not just logical possibility. ‘The forms of 
thought at this level of fundamentality are the forms of being’.223 Hence Hegel says his 
logic is metaphysics. At the most general level of making sense logical terms are 
metaphysical terms because they are about ‘the sense the world could make’224 and not 
just the sense we make of the world (e.g. how can something change most of its 
properties and remain the same? How can two things share a common form but be 
different?). Any empirical explanation will ultimately depend on the theoretical account 
of making sense, but they are not of the same order. There is more to questions about 
Geist than natural scientific questions. The inability of purely natural scientific thinking 
to understand Geist is expressed by Hegel as: ‘thought determines for itself what is 
actual; gives itself its own actuality. ‘The Concept’ gives itself its own actuality’.225 For 
example, the question, “Why do humans make art?” cannot be answered with the same 
sort of answer we give to, “why do isotopes decay?” To understand art requires 
reference to the history of the human activity of art. The logic of Geist is about 
actualities (logos, Wert, Sache an sich selbst) and actualities are historical, not fixed 
essences. The sense made of different practices will have to cohere with the sense made 
of other practices; hence Hegel’s interconnection of different areas of philosophy. Hegel 
argues that ‘different forms of practical logic are not only compatible with, but 
somehow depend on each other for their individual intelligibility, and his account of 
institutions is a reflection of that commitment’.226 Practices such as art, markets, 
religion and politics are not natural in the sense that eating or dying are natural; they are 
underdetermined by nature; they can only be done by having reasons for doing them. 
The reasons given for them, and the change over time of those reasons, is how to make 
sense of them. But this way of making sense relies on Hegel’s claim that rationality, 
making sense, changes over time. The Philosophy of Right is about the actuality of 
freedom, understood in the sense just outlined. Without this theoretical philosophy 
behind it, an ultimately satisfying account of what in contemporary society does and 
does not actualise freedom will be lacking.  
 
In short, Hegel makes explicit that reason’s self-grounding is not only theoretical (as 
with Kant) but also historical and practical. Reason is not internal to the mind but is 
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located in the mutual practices and experiences of societies, in the “space of reasons,” 
and so is historical. Thus Hegel writes reason’s history as a history of Geist, the self-
constitution of these reason-grounding practices. Reason is both constituted and 
constituting (which is why it evades the neo-Kantian separation of these onto different 
planes). But if reason relies on Geist, one element of Geist is the intentional practices of 
humans, such that Geist and reason do develop at least partly in dependence on 
humanity.227 People had only in Hegel’s time fully realised this. Hegel explains the 
development of reason up to that point – qua requiring humanity but taking place 
without its understanding – as the ‘cunning of reason’; yet now that humanity had 
realised this, it had the possibility of comprehending the grounds and processes of its 
own reasoning, of reason itself, in a deeper way: ‘absolute knowledge’ as the qualified 
autonomy of reason. The critical philosophy’s desire for reason to be self-grounding and 
self-transparent is thereby granted only in paradoxical fashion. By equating reason with 
intersubjective practices and experiences in society, reason does become a self-
grounding, constituted-constituting, self-actualising whole, of which the intentions of 
individuals and groups are an ineliminable moment; yet whilst elements of this 
constituted-constituting dynamic can be comprehended (which is thus self-
comprehension) the full complexity of this whole is never available. Thus the need for 
an approach that is both historical and Verstehen; thus speculative thought’s attempts to 
grasp the whole are never perfect and the path of thought must be continuously re-
traversed. 
 
Much of Honneth’s work on recognition is compatible with the sort of Hegelianism 
held by Pippin and Rose. A sketch of his work thus provides a response to the criticism 
that Rose’s work lacks normative content. We noted above the permanent tension 
inscribed at the heart of the broken middle because it holds together three levels of 
society, each with its own form of respect/recognition. It thereby differentiates itself 
from traditional moral philosophy, from the unity of the virtues in Greek and Christian 
thought, and from modern ethics’ tendency to define a single principle to generate an 
ethical system. Thus although mutual recognition is the actuality of both ethics and law, 
ethics and law remain dirempted in part because mutual recognition itself is 
irreconcilably split three ways. The three forms of respect are: love, in which a person is 
affirmed as unique in their needs and desires, and which exists amongst small groups of 
                                                
227 To make Geist the term for, roughly, the mindedness of society is to read Hegel as already Marxist, or, 
better, to soften the opposition between materialism and idealism. 
 209 
people; esteem or solidarity, in which a person’s contributions to a shared, concrete 
community and/or project are valued (in the various arenas of civil society); and 
respect, in which individuals hold one another and themselves morally accountable and 
as possessing dignity, at the state level and beyond. The three levels increase in scope 
and comprehensiveness, but at the same time lose concreteness. The worst form of 
disrespect is at the level of bodily needs, desires and integrity (similar to Mill’s harm 
doctrine). The next worst is to disregard the most comprehensive level, that of moral 
accountability and dignity. Finally, the least bad form of disrespect is not to recognise 
another’s contributions to civil society and its projects. (This follows not the order of 
comprehensiveness and abstractness of forms of recognition but their historical 
development). Now, ‘the transition from one sphere of recognition to another is always 
caused by a struggle to gain respect for a subject’s self-comprehension as it grows in 
stages. The demand to be recognized in ever more dimensions of one’s own person 
leads to a kind of intersubjective conflict whose resolution can only consist in the 
establishment of a further sphere of recognition’.228 Thus social conflict is not merely a 
struggle for brute power or self-interest but, at least sometimes, derives from ‘moral 
impulses.’229  
 
Honneth’s theory is thus able to identify not only injustice but also social pathologies, 
not only harm but also disrespect. By way of phenomenological reconstruction it can be 
argued that recognition has emerged historically and immanently from modern 
European society, which explains Rose’s less pessimistic stance than some forms of 
critical theory. In particular, Rose refuses the dilemma, often associated with Adorno, of 
having no norms to ground critique. Hegel’s criticism of natural law was that what 
appeared as a priori values were in fact a posteriori. Adorno thought this left him with 
no immanent norms other than those of the bourgeois world, which had ended up in 
Auschwitz.230 One response to this is to look for practices that can ground a different set 
of values and reasons – modern art for Adorno, small communities for MacIntyre, the 
church for Milbank, institutions of the middle for Rose. The question is always whether 
they are able to do the task set for them. Yet Rose blunts the force of the dilemma by 
refusing the initial problem as posed by Adorno. The bourgeois world is not completely 
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corrupt; notwithstanding its problems some of it is just and good, it retains some 
legitimacy. (Here again Rose resembles Habermas and Honneth). 
 
Although Rose does provide a convincing account of the fundamentals of socio-logic 
and systematically links it to a number of areas in very thought-provoking ways, much 
of the latter remain directions for future research rather than detailed positions. This of 
course is at least partly because her life ended tragically early. Yet, some of Rose’s 
work did have a more practical bent, by immanently showing the tensions of important 
areas of life – artistic representation of the Holocaust, architecture, an approach to life 
and death and medicine. And for works that do offer substantial accounts of specific 
phenomena, which succeed by Rose’s criteria, one may look to the authors she cites, to 
other examples such as those throughout this thesis, or to those directly developing 
Rose’s work.231 Here, I briefly summarise the work of Kate Schick and Liz Disley who 
have intentionally developed aspects of recognition theory on the basis of Rose’s work 
to further spell out some of the normative implications of Rose’s social philosophy.    
 
Schick argues that recognition theory has tended to take two forms: ‘hyperrationalist’ or 
‘primordial’. Hyperrationalist recognition theory has actually regressed into 
individualism, losing its some of its initial stress on intersubjectivity, and taken on a 
positivist, problem-solving intellectual mood. The radical nature of agents’ 
interdependence and vulnerability has been lost, as has the sense of the struggle of 
coming to know, the repeated re-cognition involved in recognition. Recognition has 
become a tool, applied outwardly to solve social problems by “adding more” 
recognition. The inward moment has sunk from view. By contrast, Rosean recognition 
urges the subject to discover the ways in which they are complicit in misrecognition and 
injustice, even whilst having good intentions. It highlights the vulnerability of the 
subject in the process of recognition.232 Disley suggests Hegelian recognition involves 
love and forgiveness as central paradigms, and that both are best theorised using 
elements from the theological tradition (whence Hegel took them originally in his early 
work). Recognition thus involves metanoia, repentance, changing the self not merely 
one’s mind. She thinks this is well captured by Rose’s broken middle as a place of 
‘constant change and anxiety’, since recognition in its various forms are never 
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finished.233 The broken middle entails that taking a position always involves error, and 
so “violence”, even within love.234 ‘Imperfect and in some way incomplete (Rose’s 
broken middle), the self in its relation with the Other is ever-changing and being remade 
(metanoia, Hegelian…Aufhebung) and is influenced by the Other and the wider 
community to such an extent that we cannot speak of full autonomy, though there is a 
clear space for ethical responsibility….This ethical self is not ontologically pre-defined, 
but forms itself in the encounter or confrontation with the Other, who calls the self to 
ethical action’.235 
 
These developments of a Rosean-inflected version of recognition cohere well with my 
remarks in chapters 1 and 2 about the dialectic between recognition and appropriation, 
which Rose regarded as central to Hegel. Once something has been recognised, the 
recognition remains to be appropriated, and this applies as someone or something is 
repeatedly re-cognised. This involves several dimensions, all of which are important in 
Rose’s work as a whole: time, working through, mediation, subjectivity and history. 
The recognition-appropriation dialectic requires time because recognition is not simply 
registering a fact but involves a change in the individual, ‘a new concept of the self-
other relation, the self-self relation, and the self-world relation.’236 It is both intellectual 
and existential. Many accounts of recognition focus only on the initial moment of 
recognition or its end result, but thereby neglect the time it takes to work through the 
difficulties of recognition, whereas Schick and Disley start to bring this out. The labour 
of appropriation can be thought in terms of ‘working through’, an important phrase for 
Rose237 and driving her aberrated/inaugurated mourning distinction. Working through is 
a psychoanalytic term for the process in which the individual brings to consciousness 
and thinks through different aspects of an idea, and thereby gradually overcomes his/her 
initial resistance to accepting the idea.238 Again, this is not a narrowly intellectual 
exercise but involves emotions, an aesthetic sense and may involve the body more 
directly too. Working through over time involves finding the recognised person (or 
object) in more and more of his (or its) mediations, rendering him more concrete and so 
relating him to some sort of totality. At the same time, one is relating oneself to the 
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recognised other and to the totality too, and thereby discovering something about how 
one’s self is determined, which may contribute to one’s freedom from determination. 
Equally, appropriation involves internalising – in a deep, significant way – what is 
recognised, and this involves a certain kind of self-relation. The self is transformed both 
by open receptivity to what is recognised and by active work on the self by the self. 
This is why Rose regards philosophy as existentially transformative. Finally, the 
mediations one discerns are historically shaped and can be related to historical struggles 
for recognition (Honneth) and gain their meanings from phenomenological determinate 
negations. Yet Rose’s insistence on the centrality and fundamentality of mediation 
against any kind of ethical immediacy may leave her account of recognition less 
vulnerable than Honneth’s to the charge of neglecting economic and legal deformations 
of consciousness.239 These brief remarks hopefully suggest the gains to be had from 
Rose’s restoration of appropriation alongside recognition within her speculative 
philosophy and her version of mutual recognition.  
 
4 Conclusion 
Rose’s critical theory of modern society is focused around two fundamental, interacting, 
modern diremptions: state-civil society and law-ethics. These two diremptions combine 
and alter in various forms as they are filtered through class, religion, race and gender. 
Attention to these diremptions provides a substantive theory of modern society, a guide 
for framing sociological investigations, and a mode of critique of social philosophy. 
This focus provides a lens through which to see society and a starting point for 
phenomenological examinations of modernity’s political history. Through them, Rose’s 
social philosophy consciously incorporates its own logical and material pre-conditions. 
The speculative identity between law and ethics keeps in view the question of the 
legitimation of authority and the just use of power, both their possibilities and risks. 
 
The modern version of the law-ethics diremption is a function of two things: the 
rationalisation of law and the internal fissures of ethics as mutual recognition. Even 
though rationalised law is imperfect and fosters nihilism, it is still a necessary condition 
of political legitimacy and justice in contemporary society. Impure political virtue is the 
modern form of phronesis, one that incorporates its own preconditions, including the 
violence of state power. The chiasmus ‘violence in love and love in violence’ expresses 
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the shifting mixture of good and coercion found in both ethics and law and in their 
relation, which modern social theory must investigate ever anew. The failure of much 
poststructuralist theory to do so is the ‘pathos of the concept’ – the sad fate that has 
befallen its ability to know and learn.  
 
Rose’s metaphilosophy is not narrowly logical but also provides an intellectual mood. 
In line with this Rose steers a political middle path between ignoring ethics within 
politics and subordinating politics to ethics. Encouraging forms of Sittlichkeit groups, 
middle institutions and mutual recognition is one way to cope with our necessarily 
imperfect condition. Mutual recognition is the core of her normative stance, which she 
thinks can be reconstructed from the phenomenological history of European societies 
and is therefore not an imposed Sollen. This takes the form of critical reconstructions, 
neither foundationalist nor sceptical, assessing current ethical life and theory through 
repetition backwards and forwards. As the actuality of law and ethics – yet imperfectly 
attained and distorted in its inversions – mutual recognition must heed its social 
mediations and inversions in order to ameliorate them, rather than seek to escape them. 
The dialectic of recognition and appropriation, which Rose retrieves from Hegel, is 
capable of opening up different dimensions of recognition that are still not fully 
appreciated: time, working through, mediation, subjectivity and history. Though 
implicit in her version of recognition, they are pervasive themes of her thought. 
 
The broken middle is a metatheory, both epistemologically and as an immanent critique 
of other theories. With regard to the latter, in contrast to jurisprudential wisdom the 
focus shifts away from showing the legal jurisdiction underlying social philosophies 
and towards the complementary task of revealing the way the nature of modern society 
as a broken middle is both recognised and misrecognised in various theories. It thus 
continues the second form of ideology critique common within the Frankfurt tradition – 
of pointing out the mistaking of theory for reality. Theoretical mending of the middle 
cannot heal society’s diremptions and by obscuring this may make them worse. With 
regard to the former it is a version of Hegelian phenomenology and logic, which also 
ground Rose’s view of mutual recognition. This would be consistent with the way Rose 
insisted on continuous interaction between theoretical and metatheoretical levels and the 
internality of thought and being. The broken middle and anxiety of beginning thus name 
the result of consistently facing both the deficit of epistemological and moral 
foundations in modernity, and our ability to attain, nevertheless, a measure of good 
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enough knowledge and justice. Their vulnerability to historical accident and their 
internal diremptions are the equivocations of the middle. Acknowledging them allows 
Rose to provide a philosophical-sociological grounding to value pluralism and dirty 
hands, the equivocations of ethics and its suspension in (dependence on yet tension 
with) ethical life, and the dialectic of reflective and determinant judgement. Action and 
meaning in the medium of limited and historically variable reason thus take on the 




Certainly time is the occasion for our strangely mixed nature, in every moment 
differently compounded, so that we often surprise ourselves, and always scarcely know 
ourselves, and exist in relation to experience, if we attend to it and if its plainness does 
not disguise it from us, as if we were visited by revelation.  
  – Marilynne Robinson, The Death of Adam 
 
This thesis has provided an original interpretation and reconstruction of Gillian Rose’s 
work as a distinctive social philosophy within the Frankfurt School tradition that holds 
together the methodological, logical, descriptive, metaphysical and normative moments 
of social theory; provides a critical theory of modern society; is open to religion based 
on the Frankfurt doctrine of self-limiting reason; and offers distinctive versions of 
ideology critique based on the history of jurisprudence, and of mutual recognition as the 
actuality of modern society based on a Hegelian view of appropriation. Rose’s 
philosophy integrates three key moments of the Frankfurt tradition: a view of the social 
totality – absolute ethical life – as both an epistemological necessity and normative 
ideal; a philosophy that is its own metaphilosophy because it integrates its own logical 
and social preconditions within itself; and a critical analysis of modern society that is 
simultaneously a critique of social theory. Rose’s work is original in the way it 
organises these three moments around absolute ethical life as the social totality, its 
Hegelian basis, and its focus on metaphysical entanglements of law, ethics and 
jurisprudence. Absolute ethical life emerges from the speculative exposition of the 
diremptions of the broken middle and enables a critique of social theorising that 
insufficiently appreciates its social determinations and/or attempts to eliminate 
metaphysics. The transcendental form of social theorising leaves theory more 
vulnerable to this mistake than does Hegelian speculative philosophy. Since speculative 
philosophy is more thoroughly its own metaphilosophy, reflexively incorporates more 
of its preconditions, it is better able to account for its own structure and its relation to 
and role in society. Absolute ethical life, as a speculative unity of diremptions, acts 
equally as a critique of society and sociology, including the role of bourgeois property 
law and social contract theories reflective of it, the hollowing out of middle institutions, 
and rationalised forms of law and ethics that undermine mutual recognition.  
 
Chapter 1 showed how Rose used Hegel’s phenomenology, triune rationality and 
speculative identities, in concert with recognition and appropriation, to unite method 
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and system and develop a social philosophy that was its own metaphilosophy. 
Speculative philosophy’s circularity is virtuous by reference to a non-totalising totality, 
whereas transcendental social theory begins from a given precondition. Rose’s social 
philosophy thus better explains the logical basis of social theory and sociological 
explanation, and shows normativity is intrinsic to theorising. Chapter 2 showed Rose’s 
appropriation of the Frankfurt-Weber analysis of modernity and self-limiting reason in 
relation to an aporetic ontology, philosophical modernism and religion. I showed Rose’s 
speculative philosophy is subtly different from Adorno’s negative dialectics and the 
implications for theoretical responses to Auschwitz. Chapter 3 examined for the first 
time Rose’s jurisprudential ideology critique of social philosophy, using Kant as a test 
case. Though her criticisms of Kant largely failed, they revealed further aspects of her 
social philosophy: a political philosophy inspired by Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the 
use of law to gain a view of the social totality, and a metaphysically expansive view of 
jurisprudence. Chapter 4 showed the enduring relevance of Rose’s focus on the state-
civil society and law-ethics diremptions for sociological investigations and theorising 
ethics and politics, and outlined the distinctive inflection Rose gave to mutual 
recognition.  
 
My interpretation has five advantages over previous work on Rose. It presents Rose’s 
work as a social philosophy with distinct forms of ideology critique and mutual 
recognition, and shows how it may be used without becoming an external method. It 
shows Hegel Contra Sociology, Dialectic of Nihilism and The Broken Middle as a 
trilogy pursuing the critique-of-society-and-sociology in relation to absolute ethical life 
on the basis of a Hegelian philosophy and metaphilosophy. It reveals her work as an 
original synthesis of all her main sources – Hegel, Adorno and the Frankfurt School, the 
jurisprudential tradition, Marx and Weber. It is the most comprehensive interpretation to 
date and only on the basis of such comprehensiveness can the full power of Rose’s 
social philosophy be grasped. I am thus able most fully to contextualise her work’s 
relation to religion.  
 
Rose had a Hegelian view of reason: reason itself has changed over time because reason 
is involved in practices, and the only way to tell whether something is more or less 
rational is to reconstruct the history of its emergence. Rose emphasises the inversions of 
meaning, the contradictions of reason’s forms in society, as ways of understanding both 
the universals at which philosophy rightly aims and the aporia preventing it ever 
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completely attaining them. Reason’s self-critique is circular since the tool and object of 
analysis are the same. Hegel criticised Kant’s critical philosophy not for its circularity, 
which is unavoidable, but for its way of handling this circularity, because it tried to 
ensure the proper use of reason as a canon before fully exploring the use of reason as an 
organon. The fear of error was the error itself; Kant’s critical enterprise was like the 
attempt to learn to swim before getting in the water. Our knowing and reasoning are 
always already begun and must therefore improve themselves from this initiated 
situation. We begin in the middle. Hegel’s phenomenology keeps to the immanent 
criteria of a form of reason (including, at the later stages, the social manifestations of 
that form, since the two are in fact inseparable) and negates it determinately to the next 
form. After some progress certain fundamental features of knowing and reasoning, on 
which we cannot go back, became clear. Knowing and reasoning are indeed circular, 
but may be more or less vicious or virtuous in this regard. The problem with 
transcendentally structured theories is not their circularity but their tendency to lose 
sight of their circularity by ossifying a pre-condition into too fixed a position. 
Transcendental social theory is thus less able to account for its social determinations 
than speculative social theory. In Rose’s hands, Hegel’s doctrine of the concept shows 
both that any satisfactory explanation, as a matter of logic, must refer to a totality, and 
shows how social wholes are more than the sum of their parts (have emergent 
properties).  
 
Rose thus makes explicit the importance of Hegelian epistemology and critique of neo-
Kantian transcendentalism for social philosophy. Insofar as Hegel already explicated 
reason as an intersubjective, cultural phenomenon rather than an operation internal to 
individual minds, and insofar as his epistemology is general and fundamental (not 
restricted to a specific object domain or discipline), Rose is simply drawing out what is 
already there. Nevertheless, it is particularly well suited to sociology and social 
philosophy, for sociology’s modes, tools and concepts for its investigation will 
fundamentally shape the object in question. The circularity is unavoidable and is both a 
strength and a weakness. It is a strength insofar as it explains and provides 
understanding; it is a weakness insofar as sociology has shown the tendency to forget its 
circularity in ways that materially affect the content of study. Social philosophy must 
always be simultaneously theoretical and meta-theoretical; must attend to both form and 
content. Rose’s speculative Hegelian epistemology – which emphasises negation, 
experience, surprise, aporias and provisionality – is therefore the most appropriate 
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logical basis for social theory, and in fact the basis on which it already operates at its 
best. Speculative thinking always bears in mind the difference or non-identity between 
object and concept, the failure of the explicans ever fully to account for the 
explicandum; it knows, further, that an explicans itself requires an explanation. Such 
explanations will be historical, not only structural (structures themselves have a 
history), and circular insofar as a good explanation of one part of society will be 
explained in terms of others such that the whole makes sense. The whole, the totality, 
remains an essential concept but it becomes an unreachable ideal, because society is too 
complex and too large an object to be fully known. Yet the very unattainability of the 
totality, which alone would give full context and so full meaning to any individual 
object within it and explanations thereof, is accounted for by the speculative logic of 
simultaneous identity and non-identity, and helps avoid the neo-Kantian forgetting of 
the status of sociological explanations. 
 
In Rose’s theory Hegelian phenomenology replaces Kantian transcendental deductions. 
Rose’s phenomenology is intrinsically historical. A common postmodern mistake is to 
deny the historical progress possible in knowing, reasoning and morality. If sociology 
tends to forget its circularity, poststructuralist social philosophy tends to overdo its 
circularity to the extreme degree of condemning the whole Western tradition of 
philosophy and seeking a way out of its juridical thinking. Whereas the Frankfurt 
School accepted the necessity of juridical thinking and wished to sublate it within a 
wider and more textured form of reason, poststructuralism wished to escape juridical 
thinking altogether. This led to problems with ethics and politics, which Rose discussed 
as nihilism, ‘new ethics’, and the longing for the singular and unknowable Event. It is 
now a truism to insist that universal definitions of essences are necessarily masks for 
power plays, but this is an overstatement, and anyway one cannot avoid definitions. 
Social theory must always be theoretical and meta-theoretical. Part of this dual-focus is 
the need to be reflexive, to know whence a definition or conceptual demarcation arises, 
at what it aims and what purposes it serves. A stipulative definition may clarify an 
aspect of an issue but it will scarcely if ever be universal. Within discourses – 
competing academic discourses for instance – one can keep provisionality, ambiguity 
and agnosticism in play; but when it comes to law or policy, definitions are enacted and 
imposed. This is again ineluctable. The substitution of the free-floating nature of 
academic disputes, in which definitions can remain in dispute, for the definitions 
necessary for power to operate – and to judge the legitimacy of authority – was a major 
 219 
failure of poststructuralism in Rose’s view. It was an attempt to avoid power rather than 
contribute to the legitimate exercise of power. Whether or not Rose was fair to Derrida, 
Foucault and Levinas, some of their followers seem vulnerable to Rose’s critique.  
 
In Rose’s thought Hegelian ethical life replaces Kantian morality. Social philosophy 
faces two dangers: imposing an abstract morality on society or too much normative 
reticence. The latter predominates within much sociology since normative debates can 
distract from sociological description. Yet such attempts at neutrality can only be 
provisional. The fact/value distinction is not absolute but a perennial tension to think 
with and through. Theoretical and practical reason are not hermetically separable. 
Sociological work that is relatively neutral therefore must be taken up into some wider 
consideration if it is to become fully meaningful. (One can always ask, ‘so what?’ and, 
‘what is to be done?’ in response to any sociological trend or pattern). 
Poststructuralism’s attempts at ethics tend to fall back on Levinasian immediacy, since 
they hollow out rational adjudication to such an extreme degree. Postmodern political 
theology expects too much from small communities. Both are two sides of the same 
coin: fleeing from rationalisation and underplaying the legitimacy of national political 
cultures and nation-states. Yet the middle – the complex modern relation of state and 
society, law and ethics – is broken in the sense that it is permanently and fundamentally 
dirempted and imperfect. To that extent, Rose agrees with these critics of modernity. 
But the brokenness of the middle does not justify flight from state, society and law, nor 
obviate the need to take a view of the whole. A good enough justice is sometimes 
possible, of which mutual recognition will be a central component. Rose sought to 
sublate the criticisms of law, the legal person and juridical thinking, preserving all of 
them as essential categories for thinking and living in modern society. Rose thereby 
heads off a common objection that her work lacked normative resources, without 
idealising or romanticising some kind of community innocent of the abuse of power – 
whether that be Judaism as the sublime other of modernity or Christian groups as 
immune to rationalisation. She expects neither too much nor too little from ethical life 
and its main carriers in society. Rose may be compared to Habermas and Honneth who 
have been sufficiently sociological and philosophical to offer an adequate view of the 
whole with normative weight. 
 
The broken middle, Rose’s mature position, has five main components: 
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a) A sociological thesis about modern society as fundamentally dirempted between state 
and civil society, and between law and ethics; between discourses of rights and actual 
practices of state power, between formal legal equality and inequalities of class and 
gender. This includes the constant tensions between individuals, civil society, and the 
state, and their corresponding forms of recognition. Rose’s view of diremptions and 
mutual recognition emerged from a phenomenological history of modern society.  
 
b) A philosophical thesis about the nature of thinking that serves as its own meta-
theory. Speculative philosophy reconstructs a view of different social wholes through 
phenomenological history. Such wholes are necessary for explanation but never entirely 
available. A fully coherent and seamlessly systematic philosophical system does not 
exist; philosophy, reasoning and knowing are not self-grounding but rely on social 
practices and institutions. Speculative philosophy is a hybrid of normative and 
descriptive moments able to account for the contradictions and antinomies sociology 
repeatedly discovers, without reducing philosophy to sociology of knowledge. Reason 
is also existential: it changes the subject as well as the object. The dialectic of 
recognition and appropriation is important to both the logical and existential aspects of 
reason. 
 
c) A framework for social philosophy based on the above philosophical and sociological 
elements. Rose’s speculative philosophy led her to a vision of philosophy as a 
modernist cultural practice opening the way to modern forms of phronesis and praxis, 
which involves: a combination of sociology and philosophy; a self-limiting rationality; 
an aporetic ontology; a realist-idealist epistemology rather than positivism or relativism; 
a Weberian analysis of rationalised modernity; immanent critique aiming at 
emancipation and reflexive self-knowledge; support for a social and political 
philosophy inspired by Hegel’s Philosophy of Right; the use of law to gain a view of the 
social totality; and an expansive view of jurisprudence as examining the links between 
the metaphysical, ethical and legal, oriented towards absolute ethical life and enabling 
ideology critique. Rose opposes the imposition of a moralistic Sollen on society, the 
assumption that theory can mend socio-politically sourced diremptions, and warns that 
attempts to do so may make diremptions worse due to the complexity of society as an 
emergent whole or organism. The effects of such metaphilosophical assumptions and 
intellectual moods on social theorising are an important part of Rose’s theory.  
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d) A critical phenomenology of modern theory revealing where it recognises and 
misrecognises components of the broken middle; and a critique of modern society based 
on where it does and does not embody expansive reason and mutual recognition. Rose 
criticised the inflated role of property in society, the rationalisation of law and ethics 
(whilst accepting their current importance), and the diminution of institutions of the 
middle. The modern version of the law-ethics diremption stems from the rationalisation 
of law and the internal fissures of ethics as mutual recognition. Even though rationalised 
law is imperfect and fosters nihilism, it is still a necessary condition of political 
legitimacy and justice in contemporary society. 
 
e) A thesis about some of the features of practical wisdom in ethics and politics (and 
thus of the kind of subjectivity appropriate to modern citizens): acknowledging the 
irreparability of society’s diremptions; tarrying with the contradictions of ethical and 
political life; historical and contextual awareness; risking action and reflecting on 
practice in order to learn; a modern form of phronesis aware of its own preconditions 
and mediations, including violence and coercion; an intellectual mood between 
triumphalism and despair, a counsel of imperfection but not melancholy. There is thus 
no immediate ethics in abstraction from its social mediations. In foregrounding the 
provisionality and preconditions of both the meaning and morality of action, Rose 
draws out the parallels between them and religious faith; hence her use of Kierkegaard. 
Any intentional action undertaken by an individual is predicated on some view of the 
meaning of their intention and action, which rests on (is intelligible within) a view of 
the totality; and this view of the totality is (or should be) a mixture of sociological, 
normative and metaphysical elements; and it includes, even with the most 
comprehensive view possible, large measures of ignorance and some confusion and 
error. In this sense at least, secular action and meaning are not different in kind from 
religious faith. The notion of self-limiting reason is the basis of Rose’s comments on 
Hegel, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard bringing revelation into reason. 
 
The relation between Rose’s work, religion and political theology may be assessed in 
the light of my reconstruction of her social theory. Her social philosophy was 
substantially developed before her interest in religion arose. Her early treatment of 
religion in Hegel Contra Sociology is crudely reductive and religion is absent from 
Dialectic of Nihilism. In the late works it occupies much more attention: a chapter on 
political theology in The Broken Middle, a collection of essays on Judaism, discussions 
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of political theology in Mourning Becomes the Law. In these instances Rose applied her 
developed social theory to religion and theology without being reductive or simplistic. 
A different tack appears in Love’s Work, the final two essays of Mourning Becomes the 
Law and Paradiso (the latter two both posthumous publications). In a letter, she stated 
that the last section of Love’s Work relates to John 15.13 and Romans 8.3-4: ‘You see I 
wanted to write in a way that would capture those who imagine themselves closed to 
Christ and to conventional religion: that is why I talk of comedy as an analogy of faith 
and only mention God in French. This method of ‘indirect communication’ I have learnt 
from Kierkegaard’.1 She described the final two essays in Mourning Becomes the Law 
as developing ‘an approach to eternity, to divine transcendence…contra Heideggerian 
finitude’.2 Paradiso recounts Rose’s explicitly religious experiences. She was planning 
a book called Poem and Prayer when she died.3 In a late letter, Rose described herself 
as a ‘theologian in disguise’.4 Perhaps she saw her later work as a repetition of 
Kierkegaard’s attempt to make things more difficult for others; aimed not, however, at a 
religious sub-group in society, but at society as a whole. If so, the aim was clearly not to 
convert people to a specific doctrine – Rose retained an agnostic stance towards such 
questions5 – but to raise the consciousness of her readership (or sensitise it) to the limits 
of reason, especially rationalised reason; not to proselytise but to ‘keep culture moving 
and open in dark times.’6  
 
The last point is speculative (in a non-technical sense), though it could help explain her 
work’s structural openness to religion. Rose’s social philosophy stands independently of 
these later religious concerns however. The creative uses to which political and practical 
theologians – Lloyd, Milbank, Raskhover, Rowlands, Shanks, Williams – have put 
Rose’s work are interesting and valuable, and more or less in line with her own 
thinking, though none takes full account of her social philosophy as I have 
reconstructed it here. Her engagement with theology, as well as her friendships with two 
of the most important Christian theologians working in the English language (Milbank 
and Williams), no doubt fostered this trajectory of her work’s reception. Nevertheless, 
                                                
1 Letter to Tom and Barbara, 10 February 1995, box 14. 
2 Proposal for MBL, box 31. 
3 Letter to Sir Brian Follett, 9 May 1995, box 31; Elaine Williams, ‘Interview’. 
4 Cited in Rowlands, Theology in ‘The Third City’, 11. 
5 Asked during the RTÉ interview, ‘So you believe in something outside of the spatio-temporal 
continuum?’, Rose replied, ‘Certainly, yes. But I think one has to preserve an agnosticism about it. I love 
what Simone Weil said, that agnosticism is the most truly religious position. You must be able to say you 
don’t know. Agnosticism is the only true religion because to have faith is not to give up knowledge, but 
to know where the limit of knowledge is.’ Lloyd, ‘Interview’, 217. 
6 Bernstein, ‘Philosophy Among the Ruins’, 30. 
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Rose’s work shows that a Frankfurt-Hegelian view of self-limiting reason may 
coherently lead to an openness to theological views. 
 
Rose’s social philosophy is a comprehensive structure for the logic of social theory and 
provides a useful heuristic lenses on the social totality for empirical research. It offers 
gains for both more empirically and more philosophically focused social theory. In 
relation to the former, as I showed with Catto and Woodhead’s volume, Rose’s social 
philosophy sets out not only important elements of good practice but grounds them in 
logic and their relation to one another. This provides not only confidence and clarity 
about methods and findings making use of contradiction and paradox, diremptions, 
determinate negation, speculative identity, totality, multiple methods and perspectives, 
and history, but also pushes at the metaphysical, ethical and political implications of 
such work. In relation to more philosophically slanted social theory, Rose shows how 
neglect of history, the philosophical tradition, jurisprudence, and empirical and classical 
sociology results in poorer social philosophy, unaware of its own determinations and 
unrealistic in its response to power, politics and ethics. Her objection to the separation 
of philosophy and sociology is thus justified by the consequences of its actualisation, as 
well as the fruitfulness of her own Hegelian-Frankfurt integration of them both.  
 
My reconstruction thus suggests several possibilities for further research. Rose’s work 
could be a fertile site for ongoing dialogue between religion and the Frankfurt School, 
as well as between the latter and Anglophone forms of political philosophy. Her 
insistence on the dialectical relationship of recognition and appropriation could be 
developed into a useful addition to ethical recognition theory. The effects of law on 
philosophical and natural consciousness could be further pursued as ideology critique. 
Jurisprudence as an expansive legal-metaphysical-ethical-political discipline remains a 
minority position in Anglophone scholarship but would repay further attention. As the 
examples of Sara Farris and Zygmunt Bauman showed, the state-civil society 
diremption remains a fruitful lens on society, and aspects of absolute ethical life could 
still be used as a heuristic for empirical investigation and normative insight. 
Philosophical appropriations of Weber’s analysis of rationalisation, such as Bernstein’s 
work on ethics, suggest the same is true for the law-ethics diremption. Other totalities 
besides absolute ethical life could be used to critique both sociology and society, such 
as capital, trans-national corporations, or big data. Rose’s work thus remains a 





Works by Gillian Rose 
Reification as a Sociological Category: Theodor W. Adorno’s Concept of Reification  
and the Possibility of a Critical Theory of Society (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Oxford, 1976). 
  
‘How Is Critical Theory Possible? Theodor Adorno and Concept Formation in  
Sociology’, Political Studies 24:1 (March 1976), 69-85. 
 
‘Review of Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics’, The American Political Science  
Review 7.2 (June 1976), 598-9. 
 
The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno, (New  
York: Columbia, 1978). 
 
‘Review of Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics and Zolton Tar, The  
Frankfurt School’, History and Theory 18.1 (February 1979), 126-135. 
 
‘Review of Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas’, British  
Journal of Sociology 31.1 (March 1980), 110-1. 
 
Letter to London Review of Books, 3.24 (17 December 1981),  
http://www.lrb.co.uk.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/v03/n24/letters, accessed 28th January 
2015. 
 
Hegel Contra Sociology (London: Athlone, 1981).  
2nd edition with new Preface (London: Verso, 1995). 
 
‘Parts and Wholes’, Proceedings of the International Conference on Parts and Wholes  
(June 1983), 95-100. Copy held at University of Lund, Sweden. 
 
Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). 
 
The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). 
 
Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 
 
Love’s Work: A Reckoning With Life (London: Chatto & Windus, 1995). 
 
Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University, 1996). 
 
‘The Final Notebooks of Gillian Rose’, edited by Howard Caygill, Women: a Cultural  
Review 9:1 (1998), 6-18. 
 
Paradiso (London: Menard Press, 1999). 
 
‘A Ghost in His Own Machine’, review of Points and Spectres of Marx by Derrida, The  
Times 27th July 1995, 32. 
 225 
Interviews with Gillian Rose 
Elaine Williams, ‘Keep your mind in hell and despair not’, Times Higher Education  
Supplement 1171 (14th April 1995), 15-16. 
  
‘Interview with Gillian Rose,’ edited and introduced by Vincent Lloyd, Theory, Culture  
and Society 25:7-8 (2008), 203-220. 
            First Broadcast October 28th and November 4th 1995 on Dialogue, RTÉ Radio 1;  
full audio version available at: www.rte.ie/radio1/podcast/podcast_dialogue.xml,  
accessed 13th April  2012. 
  
Gillian Rose Archives 
University of Warwick Library, Modern Records Centre, MSS.377. 55 boxes. 
 
The University of Sussex Library houses eleven tape recordings of Rose’s lectures in 
two groups. Six lectures from a 1979 series titled The Frankfurt School: 
1. Marxist Modernism. 4159, class R8056. 
2. The Politics of Realism: Georg Lukács. 4160, class R8057.  
3. The Greatness and Decline of Expressionism: Ernst Bloch. 4161, class R8058. 
4. The Battle Over Walter Benjamin. 4162, class R8059. 
5. The Dialectic of Enlightenment. 4163, R8060. 
6. The Search For Style: Adorno, Kafka or Mann? 4164, R8061. 
 
Five lectures from a multi-lecturer series titled Sociological Theory and Methodology: 
1. Introduction to Critical Theory (1986) 7658. 
2. The Dispute Over Marx and Weber (1987) 7702. 
3. Does Marx Have a Method? (1987) 7703. 
4. The Unity of Sociological Thinking (1986) 7812. 
5. Simmel, Lukács and German Critical Theory (1982) unnumbered. 
 
Some of these lectures are available online: 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2013/05/23/gillian
-rose-lectures-on-the-frankfurt-school/, accessed 6th November 2013. 
 
Conferences on Rose 
‘Symposium on the Life and Work of Gillian Rose,’ University of Warwick, 8th 
December 1995. 
  
‘Philosophy as Radical Thought: A Tribute to the Philosopher Gillian Rose’, The 
London Consortium and the Institute of Contemporary Arts, 9th December 2005. 
 
44th Annual Conference of the Association for Jewish Studies, 16th-18th December 
2012, Chicago, Panel on ‘The Challenge of Gillian Rose: law, ethics, politics’ chaired 
by Vincent Lloyd. 
 
‘Thinking in the Severe Style. A Symposium on Gillian Rose’s Hegel Contra 
Sociology’, Friday 18th October 2013, Kingston University. Some audio available at: 
http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2013/10/thinking-in-the-severe-style/, accessed 14th 
March 2014. 
 




Secondary works on Rose 
 
Obituaries 
Bernstein, J. M., ‘A Work of Hard Love’, The Guardian (11th December 1995), 12. 
 
Caygill, Howard, Radical Philosophy 77 (May/June 1996), 56. 
 
Martins, Hermínio, St. Antony’s College Record (1996), 112-114. 
 
Milbank, John, The Independent (13th December 1995), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituaries-professor-gillian-rose-
1525497.html, accessed 4th October 2010. 
 
The Times (14th December 1995). 
 
Reviews of The Melancholy Science 
Eisenberg, Elliot, American Journal of Sociology 85.5 (March 1980), 1262-4. 
 
Huaco, George A., Social Forces 58.3 (March 1980), 973-4. 
 
Mayer, Egon, Library Journal 103.14 (August 1978), 1526. 
 
Maynard, Mary, British Journal of Sociology 32.1 (March 1981), 140-1. 
 
Smith, A. Anthony, Contemporary Sociology 11.4 (July 1982), 463-4. 
 
Reviews of Hegel Contra Sociology 
Berki, R. N., ‘Thinking the Absolute’, Times Literary Supplement (23rd October 1981),  
1242. 
 
Bernasconi, Robert, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 5 (Autumn/Winter  
1981), 41-44. 
 
Crane, Jeffrey Lloyd, ‘Habermas and Hegel: Possible Contributions to a Unified  
Social Theory,’ Contemporary Sociology 11.6 (November 1982), 636-9. 
 
Cutrone, Chris, ‘Gillian Rose’s “Hegelian” critique of Marxism’, The Platypus  
Affiliated Society (March 15 2010), http://platypus1917.org/2010/03/15/gillian-
roses-hegelian-critique-of-marxism/, accessed 21st May 2012. 
 
Doubt, Keith D., Phenomenology and Pedagogy 1.3 (1984), 356-8. 
 
Harris, H. S., Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14.3 (September 1984), 425-6. 
 
Hawthorn, Geoffrey, ‘Ideal Speech’, London Review of Books 3.21 (19th November  
1981), 15-16.  
 
Kilminster, Richard, ‘From the Standpoint of Eternity: A Commentary on Rose’s Hegel  
Contra Sociology,’ Theory, Culture, and Society 2.1 (1983), 118-133. 
 
Knapp, Peter, Owl of Minerva, 15.2 (Spring 1984), 199-203. 
 
 227 
Levy, David, ‘Hegelian Idealism’, Times Higher Educational Supplement (26th March  
1982), 15.  
 
Minogue, Kenneth, British Journal of Sociology 36.3 (September 1985), 477-8. 
 
Osborne, Peter, ‘Hegelian Phenomenology and the Critique of Reason and Society’,  
Radical Philosophy 32 (Autumn 1982), 8-15. 
 
Schuler, Jeanne, Theory and Society 13.2 (March 1984), 285-9. 
 
Toth, Kathleen, American Journal of Sociology 88.4 (January 1983), 829-30. 
 
Reviews of Dialectic of Nihilism 
Beck, Anthony, British Journal of Sociology 37.4 (December 1986), 597-8. 
 
Bennington, Geoffrey, ‘L’Arroseur Arrose(e),’ New Formations 7 (1989), 35-49. 
 
Boyne, Roy, Contemporary Sociology 15.3 (May 1986), 436-7. 
 
Evans, Fred and Len Lawlor, ‘Norris, Rose, and the Rationality of Post-Structuralism,’  
Socialism and Democracy 5 (Fall-Winter 1987), 213-9. 
 
Goodrich, Peter, Journal of Law and Society 12.2 (Summer 1985), 241-8. 
 
Grier, Philip, Canadian Philosophical Review VI.4 (April 1986), 175-7. 
 
Lash, Scott, Theory & Society 16.2 (March 1987), 305-9. 
 
Murphy, W. T., ‘Memorising Politics of Ancient History,’ The Modern Law Review 50  
(May 1987), 384-405. 
 
Norris, Christopher, ‘Textual Theory at the Bar of Reason’, London Review of Books  
7.13 (18th July 1985), 15-17. 
 
Raffel, Stanley, Sociology 19.4 (November 1985), 648-650. 
  
Reviews of The Broken Middle 
Bauman, Zygmunt, ‘Philosophy for Everyday – but Not for Everyone’, Economy and  
Society 22.1 (February 1993), 114-122. 
 
Howe, S., ‘Pardon?’, New Statesman & Society (February 28 1992), 46. 
 
Jarvis, Simon, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 27/28 (1993), 88-92. 
 
Kerr, Fergus, Sociology 27.2 (May 1993), 365-7. 
 
Milbank, John, ‘Living in Anxiety,’ Times Higher Education Supplement (26th June  
1992), 20, 22. 
 
Murphy, W. T., British Journal of Sociology 45.1 (March 1994), 146-7. 
 
Solomon, Norman, Journal of Jewish Studies 46 (Spring-Autumn 1995), 342. 
 228 
Reviews of Judaism and Modernity 
Bauman, Zygmunt, Sociological Review 42.3 (August 1994), 572-6. 
 
Cheyette, Bryan, ‘Jerusalem and Athens,’ Times Higher Education Supplement 1109  
(4th February 1994), 22-3. 
 
Goetschel, Willi, Telos 98-9 (Winter 1993/Spring 1994), 295-7. 
 
Hass, Marjorie, Jewish Political Studies Review 9.3/4 (Fall 1997), 131-5 (this is also a  
review of Mourning Becomes the Law). 
 
Morra, Joanne, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73.4 (1995), 648-51. 
 
Solomon, Norman, Journal of Jewish Studies 46 (Spring-Autumn 1995), 342. 
 
Wyschogrod, Edith, Modern Theology 11.2 (April 1995), 268-70. 
 
Reviews of Love’s Work  
Aspden, Peter, ‘Brave Lament for the Human Condition’, Financial Times (4th March  
1995), 29. 
 
Baelz, Peter, Theology 99 (November-December 1996), 456-7. 
 
Battersby, Eileen, The Irish Times (19th April 1997), Supplement, 8. 
 
Carrigan Jr., Henry, Library Journal 121.1 (1st January 1996), 107. 
 
Dowse, Sara, ‘Ordinary Mortality,’ The Age (22nd July 1995), 8. 
 
Feinstein, Elaine, ‘Love’s Work’, Times Literary Supplement 4798 (17th March 1995),  
28. 
 
Hunt, Ian, New Statesman & Society (3rd March 1995), 37. 
 
Mendelsohn, Daniel, ‘Keep Your Mind in Hell,’ New York Times Book Review (21st  
January 1996), 34. 
 
Mort, Jo-Ann, ‘The Mind-Body Problem,’ The Jerusalem Report (18th April 1996), 57. 
 
Neuberger, Julia, ‘Where Bodies are Buried but Spirits Live,’ The Times (9th March  
1995), 38. 
 
Russell, Mary, ‘Life and Loves of a Gutsy Lady,’ The Irish Times (March 10th 1995),  
12. 
 
Schapira, Michael, ‘Love’s Work’, Full Stop (24th June 2011),  
http://www.full-stop.net/2011/06/24/reviews/michael-schapira/loves-work-
gillian-rose/, accessed 21st May 2012. 
 
Soper, Kate, New Left Review 218 (July/August 1996), 155-161. 
 
Stuttaford, Genevieve, Publishers Weekly 242.49 (4th December 1995), 50-1. 
 229 
Tonkin, Boyd, ‘Short Is Beautiful,’ New Statesman & Society (5th January 1996), 41. 
 
Turner, Jenny, ‘Failing Into Love,’ The Guardian (7th March 1995), T6. 
 
Warner, Marina, ‘Fierceness’, London Review of Books, 17.7 (6th April 1995), 11. 
 
Reviews of Mourning Becomes the Law 
Desmond, William, Modern Theology 13.4 (October 1997), 539-541. 
 
Johnson, Daniel, ‘Mourning: The Consolation of a Philosopher,’ The Times (21st  
December 1996). 
 
Sherman, David, Dialogue 38.2 (1999), 458-60. 
 
Warner, Marina, ‘Reason to believe’, New Statesman (4th October 4 1996), 43-4. 
 
Books  
Lloyd, Vincent, Law and Transcendence: On the Unfinished Project of Gillian Rose  
(Renewing Philosophy; Gary Banham (ed); Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009). 
  
Schick, Kate, Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University,  
2012). 
 
Shanks, Andrew, Against Innocence: Gillian Rose’s Reception and Gift of Faith  
(London: SCM Press, 2008). 
 
Journal Special Issues  
Telos (Winter 2015, in press), edited by Andrew Brower Latz and Marcus Pound. 
• Andrew Brower Latz and Marcus Pound, ‘Introduction’.  
• Rowan Williams, ‘‘The Sadness of the King’: Gillian Rose, Hegel and the 
Pathos of Reason’.  
• Andrew Brower Latz, ‘Gillian Rose and Social Theory’. 
• Peter Osborne, ‘Gillian Rose and Marxism’. 
• John Milbank, ‘On the Paraethical: Gillian Rose and Political Nihilism’. 
• Kate Schick, ‘Re-cognizing Recognition: Gillian Rose’s ‘Radical Hegel’ and 
Vulnerable Recognition’. 
• Vincent Lloyd, ‘Rose, Race and Identity’. 
• Andrew Shanks, ‘Gillian Rose and Theology: Salvaging Faith’.  
• Nigel Tubbs, ‘Rose and Education’. 
 
Women: A Cultural Review 9.1 (1998), pp. 1-61, edited by Howard Caygill. 
• Laura Marcus, ‘Introduction: The Work of Gillian Rose’, 1-18. 
• Howard Caygill, ‘The Broken Hegel: Gillian Rose’s Retrieval of Speculative 
Philosophy’, 19-27. 
• Mary Evans, ‘De-Constructing Death: In Memory of Gillian Rose’, 28-33. 
• Nigel Tubbs, ‘What Is Love’s Work?’, 34-46. 





Articles, book chapters, sections of books 
Alvares, Claudia, Humanism After Colonialism (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2006). 
 
Avrahami, Einat, ‘‘Keep Your Mind in Hell and Despair Not’: Illness as Life Affair in  
Gillian Rose’s Love’s Work,’ Narrative 9.3 (2001), 305-321. 
 
Ayres, Lewis, ‘Representation, Theology, and Faith,’ Modern Theology 11.1 (1995),  
23-46. 
 
Beardsworth, Richard, Derrida and the Political (London: Routledge, 1996). 
 
Bergo, Bettina, Levinas Between Ethics and Politics: For the Beauty that Adorns the  
Earth (Boston: Kluwer, 1999). 
 
Bernstein, Jay, ‘Philosophy Among the Ruins,’ Prospect 6 (1996), 27-30. 
 
Bewes, Timothy, Cynicism and Postmodernity (London: Verso, 1997). 
 
Brittain, Christopher Craig, ‘Bioplolitics in the Messianic Light’, Radical Philosophy  
Review 10.2 (2007), 177-89. 
 
Brower Latz, Andrew, ‘Hegelian Contra Neo-Kantian Sociology: The Case of Gillian  
Rose’, Critical Horizons (in press). 
 
⎯, ‘Ideology Critique Via Jurisprudence: Against Rose’s Critique of Roman Law in  
Kant’, Thesis Eleven (in press). 
 
⎯, ‘Purity in Future Theology’ in Purity: Essays in Bible and Theology, edited by  
Andrew Brower Latz and Arseny Ermakov (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 
2014), 252-73.  
 
Caygill, Howard, ‘Rose, Gillian Rosemary (1947-1995)’ in Oxford Dictionary of  
National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University, 2004), 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/60360, accessed 16th January 2013. 
 
Cohen, Josh, ‘Dialectic of Entanglement: Adorno, Auschwitz and the Contradictions of  
Representation’ in In Practice: Adorno, Critical Theory and Cultural Studies 
edited by Holger Briel and Andreas Kramer (German Linguistic and Cultural 
Studies 9; Peter Rolf Lutzeier (ed.); Oxford: Peter Lang, 2001). 
 
Davis, Joshua B., Waiting and Being: Creation, Freedom and Grace in Western  
Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013). See the symposium at 
https://syndicatetheology.com/symposium/409/, accessed 1st September 2014. 
 
Diedrich, Lisa, ‘A Bioethics of Failure: Antiheroic Cancer Narratives’ in Ethics of the  
Body: Postconventional Challenges, edited by Margrit Shildrick and Roxanne 
Mykitiuk (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005). 
  
Disley, Liz, Hegel, Love and Forgiveness: Positive Recognition in German Idealism  
(London: Pickering & Chatto, 2015). 
 
Ellis, Marc H., ‘Questioning Conversion: Gillian Rose, George Steiner, and  
 231 
Christianity’ in Revolutionary Forgiveness: Essays on Judaism, Christianity, 
and the Future of Religious Life (Waco: Baylor University, 2000), 229-58. 
 
Flessas, Tatiana, ‘Sacrificial Stone’, Law and Literature 14.1 (2002), 49-84. 
 
Gorman, Anthony, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism,’ Radical  
Philosophy 105 (2001), 25-36. 
 
⎯, ‘Nihilism and Faith: Rose, Bernstein, and the Future of Critical Theory,’ Radical  
Philosophy, 134 (November/December, 2005), 18-30. 
 
⎯,  ‘Whither the Broken Middle? Rose and Fackenheim on Mourning,  
Modernity, and the Holocaust’ in Social Theory After the Holocaust, edited by 
Robert Fine and Charles Turner (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), 
47-70. 
 
Greer, Clare, ‘The Problem of the Middle in Gillian Rose’s Reading of Hegel: Political  
Consequences for the Theology of John Milbank’ in After the Postsecular and 
the Postmodern: New Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion, edited by 
Anthony Paul Smith and Daniel Whistler (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars 
Press, 2010), 189-208. 
 
Harrington, Austin, ‘From Hegel to the Sociology of Knowledge: Contested Narratives’  
Theory, Culture & Society 18.6 (2001), 125-33. 
 
Harris, H. S., ‘The Hegel Renaissance in the Anglo-Saxon World since 1945’, The Owl  
of Minerva 15.1 (1983), 77-105. 
 
Hartley, George, The Abyss of Representation: Marxism and the Postmodern Sublime  
(Durham, NC: Duke University, 2003). 
 
Hill, Geoffrey, ‘Rhetorics of Value and Intrinsic Value’ 465-477 and ‘A Postscript on  
Modernist Poetics’, 565-80 in Collected Critical Writings (Oxford: Oxford 
University, 2008). 
  
Hyman, Gavin, Traversing the Middle: Ethics, Politics, Religion (Eugene, Or.: Cascade  
Books, 2013). See the symposium at  
http://syndicatetheology.com/symposium/395/, accessed 1st September 2014. 
 
Israel, Joachim, ‘Epistemology and Sociology of Knowledge: An Hegelian  
Undertaking’, Sociological Perspectives 33.1 (Critical Theory, Spring 1990), 
111-28. 
 
Jarvis, Simon, ‘Idle Tears: A Response to Gillian Rose’ in Hegel’s Phenomenology of  
Spirit: A Reappraisal, edited by Gary K. Browning (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 
113-9.  
 
Jay, Martin, ‘Force Fields,’ Salmagundi 113 (1997), 41-52. 
 
Kavka, Martin, ‘Saying Kaddish for Gillian Rose, or On Levinas and  
Geltungsphilosophie’ in Secular Theology: American Radical Theological 
Thought, edited by Clayton Crockett (London: Routledge, 2001), 104-129. 
 232 
Kennedy, David, Elegy (London: Routledge, 2007). 
 
Kirkland, S. A., ‘Prayerful Dispossession and the Grammar of Thinking Theologically:  
Sarah Coakley and Gillian Rose’ (2014) New Blackfriars; 
 doi: 10.1111/nbfr.12085., accessed 1st October 2014. 
 
Kolbrener, William, ‘Death of Moses Revisited: Repetition and Creative Memory in  
Freud and the Rabbis’, American Imago 67:2 (2010), 245-64. 
 
⎯, ‘The Hermeneutics of Mourning: Multiplicity and Authority in Jewish Law,’  
College Literature 30.4 (2003), 114-139. 
 
Lathangue, Robin, ‘Yielding Actuality: Trust and Reason in Gillian Rose’s Vision of  
Community,’ Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45.1 (2007), 117-127. 
 
Lloyd, Vincent, ‘Gillian Rose: Making Kierkegaard Difficult Again’ in Kierkegaard's  
Influence on Philosophy, volume 11 of Kierkegaard Research: Sources, 
Reception and Resources, edited by Jon Stewart (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), 
203-18. 
  
⎯, ‘On Gillian Rose and Love,’ Telos 143 (2008), 47-62. 
Accompanied by: ‘Love, In Theory: Five Questions for Vincent Lloyd’ at 
http://www.telospress.com/main/index.php?main_page=news_article&article_id
=249, accessed 14th May 2011. 
 
⎯, ‘On the Use of Gillian Rose,’ The Heythrop Journal 48.5 (2007), 697-706. 
 
⎯, The Problem with Grace: Reconfiguring Political Theology (California: Stanford  
University, 2011). 
 
⎯, ‘Review of Against Innocence’, Ars Disputandi 11 (2011), 40-2. 
 
⎯, ‘The Secular Faith of Gillian Rose,’ Journal of Religious Ethics 36.4 (2008), 683- 
705. 
 
Mack, Michael, ‘Law and Charity: Walter Benjamin, Leo Strauss, Georg Simmel, Franz  
Baermann’, Law Text Culture 5:1 (2000), n.p., 
http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol5/iss1/6, accessed 10 March 2015. 
 
MacMillen, Sarah L., ‘Faith Beyond Optimism: Simone Weil, Hannah Arendt, and  
Gillian Rose’, Philosophy & Theology 23.2 (2011), 257-66. 
 
Milbank, John, ‘An Essay Against Secular Order’, The Journal of Religious Ethics 15.2  
(Fall 1987), 199-224. 
 
Milne, Drew, ‘The Beautiful Soul: From Hegel to Beckett’, Diacritics 32.1 (Rethinking  
Beauty Spring 2002), 63-82. 
 
O’Neill, Maggie, Adorno, Culture and Feminism (London: Sage, 1999). 
 
Parkinson, Anna, ‘‘Mourning Rationalism without Reason?’ Affectual Surplus in the  
Wake of Poststructuralism,’ REAL: The Yearbook of Research in English and 
 233 
American Literature, 16 (2000), 213-28. 
 
Parry, Ann, ‘‘…To Give…Death a Place’: Rejecting the ‘ineffability’ of the Holocaust:  
the Work of Gillian Rose and Anne Michaels,’ Journal of European Studies 
30.4 (2000), 353-68. 
 
Paskins, Matthew, ‘Hill and Gillian Rose’ in Geoffrey Hill and his Contexts, edited by  
Piers Pennington and Matthew Sperling (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011), 171-86. 
 
Phillips, Wesley, ‘Melancholy Science? German Idealism and Critical Theory  
Reconsidered’, Telos 157 (Winter 2011), 129-47. 
 
Pound, Marcus, ‘Political Theology and Comedy: Žižek through Rose tinted Glasses’,  
Crisis and Critique 2:1 (9 February 2015), http://crisiscritique.org/uploads-
new/Pound.pdf, accessed 10th February 2015. 
 
⎯, Žižek: A (Very) Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008). 
 
⎯, ‘Žižek, Milbank, and the Broken Middle’, International Journal of  
Žižek Studies 4:4 (2010; Žižek’s Theology, edited by Marcus Pound), 
http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/269/344, accessed 25th 
November 2011. 
 
Rashkover, Randi, ‘Theological Desire: Feminism, Philosophy, and Exegetical Jewish  
Thought’ in Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, edited by Hava Tirosh-
Samuelson (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 2004), 314-339. 
 
Ratekin, Tom, ‘Working through the Four Discourses: Gillian Rose and the Products of  
Love’s Work,’ Prose Studies 28.1 (2006), 74-96. 
 
Rose, Jacqueline, ‘On Gillian Rose’ in The Last Resistance (London: Verso, 2007),  
223-8. 
 
Rowlands, Anna ‘‘Angry Angels’ as Guides to Ethics and Faith: Reflections on Simone  
Weil and Gillian Rose,’ Theology 112.865 (2009), 14-23. 
 
Schick, Kate, ‘Gillian Rose and Vulnerable Judgement’ in The Vulnerable Subject:  
Beyond Rationalism in International Relations, edited by Amanda Russell 
Beattie and Kate Schick (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 43-61. 
  
Sider, J. Alexander, To See History Doxologically: History and Holiness in John  
Howard Yoder’s Ecclesiology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011). 
 
Silverman, Max, Facing Postmodernity: Contemporary French Thought on Culture and  
Society (London: Routledge, 1999). 
 
Smith, Ted A., ‘Mourning 9/11: Walter Benjamin, Gillian Rose, and the Dual Register  
of mourning’, Political Theology 12.5 (2011), 792-800. 
⎯, ‘Politics in the Wake of Divine Violence’, Studies in Christian Ethics 25.4 (2012),  
454-72. 
 
Stanley, Liz, ‘Mourning Becomes…: The Work of Feminism in the Spaces Between  
 234 
Lives Lived and Lives Written,’ Women’s Studies International Forum 25.1 
(2002), 1-17. 
 
Stone, Alison, ‘Hegel’s Dialectic and the Recognition of Feminine Difference,’  
Philosophy Today Supplement 47.5 (2003), 132-9. 
 
Surin, Kenneth, ‘Marxism(s) and “The Withering Away of the State”’, Social Text 27  
(1990), 35-54. 
  
Tubbs, Nigel, Contradiction of Enlightenment: Hegel and the Broken Middle  
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997). 
 
⎯, Education in Hegel, (London: Continuum, 2008). 
 
⎯, ‘Hegel and the Philosophy of Education’, (no date) Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of  
Education, edited by M. Peters, P. Ghiraldelli, B. Źarnić and A. Gibbons, 
http://www.ffst.hr/ENCYCLOPAEDIA/doku.php?id=hegel_and_philosophy_of
_education_ii, accessed 12th November 2012. 
 
⎯, ‘Mind the Gap: The Philosophy of Gillian Rose,’ Thesis Eleven 60 (2000), 42-61. 
 
⎯, The Philosophy of the Teacher (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).  
 
Walsh, Philip, Skepticism, Modernity and Critical Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave  
Macmillan, 2005). 
 
Williams, Rowan D., ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics: Reflections in the Wake of  
Gillian Rose,’ Modern Theology 11.1 (1995), 3-22. 
 
⎯, Lost Icons: Reflections on Cultural Bereavement (London: T&T Clark, 2002). 
 
Wolf, Arnold Jacob, ‘The Tragedy of Gillian Rose,’ Judaism 46.4 (1997), 481-8. 
 
Žižek, Slavoj, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (2nd  
edition; London: Verso, 2008 [1991]). 
 
Poetry  
Hill, Geoffrey, ‘In Memoriam: Gillian Rose,’ Poetry 189.3 (December 2006), 187-91. 
 
Mann, Rachel, ‘Presiding From the Broken Middle’ in Presiding Like a Woman, edited  
by Nicola Slee and Stephen Burns (London: SPCK, 2010), 133-9. 
 
Williams, Rowan, ‘Winterreise’ in The Poems of Rowan Williams (Oxford: Perpetua,  
2002), 84-5. 
 
Doctoral Dissertations  
Gibson, Suzie M., Dramas of Decision: Ethics and Secrecy in Henry James, Jacques  
Derrida and Gillian Rose (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of 
English, Queensland University, 2002).  
 
Hammond, Naomi Felicity, Philosophy and the Facetious Style: Examining Philosophy  
as a Method in the Works of Gillian Rose (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
 235 
School of Education, King Alfred’s College of Higher Education, Winchester 
University, 2002). 
  
Lloyd, Vincent, Beyond Supersessionism: Gillian Rose and the Rhetoric of  
Transcendence (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 
 Berkeley, 2008). 
 
Parry, Gregory David, The “Void” in Simone Weil and the “Broken Middle” in Gillian  
Rose: The Genesis of the Search for Salvation (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Durham, 2006). 
 
Ratzman, Elliot, At the Common Altar: Political Messianism, Practical Ethics and Post- 
War Jewish Thought (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Religion, 
Princeton University, 2009). 
 
Rowlands, Anna, Practical Theology in ‘The Third City’ (Unpublished Ph.D.  
dissertation, Manchester University, Thesis no. Th28503, 2007).  
 
Schick, Katherine Anne, Trauma and the Ethical in International Relations  
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, School of International Relations, University of 
St. Andrews, 2008). 
  
Internet Resources  
Fluss, Harrison, ‘The Spiritual-Animal Kingdom: On Gillian Rose’s Critique of  





both accessed 27th January 2012. 
 
‘Rose: Adorno and Reification’, 25th April 2008,  
http://frankfurtschool.wordpress.com/2008/04/25/rose-adorno-and-reification/, 
accessed 18th December 2012. 
 
‘Gillian Rose: The Melancholy Science’, 25th April 2008,  
http://frankfurtschool.wordpress.com/2008/04/25/gillian-roses-the-melancholy-
science/, accessed 18th December 2012. 
 
Black, David, ‘‘Reification a Myth’ Shock (or What Gillian Rose Tells Us about Sohn- 
Rethel, Adorno and Ancient Greece)’, 27th July 2010, 
http://www.internationalmarxisthumanist.org/articles/hegels-absolutes-and-the-
crisis-of-marxism-by-peter-hudis, accessed 18th December 2012. 
 
⎯, ‘On Hegel, Rosa Luxemburg and Marxist-Humanism’, 15 December 2010, 
http://www.internationalmarxisthumanist.org/articles/on-hegel-rosa-luxemburg-
and-marxist-humanism-by-david-black, accessed 18th  December 2012. 
 
⎯, ‘Adorno for Revolutionaries’, 16th June 2011,  
http://www.internationalmarxisthumanist.org/articles/adorno-revolutionaries-
david-black, accessed 18th December 2012. 
 
 236 
Hartnett, Liane. ‘Review of Kate Schick, Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice’,  
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2013/09/01/book-review-gillian-
rose-a-good-enough-justice/, accessed 7th June 2014. 
 
Hudis, Peter, ‘Hegel’s Absolutes and the Crisis of Marxism’, 1st May 2003,  
http://www.internationalmarxisthumanist.org/articles/hegels-absolutes-and-the-
crisis-of-marxism-by-peter-hudis, accessed 18th December 2012. 
 
http://www.gillianrose.org, accessed 18th December 2012. 
 
Works mentioning Rose  
Armstrong, Isobel, ‘Transparency: Towards a Poetics of Glass in the Nineteenth  
Century’ in Cultural Babbage: Technology, Time and Invention, edited by 
Francis Spufford and Jenny Uglow (London: Faber & Faber, 1996), 123-48. 
 
Barnes, SJ, Michael, Theology and the Dialogue of Religions (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University, 2002). 
 
Bauer, Karin, Adorno’s Nietzschean Narratives: Critiques of Ideology, Readings of  
Wagner (New York: State University of New York, 1999). 
 
Beattie, Tina, New Catholic Feminism: Theology and Theory (London: Routledge,  
2006). 
 
Boucher, Geoff, Adorno Reframed (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013). 
 
Brittain, Christopher Craig, Adorno and Theology (London T&T Clark, 2010). 
 
⎯, The Weight of Objectivity: Critical Social Theory and Theology (Saarbrücken: LAP  
 Lambert Academic, 2010).  
 
Carey, George, ‘Archbishop George Carey’s 1996 Christmas day Sermon’,  
http://www.anglicancommunion.org/acns/news.cfm/1996/12/25/ACNS1064, 
accessed 23rd February 2012. 
 
Cook, Jennifer, ‘Brushing Thinking Against the Grain: Walter Benjamin and the  
Potentialities of Art and History’, Studies in Social and Political Thought 8.2 
(April 2003), 19-34, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/cspt/1-6-1-2-8.html, accessed 13th 
November 2012. 
 
Edgar, Andrew and Peter Sedgwick, Cultural Theory: The Key Concepts (2nd edition;  
London: Routledge). 
 
Feenberg, Andrew, The Philosophy of Praxis: Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School  
(London: Verso), 2014. 
 
Fine, Robert, Political Investigations: Hegel, Marx, Arendt (London: Routledge, 2001). 
 
Gardner, Lucy, David Moss, Ben Quash and Graham Ward, Balthasar at the End of  
Modernity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999). 
 
Gibson, Suzie, ‘The Gift of Faith. Rethinking an Ethics of Sacrifice and Decision in  
 237 
Fear and Trembling and The Gift of Death’, Philosophy Today 53.2 (Summer 
2009), 126-35. 
 
Goodrich, Peter, ‘Criminology and the Aesthetic of Feminine Disappearance’, Review  
of Imagining Crime: Textual Outlaws and Criminal Conversations by Alison 
Young, The Modern Law Review 60.3 (May, 1997), 428-44.  
 
⎯, Reading the Law: A Critical Introduction to Legal Method and Techniques (Oxford:  
Blackwell, 1986). 
 
Gray, Alastair and Phillip Homburg, ‘Howard Caygill – Author of ‘In Resistance: A  
Philosophy of Defiance’, Studies in Social and Political Thought 22 (Winter 
2013), 3-10. 
 
Groves, Christopher, ‘Nietzsche’s Genealogy: the Jewish Slave Revolt, Gay Science,  
and Honest Lies’, New Nietzsche Studies 7.3&4 (Fall 2007/Winter 2008), 91-
105. 
 
Gurnham, David, ‘The Otherness of the Dead: The Fates of Antigone, Narcissus, and  
the Sly Fox, and the Search for Justice’, Law and Literature 16.3 (Fall 2004), 
327-51. 
 
Harold, Philip J., Prophetic Politics: Emmanuel Levinas and the Sanctification of  
Suffering (Athen, OH: Ohio University, 2009). 
 
Hill, Leslie, ‘Introduction’ in Maurice Blanchot: The Demand of Writing, edited by  
Carolyn Bailey Gill (London: Routledge, 1996). 
 
Ingleby, Jonathan, Beyond Empire: Postcolonialism & Mission in a Global Context  
(Milton Keynes: Author House, 2010). 
 
Jay, Martin, ‘Adorno in America’, New German Critique 31 (Winter 1984), 157-82. 
 
Johnson, Daniel, ‘The Kingmakers of Warwick’, The Times Weekend (Saturday 29th  
July 1995), 12. 
 
Joll, Nicholas, ‘How Should Philosophy Be Clear? Loaded Clarity Default Clarity and  
Adorno’, Telos 146 (Spring 2009), 73-95. 
 
Joughin, John J., ‘Bottom’s Secret…’ in Spiritual Shakespeares, edited by Ewan Fernie  
(London: Routledge, 1995), 130-56. 
 
Kaufmann, David, ‘Beyond Use, within Reason: Adorno, Benjamin and the Question of  
Theology’, New German Critique 83 (Spring-Summer 2001), 151-73. 
 
Kings, Graham, ‘Faith and Fellowship in Crisis’, Fulcrum Newsletter, April 2008,  
http://www.fulcrum-anglican.org.uk/page.cfm?ID=301, accessed 14th November 
2012. 
 




Martin, Stewart, Adorno and the Problem of Philosophy (Unpublished Ph.D.  
dissertation, Middlesex University, 2002). 
 
McGowan, Todd, ‘Condemned to the Absolute, or, How Hegel Can Help Us Cross  
Borders’, The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association 30.1/2 
(Borders Spring 1997), 114-30. 
 
Murphy, Tim, The Oldest Social Science? Configurations of Law and Modernity  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
 
Osborne, Peter, ‘More Than Everything. Žižek’s Badiouian Hegel’, Radical Philosophy  
177 (January/February 2013), 19-25. 
 
Rahskover, Randi, ‘Back to the City. Jewish Sexuate Rights’, Philosophy Today 50.1  
(Spring 2006), 104-116. 
 
Rothberg, Michael, Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation  
(London: University of Minnesota, 2000). 
 
Rowlands, Anna, ‘Teaching Political Theology as Ministerial Formation’, Political  
Theology 13.6 (2012), 704-16. 
 
Schick, Kate, ‘Acting Out and Working Through: Trauma and (in)security’, Review of  
International Studies, doi:10.1017/S0260210510001130, 13th October 2010, 1-
19. 
 
Schramm, Jan-Melissa, Atonement and Self-Sacrifice in Nineteenth-Century Narrative  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2012). 
 
Sheldon, Sally, ‘Fragmenting Fatherhood: The Regulation of Reproductive  
Technologies’, The Modern Law Review 68.4 (July, 2005), 523-53. 
 
Speight, C. Allen, ‘The “Metaphysics” of Morals and Hegel’s Critique of Kantian  
Ethics’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 14.4 (October 1997), 379-402. 
 
Thompson, Chris, Felt: Fluxus, Joseph Beuys, and the Dalia Lama (Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota, 2011). 
 
Walsh, Philip, Arendt Contra Sociology: Theory, Society and its Science (Farnham:  
Ashgate, 2015). 
 
Ward, Graham, ‘Allegoria: Reading as a Spiritual Exercise’, Modern Theology 15 (July,  
1999), 271-95. 
 
Ward, Lewis, Holocaust Memory in Contemporary Narratives: Towards a Theory of  
Transgenerational Empathy (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Exeter, English, September 2008). 
 
Wilcock, Evelyn, ‘Negative Identity: Mixed German Jewish Descent as a Factor in the  




Williams, Rowan, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language (London:  
Bloomsbury, 2014). 
 
Witkin, Robert W., Adorno on Popular Culture (London: Routledge, 2003). 
 
Wood, David, Thinking After Heidegger (Cambridge: Polity, 2002). 
 
Zamir, Shamoon, Dark Voices: W. E. B. Du Bois and American Thought, 1888-1903  
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993). 
 
Other Works Cited 
Adams, John N. and Roger Brownsword, Understanding Law (4th ed.; London: Sweet &  
Maxwell, 2006). 
 
Adorno, Theodor W., ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, Telos 31 (20th March 1977), 120- 
33. 
 
⎯, The Culture Industry, edited by J. M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1991). 
 
⎯, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Rodney Livingstone, edited by Rolf  
Tiedemann (Stanford: Stanford University, 2001 [1995]). 
 
⎯, Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, edited by Rolf Tiedemann, translated by  
Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University, 2001 [1965]). 
 
⎯, Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton (London: Continuum, 1983). 
 
⎯, The Adorno Reader, edited by Brian O’Connor (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). 
 
Adorno, Theodor W., Hans Albert, Ralf Dahrendorf, et al, The Positivist Dispute in  
German Sociology, translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: 
Heinemann, 1976 [1969]). 
 
Adorno, Theodor W. and Hellmut Becker ‘Education or Maturity and Responsibility’,  
translated by Robert French, Jem Thomas and Dorothee Weymann, History of 
the Human Sciences 12.3 (1999), 21-34. 
 
Adorno, Theodor W. and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by  
John Cumming (London: Verso, 1997 [1944 and 1969]). 
 
Allison, Henry E., ‘Justification and Freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason’ in  
Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: The Three ‘Critiques’ and the ‘Opus 
postumum’, edited by Eckart Förster (Stanford: Stanford University, 1989), 114-
30. 
 
Ameriks, Karl, Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation  
(Oxford: Oxford University, 2006). 
 
⎯, ‘Vindicating Autonomy’ in Kant on Moral Autonomy, edited by  
Oliver Sensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2012), 53-70. 
 
Ansell-Pearson, Keith, ‘Nietzsche and the Problem of the Will in Modernity’ in  
 240 
Nietzsche and Modern German Thought, edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 165-91. 
 
Arato, Andrew and Jean Cohen, Civil Society and Political Theory (London: MIT,  
1994). 
 
Avineri, Shlomo, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University, 1972). 
 
Azmanova, Albena, The Scandal of Reason: A Critical Theory of Political Judgment  
(New York: Columbia University, 2012). 
 
Batnitzky, Leora, ‘Love and Law: John Milbank and Hermann Cohen on the Ethical  
Possibilities of Secular Society’ in Secular Theology: American Radical 
Theological Thought, edited by Clayton Crockett (London: Routledge, 2001), 
73-91. 
 
Bauman, Zygmunt, Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity, 1991). 
 
⎯, Modernity and the Holocaust (Oxford: Polity, 1989). 
 
Beckford, James, Social Theory and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University,  
2003). 
 
Beiser, Frederick C., ‘Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall’, International  
Journal of Philosophical Studies 17.1 (209), 9-27. 
 
Benhabib, Seyla, ‘Review of Richard J. Bernstein’s Violence: Thinking Without  
Banisters’, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 27th July 2014, 
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/49514-violence-thinking-without-banisters/, accessed 
6th October 2014. 
 
Bernstein, J. M., Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Modern European Philosophy;  
Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001). 
 
⎯,  ‘Autonomy and Solitude’, in Nietzsche and Modern German Thought,  
edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson (London: Routledge, 1991), 192-215. 
 
⎯, ‘Benjamin’s Speculative Cultural History’, Theory, Culture & Society 16.3 (1999),  
141-150. 
 
⎯, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno  
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 1992). 
 
⎯, ‘Philosophy Among the Ruins’, Prospect 6 (March 1996), 27-30. 
 
⎯, Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory  
(London: Routledge, 1995). 
 
⎯, ‘Right, Revolution and Community: Marx’s ‘On the Jewish Question’’ in Socialism  
and the Limits of Liberalism, edited by Peter Osborne (London: Verso, 1991), 
91-119. 
 241 
⎯,  ‘Speculation and aporia’, 2nd April 1987, University of Warwick  
Library, Modern Records Centre, MSS.377, box 36, 1-7. 
 
Bhaskar, Roy, Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom (London: Routledge, 2008). 
 
Bierbricher, Thomas, ‘Critical Theories of the State: Governmentality and the Strategic- 
Relational Approach’, Constellations 20.3 (2013), 388-405. 
 
Biernacki, Richard, Reinventing Evidence in Social Inquiry: Decoding Facts and  
Variables (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
 
Bloor, David, ‘Anti-Latour’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30.1 (1999),  
81-112. 
 
Blunden, Andy, ‘Foreword’ in G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Logic: Part One of the  
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (revised edition; Marxist Internet 
Archive, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/index.htm, accessed 
9th June 2012). 
 
de Boer, Karin, On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan,  
2010). 
 
Booth, Edward, O.P., Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1983). 
 
Bottomore, Tom, with Laurence Harris, V. G. Kiernan, Ralph Miliband (editors), A  
Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Blackwell, 1983). 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, translated by  
Richard Nice (London: Routledge, 2010 [ET: 1984; 1979]). 
 
⎯, The Logic of Practice, translated by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity, 1990 [1980]). 
 
Bowie, Andrew, Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 2013). 
 
Bowman, Brady, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University, 2013). 
 
Brandom, Robert, ‘Georg Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit’, Topoi 27 (2008), 161-4. 
 
Brooks, Thom, ‘Between Natural Law and Legal Positivism: Dworkin and Hegel on  
Legal Theory’, Georgia State University Law Review 25 (2006-7), 513-60. 
 
⎯,  Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right (2nd  
edition; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2012 [2007]). 
 
⎯, ‘Natural Law Internalism’, 168-79 in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, edited by Thom  
Brooks (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). 
 




⎯, ‘Meaning and Morality in Modernity’, Philosophy Now (Jan/Feb 2015), 33-5. 
 
⎯, ‘Review of Andrew Shanks, Hegel and Religious Faith’, Political Theology, 14.2  
(April, 2013), 227-9. 
 
⎯,  ‘Review of Andrew Shanks, Neo-Hegelian Theology’, Political Theology  
(in press). 
 
⎯, ‘Review of Kate Schick, Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice’, International  
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 21.2 (May 2013), 307-11. 
 
⎯, ‘Review of Liz Disley, Hegel, Love and Forgiveness: Positive Recognition in  
German Idealism’, Critical Research on Religion (forthcoming). 
 
⎯,  ‘Review of Vincent W. Lloyd, The Problem with Grace’, Theological Book  
Review, 23.1 (October 2011), 90-1. 
 
⎯, ‘Review of Vincent W. Lloyd and Elliot A. Ratzman (Eds.), Secular Faith’ in  
Theological Book Review, 23.1 (October 2011), 12. 
 
Brown, Callum G., The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation 
 1800-2000 (2nd edition; London: Routledge, 2009). 
 
Brown, Robert, Explanation and Experience in Social Science (London: Aldine  
Transaction, 1963). 
 
Brudner, Alan, ‘Hegel on the Relation between Law and Justice’ in Hegel’s Philosophy  
of Right, edited by Thom Brooks (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 180-208.  
 
Brunkhorst, Hauke, Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community,  
translated by Jeffrey Flynn (London: MIT, 2005 [2002]).  
 
Buchwalter, Andrew, ‘Religion, Civil Society, and the System of an Ethical World:  
Hegel on the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’, in Hegel on Religion 
and Politics, edited by Angelica Nuzzo (New York: State University of New 
York, 2013), 213-32. 
 
Bucklan, W. W., A Manual of Roman Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University,  
1928). 
 
Burbidge, John, ‘Hegel’s Logic as Metaphysics’, Hegel Bulletin, 35.1 (2014), 100-15. 
 
⎯, The Logic of Hegel’s Logic (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview, 2006). 
 
Carlson, David Gray, A Commentary to Hegel’s Science of Logic (Basingstoke:  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
 
Caygill, Howard, Art of Judgement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). 
 
⎯, ‘Critical Theory and the New Thinking: A Preliminary Approach’ in The Early  
Frankfurt School and Religion, edited by Margarete Kohlenbach and Raymond  
Geuss (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 145-53. 
 243 
⎯, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge, 1998). 
 
Cerf, Walter, ‘Speculative Philosophy and Intellectual Intuition: An Introduction to  
Hegel’s Essays’ in Faith and Knowledge or the Reflective Philosophy of 
Subjectivity in the complete range of its forms as Kantian, Jacobian, and 
Fichtean Philosophy, translated by Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany: State 
University of New York, 1977), xi-xxxvi. 
 
Cheyette Bryan and Laura Marcus (editors), Modernity, Culture and ‘the Jew’  
(Stanford: Stanford University, 1998). 
 
Christakis, Nicholas A., ‘Let’s Shake up the Social Sciences’, International Herald  
Tribune 9th July 2013, < 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/lets-shake-up-the-social-
sciences.html?_r=0>, accessed 2nd December 2014. 
 
Coady, C. A. J., Messy Morality: The Challenge of Politics (Oxford: Clarendon, 2008). 
 
Cohen, Ira J., ‘General Editor’s Foreword’, in Max Weber: Readings and Commentary  
on Modernity, edited by Stephen Kalberg (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), xi-xiv. 
 
Collini, Stefan, ‘A Tale of Two Critics’, Saturday Guardian, 17th August 2013, 16-18. 
 
Collins, Randall, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual  
Change (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1998). 
 
Conklin, William E., Hegel’s Laws: The Legitimacy of a Modern Legal Order  
(Stanford: Stanford University, 2008). 
 
Cooke, Maeve, ‘Truth in Narrative Riction: Kafka, Adorno and Beyond’, Philosophy &  
Social Criticism, 40:7 (2014), 629-43. 
 
Coskun, Deniz, Law as Symbolic Form: Ernst Cassirer and the Anthropocentric View  
of Law (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007). 
 
Cotterrell, Roger, ‘Classical Social Theory and Ideas of Responsibility and the State in  
France and Germany’, Comparative Law Review 15 (2013), 21-44. 
 
⎯, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory (Aldershot:  
Ashgate, 2006). 
 
⎯, ‘Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy’, Jurisprudence 15.1 (2014), 41-55. 
 
Coyle, Sean, From Positivism to Idealism: A Study of the Moral Dimensions of  
Legality (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
 
⎯, ‘Legality and the Liberal Order’, The Modern Law Review 76.2 (2013), 401-18. 
 
Cutrofello, Andrew, Discipline and Critique: Kant, Poststructuralism, and the Problem  
of Resistance (New York: State University of New York, 1994). 
 
Dias, R. W. M., ‘Review of Peter Stein, Regulae Iuris: From Juristic Rules to Legal  
 244 
Maxims’, Cambridge Law Journal 25.2 (1967), 269-71. 
 
Duquette, David A., ‘Kant, Hegel and the Possibility of a Speculative Logic’ in Essays  
on Hegel’s Logic, edited by George di Giovanni (Albany: State University of 
New York, 1990), 1-16. 
 
Earle, Bo, ‘Reconciling Social Science and Ethical Recognition: Hegelian Idealism and  
Brunswikian Psychology’, Journal of Speculative Philosophy 14.3 (2000), 192-
218. 
 
Editors, ‘Far-right and Wrong’, The Independent, Friday 19th September 2014, 27. 
 
Elder-Vass, David, The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and  
Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2010). 
 
Ellis, Marc H., Practicing Exile: The Religious Odyssey of an American Jew  
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002).  
 
Farris, Sara R., ‘From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question. Republican  
Rigorism, Culturalist Differentialism and Antinomies of Enforced 
Emancipation’, Constellations 21.2 (June 2014), 296-307. 
 
Fine, Robert, ‘Civil Society Theory, Enlightenment and Critique’, Democratization 4:1  
(1997), 7-28. 
 
Finlayson, James Gordon, ‘Morality and Critical Theory: On the Normative Problem of  
Frankfurt School Social Criticism’, Telos 146 (Spring 2009), 7-41. 
 
⎯, ‘Review of Adorno by Brian O’Connor’, 2nd August 2013,  
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/41463-adorno/, accessed 25th September 2013. 
 
Foley, Michael W. and Bob Edwards, ‘The Paradox of Civil Society’, Journal of  
Democracy 7.3 (1996), 38-52. 
 
Forst, Rainer, ‘Civil Society’, in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy,  
edited by Robert E. Goodin, Philip Petit, Thomas Pogge (2nd edition; Oxford: 
Blackwell), 2 volumes, 2: 451-62. 
 
Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Aspects of Sociology, translated by John Viertel  
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1972 [1956]). 
 
⎯, The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, edited by Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt  
(New York: Urizen Books, 1978). 
 
Freundlich, Dieter, Dieter Henrich and Contemporary Philosophy: The Return to  
Subjectivity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). 
 
Freyenhagen, Fabian, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy: Living Less Wrongly  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2013). 
 
⎯,  ‘The Empty Formalism Objection Revisited. §135R and Recent Kantian  
Responses’ in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, edited by Thom Brooks (Oxford:  
 245 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 43-72. 
 
Galston, William, The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and  
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2004). 
 
Gardner, John, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General (Oxford: Oxford  
University, 2012). 
 
Gellner, Ernest, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (London: Penguin,  
1994). 
 
Geuss, Raymond, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981). 
 
Giddens, Anthony, The Constitution of Society: An Outline of the Theory of  
Structuration (Cambridge: Polity, 1984). 
 
⎯, New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociologies  
(2nd edition; Stanford: Stanford University; 1993 [1976]). 
 
Goodall Amanda and Andrew Oswald, ‘Do the social sciences need a shake-up?’, Times  
Higher Education, 9th  October 2014 
<http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/do-the-social-sciences-need-a-
shake-up/2016165.article>, accessed 2nd December 2014. 
 
Greiffenhagen, Christian and Wes Sharrock, ‘Where Do the Limits of Experience Lie?  
Abandoning the Dualism of Objectivity and Subjectivity’, History of the Human 
Sciences 21.3 (2008), 70-93. 
 
Guyer, Paul, Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University, 2000). 
 
Habermas, Jürgen, An Awareness of What is Missing (Cambridge: Polity, 2010). 
 
⎯, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and  
Democracy, translated by William Rehg (Cambridge: Polity, 1996 [1992]). 
 
⎯, Knowledge and Human Interests, translated by J. J. Schapiro; London: Heinemann,  
1972 [1968]). 
 
⎯, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, translated by Shierry Weber  
Nicholson and Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge: MA, MIT, 1988 [1967]). 
 
⎯, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, translated by Frederick  
Lawrence; Cambridge: Polity, 1987 [1985]). 
 
⎯, Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society,  
volume 1 translated by Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity, 1986 [1981]). 
 
⎯, The Habermas Reader, edited by William Outhwaite (Cambridge: Polity, 1996). 
Hammer, Espen, ‘Habermas and the Kant-Hegel Contrast’ in German Idealism:  




Han, Byung-Chul, Psychopolitk: Neoliberalismus und die neuen Machttechniken  
(Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2014). 
 
Hann, Matthew James, ‘Egalitarian Rights Recognition: A Political Theory of Human  
Rights’ (Unpublished Pd.D. dissertation, Durham University, 2013). 
 
Hardimon, Michael O., Hegel’s Social Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University,  
1994). 
 
Harris, Errol E., Formal, Transcendental, and Dialectical Thinking: Logic and Reality  
(New York: State University of New York, 1987). 
 
Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (2nd edition; Oxford: Clarendon, 1994 [1961]). 
 
Hartmann, Klaus, ‘On Taking the Transcendental Turn’, Review of Metaphysics, 20.2  
(Dec 1966), 223-49. 
 
Harvey, David, A Companion to Marx’s Capital (London: Verso, 2010). 
 
Hastie, W., ‘Translator’s Preface’ in Kant, The Philosophy of Law (Edinburgh: T&T  
Clark, 1887), v-xxix. 
 
Hegel, G. W. F., Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part I:  
Science of Logic, translated and edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. 
Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2010). 
 
⎯, Faith and Knowledge or the Reflective Philosophy of Subjectivity in the complete  
range of its forms as Kantian, Jacobian, and Fichtean Philosophy, translated by 
Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York, 1977). 
 
⎯, Lectures on the History of Philosophy: The Lectures of 1825-1826. Volume III  
Medieval and Modern Philosophy, edited by Robert F. Brown, translated by R. 
F. Brown, J. M Stewart and H. S. Harris (Berkeley: University of California, 
1990). 
 
⎯, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox, revised and edited by  
Stephen Houlgate (Oxford: Oxford University, 2008 [1952]). 
 
⎯, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 1977). 
 
⎯, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Terry Pinkard,  
available at http://terrypinkard.weebly.com/phenomenology-of-spirit-page.html, 
accessed 17th April 2015. 
 
⎯, The Science of Logic, translated and edited by George di Giovanni (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University, 2010). 
 
⎯, The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, Its Place in Moral Philosophy, and Its  
 247 
Relation to the Positive Science of Law, translated by T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, 1975). 
 
⎯, The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, in On Christianity: Early Theological  
Writings, translated by T. M. Knox and R. Kroner (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1948). 
 
⎯, The Hegel Reader, edited by Stephen Houlgate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). 
 
Held, David, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas (Berkeley:  
University of California, 1980). 
 
Henrich, Dieter, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, edited by  
David S. Pacini (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University, 2003). 
 
⎯,  ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of  
the First Critique’ in Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: The Three ‘Critiques’ 
and the ‘Opus postumum’ edited by Eckart Förster (Stanford: Stanford 
University, 1989), 29-46. 
 
⎯, ‘Logical Form and Real Totality: The Authentic Conceptual Form of Hegel’s  
Concept of the State’ in Hegel on Ethics and Politics, edited by Robert B. Pippin 
and Otfried Höffe, translated by Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 2004), 241-67. 
 
⎯, The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy, edited by Richard L. Velkley,  
translated by Jeffrey Edwards, Louis Hunt, Manfred Kuehn, Guenter Zoeller 
(London: Harvard University, 1994). 
 
Honneth, Axel, ‘Decentered Autonomy: The Subject After the Fall’ in Disrespect: The  
Normative Foundations of Critical Theory, translated by Joseph Ganahl 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007 [2000]), 181-94. 
 
⎯, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life, translated by Joseph  
Ganahl (Cambridge: Polity, 2014 [2011]). 
 
⎯, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts,  
translated by Joel Anderson (Cambridge, MA; MIT, 1995). 
 
Horkheimer, Max, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ in Critical Theory: Selected  
Essays, translated by Matthew J. O’Conell and others (New York: Continuum, 
2002), 188-243. 
 
Houlgate, Stephen, Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University, 1986). 
 
⎯, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (2nd edition; Oxford:  
Blackwell, 2005 [1991]). 
 
⎯, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity (West Lafayette: Purdue  
University, 2006).  
 
 248 
Howe, Richard Herbert, ‘Max Weber’s Elective Affinities: Sociology Within the  
Bounds of Pure Reason’, American Journal of Sociology 84.2 (September 
1978), 366-85. 
 
Hulatt, Owen James, Texturalism and Performance – Adorno’s Theory of Truth  
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of York, 2011). 
 
Hunt, Alan, ‘Marxism, Law, Legal Theory and Jurisprudence’ in Dangerous  
Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence, edited by Peter 
Fitzpatrick (Durham, NC: Duke University: 1991), 101-32. 
 
Hunter, W. A., A Systematic and Historical Exposition of Roman Law in the Order of a  
Code (London: William Maxwell, 1885). 
 
Hursthouse, Rosalind, ‘Virtue theory and abortion’ in Ethics in Practice, edited by  
Hugh LaFollette ((Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies); 3rd edition; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2007), 158-67. 
 
Hutchings, Kimberly, ‘Hard Work: Hegel and the Meaning of the State in his  
Philosophy of Right’ in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right edited by Thom Brooks 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 124-142. 
 
⎯, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). 
 
von Ihering, Rudolf, Law as a Means to an End in The Great Legal Philosophers:  
Selected Readings in Jurisprudence, edited by Clarence Morris (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, 1959), 397-417. 
 
Ingram, David, Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason (London: Yale University,  
1987). 
 
Insole, Christopher J., Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem  
(Oxford: Oxford University, 2013). 
 
Jaeggi, Rahel, Alienation, translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith, edited  
by Frederick Neuhouser (New York: Columbia University, 2014 [2005]). 
 
⎯,  ‘“No Individual Can Resist”: Minima Moralia as Critique of Forms of  
Life’, Constellations 12.1 (2005), 65-82. 
 
Jarvis, Simon, Adorno: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). 
 
⎯, ‘What Is Speculative Thinking?’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:227 (2004),  
69-83. 
 
Jay, Martin, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to  
Habermas (Berkeley: University of California, 1984). 
 
Jessop, Bob, State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place (University Park:  
Pennsylvania University, 1990). 
 




Kalberg, Stephen, ‘Introduction: Marx Weber: The Confrontation with Modernity’ in  
Max Weber: Readings and Commentary on Modernity, edited by Stephen 
Kalberg (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 2-29. 
 
Kamenka, Eugene and Alice Erh-Soon Tay, ‘Beyond Bourgeois Individualism: the  
Contemporary Crisis in Law and Legal Ideology’ in Feudalism, Capitalism and 
Beyond, edited by Eugene Kamenka and R. S. Neale (Kent: Whitstable Litho, 
1975), 127-41. 
 
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason in Practical Philosophy, translated and  
edited by Mary McGregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999), 133-271. 
 
⎯,  Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited Paul Guyer and Allen  
W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998). 
 
⎯, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, translated by John Ladd (Indianapolis:  
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). 
 
⎯, ‘What Is Orientation in Thinking?’ in Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss,  
translated by H. B. Nisbet (2nd edition; Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991 
[1970]), 237-49. 
 
Kaufman, Walter, ‘The Hegel Myth and its Method’ in Hegel: A Collection of Critical  
Essays, edited by Alasdair MacIntyre (London: University of Notre Dame, 
1977), 21-60. 
 
Keane, John, ‘Introduction’ in Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives,  
edited by John Keane (London: Verso, 1988), 1-28. 
 
Keane, Webb, ‘Estrangement, Intimacy, and the Objects of Anthropology’ in The  
Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: positivism and its Epistemological 
Others, edited by George Steinmetz (London: Duke University, 2005), 59-88. 
 
Kelley, Donald R., ‘Gaius Noster: Substructures of Western Social Thought’, The  
American Historical Review 84.3 (Jun., 1979), 619-648. 
 
⎯, ‘The Metaphysics of Law: An Essay on the Very Young Marx’, The American  
Historical Review 83.2 (April 1978), 350-67. 
 
Kelly, J. M., A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
 
Kersting, Wolfgang, ‘Politics, Freedom, and order: Kant’s political philosophy’ in The  
Cambridge Companion to Kant, edited by Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 1992), 342-66. 
 
King, Anthony, The Structure of Social Theory (London: Routledge, 2004). 
 
Kołakowski, Leszek, Metaphysical Horror (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). 
 
⎯, Modernity on Endless Trial (London: University of Chicago, 1990). 
 250 
⎯, ‘In Praise of Inconsistency’, Dissent 11.2 (April 1964), 201-9. 
 
⎯, Is God Happy? (London: Penguin, 2012). 
 
Kolb, David, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and After (Chicago:  
University of Chicago, 1986). 
 
⎯, ‘What Is Open and What Is Closed in the Philosophy of Hegel’, Philosophical  
Topics 19.2 (Fall 1991), 29-50. 
 
Kortian, Garbis, Metacritique: The Philosophical Arguments of Jürgen Habermas,  
translated by John Raffan; Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1980). 
 
Kuehn, Manfred, Kant: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001). 
 
Lash, Scott, Another Modernity, Another Rationality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). 
 
Latour, Bruno, ‘For David Bloor… and Beyond: A Reply to David Bloor’s ‘Anti- 
Latour’’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30.1 (1999), 113-29. 
 
Lear, Jonathan, Freud (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005). 
 
Leiter, Brian, ‘Marx, Law, Ideology, Legal Positivism’, Virginia Law Review 101 
(forthcoming, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465672, accessed 16th 
April 2015. 
 
Levi, Neil and Michael Rothberg (editors), The Holocaust: Theoretical Readings  
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2003). 
 
Lloyd, Vincent and Elliot A. Ratzman (editors), Secular Faith (Eugene, Oregon:  
Cascade Books, 2011). 
 
Loick, Daniel, ‘Terribly upright: The Young Hegel’s Critique of Juridicism’,  
Philosophy and Social Criticism 40.10 (December 2014), 933-56. 
 
⎯, ‘Juridification and Politics: From the Dilemma of Juridification to the Paradoxes of  
Rights’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 40.8 (October 2014), 757-78. 
 
Longeunesse, Beatrice, Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University, 2007 [1981]). 
 
Lukács, Georg, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’ in History and  
Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, translated by Rodney 
Livingstone (London: Merlin, 1971 [1968]), 83-222. 
 
Lumsden, Simon, ‘The Rise of the Non-Metaphysical Hegel’, Philosophy Compass 3.1  
(2008), 51-65. 
 
Lybeck, Eric Royal, ‘Universities, Law, Jurisprudence, and Sociology: A History’,  




ology_A_History, accessed 8th July 2014. 
 
Macdonald, Iain, ‘What Is Conceptual History?’ in Hegel: New Directions, edited by  
Katerina Deligiorgi (Chesham: Acumen, 2006), 207-26. 
 
MacGregor, David, Hegel, Marx, and the English State (Toronto: University of  
Toronto, 1992). 
 
MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue (2nd edition; London: Duckworth, 1985 [1981]). 
 
Mack, Michael. ‘Law and Charity: Walter Benjamin, Leo Strauss, Georg Simmel, Franz  
Baermann’, Law Text Culture 5:1 (2000), n.p., 
http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol5/iss1/6, accessed 9th March 2015. 
 
Maker, William, ‘Two Dialectics of Enlightenment’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of  
Great Britain 66 (Autumn/Winter 2012), 54-73. 
 
Martin, Michael, ‘What Does ISIS want? Rethinking Difficult Questions’, March 9th  
2015, http://criticalreligion.org/2015/03/09/what-does-isis-want-rethinking-
difficult-questions/, accessed March 16th 2015. 
 
Martin, Stewart, ‘Adorno’s Conception of the Form of Philosophy’, Diacritics 36.1  
(Spring 2006), 48-63. 
 
Martin, Wayne, ‘Antinomies of Autonomy: German Idealism and English Mental  
Health Law’, Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 9 (2011; 
Freiheit/Freedom, edited by Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush), 191-214. 
 
Marx, Karl, Capital, volume 1, translated from the fourth German edition by Eden and  
Cedar Paul, (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1930). 
 
⎯, ‘On the Jewish Question’ in The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C.  
Tucker (2nd edition; London; W. W. Norton, 1978 [1972]), 26-52. 
 
Meiksins Wood, Ellen, Citizens to Lords: A Social History of Western Political Thought  
From Antiquity to the Late Middle Ages (London: Verso, 2008). 
 
⎯, The Ellen Meiksins Wood Reader, ed. by Larry Patriquin  
(Boston: Brill, 2012). 
 
Milbank, John, ‘The Sublime in Kierkegaard’, Heythrop Journal 37 (1996), 298-321. 
 
⎯, Theology and Social Theory (2nd edition; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006  
[1990]). 
 
Miller, Tyrus, ‘On Albrecht Wellmer: Music and Modernism After Habermas’, New  
Sound 42:II (2013), 53-61. 
 
Nagel, Thomas, ‘The Fragmentation of Value’ in Mortal Questions (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University, 1979), 128-141. 
 
 252 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, ‘Toward a Genealogy of Morals’ in The Portable Nietzsche,  
translated by Walter Kaufman (London: Penguin, 1976), 450-3. 
 
Neuhouser, Frederick, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard  
University, 2000). 
 
Nuzzo, Angelica, “The Truth of Absolutes Wissen in Hegel’s Phenomenology of  
Spirit,” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: New Critical Essays, edited by 
Alfred Denker and Michael G Vater (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2003), 
265–293. 
 
Nicholas, Barry, ‘Review of Peter Stein, Regulae Iuris: From Juristic Rules to Legal  
Maxims’, Journal of Roman Studies, 58.1-2 (November 1968), 269. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities  
Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000). 
 
O’Connor, Brian, Adorno (London: Routledge 2013). 
 
⎯, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of Critical Rationality  
(London: MIT Press, 2004). 
 
⎯, ‘Adorno and the Problem of Givenness’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:227  
(2004), 85-99. 
 
⎯, ‘Concrete Freedom and Other Problems: Robert Pippin’s Hegelian Conception of  
Practical Reason’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19.5 (2011), 
753-60. 
 
⎯, ‘The Neo-Hegelian Theory of Freedom and the Limits of Emancipation’, European  
Journal of Philosophy 21.2 (April 2012), 1-24. 
 
O’Kane, Chris, ‘Fetishism and Social Domination in Marx, Lukács, Adorno and  
Lefebvre’ (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sussex, 2013). 
 
Outhwaite, William, The Future of Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) 
 
Overgaard, Søren, Paul Gilbert, Stephen Burwood, An Introduction to Metaphilosophy  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2013). 
 
Ozment, Steven, A Mighty Fortress: A New History of the German People (New York:  
Harper-Collins, 2005). 
 
Parinetti, Dario, ‘History, Concepts and Normativity in Hegel’ in Hegel’s Theory of the  
Subject, edited by David Gray Carlson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), 60-72. 
 
Patberg, Markus, ‘Supranational Constitutional Politics and the Method of Rational  
Reconstruction’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 40.6 (2014), 501-21. 
 
Pinkard, Terry, Hegel: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001). 
 
 253 
⎯, Hegel’s Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility (Philadelphia: Temple  
University, 1988). 
 
⎯, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University, 1994). 
 
Pippin, Robert B., Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989). 
 
⎯, ‘Hegel and Category Theory’, Review of Metaphysics 43 (June 1990), 839-48. 
 
⎯, Henry James and Modern Moral Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000). 
 
⎯, Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations (Cambridge: Cambridge University,  
1997). 
 
⎯, ‘The “Logic of Experience” as “Absolute Knowledge” in Hegel’s Phenomenology  
of Spirit’ in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Guide, ed. by Dean 
Moyar and Michael Quante (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2008), 210-26. 
 
⎯, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem (2nd edition; Oxford: Blackwell, 1999  
[1991]).  
 
⎯, ‘Reconstructivism: On Honneth’s Hegelianism’, Philosophy and Social Criticism  
40.8 (October 2014), 725-41. 
 
Pleasants, Nigel, Wittgenstein and the Idea of a Critical Social Theory: A Critique of  
Giddens, Habermas and Bhaskar (London: Routledge, 1999). 
 
Proops, Ian, ‘Kant’s Legal Metaphor and the Nature of a Deduction’, Journal of the  
History of Philosophy 41.2 (April, 2003), 209-29. 
 
Rasch, William, Niklas Luhmann’s Modernity: the Paradoxes of Differentiation  
(Stanford: Stanford University, 2000). 
 
Raz, Joseph, The Practice of Value, edited by R. Jay Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press,  
2003). 
 
Redding, Paul, ‘Thom Brooks’s Project of a Systematic Reading of Hegel’s Philosophy  
of Right’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 66 (Autumn/Winter 
2012). 1-9. 
 
Rickert, Heinrich, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (Freiburg i. B.: J C B Mohr, 1892). 
 
Ripstein, Arthur, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (London:  
Harvard University, 2009). 
 
Ritzer, George, Explorations in Social Theory: From Metatheorizing to Rationalization  
(London: Sage, 2001). 
 
Sachs, Carl B., ‘The Acknowledgement of Transcendence: Anti-Theodicy in Adorno  
and Levinas’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 37.3 (March 2011), 273-94. 
 254 
Sayer, Andrew, Realism and Social Science (London: Sage, 2000). 
 
Schechter, Darrow, The Critique of Instrumental Reason from Weber to Habermas  
(London: Continuum, 2010). 
 
Schick, Friedrike, ‘Freedom and Necessity: The Transition to the Logic of the Concept  
in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, Hegel Bulletin 35.1 (Spring/Summer 2014), 84-99. 
 
Schopenhauer, Arthur, The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, translated and edited  
by Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2009). 
 
Scott, James C., Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human  
Condition Have Failed (London: Yale University, 1998). 
 
Seigel, Jerrold, Modernity and Bourgeois Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University,  
2012). 
 
Sen, Armatya, The Idea of Justice (London: Penguin, 2010 [2009]). 
 
Simmonds, N. E., ‘Judgment and Mercy’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13.1 (1993),  
52-68. 
 
Speck, Simon, ‘Just Enough’, Review of Kate Schick, Gillian Rose: A Good Enough  
Justice, Radical Philosophy 179 (May/June 2013), 46-48. 
 
Stein, Peter G., ‘The Roman Jurists’ Conception of Law’ in A Treatise of Legal  
Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, edited by Andrea Padovani and Peter G. 
Stein, 7 volumes (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 7: 1-30. 
 
Steinmetz, George, ‘Introduction’ in The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences:  
Positivism and Its Epistemological Others, edited by George Steinmetz 
(Durham: Duke University, 2005), 1-56. 
 
Stern, Robert, ‘Freedom, Self-Legislation and Morality in Kant and Hegel:  
Constructivist vs. Realist Accounts’ in German Idealism: Contemporary 
Perspectives, edited by Espen Hammer (London: Routledge, 2007), 245-66. 
 
⎯, ‘On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Ethics. Beyond the Empty Formalism Objection’ in  
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right edited by Thom Brooks (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012), 73-99. 
 
Stewart, Jon (editor), The Hegel Myths and Legends (Illinois: Northwestern University,  
1996). 
 
Surber, Jere Paul, ‘Hegel’s Speculative Sentence’, Hegel-Studien 10 (1975), 212-30. 
 
Tester, Keith, Civil Society (London: Routledge, 1992). 
 
Thompson, Michael J., ‘Axel Honneth and the Neo-Idealist Turn in Critical Theory’,  
Philosophy and Social Criticism 40.8 (October 2014), 779-97. 
 




⎯, German Political Philosophy: The Metaphysics of Law (London: Routledge, 2007). 
 
⎯, ‘Law and Religion in Early Critical Theory’ in The Early Frankfurt  
School and Religion, edited by Margarete Kohlenbach and Raymond Geuss 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 103-27. 
 
⎯, ‘Political Legitimacy: A Theoretical Approach Between Facts and Norms’,  
Constellations 18.2 (2011), 135-69. 
 
Voas, David and Abby Day, ‘Recognising Secular Christians: Toward an Unexcluded  
Middle in the Study of Religion’ (2010) (ARDA Guiding Paper Series; State 
College, PA: The Association of Religion Data Archives at The Pennsylvania 
State University), http://www.thearda.com/rrh/papers/guidingpapers.asp, 
accessed 11th November 2014. 
 
Walzer, Michael, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’, Philosophy and  
Public Affairs 2.2 (Winter, 1973), 160-80. 
 
Ward, Andrew, Kant: The Three Critiques (Cambridge: Polity, 2006). 
 
Ward, Graham, The Politics of Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial Citizens (Grand  
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009). 
  
⎯, (editor), Postmodern God: Theological Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). 
 
Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, translated and  
edited by Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California, 
1968). 
 
⎯,  The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott  
Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958). 
 
Weller, Paul, A Mirror For Our Times: ‘The Rushdie Affair’ and the Future of  
Multiculturalism (London: Continuum, 2009). 
 
Wheatland, Thomas, ‘Debate About Methods in the Social Sciences, Especially the  
Conception of Social Science Method for Which the Institute Stands’, Thesis 
Eleven 11.1 (2012). 
 
Williams, Robert R., Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition (London: University of California,  
1997). 
 
Winch, Peter, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (2nd edition;  
London: Routledge, 1990 [1958]). 
 
Winfield, Richard Dien, Hegel’s Science of Logic: A Critical Rethinking in Thirty  
Lectures (New York: Rowman & Littlefield; 2012). 
 
⎯, Reason and Justice (New York: State University of New York,  
1988). 
 256 
Wolff, Michael ‘Hegel’s Organicist Theory of the State: On the Concept and Method of  
Hegel’s “Science of the State”’ in Hegel on Ethics and Politics, edited by Robert 
B. Pippin and Otfried Höffe, translated by Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2004), 291-322. 
 
Wood, Allen W., ‘Editor’s Introduction’ in Elements of the Philosophy of Right  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991), v-xxxii. 
 
⎯, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007). 
 
⎯, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999). 
 
Wood, James, The Broken Estate: Essays on Literature and Belief (London: Pimlico,  
2000). 
 
Woodhead, Linda and Rebecca Catto (editors), Religion and Change in Modern Britain  
(London: Routledge, 2012). 
 
Žižek, Slavoj, ‘Preface: Hegel’s Century’ in Hegel and the Infinite: Religion, Politics  
and Dialectic, edited by Slavoj Žižek, Clayton Crockett and Creston Davis 
(New York: Columbia University, 2011), ix-xi. 
 
Zuckert, Catherine H., ‘Introduction’ in Political Philosophy in the Twentieth Century:  
Authors and Arguments, edited by Catherine H. Zuckert (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2011), 1-15. 
 
Zuidervaart, Lambert, Social Philosophy After Adorno (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University, 2007). 
